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Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)

I humbly disagree.
 
I would say the Germans would have been exceeding vulnerable while the tank crews learned soldiering, if they have a major opposition early in the war before they perfected the job it would have been tough on them.

-- aren't you the guy that said the Inf need to crew LAV's?

There is a lot more to getting proficient in Airmobile Operations that just entry and exit of a bird.  You can whiteboard an idea to death - but actually doing the activity and all the issues that it brings up is what created skill.

Walkthru Talkthru is a good basic step -- but it does not create proficiency - it create rudimentary understanding of a concept.

Perfect Practice Make Perfect --

 
KevinB said:
There is a lot more to getting proficient in Airmobile Operations that just entry and exit of a bird.  You can whiteboard an idea to death - but actually doing the activity and all the issues that it brings up is what created skill.

Walkthru Talkthru is a good basic step -- but it does not create proficiency - it create rudimentary understanding of a concept.

There are five plans that are essential to any airmobile operation.  Staging, Loading, Air Movement, Landing and Ground Tactical.  The first and third are really aviation-led and involve taking off and flying around.  The loading and landing plans involve some good work by planners to make sure the right stuff is going and is put down in the right spot.  The last one is where the Army makes its money, and aside from running off the ramp of a helicopter, it is no different than any other "Phase II - Actions on the Objective".

Point out to me where you can't gain a certain degree of proficiency at these 5 plans through joint rehearsals/TEWTs?  Also, you allude to the fact that getting off a helo "isn't getting off an ML"; point out to me the specialized science behind walking off a ramp and going to your position?

Having planned and partaken in airmobile operations in both training and operations, I see things differently, so we'll have to agree to disagree.  I don't dispute your notion that more familiarity with the equipment will lead to slicker execution, but I don't think air mobile operations are some black art that can only be accomplished by someone in a specific unit or with a shiny, U.S. Army bauble on their uniform.
 
And I agree that conceptually it appears to be cut and dried.

However having seen loading be buggered all to hell both on the Mattawa plain in Pet under relatively ideal situations, I've also seen loading get equally RTFO at night under mortar fire in Iraq, for different reasons, but most of which came down to crew and passenger interaction.

Secondly having been in a chopper getting ground fire (both SAM and Small Arms) I will say that having some of the "guys in back" who 1) are on comms with the crew (last time I looked, outside of SOF, the CF cannot clip into a bird by radio plug), also someone who knows where you are with a map. 

The argument I have seen is that LAV crews should be part of the Infantry team -- and I would argue this is 110% more relevant for airmobile operations, as a Helo operates in not just a liner path, but vertical, and it goes a heck of a lot fast (also tends to be somewhat less impervious to enemy fire than a LAV too).
 
    I don't think one needs a specific tasking -- but it does take time to master to the point I think that a combat operation against a medium threat could be conducted.  In the same manner that I dont think that one or two MOI's in a unit make the unit mountain operations capable -- can it be done yeah, but I tend to look at work case and mitigate from that.



 
Infanteer said:
There are five plans that are essential to any airmobile operation.  Staging, Loading, Air Movement, Landing and Ground Tactical.  The first and third are really aviation-led and involve taking off and flying around.  The loading and landing plans involve some good work by planners to make sure the right stuff is going and is put down in the right spot.  The last one is where the Army makes its money, and aside from running off the ramp of a helicopter, it is no different than any other "Phase II - Actions on the Objective".

Point out to me where you can't gain a certain degree of proficiency at these 5 plans through joint rehearsals/TEWTs?  Also, you allude to the fact that getting off a helo "isn't getting off an ML"; point out to me the specialized science behind walking off a ramp and going to your position?

Having planned and partaken in airmobile operations in both training and operations, I see things differently, so we'll have to agree to disagree.  I don't dispute your notion that more familiarity with the equipment will lead to slicker execution, but I don't think air mobile operations are some black art that can only be accomplished by someone in a specific unit or with a shiny, U.S. Army bauble on their uniform.

Nobody said anything about needing any shiny courses or other crap, like you said that is all irrelevant, and I agree with you.  My point is do we want to get serious about this stuff or don't we because their is no way you can tell me that a unit that doesn't specialize in air-mobile/airborne insertion is as good at it as one that does. 

At present we have three LIBs that have a whole bunch of skills at their disposal.  I would argue none of these skills transfer over to an actual capability because none of the units are given the proper resources or amount of training time to master these and turn them into an actual capability.  Of course with the proper work-up training and education any organization can become proficient at something but that takes time and we are in the business of delivering results now, not later.

It takes 10,000 hours to master something and I believe this also holds true in the military.


Edit:

For the record, I don't give a damn about shiny courses or any of that crap.  I am not one of the people that believe we need the airborne to give soldiers something to strive for.  I am of the school that the CF needs to get more agile with a larger focus on conducting expeditionary operations.  A lot of things we are doing in the LIBs are replicated by CSOR and they get a lot more money for training and they get to select the best soldiers which makes them far more proficient.

I am interested in discussing questions like:  Do we need the LIBs and CSOR?  Could we do with just CSOR and get rid of all the LIBs with a large chunk of PYs re-allocated to the 6 Mech Bn's?  Do we get rid of CSOR and consolidate the LIBs into one large Airborne/Air-mobile Battlegroup?  Do we maintain the status quo?  What are we trying to achieve with the LIBs?





 
RoyalDrew said:
It takes 10,000 hours to master something and I believe this also holds true in the military.

So if you were the CO/OC tasked to created a fully operations (or capable) Air Mobile Light Inf Coy what would your first year of training look like to master the art / science of air mobile warfare?  What resources would you need at your disposal make make the capability a reality?

There is no way to get 10k worth of training hours into one year, but I would be interested to know what the start point of training looks like say for the first year (1000 (?) hours of training). 

MC
 
MedCorps said:
So if you were the CO/OC tasked to created a fully operations (or capable) Air Mobile Light Inf Coy what would your first year of training look like to master the art / science of air mobile warfare?  What resources would you need at your disposal make make the capability a reality?

There is no way to get 10k worth of training hours into one year, but I would be interested to know what the start point of training looks like say for the first year (1000 (?) hours of training). 

MC

If I was a CO of a Bn I would focus first on developing a CSS capability that is tailored towards air-mobile operations. 

Familiarizing my CSS Coy with various types of slingloads and equipment used in aerial resupply
Acquire enough equipment to be able to effectively resupply the Bn via aerial delivery platforms

This would include:

Fuel Blivets
Slingload Cargo Nets
Slingload Cargo Bags
Speedballs
CDS Drop systems
SHERPA Systems

I would also have them practice and rehearse different scenarios, such as, setting up and executing FARPs (Forward Air Replenishment Points), hooking up and receiving slingloads, securing DP`s, LZ/DZ Controlling, etc...

They would also need to maintain an ability to conduct ground resupp so vehicles are also a requirement.  Light Infantry does not necessarily mean you need to walk everywhere.


The Second thing I would focus on would be Communications and developing a light and air portable CP with the ability to be moved either by aircraft or helicopter.  It should also have the option of being dispatched by parachute from an aircraft.

Equipment required:

DRASH Systems for the actual CP structure
HF radio at a minimum (VHF very much limits the capabilities of an air-mobile force)
Satellite Comms if we have the option
A few four-wheelers and trailers to haul the CP around
Some skidoos and caribou trailers so we can also transport the CP in the winter

For the actual companies they would require:

HF for the Coy CP (Again sat comms if available)
117`s for every sect comd and above


Once CSS and Comms were sorted I would begin integrating all the capabilities together so they learned to work with each other.  An important part of all of this would be cross-training with the air component as often times a problem that occurs during an air-mobile op begins before the ground tactical plan and is usually a result of a mis-communication between the ground force and the air force. 

Getting on and off the chopper is the easy part, it's the CSS and Comms piece that is going to make or break your air-mobile force.  Like I said above, you should also be able to conduct mounted ops as well so the air-mobile LIB should have some sort of vehicle platform.  This vehicle should be small enough that it is not too resource-intensive.
 
MedCorps said:
So if you were the CO/OC tasked to created a fully operations (or capable) Air Mobile Light Inf Coy what would your first year of training look like to master the art / science of air mobile warfare?  What resources would you need at your disposal make make the capability a reality?

There is no way to get 10k worth of training hours into one year, but I would be interested to know what the start point of training looks like say for the first year (1000 (?) hours of training). 

MC

Lots and lots of really long tabs (up to 30-40kms) up and down mountains with big bergens and all your weapons with shouty people swarming around the stragglers kicking them .... and some other stuff.

Yes, really.  :nod:
 
RoyalDrew said:
Nobody said anything about needing any shiny courses or other crap, like you said that is all irrelevant, and I agree with you.  My point is do we want to get serious about this stuff or don't we because their is no way you can tell me that a unit that doesn't specialize in air-mobile/airborne insertion is as good at it as one that does.

Royal Drew,

Ack all.  My comments were not directed to anyone here, but more towards a certain sub-culture that exists and prefers to draw a sharp line within the Infantry Corps.  It's the sub-culture that likes to draw a spectrum with LAV-based losers on the one end, JTF-2 on the other end and puts itself somewhere in the middle.  "We need air assault/mtn ops/para/amphib badges that take 3 courses and 89 days of training after you get a gold at the Coopers test", "we're better able to work with SOF" and "mech guys don't get out of carriers".  This kind of mentality is infectious and when we buy it we only put ourselves in boxes that'll limit our effectiveness as members of the profession of arms.  A simple walk through the lines of any of the battalions would reveal that Pte Gumby in 2 R22R is not much different than Pte Dumby in 3 PPLCI.  We ain't all that different.

As for how much better specializing makes you, remember that airmobile insertions are simply ingress/egress techniques - Phase I and Phase III of the operation.  The pilots do most of the work in flying us around, not getting shot out of the sky, and putting us in the right place.  After that, it's no different if you jumped out of a helo/airplane/canoe/truck/spaceship, as it is all "close with and destroy the enemy" s**t.

In my opinion, a bn with little specialization and requiring a familiarization with the interior of a Chinook, but with its basic infantry drills down and solid small unit leadership will be a better air mobile force than one that has focused its efforts on load plans, manifests and speed balls at the expense of the basics (not saying your Bn has done so, just emphasizing what makes any bn "good").  I think we're all in violent agreement that frequent work with helicopters will make the ingress/egress that much slicker, but you don't need helicopters to get good at the stuff that really counts.

RoyalDrew said:
Getting on and off the chopper is the easy part, it's the CSS and Comms piece that is going to make or break your air-mobile force.  Like I said above, you should also be able to conduct mounted ops as well so the air-mobile LIB should have some sort of vehicle platform.  This vehicle should be small enough that it is not too resource-intensive.

Now, if you are talking CSS and C2, the issue is something else - a force employment concept.  What is the force employment concept for this unit?  On the two airmobile operations my company did in Afghanistan, friendly link up occurred at some point during the ground tactical plan, so CSS and C2 were quite easy to factor for.

Is the force employment concept for a light battalion to pitch it off into the wild where it can only be supplied by air/avn?  Is it meant to be independant of second line support for a significant period of time?  Is this possible?  Is this desirable?  Before we start talking about how to make the CP able to function in the middle of nowhere, we need to think about why we would put it in the middle of nowhere.  The problem is that the Army has, for years, said "we have light infantry battalions" but has not defined a proper force employment concept.  As a result, "light" is whatever people want it to be.
 
daftandbarmy said:
Lots and lots of really long tabs (up to 30-40kms) up and down mountains with big bergens and all your weapons with shouty people swarming around the stragglers kicking them .... and some other stuff.

Yes, really.  :nod:

i rather enjoyed the scene in "P Company" where the Para candidates crossed the bridge by climbing up the trusswork as part pf their morning PT. I can only imagine the sort of reaction that would get in today's army if anyone tried/proposed to do that....
 
RoyalDrew said:
DRASH Systems for the actual CP structure

Get DRASH out of your system.  It isn't very useful - the smallest DRASH tents weigh in at 200 lbs.  1 CMBG played with it and it was a dismal failure - too much of an a**pain for a mech bde HQ, so it ain't the solution for a light bn.  It is very much designed for an Army that likes to drag around heaters, lights and generators so all CP personnel can charge their cellphones and run big-screen TVs....

The Sigs guys have told me that the CF is no longer pursuing DRASH, so it may be moot.  What really need is something that can be broken down and carried quite easily - both DRASH and, to a lesser extent, MOD are just to bulky for mobile warfare (light or mechanized).
 
RoyalDrew said:
Equipment required:

DRASH Systems for the actual CP structure
HF radio at a minimum (VHF very much limits the capabilities of an air-mobile force)
Satellite Comms if we have the option

For the actual companies they would require:

HF for the Coy CP (Again sat comms if available)
117`s for every sect comd and above

IMO DRASH is not the way to go,  like Infanteer stated it is heavy.  As well in colder weather it becomes rather brittle and can break easily.. even in warm weather it can break.  If you are planning on staying static,  having heaters, etc then it's ok,  but if you are going to be moving it around you take your chances of breaking it. The constant set up/tear down and cramming it into those carriers can be rough,  I've heard more then a few poles crack during the packing into the bag and securing it.

For your comms,  I would also look at Iridium phones.  For HF,  you will have to train pers on it as it isn't as simple as throwing up the whip antenna and your done - location/weather, etc can play factors and there are numerous antennas you can use.  Would you be using HF as your primary comms for Coy to BN CP? Because it wasn't mentioned,  I assume you would also have some 117s in the Coy and BN CP as well.  If you are pushing platoons out with the 117 but the CP is using a HF radio you won't be able to talk to each other.

Also, why does VHF very much limit the capabilities of air mobility?  Did you take into account that RRBs can be sent out to extend your VHF comms.  Of course security may become a issue if you push a RRB into no mans land with no friendly forces nearby;  a section of Infantry may have to help out with security of the RRB detachment.

Why would you want every section commander and above carrying a 117?  Why not give the Section Commanders(and Platoon Commander) a 148/152 and stick with one 117F for the Platoon Signaller.  Other things out there are amps for the 148/152,  adaptors to use 5590(522/177F batteries)
 
I'm wandering a bit, actually quite a bit, out of my lane, but my experience as the BC of a light battery 30 years ago may have some relevance. In those days 2 RCHA had an operational role as the close support regiment in the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade which was tasked to deploy to North Norway in the event of crisis. My battery also was tasked as part of the Allied Mobile Force to show the flag in times of increased tension.

In 2 Guns we spent a lot of time thinking about air mobile operations, both as BC and FOO parties with the supported arm and in moving guns by helicopter. Besides all the technical stuff you have all discussed, one thing that we did was to build a very strong and close relationship with the aviators. We invited the pilots to our functions, we socialized with them, we talked to them at every opportunity. We - the gunners and the aviators - got to know each other and by osmosis we learned a lot about each other's capabilities and limitations. Our mutual cooperation and trust grew to the extent that in the pre-night vision devices days, we actually moved and deployed the guns by helicopter at night. We only did it a couple of times as the strain of our sphincters was excessive, but we showed that it could be done. Most important, it demonstrated that the two units knew enough about each other that we could jointly plan and execute a difficult operation without difficulty.

I guess what I'm saying is that you need to understand what the aviators can and cannot do, and the best way to learn this is by picking it first hand from them. Ask them for advice instead of telling them what you want to do. The results may well come as a pleasant surprise.
 
Infanteer said:
Royal Drew,

Ack all.  My comments were not directed to anyone here, but more towards a certain sub-culture that exists and prefers to draw a sharp line within the Infantry Corps.  It's the sub-culture that likes to draw a spectrum with LAV-based losers on the one end, JTF-2 on the other end and puts itself somewhere in the middle.  "We need air assault/mtn ops/para/amphib badges that take 3 courses and 89 days of training after you get a gold at the Coopers test", "we're better able to work with SOF" and "mech guys don't get out of carriers".  This kind of mentality is infectious and when we buy it we only put ourselves in boxes that'll limit our effectiveness as members of the profession of arms.  A simple walk through the lines of any of the battalions would reveal that Pte Gumby in 2 R22R is not much different than Pte Dumby in 3 PPLCI.  We ain't all that different.

As for how much better specializing makes you, remember that airmobile insertions are simply ingress/egress techniques - Phase I and Phase III of the operation.  The pilots do most of the work in flying us around, not getting shot out of the sky, and putting us in the right place.  After that, it's no different if you jumped out of a helo/airplane/canoe/truck/spaceship, as it is all "close with and destroy the enemy" s**t.

In my opinion, a bn with little specialization and requiring a familiarization with the interior of a Chinook, but with its basic infantry drills down and solid small unit leadership will be a better air mobile force than one that has focused its efforts on load plans, manifests and speed balls at the expense of the basics (not saying your Bn has done so, just emphasizing what makes any bn "good").  I think we're all in violent agreement that frequent work with helicopters will make the ingress/egress that much slicker, but you don't need helicopters to get good at the stuff that really counts.

Now, if you are talking CSS and C2, the issue is something else - a force employment concept.  What is the force employment concept for this unit?  On the two airmobile operations my company did in Afghanistan, friendly link up occurred at some point during the ground tactical plan, so CSS and C2 were quite easy to factor for.

Is the force employment concept for a light battalion to pitch it off into the wild where it can only be supplied by air/avn?  Is it meant to be independant of second line support for a significant period of time?  Is this possible?  Is this desirable?  Before we start talking about how to make the CP able to function in the middle of nowhere, we need to think about why we would put it in the middle of nowhere.  The problem is that the Army has, for years, said "we have light infantry battalions" but has not defined a proper force employment concept.  As a result, "light" is whatever people want it to be.

Infanteer, completely agree with your first statement, their is a certain sub-culture within the infantry that feels the need to chest beat but soldiers are going to do that anyways it is the nature of the beast.  The leadership needs to work on humbling these fellows out and putting them in their place.  Everyone has a roll to play and they need to understand that roll.  A little bit of light hearted unit rivalry is never a bad thing though IMO.   

I also agree that we are all  infantry soldiers first and like you said it doesn't matter how you get there at the end of the day; however, that being said these skills are still skills that need to be practiced and they require a bit of time and effort to master them.  It takes time to develop capabilities and they need to be continuously practiced if we want to maintain them and be proficient at them.  It took us two years of work with lots of speedbumps in between to get our Tac CP to the state it is at now, so it does take a considerable amount of time to turn something into an actual capability.

For the rest I'll make a new post for because this will really tie into some of the questions I put out earlier. 

-Skeletor- said:
IMO DRASH is not the way to go,  like Infanteer stated it is heavy.  As well in colder weather it becomes rather brittle and can break easily.. even in warm weather it can break.  If you are planning on staying static,  having heaters, etc then it's ok,  but if you are going to be moving it around you take your chances of breaking it. The constant set up/tear down and cramming it into those carriers can be rough,  I've heard more then a few poles crack during the packing into the bag and securing it.

For your comms,  I would also look at Iridium phones.  For HF,  you will have to train pers on it as it isn't as simple as throwing up the whip antenna and your done - location/weather, etc can play factors and there are numerous antennas you can use.  Would you be using HF as your primary comms for Coy to BN CP? Because it wasn't mentioned,  I assume you would also have some 117s in the Coy and BN CP as well.  If you are pushing platoons out with the 117 but the CP is using a HF radio you won't be able to talk to each other.

Also, why does VHF very much limit the capabilities of air mobility?  Did you take into account that RRBs can be sent out to extend your VHF comms.  Of course security may become a issue if you push a RRB into no mans land with no friendly forces nearby;  a section of Infantry may have to help out with security of the RRB detachment.

Why would you want every section commander and above carrying a 117?  Why not give the Section Commanders(and Platoon Commander) a 148/152 and stick with one 117F for the Platoon Signaller.  Other things out there are amps for the 148/152,  adaptors to use 5590(522/177F batteries)

Coy CP would have both VHF and HF, I should have clarified that. The Coy CP will have a Coy Sig Op who is trained to use the HF radio, as well, all Pl Signallers should be trained to use HF as a fallback option.  One of the reasons VHF is not very good for air-mobile operations is because VHF is reliant on Line of Sight and the range is limited.  If you are conducting Ops over a large area how many RRBs are you going to push out?  Each one of these is going to require security which now eats into your manpower for conducting the actual operation.  VHF is alright but you need to overlap it with something else for long distances, Sat Comms would be ideal as in some cases HF doesn't work due to dead zones.

I would use a mix of comms equipment for the CP and overlap the capabilities as part of the PACE plan.  You would need to ability to use HF and VHF and I wasn't even thinking about iridium phones when I made that post last night so good call.  :salute:

Correction to the above and thanks for pointing it out, I meant 152's and not the 117's for the Sect Comd's.  That is what I get for making a post late at night, sometimes the brain is scrambled.  117s would be ideal for the platoon HQ. 


As for the DRASH I get what you are saying about it breaking; however, we have experimented with it here in Pet and now use it for our Tac CP.  We have managed to even drop it out of an airplane a few times and not have one pole break on us so it isn't so bad.  Of course we have had many people tell us we can't do that and we are not entitled to use DRASH or we are not entitled to replacement poles but we have done it anyways and made it work.  We also experimented with Arctic Tents and Mod Tents and found the DRASH system to be a better fit for what we required.  I would ask for your input, if we don't use the DRASH system then what are some other options we have?

Here is a picture of our Tac CP all packed and ready to be loaded btw

477996_391110497634681_1426486425_o.jpg
 

Here is a pic of the Tac CP being setup on JOAX 1-13

576335_436868686392195_714069845_n.jpg


Generators we use for Power

426377_436868623058868_300772691_n.jpg


Here is what we move the Tac CP with, these also can be dropped out of an airplane or loaded on a Chinook (We have tested on both of a these platforms and it works)

577225_436868106392253_1735785691_n.jpg



I am enjoying this debate and discussion fellows, a little bit of brainstorming and debate is never a bad thing. 


 
Old Sweat said:
I'm wandering a bit, actually quite a bit, out of my lane, but my experience as the BC of a light battery 30 years ago may have some relevance. In those days 2 RCHA had an operational role as the close support regiment in the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade which was tasked to deploy to North Norway in the event of crisis. My battery also was tasked as part of the Allied Mobile Force to show the flag in times of increased tension.

In 2 Guns we spent a lot of time thinking about air mobile operations, both as BC and FOO parties with the supported arm and in moving guns by helicopter. Besides all the technical stuff you have all discussed, one thing that we did was to build a very strong and close relationship with the aviators. We invited the pilots to our functions, we socialized with them, we talked to them at every opportunity. We - the gunners and the aviators - got to know each other and by osmosis we learned a lot about each other's capabilities and limitations. Our mutual cooperation and trust grew to the extent that in the pre-night vision devices days, we actually moved and deployed the guns by helicopter at night. We only did it a couple of times as the strain of our sphincters was excessive, but we showed that it could be done. Most important, it demonstrated that the two units knew enough about each other that we could jointly plan and execute a difficult operation without difficulty.

I guess what I'm saying is that you need to understand what the aviators can and cannot do, and the best way to learn this is by picking it first hand from them. Ask them for advice instead of telling them what you want to do. The results may well come as a pleasant surprise.

Old Sweat I think you just homed in on something else that is very important, having all elements being in synch with each other.  When I was down at the Marine Air Weapons & Tactics School in Yuma, AZ, one of the first things I noticed was that the pilots and the ground force all spoke the same language.  They understood each other and they were used to working together.  This school is a really great place because it takes the pilots, ground force planners, FOO/FAC's and runs a course where they all spend time together planning and conducting operations.  It gets them all used to working with each other and has them all speaking the same language. 

I don't think for a second we would have the ability to replicate a school like this as we don't have the manpower or the airframes; however, what we could do is an exercise that brings all these guys together.  It could be a series of TEWTs culminating in an actual air-mobile/airborne insertion at the end.  When I was at MAWTS, our coy started off very basic conducting TEWTs and over the course of a month slowly ramped up all the way to conducting Bn(-) live fire at night with CAS and Fire Spt.   
 
Thucydides said:
i rather enjoyed the scene in "P Company" where the Para candidates crossed the bridge by climbing up the trusswork as part pf their morning PT. I can only imagine the sort of reaction that would get in today's army if anyone tried/proposed to do that....

They didn't film the part where we also go UNDER the bridge, hand to hand hanging on to the I beams. It's impossibly hard and almost no one made it (including me) which, as I used to explain to the recruits, is what the Airborne battle is all about really.  ;D
 
RoyalDrew said:
If you are conducting Ops over a large area how many RRBs are you going to push out?  Each one of these is going to require security which now eats into your manpower for conducting the actual operation.  VHF is alright but you need to overlap it with something else for long distances, Sat Comms would be ideal as in some cases HF doesn't work due to dead zones.

How far forward would the Coy CPs be from the BN CP?  Also,  would there be Bde HQ and other units deployed as well?

For sure,  you need a backup to VHF,  especially if you don't have the man power to push out multiple RRBs.  Each system has it's limitations/capabilities,  just need to work around them.

RoyalDrew said:
As for the DRASH I get what you are saying about it breaking; however, we have experimented with it here in Pet and now use it for our Tac CP.  We have managed to even drop it out of an airplane a few times and not have one pole break on us so it isn't so bad.  Of course we have had many people tell us we can't do that and we are not entitled to use DRASH or we are not entitled to replacement poles but we have done it anyways and made it work. 

If you guys can make it work for you,  then great.  I'm actually surprised that no poles have broken, as it seems like every time I've worked with DRASH in the field at some point during the exercise something in the DRASH will break. 

RoyalDrew said:
We also experimented with Arctic Tents and Mod Tents and found the DRASH system to be a better fit for what we required.  I would ask for your input, if we don't use the DRASH system then what are some other options we have?

DRASH is simpler and packs up better then mod IMO because it is all in one package, so it is easier in that respect.  But is less rugged then the mod poles/a frames.  As for a better system/easily portable tentage for a LIB,  I don't know.  I've only worked with mod, arctic tents and DRASH,  I have seen some other tentage in  use,  but it would really come down to trial and error.  But I don't foresee a LIB being able to go out and buy it's own tents,  it would have to work with what we(the CF) have in the system.  I've heard DRASH is being replaced,  but I don't know what the Army has decided on if anything at this point.
 
-Skeletor- said:
How far forward would the Coy CPs be from the BN CP?  Also,  would there be Bde HQ and other units deployed as well?

For sure,  you need a backup to VHF,  especially if you don't have the man power to push out multiple RRBs.  Each system has it's limitations/capabilities,  just need to work around them.

If you guys can make it work for you,  then great.  I'm actually surprised that no poles have broken, as it seems like every time I've worked with DRASH in the field at some point during the exercise something in the DRASH will break. 

DRASH is simpler and packs up better then mod IMO because it is all in one package, so it is easier in that respect.  But is less rugged then the mod poles/a frames.  As for a better system/easily portable tentage for a LIB,  I don't know.  I've only worked with mod, arctic tents and DRASH,  I have seen some other tentage in  use,  but it would really come down to trial and error.  But I don't foresee a LIB being able to go out and buy it's own tents,  it would have to work with what we(the CF) have in the system.  I've heard DRASH is being replaced,  but I don't know what the Army has decided on if anything at this point.

This would depend on the operation conducted; however, if we were conducting an operation whereby we had to deploy coy's by air to different parts of an AO you can quickly see how this could become a challenge with respect to RRB's and you are really limiting the advantages you have if you are simply using VHF.  Imagine conducting a NEO Op if you are making a forced entry into a country and establish your initial airhead, then you have to fly to a town a 100km away to pick up foreign nationals.  Is it necessarily feasible or realistic that you are going to push out a series of RRB's to accomplish this sort of mission?

I am also of the opinion that a Bn should be able to deploy independently with its own Battlegroup, without the requirement for a Bde HQ.  This is particularly true with an Airborne BG making entry into a foreign country.

Yes we have experienced problems with DRASH poles breaking, don't get me wrong it's not perfect but its the best we have in our system and we have made it work.  The Sigs guys have done wonders with it and we have also had our shops produce some outstanding custom attachments for it that can connect the DRASH systems together.  We have also proven that it can be deployed via helicopter or dispatched via CDS Drop and that it can be setup in a reasonable amount of time by the Sigs Pl. 
 
RoyalDrew said:
This would depend on the operation conducted; however, if we were conducting an operation whereby we had to deploy coy's by air to different parts of an AO you can quickly see how this could become a challenge with respect to RRB's and you are really limiting the advantages you have if you are simply using VHF.  Imagine conducting a NEO Op if you are making a forced entry into a country and establish your initial airhead, then you have to fly to a town a 100km away to pick up foreign nationals.  Is it necessarily feasible or realistic that you are going to push out a series of RRB's to accomplish this sort of mission?

I am also of the opinion that a Bn should be able to deploy independently with its own Battlegroup, without the requirement for a Bde HQ.  This is particularly true with an Airborne BG making entry into a foreign country.

This all comes back to a force employment concept.  Forced entry is a start.  But forced entry for what?  To secure a foothold for something else or to start branching out and conducting operations?  Firing companies all over the place may brief well in Adaptive Dispersed Operations, but is that really a desired operating posture we want to aim for considering how vulnerable they would be?

Does Canada have the platforms to conduct and sustain such operations?  How do you feed them after day 3?  How many pallets of rations, batteries, and other stores does it take to supply a BG that is dropped somewhere with a possibly tenuous APOE?  How much fuel does it take for that BG to sustain sub-units dispersed all over hell's half acre?

Perhaps we need a forced entry capability for a BG that doesn't go anywhere as it secures the APOE/SPOE for more robust forces?  If the light battalion is expected to operate as part of a mech bde or within a light bde, than the force employment concept changes a bit as BGs aren't expected to be so self-sufficient.

Yes we have experienced problems with DRASH poles breaking, don't get me wrong it's not perfect but its the best we have in our system and we have made it work.  The Sigs guys have done wonders with it and we have also had our shops produce some outstanding custom attachments for it that can connect the DRASH systems together.  We have also proven that it can be deployed via helicopter or dispatched via CDS Drop and that it can be setup in a reasonable amount of time by the Sigs Pl.

DRASH may be the most useful when it comes to doing those things.  I guess it is a balancing act between the packability of DRASH to the simplicity of MOD.  Having seen a DRASH nearly crash down on a Bde Comd's head or nearly crush a signaler when it fell off the truck, I'm still leery of it's fragility and awkwardness.

Unfortunately, it looks like those are the only two choices aside from the U.S. modular command post system.  I'm wondering if one can get creative and just string shelter-halfs together?
 
RoyalDrew said:
This would depend on the operation conducted; however, if we were conducting an operation whereby we had to deploy coy's by air to different parts of an AO you can quickly see how this could become a challenge with respect to RRB's and you are really limiting the advantages you have if you are simply using VHF.  Imagine conducting a NEO Op if you are making a forced entry into a country and establish your initial airhead, then you have to fly to a town a 100km away to pick up foreign nationals.  Is it necessarily feasible or realistic that you are going to push out a series of RRB's to accomplish this sort of mission?

I am also of the opinion that a Bn should be able to deploy independently with its own Battlegroup, without the requirement for a Bde HQ.  This is particularly true with an Airborne BG making entry into a foreign country.

Yes we have experienced problems with DRASH poles breaking, don't get me wrong it's not perfect but its the best we have in our system and we have made it work.  The Sigs guys have done wonders with it and we have also had our shops produce some outstanding custom attachments for it that can connect the DRASH systems together.  We have also proven that it can be deployed via helicopter or dispatched via CDS Drop and that it can be setup in a reasonable amount of time by the Sigs Pl.

The 'high ground' for any dismounted force behind the lines and reliant on air support has to be that ground you can get comms from.

A Bridge Too Far was a mess largely due to a failure of comms. The sigs weenies are therefore critical in the estimate process, and any Pathfinders deployed need to have comms recce in mind, which they generally do. Any 'host nation' support should generally include contributing comms related info.

Once again, this speaks to the importance of higher formation level support in the planning an execution of these kinds of ops.
 
FYI there is a project on the books to replace all the HQ/CP type canvas:

http://www.materiel.forces.gc.ca/en/hqss.page

I've seen some updated DRASH shelters undergoing testing, they are reinforced to address the snow-loading issues...of course the bidders will submit multiple options.
 
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