geo said:
Redleaf...
funny thing was pointed out last fall @ a Conference I attended at the Head Puzzle palace. It was pointed out that some units, defined as being Arty Regiments or Service Battalions were in fact, nothing more than a Troop / Platoon / whatever.
I really don't care about names BUT, what is the funding model being applied to these regions? how are mandays being doled out to the areas/brigades/units? When I see some areas forced to "stop & drop" in December or January while others are spending like the devil ... I suspect that something isn't quite right.
I remember hearing Gen Q___n assuring areas to enroll and train till your nose bled.... well; some did.... and they're broke!
Geo: I can only go on my own experiences as COS 38 CBG 2002-2005. The funding model we applied was that directed through the ARE and various CLS policies and directives. Through the Brigade Operating Plan, we allocated each of our units 37.5 days/person of unit controlled funding per year, or as close to that figure as we could possibly get. If we could not reach 37.5, the Comd would explain the reasons why to our CO's, including where the money had gone. One year we only allocated 34 days as we re-allocated 3.5 days towards a Level 3/4 exercise for bde units. The soldiers and unit leaders still got the benefit of the trg dollars: it was just that we controlled the spending of them. The complete budget was always available for scrutiny (hard copy and on line) to anybody who wanted to see it. There were no "secret reserves" : in fact during most of the time the Comd's reserve was either in the red or spent to help achieve training goals.
On top of the 37.5 days, we had seven "Brigade days" that we could allocate to collective training, which in 38 CBG was almost always Bde-coordinated. We also had funding for CITY courses (Continuous Individual Training Year) such as communicator, PLQ, driver,sp wpns, etc. As well, we could usually expect a downloading of funds from LFWA in the last quarter of the fiscal year, although typically this arrived so late that it was difficult to use.
During the time I was COS, I only recall one unit "running out of money", and in this case it was because of poor fiscal management on the part of the CO, who simply decided to ignore direction and blow his budget on one activity. Most units ended up turning some money back at the end of each year. As we reviewed the budget monthly (and all our operations quarterly) we could usually see problems coming and head them off by re-allocating funds.
The very badly conceived direction issued by "General Q***n" and others to "Recruit, Recruit, Recruit" was in defiance of one of the most concrete limitations facing the Army Res: ability to train large numbers of people effectively and quickly. LFWATC certainly could not handle the additional load, and even our demand for devolution of courses to us in the Res CBGs still did not meet the needs. One of the crucial limiting factors in the training capacity problem was the availability of qualified NCOs to act as trainers. In my opinion there was no way that "Recruit, Recruit, Recruit" was ever going to work. I do not know what the final results were, but it really missed the point. What was needed was not to fill the armoury floor with "puppies" but to build an NCO cadre first. This was always our Bde Comd's priority and, IMHO, a key fight in the Res. No NCO cadre: no useful Res.
Cheers