While not Mark, I’ve come to the opinion that the FOO Party should probably be a min of 6 people at this point.
It already is and has been that way in Afghanistan since around 2007.
@markppcli can update the current info as I do not know the current establishment as well as I know the historical. The 2005 arty transformation resulted in a big boost to FOO numbers. The establishment gelled in 2009 with the new FOO battery and at that point settled. Each regiment has one Bde level FSCC established with 8 in the FSCC and 5 in the CO's rovers. There are three BG level BC parties with 7 in the FSCC and 6 in the BC's det/rover. There are nine OP Dets of 6 each and 3 JTAC dets of 4 each as per establishment. In reality most are routinely undermanned but were brought up to strength for deployments in Afghanistan. There may have been some minor tweaking to these establishments.
While there are separate JTAC dets, the intent was that within each FOO det the FOO or his tech were JTAC current. My understanding is that while it was that way in Afghanistan, it is rarely achieved these days. Again,
@markppcli would know the numbers much better than I, but its not the real numbers we're talking about here but the doctrinal establishment. As per the doctrinal establishment there appear to be enough dets so that every BG in the brigade would have an FSCC and BC rover with 13 all ranks; 3 x 6 man FOO dets and 1 x 4 man JTAC det to fulfil forward coord and fire control/engagement functions.
I'm going to ignore the battalion level mortars and whatever organic UAV resources go in the battalion. In short, I firmly believe that every battalion needs organic UAV resources from the section right up to bn. Mostly those are surveillance assets but some attack munitions (let's call them OWUAVs for the time being) as well. These should be of a size and range commensurate with whatever area of influence we wish to give to the battalion. Whether these are established within the mortar platoon or anti-armour platoon or some new hybrid organization within the battalion is immaterial so long as the battalion's logistics and C&C structure is commensurate with it.
My concern is with what the artillery brings to the table that not only augments the BG's organic systems but extends them. This is where, IMHO, the Canadian army has an issue as for the last two decades plus it has thought principally with the battalion/battle group level. This is why, for example, the batteries FSCC and BC teams are larger than the regimental CO's FSCC and rover team is smaller than the batteries'. The overriding army philosophy, as demonstrated in the expeditionary lines of operations it has, looks at generating one single composite battery on a mission with possibly a separate smaller scale simultaneous expeditionary mission. It does look at force generating a bde/TF level FSCC but not one that would control multiple Canadian batteries in any one given theatre. Hopefully, Latvia will change that thinking albeit the MNBde's command structure will be a bit of a stepchild, because of its international nature.
I'll bet dollars to donuts that whatever we look at as the "arty" UAV resources, we'll be PY neutral. That means finding "terminal weapon controllers" within the existing FSCC/FOO/JTAC/supported arm manning and finding "launcher operators" within the existing gun and STA battery manning.
Speaking of STA. As at 2009 the CS regt's STA bty had a weapon locating (radar and acoustic) tp and two MUAV troops. The latter of which was to provide close UAV support to the companies. The going forward concept was that the two MUAV troops would become two SUAV troops each with a CP and three launchers. The changeover to SUAS at the CS regt did not come about and the CS regiments went forward equipped with LCMR, AWLS, and MUAV. 4 AD Regt converted to 4 Regt RCA (GS). As of 2009 it was supposed to transform to one GBAD battery and one LRPRS battery plus an ASCC group providing up to five dets. Other than the continuation of the ASCC, the GBAD disappeared and the LRPRS was cancelled and 4 GS went to three batteries of SUAVs, MRRs and ASCCs. Personally I find the MUAV class as too restricted in range and flying time to be a proper bde level surveillance devise and should be replaced at the CS STA battery level with SUAVs as contemplated in 2009 (That may happen just as soon as GBAD and LRPRS become available to 4 GS and some PYs need to be freed up)
So, where does that leave us. Like you, I think we need to think div but need to be capable of doing independent bde
and BG deployments. The artillery needs to bring a UAV capability to the table that can augment a BGs organic surveillance and fire support (whatever they decide that needs to be) and be the bde and div's deep surveillance capability for starters. Similarly it needs a strike capability that can support everything from a precision danger close mission for a company to deep strikes for the division. Strikes can be accomplished by traditional or precision guns, OWUAVs or LRPR as appropriate.
We already have a control system in the FSCC structure. We also have a model for delivery in the gunline batteries which can be replicated as launcher batteries and LRPRS batteries all tying into the same logistics system. What is slightly different is the terminal guidance system. Currently it is based on a FOOs call for fire or a JTACs mission control. There is also radar guidance but all too often it is exceedingly complicated through ROEs. Neither of the former actually "flies" the projectile onto the target. With OWUAS, there needs to be a "pilot" from launch to terminal effect (at least until AI can do some of that). The question is whether that is done from the "forward" position (i.e. at an FSCC or FOO/JTAC or supported arm) or the "launcher" CP or a combination of the two?
In my mind there is a need for a "pilot" within the "launch battery" who takes the OWUAV from launch to either a handoff to a forward located "pilot" such as a OWUAV operator in the FOO party or alternatively, flies the OWUAV all the way to the target under the guidance of a terminal observer who can be either a member of the FOO party, a JTAC, a CS or GS regt SUAV operator, or a supported arm observer such as a member of bn recce platoon or a bde recce squadron. In all cases the mission is coordinated through the appropriate level FSCC.
Again, IMHO, there are enough people who are already available in the system. What really matters is having: the appropriate command and control system that can cater to all the desired usage models; a proper training system to be able to effect any of the multiple guidance solutions; and the appropriate equipment, deployed and operational for all the desired guidance solutions. We've never been particulalry good at doing all of the foregoing. We're particulalry poor at building systems that bridge the various arms involved. We tend to work in independent stove pipes until reality forces integration. I'm not sure if you Yanks are any better at it. IMHO proper UAV usage (both surveillance and OWUAV) requires total integration from platoon to division from square one.
