Army Reserve Restructuring

[FJAG]

It seems to have become a tail wagging the dog exercise. Bde CAX/CPXs are now impossible to run without (elderly) Calian staff operating the computers for you, apparently, which is very expensive and 'gear intensive'. Staring at blinking cursors over the shoulder of a 65+ year old contractor versus engaging with your superiors/subordinates is just weird.

The chain of command is allegedly incapable of operating and learning without miles of cables, screens, tents and various displays which, of course, wouldn't be available if you had to issue orders over a radio at Oh Dark 30 in the pissing down rain under a poncho/ in the back of an APC.

IMHO most of it could be done with good old traces and paper maps, map models on the floor, and field message pads. Like we used to do of course.

Two of the key guys on our WAFG project are with Calian (retired gunner colonel and lieutenant-colonel). The latter is a computer wizz of a magnitude that leaves me in the dust. They spend a lot of time traveling. I've seen photos of their set-up and its mind boggling. Must admit, we had Calian-like guys running our tabletop boat exercises as well but they rolled dice for combat outcomes - kind of early Dungeaons and Dragons-like.

I agree on going back to the old ways but then, I'm a curmudgeon too.

Completely off topic, my wife just showed me Behr's paint of the year. It's called "Rumours" and bears a striking resemblance to Airborne Regiment maroon. I shit you not. A lot of ex-para's man caves are going to be very stylishly in this year.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am not aware of much in the way Divisional Field Training Exercises (FTX) in NATO. We had seven Brigades in the field on TRIDENT JUNCTURE, but the fighting was scripted at the higher level and the emphasis was really on logistics. The vast majority of Divisional and higher level exercises are Command Post Exercises (CPX) delivered in a Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX). They happen all the time.

The Canadian Army has conducted CMBG-level Command Post Exercises for some time. The focus during the Afghan war was on the deploying HQ, but since then we've had the UNIFIED RESOLVE series where a CMBG is the Primary Training Audienace (PTA) under a HICON Division HQ. The Div HQ has usually been 1st Cdn Div. There have also been CMBGs in other stages of the managed readiness plan that have provided FLANCON Secondary Training Audiences (STA). We've had CMBG HQs on allies' CPX. Our 1st Cdn Div has conducted several exercises under allied Corps, sometimes as an STA and other times as a Response Cell.

AOC students will be on three CMBG-level CAX as part of their course (plus some BG-level ones). They will execute a plan that they have developed and will plan a sequel while they execute.

Regarding the comments on Calian, the primary training audience should never see a JCATs screen. There will likely be officers and NCOs from the training audience units that are in the LOCON role who will be at those stations bringing the plan to life with the Calian interactors. Those folks, though, are not in the training audience. The commanders and staff in the HQ will be talking with their subordinate unit commanders and staffs over radios or at O Gps, rehearsals etc. There might be Calian folks role-playing flanking and higher units as part of the "wrap."

A Reserve CBG should not be conducting a CMBG-style CPX as part of their annual training. Territorial Battle Groups (TBGs) will conduct an annual CPX focused on their role that may well have a CAX element providing "injects."

The value of JCATs and other constructive simulation systems diminishes as you get below Battalion-level. There can still be goodness, but its really not using the system as intended. Sub-unit and below really need first-person style simulation.

Anyhoo.

 

[PrairieFella]

Plus this does not require any changes in regulation, etc. Just someone needs to set it up and enforce it across the Brigade, along with some funding. If they start getting every Brigade to do similar, then you might be able to find ways to intergrade 2 brigade FTX's or use components to support them.

I am not sure if the senior leaders tabletop exercises include other Brigades, but that might be a good longer term goal, either working together on a tabletop exercise or against each other.

We used to do a yearly brigade ex in 38CBG, not sure what happened to it though, I suspect a mix of money and poorly planned training in the last couple years.

 

[Fabius]

I am not aware of much in the way Divisional Field Training Exercises (FTX) in NATO. We had seven Brigades in the field on TRIDENT JUNCTURE, but the fighting was scripted at the higher level and the emphasis was really on logistics. The vast majority of Divisional and higher level exercises are Command Post Exercises (CPX) delivered in a Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX). They happen all the time.

The Canadian Army has conducted CMBG-level Command Post Exercises for some time. The focus during the Afghan war was on the deploying HQ, but since then we've had the UNIFIED RESOLVE series where a CMBG is the Primary Training Audienace (PTA) under a HICON Division HQ. The Div HQ has usually been 1st Cdn Div. There have also been CMBGs in other stages of the managed readiness plan that have provided FLANCON Secondary Training Audiences (STA). We've had CMBG HQs on allies' CPX. Our 1st Cdn Div has conducted several exercises under allied Corps, sometimes as an STA and other times as a Response Cell.

AOC students will be on three CMBG-level CAX as part of their course (plus some BG-level ones). They will execute a plan that they have developed and will plan a sequel while they execute.

Regarding the comments on Calian, the primary training audience should never see a JCATs screen. There will likely be officers and NCOs from the training audience units that are in the LOCON role who will be at those stations bringing the plan to life with the Calian interactors. Those folks, though, are not in the training audience. The commanders and staff in the HQ will be talking with their subordinate unit commanders and staffs over radios or at O Gps, rehearsals etc. There might be Calian folks role-playing flanking and higher units as part of the "wrap."

A Reserve CBG should not be conducting a CMBG-style CPX as part of their annual training. Territorial Battle Groups (TBGs) will conduct an annual CPX focused on their role that may well have a CAX element providing "injects."

The value of JCATs and other constructive simulation systems diminishes as you get below Battalion-level. There can still be goodness, but its really not using the system as intended. Sub-unit and below really need first-person style simulation.

Anyhoo.

Looking at that in relation to the Wavell Room article and its authors concerns about the British Army’s proficiency at the Division level and larger and the Regular forces responsibility to provide the professional competence needed to build more mass around, in the event of a mobilization; Is the Cdn Army current approach sufficient?

The CPX (CAX enabled) as laid out focuses on the Bde as that’s the Cdn Army’s current and 40 year historical focus.

Does a yearly Div HICON function and an occasional STA, Response Cell role in an Allied Corps give the Cdn Army sufficient regular force experience and capability to serve as the skeleton to build the Divisions its mobilized reserves and regular force Bdes would fight under?

Interestingly here is the 1 Canadian Division government page. It outlines the Division’s four high readiness tasks.

1st Canadian Division Headquarters - Canada.ca

A fully deployable unit trained to lead Canadian Armed Forces operations at home and abroad.

www.canada.ca

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Looking at that in relation to the Wavell Room article and its authors concerns about the British Army’s proficiency at the Division level and larger and the Regular forces responsibility to provide the professional competence needed to build more mass around, in the event of a mobilization; Is the Cdn Army current approach sufficient?

The CPX (CAX enabled) as laid out focuses on the Bde as that’s the Cdn Army’s current and 40 year historical focus.

Does a yearly Div HICON function and an occasional STA, Response Cell role in an Allied Corps give the Cdn Army sufficient regular force experience and capability to serve as the skeleton to build the Divisions its mobilized reserves and regular force Bdes would fight under?

Interestingly here is the 1 Canadian Division government page. It outlines the Division’s four high readiness tasks.

1st Canadian Division Headquarters - Canada.ca

A fully deployable unit trained to lead Canadian Armed Forces operations at home and abroad.

www.canada.ca

The Division has certainly returned to being the "unit of action" with the return to large scale combat operations, but having a whole Div in the field with an OPFOR would be very expensive and very constrained. I did see the benefit on TRIDENT JUNCTURE of having seven Brigades deploy into an operating area. It showed that a Brigade, while important, is only a piece of the machine and it can't just demand everything. It did put things into perspective. Exercises such as STEADFAST DEFENDER that focus on deploying formations across the Atlantic and through SPODS/APODs into operating area are worth the expenditure, but not as part of a standard cycle.

I was in 1st Cdn Div for two years. We have gained experience in the Divisional level since the stand-up. The four mission sets were a challenge. Everyone had a spot on multiple TO&E. We executed the warfighting division HQ role on three CAX in those two years, along with two NEO and two DART exercises. In addition were several DART recce activations (the HART), one deployed NCE for TRIDENT JUNCTURE and a real NCE for Op IMPACT. I don't know if we need more in the way of Divisional exercise experience. The jump from BG to Bde is much higher than from Bde to Div. What is more, we don't really have the Div Troops that would be needed. We did the math for this at 1st Cdn Div and it was breathtaking. I do think that if we are serious about the warfighting division role we need to repatriate 1st Cdn Div from CJOC back into the army and push the NEO and DART roles onto something else.

We do have people in MND-North including a BGen, so there will be additional Divisional experience gained there over time.

 

[KevinB]

The Division has certainly returned to being the "unit of action" with the return to large scale combat operations, but having a whole Div in the field with an OPFOR would be very expensive and very constrained. I did see the benefit on TRIDENT JUNCTURE of having seven Brigades deploy into an operating area. It showed that a Brigade, while important, is only a piece of the machine and it can't just demand everything. It did put things into perspective. Exercises such as STEADFAST DEFENDER that focus on deploying formations across the Atlantic and through SPODS/APODs into operating area are worth the expenditure, but not as part of a standard cycle.

The old every few year RV cycle (I was going to say every 4 year, but it had varied a few times as IIRC the last 2 where '89 and then 92) but it wasn't a bad setup, as the logistics aspect of the movement and having the actual moving pieces in Suffield and Wainwright did a bunch of good -- but even back then Peter was robbed to pay Paul, as elements from D and E Bty 2RCHA became Div Arty for the Ex - after the gun live fire in Suffield.

I was in 1st Cdn Div for two years. We have gained experience in the Divisional level since the stand-up. The four mission sets were a challenge. Everyone had a spot on multiple TO&E.

Which really is an issue if you actually plan on having a real Div.

We executed the warfighting division HQ role on three CAX in those two years, along with two NEO and two DART exercises. In addition were several DART recce activations (the HART), one deployed NCE for TRIDENT JUNCTURE and a real NCE for Op IMPACT. I don't know if we need more in the way of Divisional exercise experience. The jump from BG to Bde is much higher than from Bde to Div.

I guess it depends on how your Division is equipped, as Divisions typically have a lot more enablers than Bde's, Canada's Bde Groups tend to be different - as a lot of typical Div assets are pushed down to the Bde's.

What is more, we don't really have the Div Troops that would be needed. We did the math for this at 1st Cdn Div and it was breathtaking. I do think that if we are serious about the warfighting division role we need to repatriate 1st Cdn Div from CJOC back into the army and push the NEO and DART roles onto something else.

We do have people in MND-North including a BGen, so there will be additional Divisional experience gained there over time.

With the size of the Reg and PRes Army, you should be able to fill 2 Divisions fairly easily - one with a fully deployable HQ.

 

[FJAG]

What is more, we don't really have the Div Troops that would be needed. We did the math for this at 1st Cdn Div and it was breathtaking.

That's pretty much the crux of it. Assuming one uses an American armoured division (two x armoured brigades; one x Stryker bde) then we do have the ability to organize our artillery into one brigade, our engineers into an engineer brigade and 1 Wing into pretty much the bulk of a div aviation bde (minus attack helicopters). Where we fall down is the CCSB (because it lacks a deployable headquarters and, for the time being an air defence battalion) and most importantly we lack a divisional sustainment brigade as well as brigade service battalions for each of the arty bde, engineer bde, CSSB, and the mobility aspects needed for the service support elements of the aviation brigade. Last, but not least is the signals battalion needed for the division itself (I'm not sure if the various elements of the CF Joint Signals Regiment has the same capabilities that 1 Cdn Sigs Regt had in the '80s.)

It strikes me that if anyone were ever serious about creating both a deployable division and to find a role for the ARes then that would be the hybrid structure people should be focusing on designing.

The old every few year RV cycle (I was going to say every 4 year, but it had varied a few times as IIRC the last 2 where '89 and then 92) but it wasn't a bad setup, as the logistics aspect of the movement and having the actual moving pieces in Suffield and Wainwright did a bunch of good

That's a key lesson. 3 RCHA deployed 2 x M109 batteries and an AD battery from Shilo to Gagetown by rail for RV 81. One of the things about our regiments in those days was the posting cycles exchange of personnel at all ranks with 1 RCHA in Lahr. We had numerous people who knew how to do a rail move. What was lacking was a railroad that knew how to do that, the appropriate rail cars and last but not least the railroad tie down kit that was standard on every 1 RCHA vehicle's EIS. What in Lahr took less than one day took us closer to a week to accomplish.

I guess it depends on how your Division is equipped, as Divisions typically have a lot more enablers than Bde's, Canada's Bde Groups tend to be different - as a lot of typical Div assets are pushed down to the Bde's.

Again, using the Army 2030 model, the US have moved the arty and engineer assets from the ABCT/SBCT to divisional bdes but basically most of the other assets in the CMBGs would stay in the divisional manoeuvre bdes. Our weakness is that many of the key enablers for a div simply do not exist, or would have to be scrounged together from bits and pieces here and there. Most importantly, the US Brigade Support Battalions (BSB - basically the equivalent of a Cdn Svc Bn) remain in the ABCT/SBCT which means the CMBG Svc Bns stay with the CMBGs. As a result, there is no field capable CSS available at all for the div Sust Bde or the arty bde, engr bde, CSSB, or avn bde. The good news is that none of those brigades require full time Svc Bn support and a hybrid Svc Bn (let's say 30/70) for these enabling brigades are a viable option.

With the size of the Reg and PRes Army, you should be able to fill 2 Divisions fairly easily - one with a fully deployable HQ.

I have the napkin forces to prove it. All that's missing is equipment, organization and training.

 

[GR66]

I do think that if we are serious about the warfighting division role we need to repatriate 1st Cdn Div from CJOC back into the army and push the NEO and DART roles onto something else.

We do have people in MND-North including a BGen, so there will be additional Divisional experience gained there over time.

That's pretty much the crux of it. Assuming one uses an American armoured division (two x armoured brigades; one x Stryker bde) then we do have the ability to organize our artillery into one brigade, our engineers into an engineer brigade and 1 Wing into pretty much the bulk of a div aviation bde (minus attack helicopters). Where we fall down is the CCSB (because it lacks a deployable headquarters and, for the time being an air defence battalion) and most importantly we lack a divisional sustainment brigade as well as brigade service battalions for each of the arty bde, engineer bde, CSSB, and the mobility aspects needed for the service support elements of the aviation brigade. Last, but not least is the signals battalion needed for the division itself (I'm not sure if the various elements of the CF Joint Signals Regiment has the same capabilities that 1 Cdn Sigs Regt had in the '80s.)

It strikes me that if anyone were ever serious about creating both a deployable division and to find a role for the ARes then that would be the hybrid structure people should be focusing on designing....

...Again, using the Army 2030 model, the US have moved the arty and engineer assets from the ABCT/SBCT to divisional bdes but basically most of the other assets in the CMBGs would stay in the divisional manoeuvre bdes. Our weakness is that many of the key enablers for a div simply do not exist, or would have to be scrounged together from bits and pieces here and there. Most importantly, the US Brigade Support Battalions (BSB - basically the equivalent of a Cdn Svc Bn) remain in the ABCT/SBCT which means the CMBG Svc Bns stay with the CMBGs. As a result, there is no field capable CSS available at all for the div Sust Bde or the arty bde, engr bde, CSSB, or avn bde. The good news is that none of those brigades require full time Svc Bn support and a hybrid Svc Bn (let's say 30/70) for these enabling brigades are a viable option.

I have the napkin forces to prove it. All that's missing is equipment, organization and training.

Realistically we have the personnel and equipment to more or less put together the maneuver elements of a 2030 model Division less the CSS elements and various specialty enablers to support it. Putting together a deployable Division will certainly require a hybrid structure. The problem is that you realistically need three Divisions in order to deploy and sustain a single Division in major combat operations.

I think @TangoTwoBravo makes an excellent point in another thread:

We are an army focused on the Brigade. Which makes sense given our size and commitments. If it is decided by policy-makers that we must field a division then there must be considerable growth and equipment acquisition. It would not just be reorganizing what we have and we would still need school-houses and the institutional army.

Maybe I am just a prisoner of my experience and lack vision, but I think that we should focus on being good at the very important task that we actually have before getting too far down the road on a task that we do not have. Its one thing to fake it until you make it on a CPX with notional Divisional enablers, but its another to do it for real. We briefed what it would take to field a Division and the sticker shock was evident. Having said that, our experiences at formation-level and some of our existing units and enablers would stand us in good stead should that shift to Division occur.

Leading the Multi-National eFP Latvia Brigade. SSE also talks about operating at CMBG level.

If I were King for a day I'd re-organize the CA into a single hybrid Reg/Reserve Division with the objective of working toward putting together all the building blocks to making it a deployable formation.

As I mentioned above, having just a single Division doesn't allow for sustainment of the Division in combat, but it would potentially allow us to lead a coalition Division with multi-national partners.

It would also provide a solid structure for being able to sustain our current eFP Latvia Brigade(-) deployment in a conflict if necessary. If we were to swap out the fly-over Light Battalion for a pre-positioned LAV Battalion it would also allow us to have one LAV Brigade to support Latvia and a Light Brigade to force generate a deployable Battalion for other operations.

 

[FJAG]

Realistically we have the personnel and equipment to more or less put together the maneuver elements of a 2030 model Division less the CSS elements and various specialty enablers to support it. Putting together a deployable Division will certainly require a hybrid structure. The problem is that you realistically need three Divisions in order to deploy and sustain a single Division in major combat operations.

I'm not sure where the proposition comes from that you need three divisions to sustain one. In WW2, Canada created an army HQ and two corps HQs, three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two armoured brigades all of which were sent overseas and into combat. Meanwhile three infantry divisions and two armoured brigades were kept at home. Two of those infantry divisions were disbanded in 1943.

The issue isn't whether you have additional divisions to sustain a deployed one but whether you have the infrastructure in place to recruit, train, lead and equip the forces required to sustain that deployed division.

I don't have current numbers of how many RegF and ResF offr and NCMs the army currently has but some older figures tell me there are some 2,800 army RegF offrs and 4,500 RegF NCMs of the rank of sergeant and above. An average battalion needs around 40 offrs and 100 Sgts and above. The Army 2-3- Armored Div model calls for roughly 22 battalions (including CS and CSS which equates to roughly 1,000 offrs and 2,200 Sgts and above and around 15,000 all ranks. With the current authorized strength of the Canadian army you can in fact model two divisions as well as the army's headquarters and training establishment but only if its a RegF/ARes hybrid model that goes all in. If you don't, then you can't. It's as simple as that.

I think @TangoTwoBravo makes an excellent point in another thread:

@TangoTwoBravo makes many good points in this forum. The one you cite is pretty much what is the prevailing belief within the Canadian army for many years now. In this forum, however, we also challenge traditional beliefs in order to advance our own understanding of the possibilities open to us to perhaps move the yardsticks forward

If I were King for a day I'd re-organize the CA into a single hybrid Reg/Reserve Division with the objective of working toward putting together all the building blocks to making it a deployable formation.

I'd go for the two hybrid asymmetric divisions (one armoured/mech; one light/mech) because we have the numbers to do that and because we need greater depth in the number of headquarters and deployable entities than just one division offers.

As I mentioned above, having just a single Division doesn't allow for sustainment of the Division in combat, but it would potentially allow us to lead a coalition Division with multi-national partners.

I think a Canada led coalition division is both a realistic and desirable entity that we could sustain in peacetime (assuming much of it is fly-over and/or using a partially posted-in element for leadership and sustainment.)

It would also provide a solid structure for being able to sustain our current eFP Latvia Brigade(-) deployment in a conflict if necessary.

I would consider the eFP brigade, another Canadian brigade and another European brigade as the division's manoeuvre forces with a contingency that Canada supplies another brigade and more CS and CSS elements as follow on forces. Essentially we're talking taking over the role as framework country for MND-N. That's highly aspirational.

If we were to swap out the fly-over Light Battalion for a pre-positioned LAV Battalion it would also allow us to have one LAV Brigade to support Latvia and a Light Brigade to force generate a deployable Battalion for other operations.

That's my thought too. I'd add to that that the presence of a LAV bn's equipment in Latvia, once Latvia's new training area is stood up, could form the basis for several flyover mechanized BG exercises for Canada-based battalions.

 

[KevinB]

I think the fallacy that the CA falls into is that there is going to be a rotational requirement or allowance if there is a need to deploy a Division, and this the burden is too great so why bother.

I’d argue that Canada should understand that IF it is required to field a full Division for combat operations, that a requirement for a Corps is also rolling down the hill picking up speed, because shit just hit the fan.

One has a Division so one can keep capabilities alive for larger conflicts and interoperability with larger formations when one deploys a smaller element like a Bde.

Quite honestly with all the Personnel that The CA has: Regular, Reserve, Civilians (PS and Contractors) the CA should not have any difficulty in fielding two Divisions - @FJAG and other napkin armies show that.

What is missing is equipment, and infrastructure to support those formations, and a method to scale the CA is times of great need.

The CA should have full equipment for every soldier from the individual level to the Division units, and it should also have a robust war stock for those personnel and a realistic number of older equipment stored for ‘break in case of war’ mobilization. Meaning that one shouldn’t wear ones equipment out before replacing it.

If X piece wears out at 10 years - replace it at 5, and put it into storage.
- looking after that storage is where you may find a role for @Kirkhill ’s beloved home guard.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think the fallacy that the CA falls into is that there is going to be a rotational requirement or allowance if there is a need to deploy a Division, and this the burden is too great so why bother.

I’d argue that Canada should understand that IF it is required to field a full Division for combat operations, that a requirement for a Corps is also rolling down the hill picking up speed, because shit just hit the fan.

One has a Division so one can keep capabilities alive for larger conflicts and interoperability with larger formations when one deploys a smaller element like a Bde.

Quite honestly with all the Personnel that The CA has: Regular, Reserve, Civilians (PS and Contractors) the CA should not have any difficulty in fielding two Divisions - @FJAG and other napkin armies show that.

What is missing is equipment, and infrastructure to support those formations, and a method to scale the CA is times of great need.

The CA should have full equipment for every soldier from the individual level to the Division units, and it should also have a robust war stock for those personnel and a realistic number of older equipment stored for ‘break in case of war’ mobilization. Meaning that one shouldn’t wear ones equipment out before replacing it.

If X piece wears out at 10 years - replace it at 5, and put it into storage.
- looking after that storage is where you may find a role for @Kirkhill ’s beloved home guard.

You mean like your National Guard?

An awful lot of old soft skins in that inventory, heavy on the logistics and artillery.

 

[KevinB]

You mean like your National Guard?

No I’m not talking about using those military minded volunteers for more like maintenance.

An awful lot of old soft skins in that inventory, heavy on the logistics and artillery.

You need a mix in your Army.
I’d put Arty into a heavier mix of Res, but not the logistics.

 

[GR66]

I'm not sure where the proposition comes from that you need three divisions to sustain one. In WW2, Canada created an army HQ and two corps HQs, three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two armoured brigades all of which were sent overseas and into combat. Meanwhile three infantry divisions and two armoured brigades were kept at home. Two of those infantry divisions were disbanded in 1943.

The issue isn't whether you have additional divisions to sustain a deployed one but whether you have the infrastructure in place to recruit, train, lead and equip the forces required to sustain that deployed division.

I don't have current numbers of how many RegF and ResF offr and NCMs the army currently has but some older figures tell me there are some 2,800 army RegF offrs and 4,500 RegF NCMs of the rank of sergeant and above. An average battalion needs around 40 offrs and 100 Sgts and above. The Army 2-3- Armored Div model calls for roughly 22 battalions (including CS and CSS which equates to roughly 1,000 offrs and 2,200 Sgts and above and around 15,000 all ranks. With the current authorized strength of the Canadian army you can in fact model two divisions as well as the army's headquarters and training establishment but only if its a RegF/ARes hybrid model that goes all in. If you don't, then you can't. It's as simple as that.

My concern is not so much in being able to generate the required personnel to sustain a deployed Division in case of a major conflict (although I think we are woefully unprepared for that on top of other issues) but rather having the equipment to replace our combat losses and sustain a deployed Division.

@KevinB notes that as well:

What is missing is equipment, and infrastructure to support those formations, and a method to scale the CA is times of great need.

The CA should have full equipment for every soldier from the individual level to the Division units, and it should also have a robust war stock for those personnel and a realistic number of older equipment stored for ‘break in case of war’ mobilization. Meaning that one shouldn’t wear ones equipment out before replacing it.

If X piece wears out at 10 years - replace it at 5, and put it into storage.
- looking after that storage is where you may find a role for @Kirkhill ’s beloved home guard.

Unlike WWI and WWII we will not be able to rapidly re-tool our industry to become an "arsenal of democracy" and pump out the complex military equipment that will be needed to expand our forces while already in contact with the enemy. And that's not just AFVs, artillery tubes, logistics vehicles, etc., but also uniforms, small arms, munitions of all types (in great quantities), replacement parts, raw materials, etc.

There are various ways we can shuffle the CA deck chairs using the personnel we currently have in hand...a 1 Division structure or a 2 Division structure but the fact is that in addition to both the structural changes required and the adoption of an expansion/mobilization mindset it really won't mean much without a VERY significant increase in the equipment holdings of the Army.

Now we can certainly choose alternate routes to equip an expanded Army in case of war...negotiate with the US to obtain the required materials from their war stocks or make the decision to equip our follow-on/replacement forces with less complicated equipment that can be manufactured relatively quickly in time of war (looking at you Roshel) but even those options require a conscious decision in advance because that follow-up equipment will require the ability to service and maintain it when we get it.

Now call me a pessimist, but I honestly don't believe that any Canadian Government will be willing/able to fork out the kind of money that will be required to do the above. Not when the CAF already has massive big ticket items (NORAD Modernization, F-35's, multiple shipbuilding projects, MRTT's, AEW aircraft as well as a host of missing Army capabilities to be procured). That's why I'd focus on being able to fulfill and sustain our current Latvia commitment and possibly additional deployments up to the Brigade level.

 

[KevinB]

Now call me a pessimist, but I honestly don't believe that any Canadian Government will be willing/able to fork out the kind of money that will be required to do the above. Not when the CAF already has massive big ticket items (NORAD Modernization, F-35's, multiple shipbuilding projects, MRTT's, AEW aircraft as well as a host of missing Army capabilities to be procured). That's why I'd focus on being able to fulfill and sustain our current Latvia commitment and possibly additional deployments up to the Brigade level.

I think that your next government may find it in it's heart to find a lot of money.
Or your going to get cut off a lot of other projects.

If I was the CA, I’d have my restructuring wish list ready.

 

[GR66]

I think that your next government may find it in it's heart to find a lot of money.
Or your going to get cut off a lot of other projects.

If I was the CA, I’d have my restructuring wish list ready.

I have zero doubts that there will be major pressure from the new landlord to seriously increase our defence spending and that we'll not have much choice but to comply.

My point is that with just the projects that we already have planned (or know are needed but not yet officially in the works) we will almost certainly hit the 2% of GDP mark and quite possibly the 3% mark...especially if potential tariffs, etc. by the US result in a hit to our GDP (making reaching the targets ironically easier). Just look at what we're potentially looking at:

• NORAD Modernization
• CAF Digitization
• National Shipbuilding Strategy (AOPS, River-Class, JSS)
• F-35's
• P-8's
• MRTT's
• MQ-9B's
• Submarines
• AEW Aircraft
• Kingston-Class replacements
• Air Defence
• Long Range Precision Fires
• Tube Artillery
• Anti-Tank capabilities
• C-UAS capabilities
• Leopard Tank replacements
• Logistics vehicles
• EW capabilities
• UAVs

These are just some of the major equipment purchases. Each of these will also require a massive increase in the munitions (including some very expensive munition types) to fire from these platforms and build adequate war stocks.

Add to that the need to actually increase the current size of the CAF not only to meet our current authorized strength, but also to operate the additional/expanded fleets we're planning (with the resultant increase in personnel costs).

Don't forget the general recapitalization of our crumbling infrastructure and the likelihood that our per capita personnel costs will likely increase as well due to inflation in addition to likely retention and recruiting bonuses required to reach our target strength.

There are also a myriad of other "minor" equipment purchases that are required...improved Comms, optics, PPE, etc.

So if we just follow through with our already planned major projects and focus just on making our current CA formations properly equipped with all the kit they need to be effective I think you'll find our 2%-3% will have been achieved...with no money left to get the vehicles and equipment required to transform the Reserves into the basis for a mobilization force.

 

[FJAG]

My concern is not so much in being able to generate the required personnel to sustain a deployed Division in case of a major conflict (although I think we are woefully unprepared for that on top of other issues) but rather having the equipment to replace our combat losses and sustain a deployed Division.

Equipment is mine as well, which, in a lot of ways is why I model my structure on the existing RegF and ARes authorized strengths. My fear is if more money becomes available it goes mostly to new PYs rather than equipment. We have enough PYs (especially if we thin out the Ottawa HQ glut and Class B dependency) and if more people are eventually needed they should come by much less expensive ARes Class A positions.

Unlike WWI and WWII we will not be able to rapidly re-tool our industry to become an "arsenal of democracy" and pump out the complex military equipment that will be needed to expand our forces while already in contact with the enemy. And that's not just AFVs, artillery tubes, logistics vehicles, etc., but also uniforms, small arms, munitions of all types (in great quantities), replacement parts, raw materials, etc.

There's no question we need a retooled and transformed defence industry designed to keep a constant supply of materiel of all natures coming, build a reasonable stockpile and be able to surge production when required.

There are various ways we can shuffle the CA deck chairs using the personnel we currently have in hand...a 1 Division structure or a 2 Division structure but the fact is that in addition to both the structural changes required and the adoption of an expansion/mobilization mindset it really won't mean much without a VERY significant increase in the equipment holdings of the Army.

Now we can certainly choose alternate routes to equip an expanded Army in case of war...negotiate with the US to obtain the required materials from their war stocks or make the decision to equip our follow-on/replacement forces with less complicated equipment that can be manufactured relatively quickly in time of war (looking at you Roshel) but even those options require a conscious decision in advance because that follow-up equipment will require the ability to service and maintain it when we get it.

I think its a two step process. Obtain US equipment - perhaps as a lease - until we can convert several companies to manufacture both heavy armoured (tank, IFV, SP and related equipment) and light (yes, even Roshel) on a continuous long-term basis. Don't forget munitions in all their forms.

Now call me a pessimist, but I honestly don't believe that any Canadian Government will be willing/able to fork out the kind of money that will be required to do the above. Not when the CAF already has massive big ticket items (NORAD Modernization, F-35's, multiple shipbuilding projects, MRTT's, AEW aircraft as well as a host of missing Army capabilities to be procured). That's why I'd focus on being able to fulfill and sustain our current Latvia commitment and possibly additional deployments up to the Brigade level.

The government either gets on board with 2% or more, or gets out of the defence game and becomes a much larger version of Iceland. At that point the people who worry about our uniforms looking "too British" can stop worrying.

Personally I don't think equipping the army would need a wholesale adoption of 2%. $7 or 8 billion a year, well programmed would equip the force at about the same time it would take to reorganize and train it - say three to four years. After that you can turn to a maintenance and upgrade mode. We need to stop the stupidity of designing a force for 20 years out and then dribbling in the equipment under ever changing priorities. No long range design window should ever exceed 10 years (better yet 7). That, however, would rob the government of their favourite pastime - kicking the defence spending can down the road.

 

[KevinB]

I have zero doubts that there will be major pressure from the new landlord to seriously increase our defence spending and that we'll not have much choice but to comply.

My point is that with just the projects that we already have planned (or know are needed but not yet officially in the works) we will almost certainly hit the 2% of GDP mark and quite possibly the 3% mark...especially if potential tariffs, etc. by the US result in a hit to our GDP (making reaching the targets ironically easier). Just look at what we're potentially looking at:

• NORAD Modernization
• CAF Digitization
• National Shipbuilding Strategy (AOPS, River-Class, JSS)
• F-35's
• P-8's
• MRTT's
• MQ-9B's
• Submarines
• AEW Aircraft
• Kingston-Class replacements
• Air Defence
• Long Range Precision Fires
• Tube Artillery
• Anti-Tank capabilities
• C-UAS capabilities
• Leopard Tank replacements
• Logistics vehicles
• EW capabilities
• UAVs

Most of those are already budgeted for in the current sub 1.4% budget (1.37% for FY 24).

These are just some of the major equipment purchases. Each of these will also require a massive increase in the munitions (including some very expensive munition types) to fire from these platforms and build adequate war stocks.

Most actually won't require new types of munitions - but yes there is a large infrastructure aspect to many of those programs to be able to properly store munitions and great amounts of them.

Add to that the need to actually increase the current size of the CAF not only to meet our current authorized strength, but also to operate the additional/expanded fleets we're planning (with the resultant increase in personnel costs).

Ignoring everything else but the Army for the moment - you have the basics of 2 LAV brigades currently.
You have an under equipped Light Bde (spread out amongst the CMBG's), and a poorly resourced CSSB.

Don't forget the general recapitalization of our crumbling infrastructure and the likelihood that our per capita personnel costs will likely increase as well due to inflation in addition to likely retention and recruiting bonuses required to reach our target strength.

Which is why a lot of the above programs you list have huge cutouts in them for infrastructure -- but I would agree that isn't enough.

There are also a myriad of other "minor" equipment purchases that are required...improved Comms, optics, PPE, etc.

They are relatively minor in the grand scheme.
For 2.5b you could equip every CA soldier (Reg and Res) with modern gear from boots to helmet, NODS's Comms etc with a 25% overage for spares.

So if we just follow through with our already planned major projects and focus just on making our current CA formations properly equipped with all the kit they need to be effective I think you'll find our 2%-3% will have been achieved...with no money left to get the vehicles and equipment required to transform the Reserves into the basis for a mobilization force.

2.2b for 2 Bde worth of CV-90
4b for 2 Armor Bde's worth of M1A2 SepV3 Abrams
300m for 72 M109A7
200m for 36 HIMARS
2.5b for 300 AMPV variants for Armor Bde's

So around 9.2 Billion
100m for 2 Light Bde worth of ISV at 2/Section

Under 13B to effectively remodel the CA -- sure it is a big number - but considering you need to add about 22B to your budget a year to hit 2%, if you allocate 1/2 of that to Capital Equipment for the first 10 years, so lest say an extra 11B, and break it up over the various Elements, the Army should be getting about 3.5b for Capital Equipment a year -- so inside of 4 years you would have a credible 6 Maneuver Bde Force 2 Light, 2 Med, and 2 Heavy - and a fair amount of Divisional assets.