I'll believe it when I see it.
Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending
- Thread starter Maxman1
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Hey at least you aren't as bad as the USMC, when they conduct UNS (Urgent Needs Statements) if by 3 years their isn't a program requirement for those UNS items, and if there is, and it isn't identical to the UNS bought items, the system takes them away for disposal.
Lot of fantastic gear got it's start via UNS, but a lot has also been sent to DMRO to be disposed of.
The Army tends to be a bit more pragmatic than that - but a lot of gear still ends up being destroyed or offered to others via DRMO.
Sometimes an OEM will step in, if they where the UNS manufacturer as well as the Program of Record OEM to "swap" the UNS items for a Delivery Order item - but it can be a nightmare that can end up biting the last guy standing when the music stops (ask me how I know when I did some Mk11 Mod1 exchanges for USMC M110's and Army XM110's for M110's...)
FJAG
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The arty experience with UORs during Afghanistan was mixed. A good one was that the 12 M777s bought on UOR were incorporated into a life cycle when the 25 were subsequently bought by project. On the down side manning wasn't adjusted from 7 man dets to the required 10 which slid them into four gun batteries. That has resulted in a misconception in many minds (including some gunners) that a four gun battery is enough and normal. The problem is perpetuated by the operational building block usage concept that a deployed battery is formed around a tactical group of a BC, FSCC, FOOs and JTACs with whatever number of 2-gun troops, STA troops and other resources appropriate for the mission.
The initial UOR radars and UAVs (one bought the other leased) developed skilled operators while the equipment was quickly left behind for newer and better items (although post-war there has been a partial slump and some stagnation)
IMHO, the continued reliance on UORs is a symptom of the fact that the army's combat capability development process is undisciplined and badly broken.
The initial UOR radars and UAVs (one bought the other leased) developed skilled operators while the equipment was quickly left behind for newer and better items (although post-war there has been a partial slump and some stagnation)
IMHO, the continued reliance on UORs is a symptom of the fact that the army's combat capability development process is undisciplined and badly broken.
daftandbarmy
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The Natty Post weighs in, of course 
Trudeau Liberals will never hit NATO target if DND can't even spend the money it has
'Government policy without money is basically rhetoric,' says David Perry, head of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute
The Trudeau government is trying to assure NATO allies it’s moving in the direction of spending two per cent of Canada’s GDP on defence. Meanwhile, billions of dollars committed to new military equipment is being handed back, lapsed, re-profiled or simply not requested by the Department of National Defence.
“Government policy without money is basically rhetoric,” chides David Perry, the PhD in defence procurement heading up the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, a non-partisan think tank in Ottawa.
Perry has studied Canada’s bureaucratic defence procurement process — clogged with bureaucrats from Public Services and Procurement Canada, National Defence, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada and Treasury Board — and can follow the money.
In just the past few years, David confirms, Canada’s Department of National Defence failed to spend over $9 billion that was in its budget or the government’s fiscal framework for capital acquisitions under Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) — Canada’s defence policy. While there’s a general phenomenon across the federal government of departments asking for money and not being able to spend it by the year-end, thus having the money lapse, Perry reports, “it’s been a particularly pernicious problem at National Defence.”
“We took way too long getting that money moving and actually getting it out the door,” Perry says, and now it’s being exposed to a return of normal levels of interest. He’s not alone in his concerns. Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) — an independent financial expert tasked with tracking planned and actual capital expenditures by the federal government — is raising the same red flags.
Canada has lost buying power at a time when the “international defence industrial market is going bananas, supplying the largest conflict in Europe in 80 years, plus the Middle East, plus everybody preparing to deal with the China contingency,” Perry continues, more urgently.
Not only will Canadians pay far more to fund defence purchases as a result of this flawed procurement process, there are less obvious yet potentially graver hits — to our efforts to recruit and retain military personnel, to our reputation with allies, and to our state of military preparedness. “For the near term, things are pretty grim for the Armed Forces,” Perry cautions, “in the next five-year window, the cupboard is pretty bare.”
“If you ask the Air Force, right now, what they could commit to a real contingency, it’s virtually nothing,” Perry says. For the Navy, “unless it was a real catastrophe, they wouldn’t really want to send our upgraded frigates because of the age, the structure of the hull; for a high-intensity conflict, you wouldn’t want to send something that was built 32 years ago, that’s been sitting in salt water, rusting that long and having all the systems age out.
“Our allies have made clear that they actually see a reputational problem with the performance of our procurement system,” Perry says. And that’s left us on the outside, looking in, on initiatives like AUKUS (the security arrangement with the U.K., the U.S., and the Australians) because, Perry reports: “One, they don’t think that we’ve been serious about it; two, we haven’t committed enough real resources to do it; and then the third piece is they want to see us actually come forward with a credible mechanism to translate a commitment of money and intent into an actual acquisition of something.”
Basically, Perry concludes, our allies don’t have confidence in our ability to take a large assignment of money from the government and go buy something in a timely fashion.
So much has been said about the abysmal state of Canada’s defence procurement, it’s difficult to imagine any young leader being motivated to delve into this morass. Yet this articulate, level-headed, 41-year-old not only has the patience to follow the money, Perry is highly motivated to see Canada do procurement better. “Having just made a commitment to spend two per cent of GDP (on defence) eight years from now, there’s no way to actually achieve that, I don’t think,” he says, “without some meaningful procurement reform.”
nationalpost.com
Trudeau Liberals will never hit NATO target if DND can't even spend the money it has
'Government policy without money is basically rhetoric,' says David Perry, head of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute
The Trudeau government is trying to assure NATO allies it’s moving in the direction of spending two per cent of Canada’s GDP on defence. Meanwhile, billions of dollars committed to new military equipment is being handed back, lapsed, re-profiled or simply not requested by the Department of National Defence.
“Government policy without money is basically rhetoric,” chides David Perry, the PhD in defence procurement heading up the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, a non-partisan think tank in Ottawa.
Perry has studied Canada’s bureaucratic defence procurement process — clogged with bureaucrats from Public Services and Procurement Canada, National Defence, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada and Treasury Board — and can follow the money.
In just the past few years, David confirms, Canada’s Department of National Defence failed to spend over $9 billion that was in its budget or the government’s fiscal framework for capital acquisitions under Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) — Canada’s defence policy. While there’s a general phenomenon across the federal government of departments asking for money and not being able to spend it by the year-end, thus having the money lapse, Perry reports, “it’s been a particularly pernicious problem at National Defence.”
“We took way too long getting that money moving and actually getting it out the door,” Perry says, and now it’s being exposed to a return of normal levels of interest. He’s not alone in his concerns. Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) — an independent financial expert tasked with tracking planned and actual capital expenditures by the federal government — is raising the same red flags.
Canada has lost buying power at a time when the “international defence industrial market is going bananas, supplying the largest conflict in Europe in 80 years, plus the Middle East, plus everybody preparing to deal with the China contingency,” Perry continues, more urgently.
Not only will Canadians pay far more to fund defence purchases as a result of this flawed procurement process, there are less obvious yet potentially graver hits — to our efforts to recruit and retain military personnel, to our reputation with allies, and to our state of military preparedness. “For the near term, things are pretty grim for the Armed Forces,” Perry cautions, “in the next five-year window, the cupboard is pretty bare.”
“If you ask the Air Force, right now, what they could commit to a real contingency, it’s virtually nothing,” Perry says. For the Navy, “unless it was a real catastrophe, they wouldn’t really want to send our upgraded frigates because of the age, the structure of the hull; for a high-intensity conflict, you wouldn’t want to send something that was built 32 years ago, that’s been sitting in salt water, rusting that long and having all the systems age out.
“Our allies have made clear that they actually see a reputational problem with the performance of our procurement system,” Perry says. And that’s left us on the outside, looking in, on initiatives like AUKUS (the security arrangement with the U.K., the U.S., and the Australians) because, Perry reports: “One, they don’t think that we’ve been serious about it; two, we haven’t committed enough real resources to do it; and then the third piece is they want to see us actually come forward with a credible mechanism to translate a commitment of money and intent into an actual acquisition of something.”
Basically, Perry concludes, our allies don’t have confidence in our ability to take a large assignment of money from the government and go buy something in a timely fashion.
So much has been said about the abysmal state of Canada’s defence procurement, it’s difficult to imagine any young leader being motivated to delve into this morass. Yet this articulate, level-headed, 41-year-old not only has the patience to follow the money, Perry is highly motivated to see Canada do procurement better. “Having just made a commitment to spend two per cent of GDP (on defence) eight years from now, there’s no way to actually achieve that, I don’t think,” he says, “without some meaningful procurement reform.”
Trudeau Liberals will never hit NATO target if DND can't even spend the money it has
"Government policy without money is basically rhetoric," says David Perry, who heads the non-partisan Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
nationalpost.com
- Reaction score
- 20,371
- Points
- 1,260
Netherlands boosts their military capabilities
www.defensenews.com
Seems like everyone but Trudeau seems to have gotten the memo.
Netherlands to add tanks, F-35s, frigates amid warnings of war
With a Russian attack on NATO no longer deemed inconceivable, the Dutch plan to bolster all branches of their military forces.
www.defensenews.com
Seems like everyone but Trudeau seems to have gotten the memo.
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