Reuters: Somali Pirates Form Investment Cooperative

[Edward Campbell]

This thread is frustrating me.

Me too, for the same reasons.

I don't need to provide an alternative solution to the piracy situation in order to point out that indiscriminately dropping JDAMs on Somalia is a waste of money, ordinance,  is morally wrong, and would do absolutely NOTHING to solve the problem.  Dropping bombs is NOT a deterrent and would do nothing to disrupt pirate operations:

Completely, 100% correct.

But this thread isn't about piracy anymore.  It's a pissing match between personalities.

Equally correct.

Gay.

Absolutely. Well said. +300 MPs.

 

[mellian]

I don't need to provide an alternative solution to the piracy situation in order to point out that indiscriminately dropping JDAMs on Somalia is a waste of money, ordinance,  is morally wrong, and would do absolutely NOTHING to solve the problem.  Dropping bombs is NOT a deterrent and would do nothing to disrupt pirate operations:

But this thread isn't about piracy anymore.  It's a pissing match between personalities.

I completely agree on both points.

Gay.

That was not necessary thought.

 

[Loachman]

Bombing serves as a deterrent.

But what kind of bombing?

A 500 pounder through the roof of every one of the pirate leaders might. It might also have little effect beyond an for accelerated promotion programme for some of the lower-level ones. What about family members in those houses, though?

Indiscriminate bombing of a starving population will not solve anything, as there will never be a shortage of people desperate enough to do anything to feed themselves and their families regardless of the risk. If it has any real effect, it will likely be the opposite of what we seek. And it is also immoral.

Not all of the Taliban supporters are really Taliban supporters. Some are accepting money for digging holes in roads as their only means of providing for their families. Some of them are killed or captured, but this does not seem to discourage all in that situation. Of what value would indiscriminate bombing be under those circumstances?

We go to great lengths to preserve the lives of innocents in Afghanistan, and rightly so.

We also put great effort into dealing appropriately with those who most definitely deserve it, and that requires a high degree of precision.

Ships passing through the region need to be armed, which requires an enlightenment of politicians in numerous countries.

The current catch-and-release policies need to be corrected.

And there has to be a political will internationally in order to strike known pirate strongholds, by air, sea, and on land.[/quote]

 

[muskrat89]

But this thread isn't about piracy anymore.  It's a pissing match between personalities.

Agreed.

No one is going to convince the other to adopt their point of view. State your opinion and move on. If you have nothing fresh to add, don't post.

Thanks

Army.ca Staff

 

[mellian]

I agree with Loachman and basically what I was trying to say.

 

[mariomike]

Re: Bombing in Somalia, FYI from last year, if interested:
"US bombs Islamist town in Somalia: The US has launched an attack against a "known al-Qaeda terrorist" in southern Somalia, the Pentagon says.":
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7274462.stm

"US Somali air strikes 'kill many' ":
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6243459.stm

"The Somali Connection: A Terrorism Crackdown in Australia":
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1914644,00.html

2007: "U.S. Strikes In Somalia Reportedly Kill 31
Official Says Dead Were Civilians From Village Targeted In Hunt For Alleged Al Qaeda Suspects";
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/08/world/main2335451.shtml

"US Reportedly Bombs Somalia:
May 26, 2008
Associated Press
MOGADISHU, Somalia - Airstrikes, possibly by U.S. planes, caused explosions in a remote area in southern Somalia, officials said May 26. There was no immediate information on casualties."
http://www.military.com/news/article/us-reportedly-bombs-somalia.html

Time Magazine. Sept 2009: "After a U.S. Air Strike, Somali Peacekeepers Pay":
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1924902,00.html

I think this is from today:
"Al-Qaeda leader among 10 killed in Somalia air strike
An air strike in Somalia on Thursday, which insurgents blamed on the United States, killed at least 10 people, including Al-Qaeda’s military leader in the war-torn country, a rebel spokesman and residents said.":
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/turkey/8833377.asp?gid=231&sz=19879

 

[Kat Stevens]

Okay, to be clear here I'm not advocating day and night arclight style blanket bombings.  But just maybe a 500 lb LGB in the centre of the Piracy Stock Exchange might convince people that investing in piracy is bad.

Nah, never mind.

 

[Kat Stevens]

...and people wonder why some of those countries and people hates the west.

And it didn't become about personality pissing until this little piece of bait was tossed in the water.

 

[the 48th regulator]

Okay, to be clear here I'm not advocating day and night arclight style blanket bombings.  But just maybe a 500 lb LGB in the centre of the Piracy Stock Exchange might convince people that investing in piracy is bad.

Nah, never mind.

My thoughts exactly.

And it didn't become about personality pissing until this little piece of bait was tossed in the water.

...and people wonder why some of those countries and people hates the west.

Bingo.

+3000 points.

I am with Kat on this one.  Send a message, and bomb these thugs.  Troops on the ground, is not always the right answer.  What do we do, surround the compound and play loud music until they stop take off their bandanas and eyepatches? 

dileas

tess

 

[Journeyman]

A large percentage of the piracy appears based out of Basaso, Somalia.

The mayor of Basaso, Abidrahman Mohamoud Haji Hasan, is a Canadian-Somali; much of his family lives in Ottawa.

Basaso is in Puntland State. The President of Puntland, Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud Farole, is an Australian-Somali; several of his key family members live in Melbourne Australia.


Perhaps if western countries simply got tired of being doormats -- nice safe countries to 'store' their families, while they support Islamist, anti-western, or simply criminal activities in the homeland......

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

I 100% agree with Kat.

His example and this one,

indiscriminately

Get a grip lad, you know that isn't what the serious posters meant......................

 

[Edward Campbell]

...
Get a grip lad, you know that isn't what the serious posters meant......................

Rubbish.

The so called serious posters advocate a policy that is illegal, immoral and, almost certainly, aims to accomplish nothing. They advocate, in short, stupidity. Now, sadly, stupid policy is fairly common - especially in the West. So is policy that is illegal and immoral. But common does not mean smart or right.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

I see your rubbish and raise your post as garbage. :-*

I hardly think for a second those that posted things like "scorched earth" meant the innocents involved.  You know what that person does as well as I do and that he did his bit putting his life on the cheque if required for his tour........

Having said what you said I guess you think we should pull out everything form Afghanistan that might kill from above?

To try and get this thing back on topic,...............................Is there anyone here who thinks we should just let the piracy continue unabated and consider it part of the cost of doing business?

 

[Edward Campbell]

I see your rubbish and raise your post as garbage. :-*
...

Fill your boots. It doesn't make you any less wrong. Illegal + Immoral + Pointless = STUPID.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Having said what you said I guess you think we should pull out everything form Afghanistan that might kill from above?

I guess you missed this??

 

[Edward Campbell]

Is there anyone here who thinks we should just let the piracy continue unabated and consider it part of the cost of doing business?

Pointless question. Piracy is not continuing unabated. The international flotilla is abating it. Pirates are being, at least, slowed.

Abate -v.tr. To reduce in amount, degree, or intensity; lessen.

That's what's being done, piracy is being reduced in amount, degree and intensity. More can be done: more smart things; more moral things; more legal things. Bombing is not included in that list.

 

[GAP]

We have various governments spending millions to patrol the gulf of Aden and surrounds, because these merchant ships are being ransomed for millions when they are captured by the pirates. This is becoming quite the little industry in of itself.

It has been suggested multiple times to put armed teams on the ships from point A to point B, but the merchant ships are decrying this solution because of costs and the perceived notion that they should not carry arms.

This is dumb. If you are going to ship in this area either protect yourself or live with the consequences. We have to stop playing by imaginary rules the other guys don't know about and don't care about.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Quote from: Bruce Monkhouse on Today at 15:48:50

Having said what you said I guess you think we should pull out everything form Afghanistan that might kill from above?

I guess you missed this??

Doesn't matter! You are tossing up weak strawmen.

What’s at issue here is a “small facility” that Reuters describes as being : ”open 24 hours a day and serves as a bustling focal point for the town. As well as investors, sobbing wives and mothers often turn up there seeking news of male relatives missing in action.”

We don’t just bomb “bustling focal points” where “sobbing wives and mothers” gather: not in Afghanistan and not in Somalia, either. If we do we are wrong and stupid.

If someone has sensible suggestions about how to better address the piracy problem I’m sure they can be sensibly discussed somewhere – I doubt here is the place.

 

[Edward Campbell]

If anyone would like to consider another POV, look here. It is from the spring of this year.

--------------------
Bronwyn Bruton, a democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa, is an international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). She was born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana. Prior to her fellowship appointment, Bronwyn spent three years at the National Endowment for Democracy, where she managed a $7-million portfolio of grants to local and international nongovernmental organizations in east and southern Africa (priority countries included Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Sudan). Ms. Bruton has also served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives, as a policy analyst on the international affairs and trade team of the Government Accountability Office, and as a program officer at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

Ms. Bruton holds an MPP, with honors, from the University of California at Los Angeles.

Source: Council on Foreign Relations

 

[Edward Campbell]

This, reproduced in three parts under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the November/December 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs is an article about Somalia – same author as I cited above – that, while not related directly to piracy illustrates the difficulties of any simple solutions to any of Somalia’s problems:

PART 1 of 3

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65462/bronwyn-bruton/in-the-quicksands-of-somalia?page=7

In the Quicksands of Somalia
Where Doing Less Helps More

Bronwyn Bruton

November/December 2009

Summary –

Washington's repeated attempts to bring peace to Somalia with state-building initiatives have failed, even backfired. It should renounce political intervention and encourage local development without trying to improve governance.

BRONWYN BRUTON is an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The U.S. government needs to change its Somalia policy -- and fast. For the better part of two decades, instability and violence have confounded U.S. and international efforts to bring peace to Somalia. The international community's repeated attempts to create a government have failed, even backfired. The United States' efforts since 9/11 to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda have alienated large parts of the Somali population, polarized the country's diverse Islamist reform movement into moderate and extremist camps, and propelled indigenous Salafi jihadist groups to power. One of these groups, a radical youth militia known as al Shabab, now controls most of Somalia's southern half and has established links with al Qaeda. The brutal occupation of Somalia by its historical rival Ethiopia from late 2006 to early 2009, which Washington openly supported, only fueled the insurgency and infuriated Somalis across the globe.

One of Washington's concerns today is that al Qaeda may be trying to develop a base somewhere in Somalia from which to launch attacks outside the country. Another is that more and more alienated members of the Somali diaspora might embrace terrorism, too. Somali nationals were arrested in Minnesota in early 2009 after returning from fighting alongside al Shabab, and in August 2009, two Somalis were arrested in Melbourne for planning a major suicide attack on an Australian army installation. The first American ever to carry out a suicide bombing did so in Somalia in October 2008. These isolated incidents have generated more hype than they deserve, but they have nonetheless put the Obama administration in a tough position. If only to avoid seeming weak in combating terrorism, it must prevent these threats from escalating, but it is entering the fray at a time when almost any international action in Somalia is likely to reinforce the Somalis' anti-Western posture.

Alarmingly, the State Department seems not to realize this or the failures of past policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is clinging to the bankrupt strategy of supporting the Transitional Federal Government, Somalia's notional government but really a dysfunctional institution that has failed to garner much support from the population. Barricaded in a small corner of Mogadishu behind a wall of international peacekeepers, the TFG is incapable of advancing the United States' primary interests: stopping the expansion of extremist forces throughout Somalia and preventing the formation of al Qaeda cells, other radical strongholds, and training camps in the country. If anything, the TFG's presence in Somalia hurts U.S. goals. Resistance to the so-called government has united various radical groups that would otherwise be competing with one another. These groups and the TFG are now locked in a violent stalemate that is further battering the population, making it more likely that certain corners of Somalia will eventually become hospitable environments for al Qaeda. With 3.8 million people urgently in need of relief, Somalia has once again become the site of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

This error stems from Washington's mistaken belief that state building is the best response to terrorism. Because Washington has lacked both the political will and the resources to launch a large enough state-building program, U.S. efforts in Somalia have been inadequate. Neither Clinton nor the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, appears ready to support the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia. Even if enough resources were available, the conditions on the ground mean the approach would be unlikely to work anyway. Somalis may have grown weary of war, but they remain highly suspicious of centralized government. And they disagree about questions as fundamental as whether a Somali state should be unitary, federal, or confederal; whether the judicial system should be wholly Islamic or a hybrid of sharia and secular law; and whether the northern territory of Somaliland should be granted its long-sought independence. Efforts to create a central government under such conditions are a recipe for prolonging conflict.

Another major problem with Washington's Somalia policy is that it has not kept pace with important shifts in U.S. thinking about how to confront terrorism. In Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, General David Petraeus, former U.S. commander in Iraq; General David McKiernan, former U.S. commander in Afghanistan; and David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency expert, among others, have successfully steered U.S. counterterrorism strategies away from militarized tactics focused on killing the enemy. They have promoted more integrated, population-centric approaches that engage traditional local political authorities, civil society, and a wide range of religious actors -- strategies that stand a better chance of reducing the tensions between the United States' counterterrorism, humanitarian, and stabilization goals. John Brennan, the president's assistant for homeland security and counterterrorism, has said that efforts are under way to develop a new Somalia policy along these lines, but they seem to have been hampered by the lack of an intelligence infrastructure and reliable partners on the ground.

Both to protect its interests in Somalia and to help the country, Washington must abandon its hope of building a viable state there and explore new counterterrorism strategies. Perhaps even more important, it needs to better understand the exact nature of the threat that Somalia poses to U.S. national security. For example, piracy has flourished not in the country's anarchic south but in the weakly governed northern regions. And it is a problem of organized crime, not terrorism. Any links between the pirates and al Shabab are profit-motivated, which suggests that even for al Shabab, ideology can yield to pragmatism. The emergence of yet another indigenous jihadist movement in a faraway corner of the world does not merit a militarized response from the United States or its allies, especially when the absence of reliable intelligence on the ground means that even discrete attacks on terrorist suspects could do more harm than good.

The presence of al Qaeda operatives in Somalia is alarming, of course, but it does not mean that transnational terrorism will necessarily spread. In its previous inroads into Somalia, al Qaeda bumped up against Somalia's xenophobia and its pragmatic, clannish political culture. In the midst of the UN's invasive state-reconstruction effort in the 1990s, much of the country fell under the control of al Itihaad al Islamiya, a radical movement with links to al Qaeda. But the al Qaeda operatives in the country soon conflicted with recalcitrant nationalist leaders (they considered the locals cowardly for refusing to subscribe to jihad) and were frustrated by the fractious local Islamists and the harsh living conditions, according to a West Point study based on intercepted correspondence. By the mid-1990s, al Itihaad al Islamiya was essentially defunct. Since then, U.S. intelligence analysts have argued that Somalia is fundamentally inhospitable to foreign jihadist groups. Al Qaeda is now a more sophisticated and dangerous creature, but its current foothold in Somalia appears to be largely the product of the West's latest interference. In fact, the terrorist threat posed by Somalia has grown in proportion to the intrusiveness of international policies toward the country. Al Shabab metamorphosed from a fringe movement opposed to the foreign-backed TFG into a full-blown political insurgency only after the U.S.-supported Ethiopian invasion.

It is time for the United States to adopt a policy of constructive disengagement toward Somalia. Giving up on a bad strategy is not admitting defeat. It is simply the wise, if counterintuitive, response to the realization that sometimes, as in Somalia, doing less is better.