• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Discussion on Israeli Strategy

It will be interesting to see what unfolds in the next several days as Israeli armour currently masses along the southern Lebanese border.  Hezbollah are no longer the rag-tag militia group they once were when the Israelis entered Lebanon in the early 80's.  During that conflict, all told, Israel lost 900 troops in Lebanon and eventually withdrew.  In the south, Hezbollah still holds high esteem among the locals for forcing this withdrawal and victory for the Arab world - hence their support and following there.

Militarily, there is absolutely no question Israel is superior.  In the end, Hezbollah will lose this imminent battle - but they may also become stronger because of it.
 
How about calling this "Hezbollah and Hamas have been taking stupid pills for too long" ?
 
toddskam said:
It will be interesting to see what unfolds in the next several days as Israeli armour currently masses along the southern Lebanese border.  Hezbollah are no longer the rag-tag militia group they once were when the Israelis entered Lebanon in the early 80's. 
True, now they have financial, ideological and military support from Iran. You might call them a well funded and armed ragtag militia group. Cut off their sources of funding and arms, and you are left with what they were 20 years ago. Heezbollah's advances are due to the Iranians, not because of any measure of success in organisation or military superiority.

During that conflict, all told, Israel lost 900 troops in Lebanon and eventually withdrew.  In the south, Hezbollah still holds high esteem among the locals for forcing this withdrawal and victory for the Arab world - hence their support and following there.
Israel lost 900 troops cumulatively to every Lebanese militia over the period of the entire conflict. I believe their kill ratio was in the neighbourhood of 12:1 as well. They withdrew when an election took place in Israel, and a politician made good on his promises to pull out. This was not due to any military setback, or being "forced out". No arab country has ever forced Israel to do anything but kick the crap out of it.

Militarily, there is absolutely no question Israel is superior.  In the end, Hezbollah will lose this imminent battle - but they may also become stronger because of it.
Hezbollah becomes stronger when Iran and Syria make it that way, full stop.

If we want to address the "root causes" that the lefties like you keep talking about, a furious barrage of Tehran would be more successful than one of Beirut. Hezbollah is a puppet of foreign powers.
 
tamouh said:
If the Israelis really wanted to stop Hezbollah attacks from the south, they should have bombed southern positions more

Bombing/shelling is never a total success (remember Cassino in WW2), and at the end of the day one needs the 'corkscrew and blowtorch' methods used by the infantry to weed out the well dug in (and in this case finatical) enemy.

Remember Tamouh, these ratbags have had 6 yrs to dig (deep no doubt) in and prepare a rabbits warren of tunnels, caves and the rest of it, and they have almost been wanting or luring the IDF to come in and play in this sector. For all we know the place is wired up with HE and booby traps to the max. If I was a ratbag like these winners (don't get me wrong I do have respect for their overall intelligence and they should never be under-estimated or taken as a untrained ragtag force), thats what I'd be doing.

These guys are well prepared, well armed, well trained and highly motivated to become martyrs for their cause. The IDF could be in for a nasty and costly fight. Arty and bombs can soften the place up, but thats about it. As morbid as it sounds, what one needs is napalm, HE and flamethrowers, and finally the bayonet to sort them out just like the island fighting campaign during WW2.

Yes, one has to have infantry backed by supporting arms to go in and get the job done right. There is no two ways about it if you want to win.

One can have all the technology you want, but at the end of the day, it's still a 'grunts' job to get in close to do the dirty work! (being a former 'grunt' I can say that).

Its going to be upclose and personal for the IDF should they go in full-on on the ground. They do not really have a choice. This mess is going to get far worse before it starts getting better.

My 2 cents.

Wes
 
Wes

There is one problem with this theory, and it is: If these guys are willing to be martyrs for their cause, then they are falling into a trap.  Like General George Patton said: " It is not our goal to die for our country, but the make the other poor bastard die for his."  If he wants to die for his country, he is admitting defeat.  He will not see any benefits or improvement to his country's situation if he is a martyr.  He accomplishes nothing.
 
Here is another analysis from a (US based) outfit called Stratfor –
http://www.stratfor.com/ .  It is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the  Copyright Act, but Mods given their Copyright Notice (see bottom of the page) you may want/need to delete this to protect Army.ca from unwanted legal harassment.

Red Alert: The Battle Joined

The ground war has begun. Several Israeli brigades now appear to be operating between the Lebanese border and the Litani River. According to reports, Hezbollah forces are dispersed in multiple bunker complexes and are launching rockets from these and other locations.

Hezbollah's strategy appears to be threefold. First, force Israel into costly attacks against prepared fortifications. Second, draw Israeli troops as deeply into Lebanon as possible, forcing them to fight on extended supply lines. Third, move into an Iraqi-style insurgency from which Israel -- out of fear of a resumption of rocket attacks -- cannot withdraw, but which the Israelis also cannot endure because of extended long-term casualties. This appears to have been a carefully planned strategy, built around a threat to Israeli cities that Israel can't afford. The war has begun at Hezbollah's time and choosing.

Israel is caught between three strategic imperatives. First, it must end the threat to Israeli cities, which must involve the destruction of Hezbollah's launch capabilities south of the Litani River. Second, it must try to destroy Hezbollah's infrastructure, which means it must move into the Bekaa Valley and as far as the southern suburbs of Beirut. Third, it must do so in such a way that it is not dragged into a long-term, unsustainable occupation against a capable insurgency.

Hezbollah has implemented its strategy by turning southern Lebanon into a military stronghold, consisting of well-designed bunkers that serve both as fire bases and launch facilities for rockets. The militants appear to be armed with anti-tank weapons and probably anti-aircraft weapons, some of which appear to be of American origin, raising the question of how they were acquired. Hezbollah wants to draw Israel into protracted fighting in this area in order to inflict maximum casualties and to change the psychological equation for both military and political reasons.

Israelis historically do not like to fight positional warfare. Their tendency has been to bypass fortified areas, pushing the fight to the rear in order to disrupt logistics, isolate fortifications and wait for capitulation. This has worked in the past. It is not clear that it will work here. The great unknown is the resilience of Hezbollah's fighters. To this point, there is no reason to doubt it. Israel could be fighting the most resilient and well-motivated opposition force in its history. But the truth is that neither Israel nor Hezbollah really knows what performance will be like under pressure.

Simply occupying the border-Litani area will not achieve any of Israel's strategic goals. Hezbollah still would be able to use rockets against Israel. And even if, for Hezbollah, this area is lost, its capabilities in the Bekaa Valley and southern Beirut will remain intact. Therefore, a battle that focuses solely on the south is not an option for Israel, unless the Israelis feel a defeat here will sap Hezbollah's will to resist. We doubt this to be the case.

The key to the campaign is to understand that Hezbollah has made its strategic decisions. It will not be fighting a mobile war. Israel has lost the strategic initiative: It must fight when Hezbollah has chosen and deal with Hezbollah's challenge. However, given this, Israel does have an operational choice. It can move in a sequential fashion, dealing first with southern Lebanon and then with other issues. It can bypass southern Lebanon and move into the rear areas, returning to southern Lebanon when it is ready. It can attempt to deal with southern Lebanon in detail, while mounting mobile operations in the Bekaa Valley, in the coastal regions and toward south Beirut, or both at the same time.

There are resource and logistical issues involved. Moving simultaneously on all three fronts will put substantial strains on Israel's logistical capability. An encirclement westward on the north side of the Litani, followed by a move toward Beirut while the southern side of the Litani is not secured, poses a serious challenge in re-supply. Moving into the Bekaa means leaving a flank open to the Syrians. We doubt Syria will hit that flank, but then, we don't have to live with the consequences of an intelligence failure. Israel will be sending a lot of force on that line if it chooses that method. Again, since many roads in south Lebanon will not be secure, that limits logistics.

Israel is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Hezbollah has created a situation in which Israel must fight the kind of war it likes the least -- attritional, tactical operations against prepared forces -- or go to the war it prefers, mobile operations, with logistical constraints that make these operations more difficult and dangerous. Moreover, if it does this, it increases the time during which Israeli cities remain under threat. Given clear failures in appreciating Hezbollah's capabilities, Israel must take seriously the possibility that Hezbollah has longer-ranged, anti-personnel rockets that it will use while under attack.

Israel has been trying to break the back of Hezbollah resistance in the south through air attack, special operations and probing attacks. This clearly hasn't worked thus far. That does not mean it won't work, as Israel applies more force to the problem and starts to master the architecture of Hezbollah's tactical and operational structure; however, Israel can't count on a rapid resolution of that problem.

The Israelis have by now thought the problem through. They don't like operational compromises -- preferring highly focused solutions at the center of gravity of an enemy. Hezbollah has tried to deny Israel a center of gravity and may have succeeded, forcing Israel into a compromise position. Repeated assaults against prepared positions are simply not something the Israelis can do, because they cannot afford casualties. They always have preferred mobile encirclement or attacks at the center of gravity of a defensive position. But at this moment, viewed from the outside, this is not an option.

An extended engagement in southern Lebanon is the least likely path, in our opinion. More likely -- and this is a guess -- is a five-part strategy:

1. Insert airmobile and airborne forces north of the Litani to seal the rear of Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon. Apply air power and engineering forces to reduce the fortifications, and infantry to attack forces not in fortified positions. Bottle them up, and systematically reduce the force with limited exposure to the attackers.

2. Secure roads along the eastern flank for an armored thrust deep into the Bekaa Valley to engage the main Hezbollah force and infrastructure there. This would involve a move from Qiryat Shimona north into the Bekaa, bypassing the Litani to the west, and would probably require sending airmobile and special forces to secure the high ground. It also would leave the right flank exposed to Syria.

3. Use air power and special forces to undermine Hezbollah capabilities in the southern Beirut area. The Israelis would consider a move into this area after roads through southern Lebanon are cleared and Bekaa relatively secured, moving into the area, only if absolutely necessary, on two axes of attack.

4. Having defeated Hezbollah in detail, withdraw under a political settlement shifting defense responsibility to the Lebanese government.

5. Do all of this while the United States is still able to provide top cover against diplomatic initiatives that will create an increasingly difficult international environment.

There can be many variations on this theme, but these elements are inevitable:

1. Hezbollah cannot be defeated without entering the Bekaa Valley, at the very least.

2. At some point, resistance in southern Lebanon must be dealt with, regardless of the cost.

3. Rocket attacks against northern Israel and even Tel Aviv must be accepted while the campaign unfolds.

4. The real challenge will come when Israel tries to withdraw.

No. 4 is the real challenge. Destruction of Hezbollah's infrastructure does not mean annihilation of the force. If Israel withdraws, Hezbollah or a successor organization will regroup. If Israel remains, it can wind up in the position the United States is in Iraq. This is exactly what Hezbollah wants. So, Israel can buy time, or Israel can occupy and pay the cost. One or the other.

The other solution is to shift the occupational burden to another power that is motivated to prevent the re-emergence of an anti-Israeli military force -- as that is what Hezbollah has become. The Lebanese government is the only possible alternative, but not a particularly capable one, reflecting the deep rifts in Lebanon.

Israel has one other choice, which is to extend the campaign to defeat Syria as well. Israel can do this, but the successor regime to Syrian President Bashar al Assad likely would be much worse for Israel than al Assad has been. Israel can imagine occupying Syria; it can't do it. Syria is too big and the Arabs have learned from the Iraqis how to deal with an occupation. Israel cannot live with a successor to al Assad and it cannot take control of Syria. It will have to live with al Assad. And that means an occupation of Lebanon would always be hostage to Syrian support for insurgents.

Hezbollah has dealt Israel a difficult hand. It has thought through the battle problem as well as the political dimension carefully. Somewhere in this, there has been either an Israeli intelligence failure or a political failure to listen to intelligence. Hezbollah's capabilities have posed a problem for Israel that allowed Hezbollah to start a war at a time and in a way of its choosing. The inquest will come later in Israel. And Hezbollah will likely be shattered regardless of its planning. The correlation of forces does not favor it. But if it forces Israel not only to defeat its main force but also to occupy, Hezbollah will have achieved its goals.
Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.

Notification of Copyright
This is a publication of Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (Stratfor), and is protected by the United States Copyright Act, all applicable state laws, and international copyright laws and is for the Subscriber's use only. This publication may not be distributed or reproduced in any form without written permission.
For more information on the Terms of Use, please visit our website at www.stratfor.com.

It’s all grist for the mill; at least Stratfor has the good sense to say: ” An extended engagement in southern Lebanon is the least likely path, in our opinion. More likely – and this is a guess -- is a five-part strategy ..."


 
George Wallace said:
Wes

There is one problem with this theory, and it is: If these guys are willing to be martyrs for their cause, then they are falling into a trap.  Like General George Patton said: " It is not our goal to die for our country, but the make the other poor ******* die for his."   If he wants to die for his country, he is admitting defeat.  He will not see any benefits or improvement to his country's situation if he is a martyr.  He accomplishes nothing.

This is true George, but thats how they operate. Finatical as equal to the Japs or worse.

Either way, it looks like the IDF is going in full on, non-stop by ground, and if there is one thing we all can agree on, war is truly a four lettered word.

Fight to win!

No quarter drawn or given.

Regards,

Wes
 
This is one (of a dozen plus) responses to an article in Foreign Affairs - http://www.foreignaffairs.org/ - by Stephen Biddle*.  The central issue is Iraq but this author expands the discussion somewhat to include Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine so I am adding it here as, once again, grist for the mill. 

It is reproduced here under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/special/roundtable_drum2
Responses to "What to Do in Iraq: A Roundtable"
Web Exclusive (posted July 17, 2006)

by Kevin Drum

Kevin Drum is a contributing writer for The Washington Monthly and author of the blog "Political Animal" at www.washingtonmonthly.com.

We all seem to agree that Stephen Biddle is right to call the current conflict in Iraq a civil war. We also agree that Biddle's solution is probably unworkable, and that all the other solutions on offer are probably unworkable too. In fact, there's only one real source of disagreement between us: I think a prudent withdrawal is our best option given the lack of any other workable solutions, and at least on the basis of their first posts, the other participants in this symposium don't. However, since I already discussed withdrawal in my own first post, I don't think it's worth dwelling on here.

Instead, I'd like to widen the focus to the region more generally. In Iraq, Biddle's civil war is proceeding apace. London Times correspondent James Hider writes that West Baghdad has become an "orgy of ethnic cleansing" and the city itself is "verging on total collapse." The New Republic's Lawrence Kaplan, an early and enthusiastic supporter of the war, now believes there is "very little that we can do to dampen the sectarian rage and pathologies tearing Iraq apart at the seams." And Riverbend, an Iraqi blogger who writes from Baghdad, has given up entirely on the American troops there. During last Sunday's carnage in the Jihad Quarter, she notes, "They just sat by, on the outskirts of the area, and let the massacre happen."

And what of Afghanistan? It once seemed to be a success story, but now press reports indicate that the Taliban is becoming increasingly sophisticated and lethal. "We need to realize that we could actually fail here," warns Lieutenant-General David Richards, the British commander of NATO forces in the country. And the much hyped Cedar Revolution in Lebanon? All it took was the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah to put paid to that. Ditto for the Palestinian elections.

Still, these events have had the virtue of clarifying at least one fundamental point: that the key to stability in the greater Middle East—including Iraq—lies in Iran. The kidnapping of Israeli soldiers by Iran's proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, has been widely viewed as a signal from the mullahs that Iran can make life hard for George W. Bush in more ways than he suspects, while America's near-silence in the face of Israeli retaliation is equally widely viewed as tacit approval of an escalated war against Tehran. Iran's dogged pursuit of nuclear technology is probably the single most destabilizing development in the world today. And the war in Iraq itself has increasingly become a conflict between Shiite parties aligned with Iran and secular and religious parties aligned against them.

Things didn't have to work out this way. It's unlikely that anything would have turned Iran into a genuine American ally in the Middle East, but after 9/11 Tehran was nonetheless helpful, providing Washington with useful assistance against both al Qaeda and the Taliban. A few months later, according to James Dobbins, Iranian diplomats and military officers offered to expand cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan and launch a broader dialogue. And in 2003, shortly after the invasion of Iraq, the Iranians drafted a letter offering a "grand bargain" on a stunningly wide array of issues, including "decisive action" against terrorists, a dramatic reorientation of Iran's sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah, support for the Saudi initiative for a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and concessions on international monitoring of Iran's nuclear program. American diplomats who have seen the letter say that it was detailed and genuine.

Needless to say, the Bush administration turned Iran down flat, even going so far as to admonish the Swiss ambassador who had passed the offer along. Since then, the Iranians have gained influence in Iraq, elected a firebrand anti-American president, accelerated their nuclear program, and given Hamas and Hezbollah a green light to ramp up terrorist attacks on Israel. All of this has affected the civil war in Iraq, where American success now requires at least a minimal level of cooperation on Iran's part.

This means that, like it or not, Washington has to engage seriously with Tehran. Are serious negotiations still possible? It's hard to say. Thanks to the hardliners in the White House, the United States is in a significantly worse position than it was three years ago. Iran's nuclear program is further advanced, its alliances with Russia and China are more substantial, and U.S. regional military leverage is far more tenuous. Still, there are cards Washington can play. Iranian cooperation in Iraq can't be forced by sanctions and threats of military action alone, but it might still be purchased with genuine security agreements and acknowledgments of legitimate Iranian interests in the region.

Of course, there's no way to know unless Washington starts talking with Tehran, something the Bush administration apparently believes is by itself sign of weakness. But as Nelson Mandela said (and Ronald Reagan understood), you negotiate with your enemies, not your friends. It's time to recognize that serious negotiations with Iran might not guarantee success, in Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East, but refusing them certainly guarantees failure.

First, I agree with Drum and LGen David Richards: we (the Western allies and, specifically, Canada) can lose in Afghanistan – we can fail, militarily, or we can have a national failure of will and withdraw in fear and confusion.

Second: I think Iran (as the leader of the Shias) and Saudi Arabia (as the home of Wahhabis, the quintessential hard-line, medieval Sunnis) are the keys and I think neither can be trusted or, more to the point, be considered as anything but an enemy of the West.

I’m not sure I understand what America (and its remaining coalition of the willing partners) should or even can do in/about Iraq.  I remain convinced that we should be provoking internecine wars and revolutions throughout the entire Islamic Crescent (Morocco to Indonesia) for both short term relief (when they’re busy killing one another they are less likely to be busy killing us) and the essential, in my personal opinion, reformation of Islam and enlightenment of the North African/Arab/Persian/West Asia peoples.

Israel may get lost in the shuffle, even sideswiped in the (highly desirable) new Thirty Years War.  We should, as Infanteer suggested -  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/47644/post-415082.html#msg415082 – offer refugee/immigration to Israelis fleeing the inevitable horrors of war on terms at least as generous as those we offered to the Lebanese in the ‘70s when they were fleeing civil war there.

----------
* Stephen Biddle is a Senior Fellow in Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Military Power.

----------

PS: Mods the Maj. Paeta Hess-von Kruedener item has been posted at last twice, elsewhere, on Ary.ca.

 
I have a question.

If Israel wants the civilians to fall back (25 miles?) away from the border and basically get out of dodge so they don't get killed, why then would they bomb bridges?

I understand the tactical value of bridges but given the high profile of this battle wouldn't it make sense to try and come across like the good guys and keeping civilian escape aids such as bridges intact??
 
If Israel wants the civilians to fall back (25 miles?) away from the border and basically get out of dodge so they don't get killed, why then would they bomb bridges?

IDF is very popular for these tactics of bombing the hell out of their enemy's infrastructure to send a point.....we'll make it very costly for you to even ponder at attacking us.  Kinda the bully approach if you want my opinion.
 
tamouh said:
IDF is very popular for these tactics of bombing the hell out of their enemy's infrastructure to send a point.....we'll make it very costly for you to even ponder at attacking us.  Kinda the bully approach if you want my opinion.

Really?  I don't know.  If a dog tries to bite you and you hit him with a stick hard enough he will think twice about biting you.
 
Plus bombing bridges make it very awkward to bring heavy equiptment up to the front...

IF I where trying to limit missle attacks on my homeland I'd bomb the bridges too...
(I'd have burned the damn country [and anyone I thought may support them]  down too -- but I dont run the IDF)
 
tamouh said:
IDF is very popular for these tactics of bombing the hell out of their enemy's infrastructure to send a point.....we'll make it very costly for you to even ponder at attacking us.  Kinda the bully approach if you want my opinion.

I don't think denying the EN access to bridges is bullying, I call it good common sense tactics which work. We would be doing the same thing, and did such in previous conflicts ourselves.

Its always the innocent who get the shyte end of the stick, that we can agree on Tamouh.

Cheers,

Wes
 
tamouh said:
IDF is very popular for these tactics of bombing the hell out of their enemy's infrastructure to send a point.....we'll make it very costly for you to even ponder at attacking us.  Kinda the bully approach if you want my opinion.

I thought it was Strategically to prevent supplies and rearming from Syria. Or so the reports say.

As for the IDF Bullying tactics you base this on what experience ?.
 
For anyone interested, there is a very busy forum with near real-time updates from web users in Lebanon at:

http://lfpm.org/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=6

"Lebanon Under Attack - Day 11" has the most current information.
 
M said:
For anyone interested, there is a very busy forum with near real-time updates from web users in Lebanon at:
"Lebanon Under Attack - Day 11" has the most current information.

This is such a wonderful site...(now where is that sarcasm icon?) Sign a petition against the Israeli's, donate money, donate more money, oh, and I shouldn't forget...

Re: Lebanon Under Attack - Day 11 - News and Updates Only

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

01.49: هدوء نسبي يلف أجواء العاصمة

[translation]
Quiet settles over the capital


tayyar.org
__________________
"The blood of the martyrs is seed."

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last edited by Chief : 12 Hours Ago at 03:36 AM. Reason: chief

Yup, I can see that this site is for me....why, I'll just run out and help this poor fellow along....now, how much seed did you want to donate?
 
Kinda the bully approach if you want my opinion.

Well, I am no Field Marshal, but it seems far easier (and more practical) to warn people away from a large zone, for a general prolonged attack, than to warn people away from a specific bridge, at a specific time  ::)  "Don't be in these 50 miles2 the next 2 weeks" vs "Don't be within 200 yards of the east end of the McLintock bridge between 6:30 and 6:36 tomorrow morning". Yeah - that ought to give them time to get the AA in place
 
Tamouh, give it up.

Seriously, too bad most of us here are not sympathetic to Lebanon.

I hope Israel bombs the ever living day lights out of their enemy's infrastructure.

If they harbour terrorist knowingly and do nothing? Then they too become enemy...
 
Back
Top