Do you have MANY friends down at the mess? ;D
- Reaction score
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- Points
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(Rolls up sleeves, spits on hands.......)
RSS is like any duty in the Army: you should work hard, but work well, and try to enjoy yourself while you're at it. in my opinion, RSS who do their jobs properly, and serve their units well, will work considerably harder than most of their peers on Regtl duty.We have generally been blessed with good RSS in this Bde: we have had a couple of clangers but fortunately they are all gone.
WRT taking school, I cannot spreak for RSS outside 38 CBG, but I can defend the Regular FTS in our Bde. Since I have taken over as COS in Jan of 2002, I am aware of one officer out of our 16 units who was absent on classes, and that was not on a full time basis. (Perhaps a 38 CBG poster will pop up to embarass me, but I don't think so...). In order for that officer to do that, the first requirement is the concurrence of the unit CO. Next, the CO will discuss it with me, since I assist the COs with any RegF career or PD issues. No RSS person is going to "skive off" without the concurrence of the CO. And, if we consider the fact that the Army now expects us to improve our education, and offers us money and time towards it, as well as the fact that RSS must not become a "career graveyard" (as it was when I was a Reserve soldier), then it makes sense to permit RSS (and Res on FTS) to be able to improve their education where and when the workload permits, but not "willy nilly" or "any time they feel like it", any more than they could if they were back on Regtl duty.
WRT career courses, the COs in this Bde are in pretty universal agreement that they want their RSS folks to advance in their careers: I have never heard of a CO resisting a career course (the Bde Comd would probably overrule them anyway...). That's not to say that the absence doesn't cause pain: it does, but the COs seem to understand it, although I know that they don't like it. We will normally authorize a Class B backfill (if such a suitable Res officer is available, which tends to be a problem for us). The point is that RSS cannot be a career graveyard.
As for overseas duty (again speaking only for our Bde..) we do not permit RSS to volunteer for tours, or to go "tour hunting". An RSS person will go on a tour if the Army tasks us to send them (assuming a Res will not do the job just as well...) This happens, of course: we have now dispatched me (the COS) our G3 and and our G1 (Class B) here to ATHENA, in response to taskings from LFWA. Class B or Class A are viewed a bit differently: we encourage them to do tours as they are able. The fact is that the Army is at such a manning state that there is very little choice. Fortunately, we can suck it up to a certain extent in Bde HQ, but there is no such capacity at the units.
Cheers.
RSS is like any duty in the Army: you should work hard, but work well, and try to enjoy yourself while you're at it. in my opinion, RSS who do their jobs properly, and serve their units well, will work considerably harder than most of their peers on Regtl duty.We have generally been blessed with good RSS in this Bde: we have had a couple of clangers but fortunately they are all gone.
WRT taking school, I cannot spreak for RSS outside 38 CBG, but I can defend the Regular FTS in our Bde. Since I have taken over as COS in Jan of 2002, I am aware of one officer out of our 16 units who was absent on classes, and that was not on a full time basis. (Perhaps a 38 CBG poster will pop up to embarass me, but I don't think so...). In order for that officer to do that, the first requirement is the concurrence of the unit CO. Next, the CO will discuss it with me, since I assist the COs with any RegF career or PD issues. No RSS person is going to "skive off" without the concurrence of the CO. And, if we consider the fact that the Army now expects us to improve our education, and offers us money and time towards it, as well as the fact that RSS must not become a "career graveyard" (as it was when I was a Reserve soldier), then it makes sense to permit RSS (and Res on FTS) to be able to improve their education where and when the workload permits, but not "willy nilly" or "any time they feel like it", any more than they could if they were back on Regtl duty.
WRT career courses, the COs in this Bde are in pretty universal agreement that they want their RSS folks to advance in their careers: I have never heard of a CO resisting a career course (the Bde Comd would probably overrule them anyway...). That's not to say that the absence doesn't cause pain: it does, but the COs seem to understand it, although I know that they don't like it. We will normally authorize a Class B backfill (if such a suitable Res officer is available, which tends to be a problem for us). The point is that RSS cannot be a career graveyard.
As for overseas duty (again speaking only for our Bde..) we do not permit RSS to volunteer for tours, or to go "tour hunting". An RSS person will go on a tour if the Army tasks us to send them (assuming a Res will not do the job just as well...) This happens, of course: we have now dispatched me (the COS) our G3 and and our G1 (Class B) here to ATHENA, in response to taskings from LFWA. Class B or Class A are viewed a bit differently: we encourage them to do tours as they are able. The fact is that the Army is at such a manning state that there is very little choice. Fortunately, we can suck it up to a certain extent in Bde HQ, but there is no such capacity at the units.
Cheers.
- Reaction score
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- Points
- 1,260
All fair enough - and I did say that it was an unfair, broad-brush comment. I apologise to all of those hard working RSS (and they are the vast majority) who I have painted with that brush.
I am simply frustrated by the amount of full-timers that it takes to run a Reserve Unit these days, as compared to 88 when I was Cl B "Acting RSS", 91-94 when I was RSS, and 94-95 when I was 10/90. I realise that, to some extent, the admin burden has increased since then, and hence the workload - but not that much. Cl B is, in most cases, Cl A money that comes off of the Armoury floor. The exception is the Cl B backfills for RSS - and I lament that necessity as well.
I found my RSS experience to be extremely rewarding. I worked harder than I had in my first Regtl Tour, and had much more responsibility. Like most postings, it is what you make of it.
So, thanks for slapping me upside the head PBI - an offhand rant that did not articulate my true point - that somehow we need so many full-timers to run a unit.
Dave
I am simply frustrated by the amount of full-timers that it takes to run a Reserve Unit these days, as compared to 88 when I was Cl B "Acting RSS", 91-94 when I was RSS, and 94-95 when I was 10/90. I realise that, to some extent, the admin burden has increased since then, and hence the workload - but not that much. Cl B is, in most cases, Cl A money that comes off of the Armoury floor. The exception is the Cl B backfills for RSS - and I lament that necessity as well.
I found my RSS experience to be extremely rewarding. I worked harder than I had in my first Regtl Tour, and had much more responsibility. Like most postings, it is what you make of it.
So, thanks for slapping me upside the head PBI - an offhand rant that did not articulate my true point - that somehow we need so many full-timers to run a unit.
Dave
- Reaction score
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- Points
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PPCLI Guy said:
Ok-forgiven. Ah knowed ya wuz jes kiddin'.
About the number of full timers-I argue that the day the Army decided to place more demands on the Army Reserve is the day it had a responsibility to ante up for an adequate FTS in each unit. Quite apart from the increased opred demand is the burden of governance that is now placed on a Reserve CO and his people-running the training is the easy part. The Army has tried to fill the gaps to a limited extent, but not to the extent required. RSS has remained a low manning priority: for the first two years I was in 38 CBG, we had less than half of the required number of RSS officers for our 16 units, and at one point we were down to about a half dozen. At the peak of our RSS manning crisis, we were spending as much on Class B backfill as we were to run an average-sized unit. Even then, the shortage of suitable officers available for Class B meant that some units just went without a full time officer altogether, with noticeable suffering in unit efficiency as well as an added burden on the Class A COs. It also affected our ability to fill courses or run training, particularly in the Arty units.
At present, we tightly restrict the Class Bs in our units. We will backfill to ensure that there is one officer and one WO/Sgt on FTS, and we will fund a clerk posn/unit in the Grn OR pools or at an isolated unit. Units are not permitted to hire without Bde auth. Now-all that is not because we are against having adequate FTS:quite the opposite. Rather, it is because we have to watch the pennies or there will be no money to train the troops. When I hear of units in certain CBGs to the east with their full RSS PLUS five or more Class B at a single location unit, I shudder. Where is that money coming from? Are the troops on the Armoury floor getting the mandated 37.5 DPY?
In our LFRR Phase II Proposals, we included plans for two "grouped" (to avoid the "A"-word) units: 38 Svc Bn and 38 Field RCA. Our FTS manning slate approximated the following for one of these units:
Unit HQ location:
Capt Adjt: Class B
Capt Ops: RegF
Ops/Trg WO: RegF
Chief Clk: RegF/ClassB
Stmn/Dvr: Class B
Clerk (pool/detatched): Class B
Outlying Battery/Coy:
Ops/Trg WO: RegF
Clerk (pool/detatched): RegF/ClassB
Stmn/dvr. Class B
This was based on a majority of pers admin and trg coord functions being moved to unit HQ from the former three unit HQ locs, with the outlying locations retaining only the capability to function as a sub-unit.
Further, we completed a poll of our COs and RSSOs last year on a number of issues to do with RSSO employment. The results were quite surprising in some respects. (we sent it up the CofC-I don't know what became of it...) One of the questions concerned whether or not FTS need to be Regular or just FTS. We used the USARNG example: there are effectively no Active Army personnel in most ARNG units: FTS are "activated Guardsmen" (we would say Class B). The response we got was that while some Class B officers can certainly do a credible job , and may in fact be far more suited as Capt Adjt than a young RegF Capt who has no experience above Platoon/Tp level, there were clear benefits to having the Res/Reg relationship at unit level.
So my point.....oh...yeah...what is my point? OK-right-that we DO need a healthy FTS in our units, but that the Army must resource it such that we do not have to make a Hobsons' Choice between paying the troops and supporting their trg/admin. Cheers.
- Reaction score
- 35
- Points
- 560
The historiography of the development of AirLand battle is certainly not complete, and arouses controversy even today. It was an iterative response to what was seen as the pressing problems of the time, hence the emphasis on heavy, conventional forces and the lack of attention to the unconventional/low intensity conflict aspects of war and conflict.
This is why I am such a firm believer in a new White Paper. By all means get the TB and Foreign Affairs involved with the drafting of the paper, and make it an open process with public involvement as well. We need to know what idea to circle around, or we will end up as Kirkhill suggests and dissapear down our own...orifice.
The question of "ownership" of people and resources funded by outside agencies is very important. If it is unclear, then it will become a battle of wills settled at either TB or Cabinet level. These are battlegrounds we do not do well at historically. I will pull back from endorsing the idea that the Provincial Soliciter General or Emergency Management fund extra supplies and manpower for DOMOPS, rather that money should be added to our budget in the sure knowledge that it will also improve the combat capabilities of the augmented units. We also need to be clear as to how much we can and should do in DOMOPS scenarios. 31 CBGHQ is working on our own plan, which stresses the limited nature of support available. The seacans of supplies and extra manpower would make a big difference to us, but in the bigger scheme of things, is would be an extra teacup to drain the Great Lakes.
This is why I am such a firm believer in a new White Paper. By all means get the TB and Foreign Affairs involved with the drafting of the paper, and make it an open process with public involvement as well. We need to know what idea to circle around, or we will end up as Kirkhill suggests and dissapear down our own...orifice.
The question of "ownership" of people and resources funded by outside agencies is very important. If it is unclear, then it will become a battle of wills settled at either TB or Cabinet level. These are battlegrounds we do not do well at historically. I will pull back from endorsing the idea that the Provincial Soliciter General or Emergency Management fund extra supplies and manpower for DOMOPS, rather that money should be added to our budget in the sure knowledge that it will also improve the combat capabilities of the augmented units. We also need to be clear as to how much we can and should do in DOMOPS scenarios. 31 CBGHQ is working on our own plan, which stresses the limited nature of support available. The seacans of supplies and extra manpower would make a big difference to us, but in the bigger scheme of things, is would be an extra teacup to drain the Great Lakes.
- Reaction score
- 8,198
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I completely agree the question of ownership is a critical one, but it is essentially an administrative one. It is one that can and should be dealt with when there is time for debate and not in the middle of a couple of competing crises.
I also am in agreement with the observation we traditionally haven't handled those types of questions well (although SAR services seem to be functioning) and also that we need a realistic White Paper based on doable options with firm decisions taken.
Once folks know what they have to deal with, atts, dets and own forces as well as budget, then they will figure out the best way to use them.
I also am in agreement with the observation we traditionally haven't handled those types of questions well (although SAR services seem to be functioning) and also that we need a realistic White Paper based on doable options with firm decisions taken.
Once folks know what they have to deal with, atts, dets and own forces as well as budget, then they will figure out the best way to use them.
- Reaction score
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- Points
- 410
PPCLI Guy said:What do you think of CONPLAN RAPTOR? (It was issued on my watch :-\) Is the Bde happy with the increased Liaison and Planning authority? How are you incoporating the "Community Contingency Planners" :
WRT to these "CCP", in our Bde in particular and in LFWA in general it was made quite clear that the original idea from the LFRR shop was poorly thought out. We do not need to provide military personnel to civil authorities to "help" them plan for emergencies. In most provinces, municipalities are required by law to have a plan and a designated lead person (usually the Fire or Police Chief). As well, becoming intimately involved in civilian agency planning before a request has been made violates one of our tenets of Dom Ops: avoid creating expectations or committments we may not be able to honour at the moment. We already have quite adequate planning staff in the Bde HQ, sufficient to prepare the generic, capability-based type of CONPLAN that is (IMHO) the most appropriate form of Dom Ops planning in the absence of a specific request. We are not "front row" on emergency response nor do we have any mandate to be except in extremis.
The direction we have taken is to use them as Regional LOs who will augment the four Provincial Dom Ops dets (Victoria, Edmn, Regina, Wpg) on an "as required" basis, but will continue to train and parade with the units. They will receive some basic LO /Dom Ops trg (Dom Ops is not hte "rocket science some would have us believe...) and be ready to go. In our Bde in particular we do not have such a richness of officers that we can have "floaters" who do nothing but sit about waiting for civil emergencies. Cheers.
- Reaction score
- 35
- Points
- 560
I am actually working on some of the implementation of CONPLAN RAPTOR, but many issues still have to be ironed out. We should be putting it to the test in the near future, and if possible, I will start a new thread to share the "open source" lessons learned stuff.
M
MSE_OP18
Guest
An 11 Ton VHLVW can't really replace a SHLVW(16 Ton) as most of the containers we carry now are getting closer to the 16 Ton weight capacity now , ISO, CP's and other mech shelters are not really going to get much lighter....are they? We cannot forget heavy lift capability. Other then that I like the! plan
ArmyRick
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 2,326
- Points
- 1,010
Getting away from MSE specifics here is my idea for army structure....
1. Bin the DFS regt idea (In LdSH) the wealth of equipment should be divided so that any brigade that gets assigned a mission won't have to "borrow" or task the FS gear soon to be in LdSH.
2. Go with 4 equla size brigades (1 out west, 2 in Pet, 4 in Gagetown and 5 in valcartier)
3. Have the LAV III remain with infantry, Coyote, LAV MGS, MMEV and TUA remain armor (direct fire capability), purchase the 120mm mortar and have the arty man those (The AC Delco AMS system looks good) and the engineers can stick with mobility/counter mobility roles using what ever gear they get.
4. Have 3 x Battalions of Infantry for each brigade, the third will be light and quick deployable battalion (Ditch this theater activation team out of kingston).
5. If you do the math, you must stand up one more REGT of infantry (The guards sound OK) and the 8th CH can be activated again.
6. Before people scream about tanks, arty guns and what ever, lets be realistic. We are in the CF and we KNOW why our equipment is what is and what it is going to be. (Hint the word "Tanks" were a scare tactic ofr a certain election in June).
1. Bin the DFS regt idea (In LdSH) the wealth of equipment should be divided so that any brigade that gets assigned a mission won't have to "borrow" or task the FS gear soon to be in LdSH.
2. Go with 4 equla size brigades (1 out west, 2 in Pet, 4 in Gagetown and 5 in valcartier)
3. Have the LAV III remain with infantry, Coyote, LAV MGS, MMEV and TUA remain armor (direct fire capability), purchase the 120mm mortar and have the arty man those (The AC Delco AMS system looks good) and the engineers can stick with mobility/counter mobility roles using what ever gear they get.
4. Have 3 x Battalions of Infantry for each brigade, the third will be light and quick deployable battalion (Ditch this theater activation team out of kingston).
5. If you do the math, you must stand up one more REGT of infantry (The guards sound OK) and the 8th CH can be activated again.
6. Before people scream about tanks, arty guns and what ever, lets be realistic. We are in the CF and we KNOW why our equipment is what is and what it is going to be. (Hint the word "Tanks" were a scare tactic ofr a certain election in June).
ArmyRick
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 2,326
- Points
- 1,010
So more to follow..
4 x Brigades basically means
4 x REGTs of INF w/3 x BN each (RCR, R22eR, PPCLI, Canadian Guards) Eric Leclerc would love that (He was originally a guard) !!!
4 x REGTs of Cavalry (Armour is kind of not appropriate) RCD, 12RBC, LdSH, 8thCH
4 x REgts of Arty (1,2,3 and 5 RCHA/RALC)
4 x CER, 4 x SVC BNs and 4 x FD AMBS
4 x Brigades basically means
4 x REGTs of INF w/3 x BN each (RCR, R22eR, PPCLI, Canadian Guards) Eric Leclerc would love that (He was originally a guard) !!!
4 x REGTs of Cavalry (Armour is kind of not appropriate) RCD, 12RBC, LdSH, 8thCH
4 x REgts of Arty (1,2,3 and 5 RCHA/RALC)
4 x CER, 4 x SVC BNs and 4 x FD AMBS
- Reaction score
- 35
- Points
- 560
1 "Special Forces" brigade, grouping valuable but hard to categorize units like JTF 2, CF DART and a Cyberwar unit. (add own favorite specialty units here). Core fighting power should be the "Canadian Parachute Battalion", created by bringing all the para assets under one canopy. (couldn't resist)
1 Regular Force Brigade/Area with one Light Infantry Battalion (maybe upgraded to an Airmobile Battalion), and three "Manoeuvre Battalions": composite formations resembling current battlegroups, but all under one "cap badge" for organizational and esprit de corps reasons. (If it makes traditionalists happy, the "cap badge" could be the current one, even though "I PPCLI" and the "LdSH(RC)" under this plan would have the same TO&E).
The Reserves expanded to 3 brigades/Area, with similar TO&E to the Regular force brigade, but with the added responsibility of Home Defense; and the appropriate "Home Defense package" of extra equipment and manpower to respond to a local crisis within 12 hr. Equipment holdings might be limited and pooled to each Area Training Centre for a singel battlegroup worth of kit (not ideal, but financially doable)
The whole Army supported by a flexible and strong logistics backbone, which is decentralized and responsive.
The Navy configured with the core capability of transporting a brigade battle group and all its equipment as a package from either coast to the AOR, defending the package in transit and supporting the package ashore with AAD, NGS and command and control until they are firmly established. These defense and support capabilities are transferable to Naval operations when the Expeditionary force is not being assembled and sent out, joining other specialist capabilities and ships which are required for Naval operations.
The Air Force organized into "Air expeditionary wings", one per Area, and sized to provide tactical and operational support for a deployed battlegroup. Once again, most of the capabilities needed to support the expeditionary force can be used when not deployed. A Strategic support wing is also required to support the Air expeditionary wings, and a "Special Forces Wing" is needed to support the Special Forces brigade.
HQ's at Brigade and above levels should be intrinsically "Joint HQ's", to promote interoperability and flexibility.
1 Regular Force Brigade/Area with one Light Infantry Battalion (maybe upgraded to an Airmobile Battalion), and three "Manoeuvre Battalions": composite formations resembling current battlegroups, but all under one "cap badge" for organizational and esprit de corps reasons. (If it makes traditionalists happy, the "cap badge" could be the current one, even though "I PPCLI" and the "LdSH(RC)" under this plan would have the same TO&E).
The Reserves expanded to 3 brigades/Area, with similar TO&E to the Regular force brigade, but with the added responsibility of Home Defense; and the appropriate "Home Defense package" of extra equipment and manpower to respond to a local crisis within 12 hr. Equipment holdings might be limited and pooled to each Area Training Centre for a singel battlegroup worth of kit (not ideal, but financially doable)
The whole Army supported by a flexible and strong logistics backbone, which is decentralized and responsive.
The Navy configured with the core capability of transporting a brigade battle group and all its equipment as a package from either coast to the AOR, defending the package in transit and supporting the package ashore with AAD, NGS and command and control until they are firmly established. These defense and support capabilities are transferable to Naval operations when the Expeditionary force is not being assembled and sent out, joining other specialist capabilities and ships which are required for Naval operations.
The Air Force organized into "Air expeditionary wings", one per Area, and sized to provide tactical and operational support for a deployed battlegroup. Once again, most of the capabilities needed to support the expeditionary force can be used when not deployed. A Strategic support wing is also required to support the Air expeditionary wings, and a "Special Forces Wing" is needed to support the Special Forces brigade.
HQ's at Brigade and above levels should be intrinsically "Joint HQ's", to promote interoperability and flexibility.
- Reaction score
- 10,326
- Points
- 1,260
Since we're playing "CDS" for a day, I'll agree with alot of what A Majoor has said. I don't have the energy to give the little specific quirks from my "shopping list", put the principle of force structure should be EXPEDITIONARY...anything (meaning equipment and planning structure) that is sits in war-stocks, can't be moved and supported properly, or is geared towards augmenting and mobilizing is simply preparing for the last war and is a drag on the limited resources we have.
Every dollar should be focused into the ability to quickly project flexible combat power to whatever flavour-of-the-week is in the National Interest.
Every dollar should be focused into the ability to quickly project flexible combat power to whatever flavour-of-the-week is in the National Interest.
- Reaction score
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- Points
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Infanteer: I certainly agree with your emphasis on being expeditionary, but I caution against too zealous an application ofInfanteer said:
. This was, in a manner, the sort of thinking that led to the degradation and ruination of the Army Reserve in the 1960s and 70s, as being an obsolete appendage to the "come as you are" war. As the US has found (remembered...) in Iraq and Afghanistan, a nation must posess the ability to augment and mobilize its standing forces in order to deal with the unexpected or protracted operation. One could argue that the US may have gone overboard in the shifting of resources into the USAR and ARNG, but the fact is that they are now drawing very heavily on both in what began as two expeditionary campaigns.
I am all for a capable, joint expeditionary force package: the "CJEF" if you will, but let's not fall into the traps of the past. Cheers.
- Reaction score
- 10,326
- Points
- 1,260
Sorry, my statement was geared towards the Regular Force, I should have made that caveat more clear. When I envision an expeditionary force, I picture something akin to the USMC of "three-block-war" fame; capable of patrolling the mean streets of Haiti or fighting a conventional battle into Baghdad.
The Reserves should be geared towards a homeland defence roll (I would consider building an Army up for 3 years in the British Isles while waiting to kick in the door of the Third Reich to be "Homeland Defence".)- we must be wary of using "Homeland Defence" to turn the reserves into a volunteer firefighter/snowshovel brigade or something else al la the 1950's when ground forces were thought to be obsolete. As well, I think the current policy of seeing the Reserves as a "farm team" is like sitting adrift with no sail, give the Reservists a mission.
The Regular Force is for the "Cabinet Wars" while the Reserves come for the "National Wars".
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Lind_092404,00.html
The Reserves should be geared towards a homeland defence roll (I would consider building an Army up for 3 years in the British Isles while waiting to kick in the door of the Third Reich to be "Homeland Defence".)- we must be wary of using "Homeland Defence" to turn the reserves into a volunteer firefighter/snowshovel brigade or something else al la the 1950's when ground forces were thought to be obsolete. As well, I think the current policy of seeing the Reserves as a "farm team" is like sitting adrift with no sail, give the Reservists a mission.
The Regular Force is for the "Cabinet Wars" while the Reserves come for the "National Wars".
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Lind_092404,00.html
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