Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)

[vonGarvin]

I agree with Infanteer on most points.  The most important is the force employment model for the land force.  Gone are the days of having brigades tasked for certain tasks, such as 4 CMBG tasked as a formation to fend off the Soviet hordes, 5e GBMC to be our CAST brigade, or later the formation to augment 4 CMBG and form 1 Canadian Division in the Federal Republic of Germany in the event of war. 

Our model now is to deploy task-tailored battlegroups, with various support and headquarters elements.  In order to deploy for operations, we need a model.  That model currently is to deploy as an infantry battlegroup into Kandahar.  The next model is...?  Anyway, I would offer that the key is flexibility.  We need forces that can operate with tanks, without tanks, with air support, without air support or however.  Can the Land Force make the risk to have fewer units, all of which are specialised?  Or do we need generalists?  I think we all know the advantages and disadvantages of both generalists and specialists.  We are indeed a small Land Force, and I would offer that forces that are flexible enough to deploy in many modes is preferable.

But what does this mean?  Does this mean that we should revert to an model in which all three regular brigades are symmetrical in order to allow for force generation to sustain an operation?  Or do we have three different versions of brigades, and as required, the brigade that best fits the model for employment is deployed, and then the other two then revert to mirror the role best suited for operation "X"?

In any event, no matter to what degree I disagree with Infanteer on "mindsets", the key is that there are many skillsets that transcend "infantry types", that one must remember the training model for any arm or branch.  The "progress" is from individual training, sharpened by continuation training, and then augmented by collective training, and so forth.

As an example, all infantrymen must know how to do a number of things.  They need, for example, to be able to shoot, move and communicate as a member of a rifle section.  It matters not if they are with or without tanks, dropped by parachute, dropped off on shore by a landing craft, or beamed in from a Constellation class Starship.  Potential infantrymen are trained up to CF requirements on their BMQ (stuff that all NC Members of the CF require), followed by DP 1, which teaches army and infantry specific skillsets. 

Once successful, they are posted to a unit, where they develop their skillsets as part of a rifle section.  From there, you can talk about collective training.  The levels are as follows:
1: Crew
2: Section
3: Platoon
(I'll go no further for now)
As a crew member, they could become a machine gunner, a LAV APC gunner, etc.  They then train up as a crew, with crew commander, etc.  Then, they learn to fight as a section.  This differs from Individual training in that they aren't training as part of a generic section, but the actual section commander, 2IC, etc all learn to gel, and all that goes with it.  And from there to platoon.  And so on and so forth


So, no matter what they fight in, on or with, they are all trained first to a common level, and then branch from there to fit the niche required of them as part of the team.

Now, for me, my experience is virtually all mechanised.  I have, since the 1980s, learned to shoot, move and communicate as part of a combat team.  First as a section 2IC, then Section commander, then on as platoon commander (detour to mortar platoon) and then as a LAV Captain and Coy 2IC.  I see the advantages of being with a certain "type" as a base.

However:

I don't think that it's all that hard to "morph" from a "light fighter" to a "mech head".  I just feel that the difference is enough that one cannot simply crawl from one "role" to another, but requires certain individual and collective training before carrying on with that role. 

So, the disagreement I have with Infanteer's opinion is more philosophical, rather than practicable. 

 

[Matt_Fisher]

1.  Force Generation rules all.  It's nice to have a certain capability, but if it can't be generated and sustained then I'd suggest it is of limited use to the Force Generators.  More disparity between force generation and force employment means more shuffling and more re-tasking and ad hocery, which makes for more turbulence.  I think others are recognizing this as well.

Do we have enough forces to run a dual track of mission capability? i.e. enough mech or light roled units to allow for sufficient ramp up time for either to be trained up into the other mission capability?

2.  Winter warfare always seems to hold a sacred place in the Army's heart.  What do we really want/need.  Winter indoc in terms of making sure we don't die if we are out in the freezing cold for over a day?  Or do we want genuine winter warfare capability?  If so, I'd suggest that stringing a toboggan up and wandering around in snowshoes is the wrong way to achieve this.

Much agreed, and I think the Army needs to take a more serious look at what they are required to bring to the table in terms of arctic response capability.  The current reserve company groups tasked with arctic response is pretty laughable.  Serious work needs to be made into redeveloping an Army capability that is able to respond in a timely manner, conduct operations for an extended period of time regardless of environmental conditions, and have a working sustainment system that can operate for an extended period of time regardless of environmental conditions.

3.  ArmyRick makes a good call for "skill-camps"; the British recently moved away from (but still maintain some aspects of) the Arms Plot system.  Aspects of this, as Rick mentioned, could be worked into the Force Generation cycle to good measure.

4.  Air mobility isn't that hard.  I've seen a "mech" company (I prefer to call it a Rifle Company) conducting fast-roping onto objectives on air mobile assaults from amphibious assault ships - it wasn't SOF-standard precision but it was what one would require out of conventional forces.  It wasn't a black art for them to learn and I don't know if this requires full-scale reorganization of the Forces to accomplish.

I think a big problem here is the ad hoc/random nature/commander's fetish/good idea fairy mindset with light infantry training, i.e. mountain ops, long range dismounted patrolling, amphibious ops, etc. that tends to happen with respect to CF infantry training in the mech battalions.  We do a fairly good job of identifying key training milestones that a mech infantry battalion must pass as part of a readiness cycle (i.e. LAV Gunner PCF, unit gunnery ex's, mech ops, etc.) but on the light infantry side of things, there seems to be little if anything similar in terms of skillsets identified and a formalized uniform training system put into place.  USMC MEU (SOC) work up certifications for the Ground Combat Element's Battalion Landing Team have specific skillsets which could be used as a general base guideline as to where CF infantry battalions could work from to develop both mech and light role skillsets.

5.  Finally, most here know my thoughts on the "Light Infantry Mindset" - I'll restate my view that it is a bit of a fallacy and that all it's positive aspects are part of a "Good Infantry Mindset" which we have and should continue to refine.  Never discount the ability of good soldiers to use vehicles to operate in complex environments to increase their effectiveness - I'll point disbelievers to William Slim's thoughts on the matter (I also agree with his thoughts a parachutes to).

Again agreed.  Things like physical and mental fitness, initiative, and an ability to positively respond to change should be developed as core functions of the Infanteer so as to be able to adapt and overcome adversity in his environment.  I don't think the problem so much is the individual Infanteer not being able to change roles, but more so the organizational structure in terms of how we organize echelons/support/sustainment, unit embark lists, etc. which can cause alot of growing pains between light and mech roles. 

 

[Infanteer]

I don't think that it's all that hard to "morph" from a "light fighter" to a "mech head".  I just feel that the difference is enough that one cannot simply crawl from one "role" to another, but requires certain individual and collective training before carrying on with that role. 

So, the disagreement I have with Infanteer's opinion is more philosophical, rather than practicable.

Actually, we're in agreement here.  My mention above of "Arms Plot" respects the fact some lead time must be given to transition between orientation.  A CQ/2IC team isn't going to automatically know how much fuel 15 LAVs will chew up in a day.  But they'll learn quick.  What I don't believe is that there is a sharp divide between the two and that there is a black art to both that requires separate career paths and organizations.  Semper Gumby!

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I am not a believer in the idea that you can take any unit and at the drop of the hat make them a light infantry force.  Sure at the very basic level a soldier will be able to with little effort switch between the two, a rifleman is a rifleman that we cannot dispute; however, it is at the more senior levels of the NCO cadre as well as at the Officer level where the separation must be made.  Why?  because the planning considerations in terms of tactics/supply and support for lets say an Air Mobile/Air Assault Op are very different from that of a mechanized force. 

This is not to say that at the present time all our infantry units couldn't conduct these operations.  The problem we have in Canada is that we have these "Light Infantry Units" but they don't have any of the necessary enablers that would make them particularly effective i.e. Helicopters.  To shed more light on this, N Coy 3 RCR is conducting an Air Mobile exercise next week, we asked for 4 griffons to assist with this operations, 400 sqn came abck said you can have two, we said fine; 2 Helicopters to move an entire company lets make it work.  They come back to us a couple of days ago and tell us now you only have one Chopper.  We are supposed to be an Air Assault Company yet we can't even get more then one utility helicopter for an exercise.

So with this being said, at this time sure all the units could definitely conduct air mobile ops, but then again the CF's approach to Light Infantry and Air Mobility/Para/Mtn Ops/Arctic Warfare as a whole is pretty sub-standard to the point where it broaches being non-existent.

If we are to have a light infantry capability lets do it right and have those units designated light infantry focus on those operations that occur in austere environments so that they can become specialists and SME's in those areas.  This is not me bashing Mech forces and to say that you couldn't do the light role, you most definitely can; however, would it not be more effective to have forces that are specialists in mechanized warfare and forces that are specialists in the light tasks.

Its like playing Canadian Football as opposed to American Football, both are relatively similar, have the same objectives etc... yet their are enough differences between the two that they require different types of players.  If we want to have an effective light infantry force we need soldiers that are out there practicing light infantry tasks day in day out.     

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I agree with Infanteer on most points.  The most important is the force employment model for the land force.  Gone are the days of having brigades tasked for certain tasks, such as 4 CMBG tasked as a formation to fend off the Soviet hordes, 5e GBMC to be our CAST brigade, or later the formation to augment 4 CMBG and form 1 Canadian Division in the Federal Republic of Germany in the event of war. 

Our model now is to deploy task-tailored battlegroups, with various support and headquarters elements.  In order to deploy for operations, we need a model.  That model currently is to deploy as an infantry battlegroup into Kandahar.  The next model is...?  Anyway, I would offer that the key is flexibility.  We need forces that can operate with tanks, without tanks, with air support, without air support or however.  Can the Land Force make the risk to have fewer units, all of which are specialised?  Or do we need generalists?  I think we all know the advantages and disadvantages of both generalists and specialists.  We are indeed a small Land Force, and I would offer that forces that are flexible enough to deploy in many modes is preferable.

But what does this mean?  Does this mean that we should revert to an model in which all three regular brigades are symmetrical in order to allow for force generation to sustain an operation?  Or do we have three different versions of brigades, and as required, the brigade that best fits the model for employment is deployed, and then the other two then revert to mirror the role best suited for operation "X"?

In any event, no matter to what degree I disagree with Infanteer on "mindsets", the key is that there are many skillsets that transcend "infantry types", that one must remember the training model for any arm or branch.  The "progress" is from individual training, sharpened by continuation training, and then augmented by collective training, and so forth.

As an example, all infantrymen must know how to do a number of things.  They need, for example, to be able to shoot, move and communicate as a member of a rifle section.  It matters not if they are with or without tanks, dropped by parachute, dropped off on shore by a landing craft, or beamed in from a Constellation class Starship.  Potential infantrymen are trained up to CF requirements on their BMQ (stuff that all NC Members of the CF require), followed by DP 1, which teaches army and infantry specific skillsets. 

Once successful, they are posted to a unit, where they develop their skillsets as part of a rifle section.  From there, you can talk about collective training.  The levels are as follows:
1: Crew
2: Section
3: Platoon
(I'll go no further for now)
As a crew member, they could become a machine gunner, a LAV APC gunner, etc.  They then train up as a crew, with crew commander, etc.  Then, they learn to fight as a section.  This differs from Individual training in that they aren't training as part of a generic section, but the actual section commander, 2IC, etc all learn to gel, and all that goes with it.  And from there to platoon.  And so on and so forth


So, no matter what they fight in, on or with, they are all trained first to a common level, and then branch from there to fit the niche required of them as part of the team.

Now, for me, my experience is virtually all mechanised.  I have, since the 1980s, learned to shoot, move and communicate as part of a combat team.  First as a section 2IC, then Section commander, then on as platoon commander (detour to mortar platoon) and then as a LAV Captain and Coy 2IC.  I see the advantages of being with a certain "type" as a base.

However:

I don't think that it's all that hard to "morph" from a "light fighter" to a "mech head".  I just feel that the difference is enough that one cannot simply crawl from one "role" to another, but requires certain individual and collective training before carrying on with that role. 

So, the disagreement I have with Infanteer's opinion is more philosophical, rather than practicable.

I hadn't read this post before I made my last one but this goes along well with my argument about Planning Considerations, we have been very fortunate that we have time on our side so we can actually do Collective Training prior to deploying overseas.  What happens if we don't have that luxury in the future. 

There is a reason why countries maintain Light Infantry Air Mobile divisions; the Dutch for instance and their 11 Luchtmobiele Brigade, so that when they need to make that forced entry they can do it quickly then call up the heavies afterwards. 

 

[Kirkhill]

So, a mech infanteer can become a light infanteer and a light infanteer can become a mech infanteer. Likewise a Brigade can switch roles.

But, for the transition to occur a couple of things are required:
Time
Target

It will take time to reorient an entity from one tasking to the other.  The greater the complexity of the entity the longer time it will take.  An infanteer may make the switch with a two period briefing while a Brigade may require a 6 month Work Up.

The other thing required is a Quality Control Standard - a Target - what are the clearly defined expectations of a Mech and a Light Infantry Brigade or Battle Gp.  What can they do with the kit the taxpayer has supplied them, where can they do it and how long can they continue doing it?

To my mind developing that Target demands maintaining a Light Infantry force-in-being as a permanent entity.

A single unit would be useful for running trials but probably be ineffective as a policy tool because if deployed you have now deprived the army of its trainers and there is no one available to conduct the conversion training of follow on units.

Conversely, if you have 3 units you can have one deployed, and learning how to adapt to the enemy's plan, one back home trained in the same assumptions as the one deployed and learning their lessons learned while the third one is working with the rest of the army to bring their skill sets up to the base level.

I believe the same process was used in reverse to convert the light infantry to mech for Afghanistan.

The real advantage of a permanent light force AND a permanent mech force is that they learn how to operate within the special limitations of their kit and, more importantly, buy time for the force and the government to react more effectively to the actual needs of the situation.

The more practice they get in particular scenarios the more proficient they will become but even doing one exercise one time will supply lessons learned.

And perhaps conversion training, light to mech, mech to light should be part of the training cycle, if for no other reason than, I believe, that a CH47 can lift a Bison, and a Coyote (I think the LAV III is too heavy), it can also lift a Bv206, so it is possible that some "light" operations could involve a "mech" component.

 

[Infanteer]

I am not a believer in the idea that you can take any unit and at the drop of the hat make them a light infantry force.  Sure at the very basic level a soldier will be able to with little effort switch between the two, a rifleman is a rifleman that we cannot dispute; however, it is at the more senior levels of the NCO cadre as well as at the Officer level where the separation must be made.  Why?  because the planning considerations in terms of tactics/supply and support for lets say an Air Mobile/Air Assault Op are very different from that of a mechanized force.

...and that makes "Light Infantry" unique?  Helicopters?  Sorry, but working with helicopters is not black magic.  As I said above, I've seen rifle companies do this with minimal difficulty.  I went from the guy dealing with zulu LAVs to the guy dealing with 6 CH-53s.  Planning considerations in terms of tactics/supply and support are different, but it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure it out - in fact it takes a well-rounded and experienced Infantry Officer and Warrant Officer to do so.

For you I go back to my original comment - does any threat to Canada really justify 3 Mountain/Jungle Warfare battalions (as that's pretty much what the "Light Infantry" have been explained to me as) and if so, how do you fit those 3 into the Force Generation cycle?

 

[a_majoor]

If  Canada is to need a specialist force, then it should be an Arctic warfare force.

That is one place which is/will become more important as we need to assert our own sovereignty, which is job one for any military force.

As Infanteer pointed out, a force which actually knows how to live, work and fight in the arctic needs more than "how to avoid freezing to death" indoc training. Loads of very specialized kit will be needed, and lots of training and experience in actually living and working in a very unforgiving environment in order to be an effective and creditable force. Since we will need all arms and elements, this is actually an Arctic Brigade group.

As for the light/heavy divide south of the Arctic circle, I don't see that we have diverged or specialized so much that there is a need for a distinctive "Panzergrenadier", Stoßtruppen or Jäger units. In some past thread, there were arguments about Panzergrenadiers being defined by being trained in the customary use the firepower of their vehicles while fighting dismounted (the vehicle being essentially a mobile firebase that fought and moved with the troops).
Unless something has changed, this is just one of the many tactics our Infantry can use when circumstances dictate, not the ordinary and customary means of operating in a mech battalion.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

...and that makes "Light Infantry" unique?  Helicopters?  Sorry, but working with helicopters is not black magic.  As I said above, I've seen rifle companies do this with minimal difficulty.  I went from the guy dealing with zulu LAVs to the guy dealing with 6 CH-53s.  Planning considerations in terms of tactics/supply and support are different, but it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure it out - in fact it takes a well-rounded and experienced Infantry Officer and Warrant Officer to do so.

For you I go back to my original comment - does any threat to Canada really justify 3 Mountain/Jungle Warfare battalions (as that's pretty much what the "Light Infantry" have been explained to me as) and if so, how do you fit those 3 into the Force Generation cycle?

No it doesn't and your right all it takes is well experienced senior NCO's and infantry officers to make it work.  What I
would like to see is taking all the light infantry assets congregating them into their own Brigade; something like what
the Dutch have done.  Unfortunately this probably isn't a reality, something maybe a little bit more practical would be
giving each of the light battalions we currently have a specific task 3PPCLI (Mtn/Jungle warfare) 3RCR (Air Mobile)
3 R22eR (Para)... this probably wouldn't happen either because no regiment really wants to let go of their little i
individual fiefdom but lets face it a Coy of Para/Mtn Ops/Air Mobile whatever is not big enough to operate on its own... having a battalion of each would provide concentration of force and clear direction that each of these specialties is clearly lacking.

Maybe something else to consider; bringing CSOR out of the SOF world and closer to the regular army and making them
something akin to the 75th Ranger Regiment. 

In reality I think you bring up an excellent point Infanteer; how do we fit light infantry into our current force generation cycle.  This I don't really have an answer for at the moment but it would be interesting to hear what other peoples opinions are?

Thinking about off the top of my head the only way I would see it occurring would be taking the light infantry units out of their present brigades and congregating them into their own special brigade?  The biggest problem with this would be providing them with all the enablers... one way to get around this could be bringing back all the Combat Support elements Mortars/Pioneers/Anti Armour... etc but only in the light infantry.  I don't know what thoughts are on this but it is worth some consideration.

 

[vonGarvin]

I would offer that if we did go with a light force, that the light force be brigade sized, because the combat support and combat service support elements in the brigade would be required to provide those functions to any deploying unit.  I would then go a step further, and of the other two brigades, make one of them "heavy" and the other "medium" (whatever that means...)

So, what of the force generation/force employment?  Suppose we have to deploy to Kerblackistan, and a light force were deemed to be optimal. Well, the first "roto" would come from that light brigade.  But just as immediate as its deployment of a unit from that brigade, another unit (another brigade?  same brigade?) would have to them train up starting immediately with all the individual and collective training to get them to level 7 confirmed (eg: battlegroup), supposing that we maintain that we only deploy battlegroups.  Assume that the deployment is 9 months long, that give the next unit around 8 months to "ramp up", and if done efficiently, that is sufficient time. 

The same model could work with the "heavy" and "medium" brigades.  Now, in terms of readiness, and assuming a two-month confirmation period prior to deployment, each brigade would have to have a battlegroup on "medium" readiness, confirmed up to level 5 (combat team) upon entering their term of readiness.  Once warned off of an impending deployment, given that the individual and collective training has been completed to level 5, it wouldn't take long to "dust off" an exercise instruction to have that unit complete a level 7 confirmation and then deployment.  It would also require units to maintain a DAG of sorts, with monthly checks, during their readiness cycles, but it would also mean that units wouldn't have to keep cycling through CMTC, because we all know that we aren't "coiled springs" ready to fly away on missions.

 

[HItorMiss]

Maybe something else to consider; bringing CSOR out of the SOF world and closer to the regular army and making them
something akin to the 75th Ranger Regiment. 

Wont/Can't happen you would lose the vast majority of guys there who didn't go through selection and then 7-8 months of course to suddenly say yeah forget those skills sets now you're going to be Rangers, not a viable option

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Wont/Can't happen you would lose the vast majority of guys there who didn't go through selection and then 7-8 months of course to suddenlty say yeah forget those skills sets now you're going to be Rangers, not a viable option

And if a re-role happened, what'd these guys realistically be looking at doing as an alternative? 

 

[HItorMiss]

The VAST majority would release I suspect. Some would stay of course but the idea of going back to Army and to a role such as that would/is repugnant to the people I know that hang their hat there. Thankfully I can't see there being any steam for this anywhere in CANSOFCOM but then again it isn't like I walk around the halls of Ottawa in the know about these things  8)

Don't even ask how many would be willing to go back to a normal Bn that's pretty much 0...


EDIT: Spelling and to add small point

 

[vonGarvin]

Personally I don't see a reason for CSOR to return as anything part of the army.  (Unless they just bring their 60mm mortars and let me have them)  ;D

 

[Matt_Fisher]

The VAST majority would release I suspect. Some would stay of course but the idea of going back to Army and to a role such as that would/is repugnant to the people I know that hang their hat there. Thankfully I can't see there being any steam for this anywhere in CANSOFCOM but then again it isn't like I walk around the halls of Ottawa in the know about these things  8)

Don't even ask how many would be willing to go back to a normal Bn that's pretty much 0...


EDIT: Spelling and to add small point

We always hear the 'Troops will vote with their feet' argument, and to a certain respect, yeah probably a significant number would VR, however we've seen things like this happen in the past whereby a unit is disbanded (i.e. CAR), Re-roled, or is moved (i.e. 1RCR from London to Petawawa, and 2PPCLI from Winnipeg to Shilo) and the majority of troops just get on with things. 

I'm not saying this to belittle the efforts that the pers in CSOR have made in developing that unit, what I'm saying is that I don't always buy the 'Troops vote with their feet' argument that's made.

 

[Old Sweat]

I think Bullet Magnet is referring more to the difference in "climate" between a SOF unit where self discipline and accountability plays a large part, and the more formal and stiffer modus operendi in an infantry battalion.

 

[Illegio]

Add to that, a disproportionate amount of time and money goes into the training of each CSOR operator, so it makes sense to exploit them to the full extent of their capabilities.

 

[ArmyRick]

Matt,

Sorry bro but I don't think there is any way CSOR would/should be re-rolled into a conventional army unit. It would be btter off to simply disband them rather than make another unit.

Matt our boys are not pure mech infantry soldiers. When I was in 2VP, we more than impressed the USMC down in lejeune with our dismounted skills. We did 0 work up training but we did receive a little from US Navy and the corps (mostly on proper boarding/deboarding drills choppers, amtracks, LCAC, river boats, etc, etc). Again trg was minimal.

As far as really expanding our arctic skills and capabilities, we have the skills but we could certainly use a nice peice of kit such as the Viking ATVP (BV210). Its light enough to be hauled around by a chinook.

 

[Kirkhill]

Disregarding the issue of CSOR re-roling to inf for a moment - an unnecessary and undesirable course IMHO - and reverting to the issue of Light Battalions:

As I understand the situation current there is an allocation of something like 6000 PYs (the number 5394 seems to stick in my mind for some reason) for all Infantry based positions including sigs, medics, loggies and clerks permanently attached to battalions.  There is also a determination to maintain 9 Infantry Battalions.  There is also a limitation on the number of LAVs available so that only 1/2 to 2/3rds of the available troops are likely to be mechanized.  This is recognized by the fact that some of the TAPVs are being purchased as Section Carriers for the Infantry.

IMHO the situation is not a question of SHOULD you have Light Infantry soldiers but WHERE will you locate them?

Will they be LOB numbers waiting for their chance to ride in the LAVs?

Will they be allocated to various schools?

Will they be held as a spare platoon at company level? Company at Battalion level?  Battalion at Brigade level? Brigade at CF level?


In my opinion any numbers supernumerary to the minimum needs of the LAVs should be held at the highest possible level and organized into the largest possible groups and trained to operate within the limits that the equipment available imposes.

It is not that LAV Troopers can't do helo or riverine ops.  It is that helo and riverine ops can also be done by troops without LAVs.  And we don't have enough LAVs to go around but we do have Helicopters.  Therefore train the LAVless in tasks that don't need LAVs.  Fortunately for Canada LAVs are incompatible with operations in the 70% of our landmass that is inaccessible by roads of any sort, the 8% of the country that is covered by fresh water and all of our littoral waters.

LAV units are absolutely brilliant as foreign policy tools.  We pick those fights and deploy what we can, where we can, as we can.  We set the terms of reference and planning permits LAVs to operate alongside Strykers, CV90s, Warriors, Bushmasters, TLAVs and the entire arms dealers catalogs with unit structures that allocate 3 to 8 vehicles per platoon and 4-12 troops per vehicle.

There is a way to generate 6 LAV battalions and 9 independent Light Infantry Company Combat Teams within the 5394 number (to include Pnrs, Mors, and AT-DF troops) but it would require downsizing the LAV platoon to 3 cars each with a 3 man crew (Fire Teams A,B & C) and a 4 man dismount team (Fire Teams D,E & F).  The Pl and 2ic would be ride alongs as would be specialist dets and teams.  (30 seats-9 crew-12 dsmounts-2 cmd = 7 specialists)

The Light Infantry wold be based on replacing the LAV with one more body creating two fire teams of 4 per section.

The new CCV could be allocated to the RCDs and 12 RBC, organized on the same pattern as the LAV units.  That woould give the government 8 deployable LAV/CCV units and 9 Lt Infantry Combat Teams as well as 4 Armoured Squadrons from the LdSH(RC).


But regardless of the mind games: with respect to how the 5394 might be deployed and trained and maintained in a useable state it is important, IMO, that every soldier in uniform, feels that he or she is gainfully employed in a useful activity and not just warming the bench waiting for a shot at the big leagues.


One way to do that is to convert the LAVless to light infantry and thn challenge them with doing the best they can in demanding environments with the tools they have at hand.

This should not be about creating elites.  This should be about supplying the Government of Canada the greatest posssible array of tools of the best possible quality to meet that widest possible assortment of eventualities.

Note all the "if possible" qualifiers. 

This should not be about creating the USMC, the Paras or the Brigade of Guards.  It should be about creating Slim's army of "odd-job men" with a motto of "Good Enough".

 

[Haligonian]

Could anyone recommend to me some reading on Field Marshall Slim's perspective on the generalist vs specialist debate, and perhaps something from the opposite perspective as well plese?