- Reaction score
- 35
- Points
- 560
I am sorry if my post implied the Navy is the Taxi service for the Joint Expeditionary Force. Perhaps a better way to look at is is the Navy requires sufficient combat capability to perform power projection missions across the ocean, while also supporting the "U-Haul" function of transporting the battlegroup and supporting them ashore. That will define the size of the fleet (more platforms for Mine counter measures, AAD, NGS, surveillance and so on).
I notice the Air Force hasn't come aboard this discussion yet. What do we need in the Air Expeditionary Wing?
Pbi's other point about stripping away excessive overhead is well taken. When reading the LFRR Phase 2 briefing packages, the implications were pretty clear to me. In my brigade, we would go from having six company+ sized Infantry "Regiments" to six companies within a notional "31 Infantry Brigade". Collapsing all the various units into sub-units of a larger organization (31 Infantry Bn, 31 Armoured Regt, 31 Artillery Regt, 31 SVC BN and 31 CER) results in reducing LCol's, RSM's and Staffs from the current 15 to five. For esprit de corps reasons, the companies/squadrons/batteries might retain the historical titles in their unit designations (A/31 "Essex and Kent Company").
On a larger scale, the Brigade headquarters and Joint Expeditionary Force HQs will also need reforming, using modern communications and "reach back" capabilities to tie into national level assets when needed, rather than carry a lot of staff and equipment around. Database development and "distributed programming" (think of a military Kazzaa or Napster for finding information on the DWAN) will help reduce the possibility of "decapitation" by an enemy armed with WMD. Other organizational changes to reduce "overhead" are also urgently needed to speed up the pace of information flow, and free up funds for the "sharp end".
I notice the Air Force hasn't come aboard this discussion yet. What do we need in the Air Expeditionary Wing?
Pbi's other point about stripping away excessive overhead is well taken. When reading the LFRR Phase 2 briefing packages, the implications were pretty clear to me. In my brigade, we would go from having six company+ sized Infantry "Regiments" to six companies within a notional "31 Infantry Brigade". Collapsing all the various units into sub-units of a larger organization (31 Infantry Bn, 31 Armoured Regt, 31 Artillery Regt, 31 SVC BN and 31 CER) results in reducing LCol's, RSM's and Staffs from the current 15 to five. For esprit de corps reasons, the companies/squadrons/batteries might retain the historical titles in their unit designations (A/31 "Essex and Kent Company").
On a larger scale, the Brigade headquarters and Joint Expeditionary Force HQs will also need reforming, using modern communications and "reach back" capabilities to tie into national level assets when needed, rather than carry a lot of staff and equipment around. Database development and "distributed programming" (think of a military Kazzaa or Napster for finding information on the DWAN) will help reduce the possibility of "decapitation" by an enemy armed with WMD. Other organizational changes to reduce "overhead" are also urgently needed to speed up the pace of information flow, and free up funds for the "sharp end".