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Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

Yes, but park them in a field somewhere and set fire to them wasn't the solution the Government is looking for.
I suspect based on past performance I'm making a big assumption that the Government is actually looking for a solution other than ignoring them and hoping the whole mess will go away.
its clear people dont like certain equipment choices, but im curious what the identifiable error was in the process that led to the eventual choice and what the policy recommendations would be to avoid it going forward. Im assuming that there are tweaks made to the process as problems are identified?
 
I might be off base here, but looking in from the outside, it's not the micro management of requirements that seems to be the problem but the formulation of a macro strategy or vision that the micro components exist and work in. In short, without a credible concept of an end state organization , purpose and operational doctrine for the army (or CAF) as a whole, how can you properly formulate requirements for its various components.

If you don't know what you want to be when you grow up, folks will just fumble around making it up as they go along.

🍻
From further outside (and from a fairy tale world where the government supports the military)
Doctrine ->ORBAT-> TO&E -> Purchase Parameters/Decision Heuristics* for fulfilling TO&E-> Requirement. Canada shouldn't feel the need to redefine the wheel everytime we need a new oxcart.
 
its clear people dont like certain equipment choices, but im curious what the identifiable error was in the process that led to the eventual choice and what the policy recommendations would be to avoid it going forward. Im assuming that there are tweaks made to the process as problems are identified?
With the caveat that this is a personal observation, to me the most glaring error was in not staying within the original requirement statement and then not giving proper credence to the expert's observations during the evaluation phase. The aircraft is too slow, hasn't got sufficient range to cover the country within a crew day, hasn't got adequate head room and from what I understand isn't suitable for paradrops at this time.
 
From further outside (and from a fairy tale world where the government supports the military)
Doctrine ->ORBAT-> TO&E -> Purchase Parameters/Decision Heuristics* for fulfilling TO&E-> Requirement. Canada shouldn't feel the need to redefine the wheel everytime we need a new oxcart.
No but its a good reason th have 346 or so meetings,
 
With the caveat that this is a personal observation, to me the most glaring error was in not staying within the original requirement statement and then not giving proper credence to the expert's observations during the evaluation phase. The aircraft is too slow, hasn't got sufficient range to cover the country within a crew day, hasn't got adequate head room and from what I understand isn't suitable for paradrops at this time.
the original SOR was said to favour one vendor too much I think?
If there are so many problems, how was it chosen?
What value does end user evaluations hold in our process?
 
the original SOR was said to favour one vendor too much I think?
If there are so many problems, how was it chosen?
What value does end user evaluations hold in our process?
that is where you have to trust the ones who wrote the requirements to be honest in their description of the needs. If one responder ends up being the obvious choice perhaps the only reason is that their product actually meets the requirements better than the other offerings: Occam's razor.
 
that is where you have to trust the ones who wrote the requirements to be honest in their description of the needs. If one responder ends up being the obvious choice perhaps the only reason is that their product actually meets the requirements better than the other offerings: Occam's razor.
Or you trust the ones who review it?

I think we should demand better than that. Some clarity and demonstrability, OPSEC/proprietary concerns noted
 
the original SOR was said to favour one vendor too much I think?
If there are so many problems, how was it chosen?
What value does end user evaluations hold in our process?
I've asked myself this very same question...

If the aircraft is too slow, can't deploy SAR techs via the rear ramp, can't get to a search area within a single cree day (potentially) than HOW on Earth did it end up getting chosen?



Surely the parameters and performance requirements were well known to the PMO.

Yet somehow we ended up with an aircraft that fails to meet some pretty basic yet mandatory requirements, such as being able to deploy SAR techs...
 
the original SOR was said to favour one vendor too much I think?
If there are so many problems, how was it chosen?
What value does end user evaluations hold in our process?

I have experience with the project. The SOR favoured a certain vendor because that was the only one capable of meeting the requirements (which were based on decades worth of historic SAR callouts). In addition to range, speed, payload, the government of the day wanted the cheapest solution. That meant 2 engines vs 4. The government also refused to consider the impact of commonality. These last details are what ended up favouring a single vendor or we would have had two competitive bids.

Next up, for any project to go forward, DND, PWGSC and Industry Canada have to agree. Our Minister, of course, agreed with us. PWGSC as contract authority supported the procurement strategy. Industry Canada, however, refused to support the plan. They wanted a more competitive process so that they could leverage more Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs) and specifically the percentage going to the aerospace sector (direct offsets), from all the bidders. They held up the process until DND caved. And the requirements that demanded simultaneous fulfillment of range, speed and payload became individual requirements. This allowed Airbus to compete on price and IRBs and win.

Industry Canada was explained the risk that their actions were bringing to the process. Response? "CAF problem. Not our mandate.". And they are not wrong. Ultimately, all these decisions are political and the government of the day decided that they had burned enough political capital on other sole source purchases and that FWSAR was going to be the bone they threw to the dogs.

As for user input, the project office had a SAR pilot and senior SAR Tech on staff as the Ops Requirements Managers. They arranged trips for staff to SAR bases. Engineers on the team flew with SAR Techs on training missions. And the ORM worked with the engineers and the community (notably represented by SARSET) to develop and validate the requirements. Two decades worth of SAR calls were evaluated by DRDC CORA to determine the range and speed requirements. But all of that doesn't mean much when some other government department gets a veto on the procurement process and can simply decide your work doesn't need to be followed. The pilot on the team took his retirement as soon as he saw this thing starting to go sideways.

Having lived this history, it's hilarious to me how people think that the CPC would act differently from the LPC. They are all politicians. They are driven by political interests from donors to voter bases. And the problem with procurement is exactly this: the culture. It's not the process per se. Anybody who has spent enough time at the higher levels of project staff gets this. Nobody should expect it to change with the coming government either.

Will add that it's super convenient for the politicians that even most CAF members don't understand the procurement process and either blame project staff or "the process". This ensures they get to keep up their shenanigans sans accountability and responsibility in perpetuity.
 
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I have experience with the project. The SOR favoured a certain vendor because that was the only one capable of meeting the requirements (which were based on decades worth of historic SAR callouts). In addition to range, speed, payload, the government of the day wanted the cheapest solution. That meant 2 engines vs 4. The government also refused to consider the impact of commonality. These last details are what ended up favouring a single vendor or we would have had two competitive bids.

Next up, for any project to go forward, DND, PWGSC and Industry Canada have to agree. Our Minister, of course, agreed with us. PWGSC as contract authority supported the procurement strategy. Industry Canada, however, refused to support the plan. They wanted a more competitive process so that they could leverage more Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs) and specifically the percentage going to the aerospace sector (direct offsets), from all the bidders. They held up the process until DND caved. And the requirements that demanded simultaneous fulfillment of range, speed and payload became individual requirements. This allowed Airbus to compete on price and IRBs and win.

Industry Canada was explained the risk that their actions were bringing to the process. Response? "CAF problem. Not our mandate.". And they are not wrong. Ultimately, all these decisions are political and the government of the day decided that they had burned enough political capital on other sole source purchases and that FWSAR was going to be the bone they threw to the dogs.

As for user input, the project office had a SAR pilot and senior SAR Tech on staff as the Ops Requirements Managers. They arranged trips for staff to SAR bases. Engineers on the team flew with SAR Techs on training missions. And the ORM worked with the engineers and the community (notably represented by SARSET) to develop and validate the requirements. Two decades worth of SAR calls were evaluated by DRDC CORA to determine the range and speed requirements. But all of that doesn't mean much when some other government department gets a veto on the procurement process and can simply decide your work doesn't need to be followed. The pilot on the team took his retirement as soon as he saw this thing starting to go sideways.

Having lived this history, it's hilarious to me how people think that the CPC would act differently from the LPC. They are all politicians. They are driven by political interests from donors to voter bases. And the problem with procurement is exactly this: the culture. It's not the process per se. Anybody who has spent enough time at the higher levels of project staff gets this. Nobody should expect it to change with the coming government either.

Will add that it's super convenient for the politicians that even most CAF members don't understand the procurement process and either blame project staff or "the process". This ensures they get to keep up their shenanigans sans accountability and responsibility in perpetuity.
I'm glad you posted this, Thank You.

It certainly helps us understand how these types of decisions are decided, and what some of the unspoken (yet powerful) influences there are on a project's final outcome

Personally, I didn't want to point fingers at any one involved party, simply because I know I don't understand our procurement process well enough.

I just knew we signed a contract for 16 planes that can't currently be used for the purpose they were bought for, and inevitably found myself asking..."Why? How?"



You seem to have far more knowledge on this project than most others, and I appreciate that you were on the PMO in some capacity...so let me ask you this.

Is there anything happening (either now, or planned) to get these planes flying with the purpose they were initially procured for?

(Am I totally outdated & the fleet is already doing it's thing?)
 
Having lived this history, it's hilarious to me how people think that the CPC would act differently from the LPC. They are all politicians. They are driven by political interests from donors to voter bases. And the problem with procurement is exactly this: the culture. It's not the process per se. Anybody who has spent enough time at the higher levels of project staff gets this. Nobody should expect it to change with the coming government either.

Will add that it's super convenient for the politicians that even most CAF members don't understand the procurement process and either blame project staff or "the process". This ensures they get to keep up their shenanigans sans accountability and responsibility in perpetuity.
This^…….x10,000
 
And the requirements that demanded simultaneous fulfillment of range, speed and payload became individual requirements. This allowed Airbus to compete on price and IRBs and win.

If we were to replace the C295 today, what's the best option available to meet all those requirements?
 
If we were to replace the C295 today, what's the best option available to meet all those requirements?

This looks good ;)

 
If we were to replace the C295 today, what's the best option available to meet all those requirements?
Personally, I would have just go with a bigger fleet of C130Js. Yeah, your fuel bill is a bit higher and it might be overkill for some situations, but having a common fleet for maintenance and crew training purposes outweighs that in the long run.
 
Is there anything happening (either now, or planned) to get these planes flying with the purpose they were initially procured for?

There are several efforts underway to make this aircraft fit for purpose. Whether it succeeds remains to be seen.

All I'll say is that at the time, all of these problems were foreseen and predicted by the PMO. The CAS, the CDS and our political masters were all aware of the risk. They made the choice to continue. There were even ridiculous requirements from the Air Staff that were later removed. Like the requirement to have a six member crew.

If we were to replace the C295 today, what's the best option available to meet all those requirements?

I am a minimalist and a systems approach guy. I detest the fact that our tiny air force has so many types. If I had the choice, we'd use Stubby Js for FWSAR. I hope we simply sell the 295 fleet and buy stubbys. The 295s are good airplanes. Just not for the role we want to employ them in.
 
Personally, I would have just go with a bigger fleet of C130Js. Yeah, your fuel bill is a bit higher and it might be overkill for some situations, but having a common fleet for maintenance and crew training purposes outweighs that in the long run.

We have a shortage of personnel and insist on adding types that then require whole new supply chains, tech support and training organizations. Incidentally, the project office had actually suggested sole source purchases of Js very early on. That was simply ruled out. The CAS wanted a cheaper airplane. The government wanted more IRBs.
 
One department in the government wanted more IRBs.

When you staff a Memorandum to Cabinet for a major crown project, you need three signatures. MND, Min PW, Min Industry. Any one of them can stop the process and it's up to their cabinet colleagues to get the dissenting minister onside. So no, it's not just one minister. They all wear it. If the government wanted to, Cabinet could have simply instructed their minister to sign. This is exactly how other projects in that era were sole sourced.
 
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