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Army Reserve Restructuring

Was listening to a podcast yesterday on a way too long of drive talking about the myths of the British Army in WW1.

One of the key points brought forward was that the platoon became the organizational focus of assault and that adaptive, flexible tactics were key to avoiding some of the fixed battle issues of places like the Somme on July 1 1916.

More and more, when looking at the realistic size of the reserve unit manning levels....I think of the role of Platoon tactics and low level leadership roles. Moving the larger unit formation exercises becomes a Reg. Force role....but somewhere in there there needs to be the cross training occurring and/or formed unit mobilization into other units.

But that platoon needs to be independent too - mobile, fully equipped with proper communications, gear and weapons, and should be focused on squad integration tactics to support each other in a dispersed battle front. To get there:
Yes...add at least 2 drone operators/platoon for front line intelligence.
Yes...add full night vision tactics.
Yes...practice the heck out of concealment/cover drills.
Yes...practice long distance sharpshooter/sniper tactics.
And yes...include Ground to Air and Ground to Ground missile defense.


But this is only practical with a solid, consistent core of regular attendees to a training day/weekend. How to achieve that is way tougher.
It's not unrealistic to bring out a sub-unit, there are reserve units that do it all the time. What's needed is rationalization and amalgamation of the losing units into bigger ones, not reducing the scope of skills to be even less useful.
 
Scheduling conflicts with career courses, OP LENTUS commitments, bad planning/prep/battle procedure and communications usually cut into the attendance numbers as well, as I recall ...

As an enlightened soldier once told me "No one wants to be part of a fuck up... " ;)
I know my unit has a lot of our hard chargers deployed atm, from Tpr all the way to MWO and Capt. Everyone is just frickin busy.
 
Was listening to a podcast yesterday on a way too long of drive talking about the myths of the British Army in WW1.

One of the key points brought forward was that the platoon became the organizational focus of assault and that adaptive, flexible tactics were key to avoiding some of the fixed battle issues of places like the Somme on July 1 1916.

More and more, when looking at the realistic size of the reserve unit manning levels....I think of the role of Platoon tactics and low level leadership roles. Moving the larger unit formation exercises becomes a Reg. Force role....but somewhere in there there needs to be the cross training occurring and/or formed unit mobilization into other units.

But that platoon needs to be independent too - mobile, fully equipped with proper communications, gear and weapons, and should be focused on squad integration tactics to support each other in a dispersed battle front. To get there:
Yes...add at least 2 drone operators/platoon for front line intelligence.
Yes...add full night vision tactics.
Yes...practice the heck out of concealment/cover drills.
Yes...practice long distance sharpshooter/sniper tactics.
And yes...include Ground to Air and Ground to Ground missile defense.


But this is only practical with a solid, consistent core of regular attendees to a training day/weekend. How to achieve that is way tougher.

This has been discussed to death in here elsewhere but, based on our current system, it is completely possible for each Infantry unit to reliably field at least one - or possibly two - fully manned and trained platoons, including well trained Pl Comds, 2ICs & Sect Comds. I'll assume the same for Tps with other combat arms units such as Engineers, Armd and Gunners.

Once you move into Coy/Sqn/Bty territory it gets a little more threadbare but, again, given the current training system it is fully possible to reliably FG a few Coys/Sqns/Btys per A Res CBG.

However, if you want to waste your scarce training time recreating the invasion of Normandy, or other well out of scope and ego driven activities generally listed under 'train to excite' BS, then you can expect different results ;)
 
However, if you want to waste your scarce training time recreating the invasion of Normandy, or other well out of scope and ego driven activities generally listed under 'train to excite' BS, then you can expect different results ;)
You referring specifically to an amphibious landing ex has me very curious if that's real or not haha.
 
You referring specifically to an amphibious landing ex has me very curious if that's real or not haha.

Sadly, yes ;)

 
Sadly, yes ;)

Probably not the best training when it comes to their task of force generating an infantry platoon but granted, thats pretty fucking cool.
 
Probably not the best training when it comes to their task of force generating an infantry platoon but granted, thats pretty fucking cool.

And, apparently, was a waste of time from the POV of soldier level training, like with many big exercises ;)
 
And, apparently, was a waste of time from the POV of soldier level training, like with many big exercises ;)
The sad thing is that these PRes Bde (Coy+) exercises can be so good and incorporate decent training that also makes people want to come again. Unless I miss the mark they aren't like a CMBG Bde ex where the point is too exercise the Bn and Bde leadership in a Bde context. They can literally work on section in a Pl and Pl in Coy context stuff and make things decent. Those are the money times on a CMBG Bde ex when you do low-level stuff as work-up before the soul sucking sit in a LAV for 16 hours dismounting twice a day Bde aspects
 
The sad thing is that these PRes Bde (Coy+) exercises can be so good and incorporate decent training that also makes people want to come again. Unless I miss the mark they aren't like a CMBG Bde ex where the point is too exercise the Bn and Bde leadership in a Bde context. They can literally work on section in a Pl and Pl in Coy context stuff and make things decent. Those are the money times on a CMBG Bde ex when you do low-level stuff as work-up before the soul sucking sit in a LAV for 16 hours dismounting twice a day Bde aspects
Reserve exs can be hit and miss. A well planned reserve ex can be a blast. They can also be real shit from the lack of support and kit or they can be insane bagdrives because of the mad dash to get BTS done in a limited time.
 
Reserve exs can be hit and miss. A well planned reserve ex can be a blast. They can also be real shit from the lack of support and kit or they can be insane bagdrives because of the mad dash to get BTS done in a limited time.
I can imagine. Haven't been on one since the late 90s but I definitely know which ones where good over bad. The latter was the bagdrive dashes while the good ones had great tempo, good training and focused on the right level vice trying to be everything for everyone.
 
You can’t force some one to pass the course, and given the internationally audited nature of the program it’s one of very few places in the green army where they won’t push someone through to be make up numbers.

That’s true at an individual level but don’t underestimate the CA and RCAF. We did lose our NATO accreditation for a while and only recently got it back due to some institutional level playing fast and loose with definitions and platforms.


The sad thing is that these PRes Bde (Coy+) exercises can be so good and incorporate decent training that also makes people want to come again. Unless I miss the mark they aren't like a CMBG Bde ex where the point is too exercise the Bn and Bde leadership in a Bde context. They can literally work on section in a Pl and Pl in Coy context stuff and make things decent. Those are the money times on a CMBG Bde ex when you do low-level stuff as work-up before the soul sucking sit in a LAV for 16 hours dismounting twice a day Bde aspects

It’s not needed to bring up the myopic reasons but it’s interesting to note the Canadian Army level of support and training for one half of the CA personnel in comparison with the fact that the US Army puts four entire National Guard BCTs though a combination of NTC and JRTC each year.

If wishes were horses there is no reason CMTC could not put at least one or more reserve BG through a similar rotation each year.
 
That’s true at an individual level but don’t underestimate the CA and RCAF. We did lose our NATO accreditation for a while and only recently got it back due to some institutional level playing fast and loose with definitions and platforms.

For clarity are you saying “we” as in the CAF or are you using we as a JTAC? My answer is going to swing depending on that.
 
We as in the CAF, specifically lost our ability to certify JTACs. Since regained.
 
We as in the CAF, specifically lost our ability to certify JTACs. Since regained.
Right, but what you wrote was this:

That’s true at an individual level but don’t underestimate the CA and RCAF. We did lose our NATO accreditation for a while and only recently got it back due to some institutional level playing fast and loose with definitions and platforms.

Which was in a response to me saying you can’t force people through the course. Which I assume if what your implying - that people were pushed through. Which is false. I’d also argue that fast and loose with the rules is a bit of an exaggeration for “didn’t have a good enough sim.” I’m assuming you obviously familiar with the specific parts of the moa that were not in compliance.
 
No I’m not implying that people were pushed through.
I’m simply stating that the course staff holding students to a high standard on the individual courses were undercut to a degree by the institutional decisions on the sims as well as calling the CH 146 an AH. Was it a critical degree? I don’t know personally, but the CAF did not think so but NATO disagreed.

That takes nothing away from the students nor the instructors as those decisions were made well above them.
 
No I’m not implying that people were pushed through.
I’m simply stating that the course staff holding students to a high standard on the individual courses were undercut to a degree by the institutional decisions on the sims as well as calling the CH 146 an AH. Was it a critical degree? I don’t know personally, but the CAF did not think so but NATO disagreed.

That takes nothing away from the students nor the instructors as those decisions were made well above them.

Using Griffons as RW assets was not an issue. UH-1Y and UH-1s are viable RW platforms, CH-146s not being viable is a strictly Canadian decision. The NATO accreditation issue was not because of that.
 
Using Griffons as RW assets was not an issue. UH-1Y and UH-1s are viable RW platforms, CH-146s not being viable is a strictly Canadian decision. The NATO accreditation issue was not because of that.

Continue Season 9 GIF by The Office
 
Using Griffons as RW assets was not an issue. UH-1Y and UH-1s are viable RW platforms, CH-146s not being viable is a strictly Canadian decision. The NATO accreditation issue was not because of that.

You’re right, my memory was faulty on that. The entire thing was a debacle not solely of the CAFs making.
Glad I derailed the conversation lol.😂
 
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