Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

[Haligonian]

**I don't mean to hijack the thread at all - I'm following the topic with quite a bit of interest.


Question for those of you who know what your talking about.

-  Does the introduction of the TAPV bring anything to the table, in regards to the "Combat Team of Tomorrow"?


*In one of the posts above, the new Lav 6.0 is mentioned as being less than ideal in that it needs to basically keep the engine running at night in order to power the turret/surveillance equipment.  Will the TAPV potentially bring something beneficial to the combat team that it doesn't currently have?

So there is some talk of mounting TOW on TAPV so they could play a role in the Cbt Tm or support it.  They could also perhaps be the HQ veh for the 2IC if for some reason a LAV wasn't available.  None of this is ideal.  We define a cbt tm as a sub unit of tanks or infantry with at least a sub sub unit of the other arm attached.  This means that the TAPV offers little to the cbt tm as its characteristics are so different from the LAV 6 and Leo 2.

I got to crawl around in the TAPV on the course and I could see the use for it in some kind of mentoring team.  One of my course mates was quite adamant that the 3rd Bn's should have taken them for this and other reasons. 

 

[Kirkhill]

So there is some talk of mounting TOW on TAPV so they could play a role in the Cbt Tm or support it.  They could also perhaps be the HQ veh for the 2IC if for some reason a LAV wasn't available.  None of this is ideal.  We define a cbt tm as a sub unit of tanks or infantry with at least a sub sub unit of the other arm attached.  This means that the TAPV offers little to the cbt tm as its characteristics are so different from the LAV 6 and Leo 2.

I got to crawl around in the TAPV on the course and I could see the use for it in some kind of mentoring team.  One of my course mates was quite adamant that the 3rd Bn's should have taken them for this and other reasons.

WRT TOW- What is wrong with this solution?  These are TOWs on an ASLAV.

 

[GnyHwy]

The most efficient way to beat mass armor with artillery takes public will to do so. We already had that solution during Cold War, and could go back to it if the will is there.

PGMs aren't the solution, unless you want to buy us a few hundred guns and lots of SUAVs.

Edited to add: A couple more thousand PYs too please!

 

[Haligonian]

WRT TOW- What is wrong with this solution?  These are TOWs on an ASLAV.

There is also some talk of putting them on LAVs.  The problem is that the systems we've pulled out of storage are dismounted systems.  So, the question is less about how to mount them and more about how to move them around right now.

The most efficient way to beat mass armor with artillery takes public will to do so. We already had that solution during Cold War, and could go back to it if the will is there.

PGMs aren't the solution, unless you want to buy us a few hundred guns and lots of SUAVs.

Edited to add: A couple more thousand PYs too please!

I assume your talking tactical nukes here?

 

[SeaKingTacco]

No, he probably means DPICM. It was a montrously efficient method of deal with massed armour.

 

[Kirkhill]

The most efficient way to beat mass armor with artillery takes public will to do so. We already had that solution during Cold War, and could go back to it if the will is there.

PGMs aren't the solution, unless you want to buy us a few hundred guns and lots of SUAVs.

Edited to add: A couple more thousand PYs too please!

No problem on that one Gunny.  As long as you don't mind the lion's share of them being reservists. 

Lots of bows.  Lots of arrows.  Still cheaper than a bunch of armoured geezers.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

My other point, that is related to many you made, is that we seem wedded to the square cbt tm which is just one method of organising a cbt tm.  Cbt Tm in operations is a good example of this with all of its TTPs being very detailed descriptions and diagrams on the conduct of operations of a SQUARE cbt tm.

Totally agree that the tank sqn ech is robust but there is no spare capacity there, hence the reason for tank squadrons being resistant to being broken up.  My point is that ADO will give us opportunities to disperse our armour assets but we'll need the sustainment capabilities to do this. 

On this point the Australians appear willing to decentralize their armour more so than ourselves.  The following is out of LWD 3-3-4 Employment of Armour on page 3-2.  You can find it here, http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20work/Publications/Doctrine/LWD_3-3-4_Employment_of_Armour_Full.pdf

I don't think we are in a place where we would consider deploying a single troop as people often bristle at the idea of detaching a single trp from its parent sqn.  The Marines also do this aboard their MEUs.

Who is wedded to the square combat team (besides the CTCC)? Our grouping doctrine is flexible. Thats a good thing!

At the Staff College the square combat team does not end up being a very common grouping. It can be a viable grouping for some situations, but its certainly not the default.

I do advise against penny packeting tank troops around to the infantry companies: I have certainly experienced an witnessed this on BG exercises over the last decade. Since our infantry lack viable AT weapons it seems that infantry officers want to assign tanks to each company to give the infantry protection from enemy tanks. It is a ruinous practice reminiscent of the 8th Army disasters of the North African campaign. Now, you can certainly attach a single tank troop to a company to form a combat team and it might even make sense for certain situations. A BG attack on a company position could see troops attached to two companies for breach/intimate support while the remaining squadron minus conducts other tasks in relation to the mission (support by fire, breach, assault/neutralize etc). There are other ways to do it, but the point remains that the doctrine is flexible.

We have even deployed single tank troops and recce troops as part of Battle Groups on operations: its not terribly efficient no but we can and have done it.

I have noticed a hesitancy to detach single platoons from companies to attach to squadrons.

Regarding ADO, I do not see it as an opportunity. I see it, rather, as a fuzzy concept that would place us at a disadvantage against a peer/near-peer foe that considered concentration of force/mass as a principle of war. I was part of an experimental exercise in 2011 where I experienced this.

 

[FJAG]

I do advise against penny packeting tank troops around to the infantry companies: ... It is a ruinous practice reminiscent of the 8th Army disasters of the North African campaign. Now, you can certainly attach a single tank troop to a company to form a combat team and it might even make sense for certain situations. ...

While I agree as to the flexibility, in my day on the Cbt Team Cmdrs course and Command and Staff course deploying tanks in anything less than a half squadron was pretty much an automatic fail.

Of course those were the days when we had tank regiments in each Bde (with, doctrinally at least, four sabre squadrons). B-GL-323-001 made it clear that while the troop was the basic fire unit, the squadron was the basic manouvre unit. Parcelling out even half squadrons (much less troops) was discouraged and was to be done only after careful deliberation and acceptance of the risk of ignoring the principle of concentration of force. 

I do note that the 2003 version of B-GL-321-006 Combat Team Operations specifically contemplates attaching "at least a troop" to a company.

There is much more than a subtle difference between saying something should be avoided and saying that something can be done. I guess it's a sign of the times that maybe we've lost our way.

:subbies:

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

While I agree as to the flexibility, in my day on the Cbt Team Cmdrs course and Command and Staff course deploying tanks in anything less than a half squadron was pretty much an automatic fail.

Of course those were the days when we had tank regiments in each Bde (with, doctrinally at least, four sabre squadrons). B-GL-323-001 made it clear that while the troop was the basic fire unit, the squadron was the basic manouvre unit. Parcelling out even half squadrons (much less troops) was discouraged and was to be done only after careful deliberation and acceptance of the risk of ignoring the principle of concentration of force. 

I do note that the 2003 version of B-GL-321-006 Combat Team Operations specifically contemplates attaching "at least a troop" to a company.

There is much more than a subtle difference between saying something should be avoided and saying that something can be done. I guess it's a sign of the times that maybe we've lost our way.

:subbies:

Doctrinally you should not attach less than a squadron to a battalion to form a BG - do not split a squadron and give it to two different battalions. Within the BG its up to the BG CO. Squadron minus and half squadron are basically sound, but the estimate of the situation will drive the grouping.

Giving a troop to each company is generally not a good idea unless you are in a city. I could certainly accept a BG attack, though, where a company had a troop attached for its assault while a squadron minus or half squadron combat team (perhaps with an infantry platoon attached) shoots them onto the objective. It's not the only way but it could work. A combat team with a single tank troop operating on its own, though, is limited in what it can do.

In any case, the BG CO is the one deciding: he is in command and not a book! Doctrine is a good guide and a great start point but it's not in command.

 

[Ostrozac]

Since our infantry lack viable AT weapons it seems that infantry officers want to assign tanks to each company to give the infantry protection from enemy tanks. It is a ruinous practice reminiscent of the 8th Army disasters of the North African campaign.

Organizing infantry without any ATGM and then expecting them to exercise and train in methods to fight tanks put everyone involved in a very awkward position. The Tactics School (at least when I attended ATOC) got around this by training in a sort of alternate reality where the ALAAWS project wasn't cancelled and Canada bought the Javelin ATGM. It's harder to "miracle" up imaginary weapons in a live training environment in Wainwright, hence the desire for tanks to be around so that the rifle companies have at least some protection.

I see that Canada is bringing back the tripod mounted TOW. That's a good first step, but there also needs to be procurement of an ATGM at company level. Basically, we have a choice -- if we want to be capable of fighting force on force, then we need anti-tank weapons. Without them, we are a COIN army, full-stop. And a COIN army has no business operating as a tripwire force in the Baltics.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

At the Staff College we kept the LAV TUA and gave each company four Javelin. The lack of infantry anti-armour in our field force is glaring.

 

[daftandbarmy]

At the Staff College we kept the LAV TUA and gave each company four Javelin. The lack of infantry anti-armour in our field force is glaring.

And Assault Pioneers. If you want the Infantry to have some integral mobility/counter mobility capabilities we'll need the Pioneer Platoons (as well as Anti-Tank, Mortars etc) back.

 

[FJAG]

This thread is making me more and more depressed by the minute.

Back when Christ was a lance jack and I was learning how to fight the Soviet hordes, we seemed to have all the gear to support our doctrines, Centurion tanks, SS11, 106 mm recoilless, 81 mm mortars, pioneers, batteries and batteries of 105 and 155s, hell, even tactical nucs and squadrons and squadrons of fighter cover. (the navy had working subs, an aircraft carrier, destroyers and support ships) Old stuff, for sure, but more or less fit for the purpose of the times.

While I'm sure that these days the individual soldiers are better trained and experienced then in my day, it seems that everything needed to keep them alive and capable of defeating a near peer enemy is gone notwithstanding that our defence budget has grown exponentially. We have seriously gone off the rails somewhere.  At the rate we're going we might as well rerole some of the infantry, a few ships and a few planes into a national gendarmerie and pack in the rest of the whole thing and save a whole lot of bucks. The thing about paying year in and year out for an insurance policy is that when you need it it should be capable of paying out. I'm not so sure that our very expensive national defence insurance plan is worth diddly squat anymore.

I simply can't see how our generals can sleep at night and why they haven't resigned in droves in shame and/or protest. Oh wait. I know why they haven't.

:endnigh:

:subbies:

 

[George Wallace]

......  At the rate we're going we might as well rerole some of the infantry, a few ships and a few planes into a national gendarmerie and pack in the rest of the whole thing and save a whole lot of bucks.

That is pretty much what our past few Governments have thought of the CAF.

 

[FJAG]

That is pretty much what our past few Governments have thought of the CAF.

Except they haven't done anything. One should go either one way or the other. Sitting in the middle is a horrendous waste of money without any real benefit.

Don't get me wrong. I'm fully in favour of a credible force, but we're not getting one the way things are going now. While I do blame the government I think our military leadership is hidebound in doing things the same old way. I've said this many ways but just like you couldn't fine tune the Titanic once it hit the iceberg, you can't fine tune the CF into effectiveness based on the dollars being given to it. If you want to increase effectiveness within what we can expect from the government on an ongoing basis then you need to redesign the entire system from the ground up. To me that means reducing bureaucracy and a greater reliance on reservists.

But I'm going  ff topic: into another whole different thread.

:subbies:

 

[blacktriangle]

FJAG - excellent posts.

I agree with most of your points - we need a properly equipped, funded, and manged force in order to be effective. If we're unwilling or unable to realize such a force, it's time to transfer the usual components to other Federal organizations, and pack the rest in.

It will never happen though. Too many fingers in the pot and different interests at stake. We will be stuck with perpetual mediocrity.

And yes, it may be a bit off-topic - but I'd argue that until we stop "sitting in the middle" the majority of discussion in this thread (and many others) is intellectual at best.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

And Assault Pioneers. If you want the Infantry to have some integral mobility/counter mobility capabilities we'll need the Pioneer Platoons (as well as Anti-Tank, Mortars etc) back.

I am not convinced that Assault Pioneers are a necessity. Mortars should exist at the Bn level to allow for fire support if the guns are not available. The AT platoon with LAV TUA would also fill a needed niche. The companies should have integral anti-tank capabilities. Pioneers, while useful, would be much lower on the priority list.

 

[GR66]

I am not convinced that Assault Pioneers are a necessity. Mortars should exist at the Bn level to allow for fire support if the guns are not available. The AT platoon with LAV TUA would also fill a needed niche. The companies should have integral anti-tank capabilities. Pioneers, while useful, would be much lower on the priority list.

I'm not so sure about that.  If we're faced with defending against an enemy advance (much more likely than an offensive NATO scenario), having troops capable of creating hasty obstacles to slow an enemy advance would be a significant advantage.

 

[Infanteer]

Is that not a capability we can teach to NCOs within Rifle platoons and companies?

 

[ArmyRick]

Yes it is