Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)

[dapaterson]

We shouldn't underestimate the capabilities of a 'normal', well led Canadian infantry battalion.

I'm glad you used quotes around "normal" when describing any Canadian infantry battalion...

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I think the last point about giving the light battalions a much-needed "boost" to their morale is bunk. I've seen plenty of guys from both mechanized and light units walking around as though their crap doesn't stink, and the same number that whine and moan about how terrible life is and how everyone overlooks them in favour of someone else. 1VP and 3VP live in each others' shadows, and 2VP sulks in the corner and complains about how awful Shilo is.

As for the light battalions/brigades, I think that in an army as small as ours we can afford to play the generalist role "well enough." For example, with the current shortage of LAVs, 2VP cannot afford to outfit the companies in their traditional mechanized role. In fact, the LAVs are being consolidated within Cbt Sp and used as a Zulu LAV "Squadron," presumably as mobile fire support. Does this mean that training stops in the companies?

I'm not going to dispute the fact that a specialized unit will perform its given function better than a unit assigned to that role in an "ad hoc" fashion, but I also believe that in the majority of cases, "good enough" really is good enough and that a force of well-trained generalists will adapt better than an assortment of specialists.

Yes what is going on right now with vehicle shortages is not optimal; however, it will get better once all the LAV's overseas come home and are redistributed back into the Battalions. Just because we are forced at the moment to make difficult decisions in terms of how we employ equipment we currently... doesn't mean we don't need to plan for the way ahead.

I think a lot of people forget Afghanistan is not going to go on forever, things will inevitably change, right now the focus is clearly on conducting operations catering towards the mission; however, when it ends it ends and the next conflict could be entirely different.

Everyone here is quick to discredit doctrine and I don't know why because ultimately it is what dictates how we fight.  Back to the basics/alterations of training/etc.... it is all about adopting our doctrine to meet the present demands and constraints placed on us.  Ultimately doctrine is essentially a guide but without it we would not really be professional soldiers as it provides the guide from the individual soldier all the way to the very top of the organizational chain.

Illegio I feel that you are attacking my point of view without really elaborating why you believe that generalists suit our needs more and that they will adapt better then specialists... I will use the "Show me" rule and ask that you give me an actual example where you think having a military based around a group of generalists will adapt better then a group of specialists.  Most other armies seem to think differently:

The Aussies for instance have their regular army grouped into: A Mechanized Brigade, A Motorized Brigade, and a Light Infantry Brigade (hmmm I think someone else earlier gave this as situation to some of our problems in terms of equipment and manning: Heavy, Medium, Light)

The Dutch also have divided their forces into specialists: 2 Mechanized Brigades, 1 Light Air Mobile Brigade (Rapid Reaction Force capable of deployment within 7 to 20 days)

The Belgian Army is divided along the lines of: 2 Mechanized Brigades, 1 Paratroop Brigade (Rapid Reaction Force)

Come to think of it, I am very hard pressed to find armies that think being generalists is a good idea.  With this in mind we have to look at why the Canadian army is an army of generalists.  I would argue that this is more for political purposes then actual combat effectiveness.  Right now we have three homogeneous Brigade groups which give each of the major population demographics of Canada (West/Central/Quebec) roughly the same capability.  The Brigades themselves are like little fiefdoms representing their part of the country.  Splitting this up, creating new units may create somewhat of an imbalance in the army particularly when dealing with the French/English divide.

On top of that their is always the worry that we create another "Airborne Monster" qack.... my heavens people who appear different then me and show a lot of unit pride, that is so bad!   

Anyways I am kind of ranting now and stepping off topic, I think a lot of people are missing the point of what this topic is about:  Resurrecting Light Infantry Battalions.  We currently have 3 light infantry battalions thrown into what are essentially mechanized brigades.  They don't have any vehicles, well other then busted up MLVW's and LSVW's and their is no plan to procure them any.  So really they are infantry battalions with no clear focus!

We are getting Chinooks, and the Griffons have a new ISTAR/CAS capability with their minigun which gives us the opportunity to develop an airmobile capability.  The Mechanized battalions already have vehicles and ample opportunity to develop training  based around them... the light battalions can go out and do dismounted advanced to contact all day or go play with the chopper boys. 

Having a dedicated air-mobile brigade would give the light battalions a raison-d'etre and would allow for better coordination and planning between the air force and the army in terms of utilization of air-mobile assets.  It would provide us with the opportunity to develop doctrine and tactics in employing the aviation and infantry assets at our disposal, and it would I believe serve some benefit to the CF.

If this is not the way forward, then I must ask how would you go about developing an Air-Mobile capability within the CF?

 


 

 

 

[a_majoor]

Taking a look at what sort of bill a true airmobile unit would require led me to this.

Like many other posters, I agree that a light/airborne/arctic/Marine/Space Ranger force needs the associated support of an entire brigade structure in order to operate. Having a fifth brigade group is a necessary part of the equation, which means that various other issues have to be addressed as well. Manning and procurement are obviously big issues. If we can't afford to buy enough LAVs for our current force, what makes you think we can afford to buy helicopters, BV-206 or other kit?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Taking a look at what sort of bill a true airmobile unit would require led me to this.

Like many other posters, I agree that a light/airborne/arctic/Marine/Space Ranger force needs the associated support of an entire brigade structure in order to operate. Having a fifth brigade group is a necessary part of the equation, which means that various other issues have to be addressed as well. Manning and procurement are obviously big issues. If we can't afford to buy enough LAVs for our current force, what makes you think we can afford to buy helicopters, BV-206 or other kit?

Well the Helicopters are already bought so this part is not so hard to overcome.  As for other special equipment such as Bv206's/G-Wagon's/Skidoos etc... some things would probably need to be cut.  For this I would argue that something like the CCV is not necessarily required.  The army has already identified the LAV as its primary vehicle for Mechanized ops so why would the purchase of a 100 odd CCV's need to occur, its not as if we would be able to outfit battalions with them anyways?  With this money we could then procure Bv's/skidoos/etc.  As well,  potentially a few armoured reserve regiments would need to be cut so that we can utilize their G-Wagons in the light battalions.

As for the support structures, if you read my earlier post you can see the new airmobile brigade would still be split up across the country.  Logistically the light infantry units could still be supported by their respective ASU's; however, we could also embed within each of the light battalions:

1.  An 81mm Mortar Platoon manned by Artillery
2.  A Troop of Engineers
3.  Signals Platoon
4.  Logistics Platoon (manned by logistics)
5.  Maintenance and Repair platoon (EME)

If you look at my original proposal it calls for 3 battalions of light infantry supported by company sized elements of Mortars/Engineers/Logistics/EME/Signals/Etc...  this would reflect its light footprint

Given the geographical separation between the Battalions we would divide these Company level formations into platoons and allocate each battalion a platoons worth to be based internally.

These platoons could then be given access to their respective ASU's and the Service Battalions within them.  It would be organized much like the old CAR when its Commandos were Battalion sized formations.

Each Battalion would look something like this:

2xAir Mobile Coys
1xPara Coys
1xCSC Coy w/Mortars/Recce/Engineer Platoons attached
1xCSS Coy w/Sigs/EME/Logistics Platoons attached

The CSC Coys would qualify 1xSection of Engineers Para to partake in Parachuting exercises/ their would also be Signallers/Medics qualified Para to go along with this. 


So We would have an Air-mobile Brigade with its HQ in Petawawa

1xBtn Air Assault Inf (Petawawa w/1xCoy Para)
1xBtn Air Assault Inf (Edmonton w/1xCoy Para)
1xBtn Air Assault Inf (Val Cartier w/1xCoy Para)

Effectively giving us:
2xBtns of Air Assault Inf
1xBtn of Para

We would have in support
1xPl 81mm Mortar for each Battalion
1xTrp Engineer per Battalion w/1 Section qualified Para
1xPl Sig Per Battalion
1xPl Log Per Battalion
1xPl EME Per Battalion
1xPl Recce Per Battalion

Each of these units would be geographically supported by the ASU's that already support them; however, collective training and planning would be dictated by a new Brigade formation and not by the Mech Brigades.  As well I would argue that in order to make this a truly effective Brigade Air Force personnel would be required to share staffing positions at the Brigade HQ as this would effectively be a dual-element Brigade.

 

[George Wallace]

Stymiest

Some of that doesn't even make sense to me on paper, let alone in real life.  Your proposal of a dispersed unit like this is not cost effective, nor practical. 

Your breakdown of equipment to platoons in three different locations is unrealistic and impractical.  I picture a platoon from each location now being required to marry up with two platoons from the other locations to make up a Coy.

I have the same impression with your statements about their respective ASU's and the Service Battalions being only one third of the whole. 

As for the CAR having Bns, it was only one Bn (called a Regt) with three Coys (called Commandos).  It never had anywhere near 2500+/-  pers at one time.

 

[aesop081]

I think a lot of people forget Afghanistan is not going to go on forever,

Just as a lot of people forget that many things have been going on in the CF in addition to Afghanistan. For example, your comment that we

not take sovereignty and Arctic patrolling seriously

is off-base. I can assure you that operations to continue to assert our control and soverignty are carried out and that CF units have spent, and continue to spend, a considerable ammount of time patrolling our northern areas. While the army has had to direct its (almost) entire focus on Afghanistan, others have had to continue other missions as well.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Stymiest

Some of that doesn't even make sense to me on paper, let alone in real life.  Your proposal of a dispersed unit like this is not cost effective, nor practical. 

Your breakdown of equipment to platoons in three different locations is unrealistic and impractical.  I picture a platoon from each location now being required to marry up with two platoons from the other locations to make up a Coy.

I have the same impression with your statements about their respective ASU's and the Service Battalions being only one third of the whole. 

As for the CAR having Bns, it was only one Bn (called a Regt) with three Coys (called Commandos).  It never had anywhere near 2500+/-  pers at one time.

My understanding was that early on the Commando's were actually intended to be battalion size but were gradually reduced to what was a battalion of infantry.  Its original intent was to operate as a Brigade(-) element, and originally it had its own integral artillery/engineer assets etc...

I'll try to explain what I mean a little bit better.  Right now at 3 RCR all we have really for Combat Support is Recce...
we have no Mortar pPatoon and no Pioneers.  My idea is to incorporate a Troop of Engineers and a Mortar Platoon from the Artillery to give the light forces their own integral Combat Support Elements.

The Light Infantry Battalions already continue to utilize the Service Battalions as they are so why not simply continue to do so.  Rather then uproot the present light battalions and forcing ourselves to build new infrastructure we can maintain them where they are but place them in their own Brigade grouping.   

I am trying to figure out a way to take the light infantry units we currently have put them in their own Brigade but maintain them in their present geographic locations.  Logisticians please help :-D

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Just as a lot of people forget that many things have been going on in the CF in addition to Afghanistan. For example, your comment that we

is off-base. I can assure you that operations to continue to assert our control and soverignty are carried out and that CF units have spent, and continue to spend, a considerable ammount of time patrolling our northern areas. While the army has had to direct its (almost) entire focus on Afghanistan, others have had to continue other missions as well.

Point taken, I wasn't directing my comment at the CF as a whole it was more targeted towards the Army audience sorry if I offended you...

 

[aesop081]

sorry if I offended you...

Not to worry, i was far from offended.

 

[Fusaki]

I'd argue that instead of building divisions within our forces, we need to put the resources into all-around excellence.  Having all parts of your forces provide you with the most options gives us true flexibility.  I know Canadian soldiers and our Infantry are capable of this.

I agree.

We need to organize and train for maximum flexibility, and build a system that allows us to learn and adapt quickly in fluid situations.

There's no sense in trying to specialize our units until we know what threat they'll be facing.  We won't know what threat they'll be facing until the war actually starts.  And even then, I'm not sure we could reach any real level of specificity before the enemy adapts to us and we have to do something new anyway.

What we should be worried about, then, is not in specializing, but in learning how to move through the OODA loop faster than the enemy.

Edit to add:

If I'm sounding really flaky, it's because I've been reading about complexity theory.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/11/coin-complexity-and-fullspectr/

 

[Old Sweat]

Let me turn to the mortar platoon again, as it seems to be just tossed around as something transferred "from the artillery." For sake of argument let us assume that it is designed to operate without other gunner support. Therefore it will require:

a. a platoon commander with a small party to perform the role of fire support adviser to the CO.

b. a FSCC with the communications and equipment to coordinate all fire support assets available to the battalion, and to control the movement and employment of the mortar groups.

c. three FOO/FAC parties, although experience from "the war" showed they should be separate, so perhaps we are tallking three FOO parties and three FACs.

d. two groups of four mortars each.

e. an administrative element to bring up the bullets and other stuff required to maintain the platoon in action.

The manpower for this will eat up close to half of the indirect fire capabiity of each field regiment. In other words, one third of our infantry is going to take command of half of our field artillery resources. I submit that this ain't going to happen.

 

[vonGarvin]

CO says so...leaving room for this sort of flexibility is a good thing; you know, that whole mission command thing.

Doctrine is "what is taught", not necessarily "what is practiced", while manning authorization and TO&E are administrative tools for the adjutant, quartermaster and comptroller branches, not tactical straightjackets on the commanders.  Since doctrine and manning authorisation are usually right outta'er, I can't blame commanders for doing what they can with what they got.

I know that doctrine is a guide, but it's there for a reason.  And since Units are obliged to do certain things (eg: have xxx Infantry Companies, etc), having a "Zulu LAV" Squadron (?) may sound like a cool thing to do, there is no basis for it in doctrine or mandate for the battalions, who are mandated to train up to only level 4 (company).  Which begs the question: what BTS are they following?

Having said that, having only enough vehicles for 1/2 or less of your sub-units is right out to lunch as well; however, I fail to see how we can say "mission command" when they aren't even following the contraints from higher (eg: train up companies).

 

[R031button]

Is there a real need for this to be a Brigade, with it's associated HQ and manning? If I understand this correctly, the real core of what Symiest is proposing is the idea of light forces which would be capable of going somewhere quickly, and without the support assets required by a mechanized force. Such a force would be used to gain lodgment in a hostile area until follow on forces are available ie taking a beach head, seizing an airfield, or some other point of entry. In my opinion the Canadian military hasn't deployed more then a battle group to a combat theater since Korea, and isn't likely to do so unless the balloons go up,  so really the initial force doesn't need to be larger then a battle group. Would it not make sense then to maintain high readiness, rapidly deployable, already organized battle groups? Trained on a delivery system that allows them to be the first in, ie: airborne/air mobile. I don't think that requires creating Canada's answer to the Royal Marines, I would prefer to see something more like the British Army's plot system, where battalions cycle through the role. So 1 PPCLI spends 3 years as a mech battalion, then shifts to take over the air mobile role from 3 RCR, while 2 RCR shifts to take over the amphibious (presuming such a role is desired) role from 3 R22R. This requires no new equipment, simply shifting the ownership over (minus the amphibious role which is probably the subject of a whole different thread). I'll also but this out there, if we're talking about a purely expeditionary role for these Battle Groups, why not have them fall directly under the command of CEFCOM rather then creating a new HQ?

edit: I would also suggest that one light infantry battle group be attached to CANCOM with an arctic / mountain warfare role, possibly having companies forward deployed to the north for sov ops.

 

[downinOZ]

1.  An 81mm Mortar Platoon manned by Artillery
2.  A Troop of Engineers
3.  Signals Platoon
4.  Logistics Platoon (manned by logistics)
5.  Maintenance and Repair platoon (EME)
Each Battalion would look something like this:

Effectively giving us:
2xBtns of Air Assault Inf
1xBtn of Para

We would have in support
1xPl 81mm Mortar for each Battalion
1xTrp Engineer per Battalion w/1 Section qualified Para
1xPl Sig Per Battalion
1xPl Log Per Battalion
1xPl EME Per Battalion
1xPl Recce Per Battalion

The light infantry brigade has a few pieces added to support its viability.  First, two (and soon all three) Bns are geographically located together, with all support assets, including an AVN Bde, some naval elements, and an airbase co-located.  Although almost completely interoperable, the concept of the light Bde is to seize and hold for 72 hours.  One battalion focuses on airmobile planning and airmobile operations including airborne rappel.  Another bn focuses on amphibious and littoral operations.  The third bn focuses on airborne (paratroop) operations, including holding and securing key points.  In full scale offensive operations, the airborne battalion conducts a deep airborne insertion (or tactical land) and holds open an airfield  or air point of entry for follow on forces; the amphibious battalion clears and secures a beachhead or Sea point of entry, and the airmobile secures other key points.  All are reinforced or relieved by any of the other four mechanized/motorised bns able to deploy from either ship or C17.

Each of the light infantry units is tasked with specific planning.  However, except for airborne operations, OPS cells are expected to be able to conduct planning for all light infantry tasks, and are supported by planning LOs from the required elements; Navy for amphib ops, army aviation for airmobile ops, and airforce for tactical land ops.

I think that what makes this (a light infantry bde) a viable option for the Chiefs is the logistical support established for these tasks.  The three bns mirror each other, which helps with a lot of planning: similar orbat, similar manning, similar equipment, just different ways of getting there.  When the bde conducts a Bde task, ISR is pulled from all three Bns.  When mobility is required, a cav unit supplies a Bn lift of PMVs.  The engineer and Artillery regiments deploy squadrons and Batteries in support of each Bn combat team, and airforce attachments reinforce any deficiencies not filled by the artillery.

I watched closely when the Canadian Infantry  began its modernisation - pioneers, mortars being farmed out/cut out.  The light Battalions are based around combat teams.  It doesn't matter what size.  An excellent live fire exercise was recently conducted for platoon teams.  Platoon commanders had sniper support, recon to lead them into FUP, mortar and gun fire controllers for the section of 81 mm mortars and either the 50 cal (NOT very cool dismounted), mag58 in SF role, a section ( or so) of pioneers, a section of engineers, and a JFC (Joint fires controller) to drop bombs from a section of 105s.  The attack was done after the platoon commander or JFC called in a pair of F18s, and the platoon had reorganised.

Three weeks later, that exercise was replicated at the Bn level, with tanks and mechanized infantry.  It was shit.  What it really demonstrated was that light infantry are not successful when motorised or mechanized infantry can do the job.  Te logistical support and rate of movement just aren't comparable.  So my argument is that specialisation SHOULD occur.  Light infantry can get into APCs (if Mech ever got out), and mech could get out and conduct an airmobile op somewhere.  But As a planner, I'd rather have tailored forces that I could count on the staff to know the details to sort out, and the soldiers to have the TTPs already ingrained.

Geographically, the Bde is not currently all co-located.  Yes,the engineer regiment is tasked to provide a parachute capable element.  I'm sure that 1 CER can do that.  A Bty is dedicated to parachute operations; that capability is likely being reduced to JFCs only.  In admin company, armourers and mechanics are jump qual'd.  For those rare must-have skills, specialists can be tandem parachuted into a DZ.  A signals det from the Sig regt provides a higher link, and organic signallers provide comms for whoever can still walk.  I can't comment on whether pre-deployment training time is shorter for mech/motorised/light.

In summary;
1.  All infantry are generalists, in that there are relatively few barriers for  being posted from one Bn to another;
2.  BDEs organised along light/med/heavy makes sense, as logistical and other support (training areas, exercise planning, equipment trials) take advantage of common requirements.
3.  Everyone else comes to the party to support a mobility type - mech engineers, paratrooper mechanics.
4.  Planning for mission types is conducted with the Bn's capability in mind; recognise the light infantry battalions come with significant organic capability, but their ability to conduct protracted missions in certain types of terrain are limited. In order to conduct the mission to an expected standard, they require either the previous experience ( gained perhaps via rotational system as per R031button) or with significant pre-deployment training.
5

 

[vonGarvin]

I know that doctrine is a guide, but it's there for a reason.  And since Units are obliged to do certain things (eg: have xxx Infantry Companies, etc), having a "Zulu LAV" Squadron (?) may sound like a cool thing to do, there is no basis for it in doctrine or mandate for the battalions, who are mandated to train up to only level 4 (company).  Which begs the question: what BTS are they following?

Having said that, having only enough vehicles for 1/2 or less of your sub-units is right out to lunch as well; however, I fail to see how we can say "mission command" when they aren't even following the contraints from higher (eg: train up companies).

Having said all this; however, given that there aren't enough to go around, I suppose it makes sense to consolidate/concentrate the few precious LAVs in one company to maintain training on them, and allowing the rifle companies to focus on other infantry stuff. 

 

[Illegio]

That, and the upcoming tasks for the companies (NEO, NTC, Northern Bison) do not require the normal complement of LAVs.

 

[vonGarvin]

That, and the upcoming tasks for the companies (NEO, NTC, Northern Bison) do not require the normal complement of LAVs.

Makes sense.

 

[Jarnhamar]

question.
How come on paper we're like, 1000+ over the limit in the infantry but when I talk to guys in the battalion they say they are short manned.  I remember augmented reservists (reserves LOL) acting as section 2ICs or even section commanders for a while during work up training and on tour.

Are we really thinking about new regiments and brigades?

I'm not sure where we are getting the manpower for this.

 

[KevinB]

The "limit" does not account for 100% manning of units, and the additional manning of other positions for which Infantryman may be detailed (HQ's, Schools, other non trade specific taskings etc).

 

 

[dapaterson]

The "limit" does not account for 100% manning of units, and the additional manning of other positions for which Infantryman may be detailed (HQ's, Schools, other non trade specific taskings etc).

Actually, the limit does account for 100% manning of the actual establishment, including ERE employment.  There are gaps at particular rank levels that may prevent that, plus some poor pers management practices that provide some with to many and others with not enough.

But the limit does include both hard and generic positions (indeed, for officers, at Major and above the number of "Any Trade" positions outnumbers the number of hard positions)