"The only downsides I see are that with having a Reg Force mentor cadre, what happens when those "Leopard Gurus" all retire... "
- Matt, this is a question that has been asked, though in relation to CMTC. The Comd LFDTS knows that if CMTC had to flush out an OPFOR Leo C2 sqn, the big shortage would be in crews, not tanks (I doubt my walker will fit in the hatch in a few years). We have 114 gun tanks (Wainwright, Gagetown, Montreal (202 Paintshop Depot), and Borden). Even as those numbers shrink due to any planned cannibalizing or disposal (until their eventual replacement by 66 MGS), that is enough to keep the CMTC OPFOR Tk Tp of four Vismodded Leo C2 rolling. The four crews in that troop will be part of the 80 man permanent OPFOR cadre. There are another few dozen Leos in Wainwright to draw on, but that probably won't happen unless one of the OPFOR agony wagons goes teats up. The Strathconas still come up and use "their" tanks, and will until they get replaced by MGS. The OPFOR will not need more than four 'sustainable' Leos unless a future Roto destined for someplace is expected to achieve Battle Task Standards against a very robust enemy with a tank company. That is unlikely. The most prob scenario is a BTE rotating in through CMTC, having been directed to achieve BTS against an OPFOR that has a tank company, again, unlikely, but doable (with some pain) in the short term.
Your proposal for retaining a Leo C2 Sqn is a good one, but we have been painted into an administrative corner by the way we are directed to cost account our activities, and something has to give. The Army has been deliberately underfunded for years - a way of stopping us from retaining capabilities you and I know we will need some day - and we are spending money on training for the missions we do now, at the expense of retaining some capability for a heavy metal punch up later.
The intent may well be to spend money on kit and capabilities we need to deploy on missions NOW (our society's focus seems stuck in the 'NOW' gear), and whatever force that process results in will have to adapt to any future that demands a maximum effort as best as it can. 1914, 1939, 1950 all over again.
"In my proposal, 1 reg. force sqn. of Leopards is maintained so that a seed corn at the reg. force level is still maintained. That way you've got reg. force pers. at all levels (Tpr-Maj.) who are versed in the art and science of working with tanks, rather than Sr. NCOs and officers being parachuted into an organization which they're supposed to provide the subject matter expertise, but have no experience on."
- Good reasoning. I tried to tie into that with my reserve summer training tank regt proposal a few days ago, but my post was unclear. Even if they had experience on the kit at one time, skill fade would come into play, so, as you say, we need a trained permanent cadre. A Regiment would be nice, Sqn would be OK. But all we get is an OPFOR Troop.
I think if the Cdn Army crews another tank, it will be exchanges on American M1A2s, like the exchanges the Strathconas and the Hussars did with M60A1 units in Ft. Hood in the 70s and 80s, and like the Gunnery competitions the Strats do with the NG Abrams units today. During Gulf War One, Ottawa was 24 hours from giving the Strathconas orders to move into the US and start trg on Abrams to go overseas, but the decision to NOT send 4CMBG from Lahr/Baden to the gulf nixed trg the Strats on the Abrams.
We seem to be stuck in a sort of groundhog day/year of 1934. We are losing hard won capacity and capabilities that the visionaries among us know we will need desperately in the future. Yey the masses scream that we will never again mobilize a large land army, or fight a conventional war.
So, where will the next Dieppe be? Or the next Hong Kong?
- Matt, this is a question that has been asked, though in relation to CMTC. The Comd LFDTS knows that if CMTC had to flush out an OPFOR Leo C2 sqn, the big shortage would be in crews, not tanks (I doubt my walker will fit in the hatch in a few years). We have 114 gun tanks (Wainwright, Gagetown, Montreal (202 Paintshop Depot), and Borden). Even as those numbers shrink due to any planned cannibalizing or disposal (until their eventual replacement by 66 MGS), that is enough to keep the CMTC OPFOR Tk Tp of four Vismodded Leo C2 rolling. The four crews in that troop will be part of the 80 man permanent OPFOR cadre. There are another few dozen Leos in Wainwright to draw on, but that probably won't happen unless one of the OPFOR agony wagons goes teats up. The Strathconas still come up and use "their" tanks, and will until they get replaced by MGS. The OPFOR will not need more than four 'sustainable' Leos unless a future Roto destined for someplace is expected to achieve Battle Task Standards against a very robust enemy with a tank company. That is unlikely. The most prob scenario is a BTE rotating in through CMTC, having been directed to achieve BTS against an OPFOR that has a tank company, again, unlikely, but doable (with some pain) in the short term.
Your proposal for retaining a Leo C2 Sqn is a good one, but we have been painted into an administrative corner by the way we are directed to cost account our activities, and something has to give. The Army has been deliberately underfunded for years - a way of stopping us from retaining capabilities you and I know we will need some day - and we are spending money on training for the missions we do now, at the expense of retaining some capability for a heavy metal punch up later.
The intent may well be to spend money on kit and capabilities we need to deploy on missions NOW (our society's focus seems stuck in the 'NOW' gear), and whatever force that process results in will have to adapt to any future that demands a maximum effort as best as it can. 1914, 1939, 1950 all over again.
"In my proposal, 1 reg. force sqn. of Leopards is maintained so that a seed corn at the reg. force level is still maintained. That way you've got reg. force pers. at all levels (Tpr-Maj.) who are versed in the art and science of working with tanks, rather than Sr. NCOs and officers being parachuted into an organization which they're supposed to provide the subject matter expertise, but have no experience on."
- Good reasoning. I tried to tie into that with my reserve summer training tank regt proposal a few days ago, but my post was unclear. Even if they had experience on the kit at one time, skill fade would come into play, so, as you say, we need a trained permanent cadre. A Regiment would be nice, Sqn would be OK. But all we get is an OPFOR Troop.
I think if the Cdn Army crews another tank, it will be exchanges on American M1A2s, like the exchanges the Strathconas and the Hussars did with M60A1 units in Ft. Hood in the 70s and 80s, and like the Gunnery competitions the Strats do with the NG Abrams units today. During Gulf War One, Ottawa was 24 hours from giving the Strathconas orders to move into the US and start trg on Abrams to go overseas, but the decision to NOT send 4CMBG from Lahr/Baden to the gulf nixed trg the Strats on the Abrams.
We seem to be stuck in a sort of groundhog day/year of 1934. We are losing hard won capacity and capabilities that the visionaries among us know we will need desperately in the future. Yey the masses scream that we will never again mobilize a large land army, or fight a conventional war.
So, where will the next Dieppe be? Or the next Hong Kong?
