AOR Replacement & the Joint Support Ship (Merged Threads)

[Cloud Cover]

You missed the point;  the average person cares more about the newest iGadget and selfie software - not AORs and naval capabilities.

No I did not miss the point, we are both saying the same things with different words.

"Actually, I don't think we are.  We are under-equipped, under-funded and under-supported by the powers that be because their bosses (voters) don't give a crap about defence.  I'd say that is 'on target, fire for effect'."

Well if the powers that be and their "bosses" have decided that they don't give a crap about defence (which is true) then I would say they must already feel the DND is over-funded, equipped with too much of the wrong stuff, and have more than the support they need to do the job tasked in the ministerial mandate, which is apparently to say nice things about defence and not do anything except promote gender equality, human rights etc. If follows that the resources on hand already clearly mis-match that mission. It is circuitous and never ending. 

I am suggesting that until the circle is broken nothing will change except by disruption (i.e. nothing short of an attack of absolutely epic proportions that fundamentally changes the outlook of the part of the nation that puts political parties in power). The prospect of that is extremely remote, thankfully.  In terms of magnitude, even loss of far off territory, seizure of valuable remote or coastal property that is resource rich, and even expulsion of a few thousand Canadians from their land  may not even be enough to mobilize the appropriate reaction.  Acting responsibly and prudently on defence matters in Canada is impossible because nobody really feels threatened enough to care about it. As Edward has pointed out, this has been the case for at least 65 years and there is NOTHING in the long term horizon to change that position. That includes climate change, the desires of the UN, and acres of marijuana burning during forest fire season.

Getting back to my earlier statements about the Mistrals, buying those ships would almost certainly have triggered  a defence spending and resource allocation war between commands causing a military-bureaucratic cockup of such proportions that the only political way out would be to gleefully disband the entire goddamned thing because it would take an obscene amount of money to fix it.  Do not underestimate the ability of the military to cut its own throat.

 

[Edward Campbell]

... about the Mistrals, buying those ships would almost certainly have triggered  a defence spending and resource allocation war between commands causing a military-bureaucratic cockup of such proportions that the only political way out would be to gleefully disband the entire goddamned thing because it would take an obscene amount of money to fix it.  Do not underestimate the ability of the military to cut its own throat.

Exactly ... it would have been the AVRO Arrow all over again. The problem with the Arrow wasn't that it wasn't a good or even very good aircraft; the problem was that it would have 'eaten' too much of the defence budget; it was too much for our limited means. Even the non-NORAD elements of the RCAF wanted the Arrow dumped because it was a horribly expensive one-trick pony.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I am just going to chime in quickly here to dispel some myths about the Mistrals.

First, I want you to note one thing: The French don't have "Marines" or any other troops specialized in amphibious assaults, nor any air assets dedicated to amphibious operations. This is important to keep in mind because, as result, when they developed the Mistral's, that was their starting point: They developed a ship that could accommodate ANY of their air forces or army's assets easily and that would require little to no special previous training for them to operate from the Mistral. In France, army and air force units don't know in advance that they will be next deployed on the Mistrals - they just get tasked and go - and then it is the Mistral that adapts to their equipment and requirements.

Here is good example: In 2014, the Mistral visited Quebec. Before getting there, they embarked about 200 members from the 1st battalion R22R with 10 of their LAV's, three helicopters from 430 Squadron with their support team and about 15 engineers from 5e Reg. Genie, to then go and carry out multi-days landing ex (LION MISTRAL) in the Gaspé area (they captured the airport in a simulated sea/air attack). Guess how much pre-ex specialized training they got to be able to do that: None - zero. Why? Because the Mistrals are meant to adapt to the embarked force - not the other way around - unlike the British or American equivalent ships. See the video below on the actual exercise:

https://youtu.be/0vSbA4CydQM

So, acquiring Mistrals is NOT like creating a "Marines" force, with dedicated assets from the army or RCAF to serve her at all time. A Mistral is basically a ship, and its crewing requirements and cost of operation is about the same as frigate - no more. If and when, and only if and when, you need to go an an exercise or operation do you then assign whatever land/air asset would be needed for that specific operation. Considering the army trains its people for many months in preparation for  any six month deployment as it is, is anybody here alleging that the couple of days of "adaptation" required here could not be accommodated in advance of any deployment. Considering that in Canada we already are supposedly "joint" Is anybody suggesting that we couldn't do this?

As for the use of such ship outside of ex and ops, well, she is just another ship. She could go out and  do naval training. Heck, the French already do that: Dixmude (the third of class) deploys every year with the French navy's naval cadets and Junior officers on a training cruise around the world called the Jeanne-D'arc cruise. Couldn't we do something similar within the Canadian context?

And I have to say that one thing that always makes me cringe in these fora is to see how many people basically use the excuse of "we can't do that because we have never done it before - there's too much to learn". Well, yeah! That may be so! But if you never start, you will never learn and that area of warfare will remain closed to you forever. What better time to start and learn than in peace time? 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Might disagree (not with OGBD), the Mistrals have a base crew smaller than a DDH. Convert one Griffon squadron to a same airframe as the Cyclone, without the ASW suite, to provide shipboard helo for Canadian ops. Use the vessels to support anti-piracy ops with another countries helos onboard or for NATO exercises, again with other peoples helo's and troops. Politically it's great, we earn brownie points, with little risks of body bags. That would give our military time to sort out it's stupidity. The Van Doos have already shown they can operate from one, rotate the responsibility to provide a contingent for marine/landing ops.

We could have seen a RCN Mistral, landing RM's with RCN landing craft and Dutch NH-90's either on NATO exercises or cleaning out a nest of pirates/AQ types in Somali.   

 

[Kirkhill]

WRT the Brits and specialist training

The Paras, Gurkhas, Scots and Welsh Guards and Household Cavalry were not specifically trained for amphibious operations.  And I doubt anybody is ever again going to sit around in sight of shore watching movies.

Most of the British transport fleet is geared to transport elements other than the Royal Marines.  A fact not lost on either the Marines nor their paymasters discussing the need for a specialized force of marines.

And before we go down that rabbit hole.... I support the Royal Marines on the grounds of utility.  They are useful.  That doesn't mean that the cat can't be skinned by other means.

 

[Baz]

Again, I'm in whole hearted agreement with OGBD.  The tendency for people is "it looks like a USMC Amphib, so we'd need to create an amphibious force.

Here's what I said when they were still available:

So a few of us had a thought bubble.

Buy both Mistrals, one on each coast.
Canadianize them as little as possible.
Ensure they have a single RAS point starboard side (so we can use them as "interim tankers").
Put all the trainees on them.
Convert extra spaces to classrooms.
Embark the two operations MH squadrons.
Sail them every week from Mon to Fri to regenerate people...

After a few years, as the new ships start to come on line, we can think about either getting rid of them or using them to start developing a "makes sense" littoral maneuver capability.

If a disaster response mission came up (like Haiti or Katrina), pull of the trainees, load up with helos (including Chinooks and Griffins) and boats (including the left over tanker and coast guard "landing craft"), fill 'er up with supplies, and off you go.

Imagine how many subbies you could cram into one of those

We were, and still are, in a period of regen, and they could have been used to:
- gain political points in NATO
- become a great big old training ship
- be available for humanitarian ops; and
- possibly be used with our Allies.

Once we actually regen'd the RCN and 12 Wing, then we could think of what Maritime Joint, instead of Hillier's JArmy SCTF, would look like.

I also agree with those that feel that left to their own devices there are those that would make it bigger then we can afford and therefore disrupt the entire organization.  As an example, take http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no2/mader-eng.asp:
<Quote>
Overall SCTF Requirement for Sealift – Drawing from this analysis of requirements, it can be concluded that the SCTF’s ships must be able to transport at least:
1. A battalion-size landing force that is equipped with some AFVs;
2. Seventeen medium or nine to 12 heavy transport helicopters;
3. Six attack helicopters; and
4. Six landing craft (in a mixture of LCVPs, LCUs and LCACs).
Ship Needs – Such a combination of troops, landing craft, and helicopters means that the Canadian Forces must deploy LHAs, LHDs, or a mixed LPH/LPD flotilla. Large LHAs and LHDs are probably too expensive for the Canadian Forces to acquire and to maintain in peacetime. However, as can be seen from Table I, no other existing, modern ship design can provide the needed lift on its own. Thus, the CF needs several ships to meet the theoretical requirement.
<Unquote>

That's a good chunk of a USMC MEU, the ESG (Expeditionary Strike Group) consists of three capital amphibs (an LHA, LPD, and LSD) plus three surface combatants and a sub. In effect the author said if it isn't at least that then what's the point; if that is the prevalent attitude amongst the Canadian Forces strategic staff then I would completely agree that we shouldn't even try as it would be too disruptive, and accept the status quo that the center of the Canadian Task Group is in fact an AOR...

 

[Kirkhill]

... the center of the Canadian Task Group is in fact an AOR...

So the real purpose of my car is to move my gas tank?  rly:

 

[Eye In The Sky]

No I did not miss the point, we are both saying the same things with different words.

Ahh, copy that.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Clearly you did not grow up watching Mad Max

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UtjGTrVwRr4

 

[jollyjacktar]

So the real purpose of my car is to move my gas tank?  rly:

That's not a bad way of thinking to some degree, at least with a Task Group in mind.  No Tanker, no Task Group, as they won't be going very far for very long.  PRESERVER wasn't called "The Heart of the Fleet" for nothing.

 

[Halifax Tar]

So the real purpose of my car is to move my gas tank?  rly:

Our AORs are much more than a gas tank.  They are floating 1st line logistics organization.  Basically and a navy Svc Bn.

We had 6-7 massive warehouses on Preserver for spare parts, huge ammo warehouses.  The biggest fridges and freezers in the fleet.  As a storesman on Preserver we supported not just our own ship but those that were in consort with us as well. 

 

[Baz]

Note that it is not just Davie that sees the government *may* be amendable to some type of "Disaster Relief Ship" and are keeping their options open with proposals; the authors of http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol13num1/vol13num1art1.pdf are the President and Special Advisory at Irving Shipbuilding...

Although that particular ship is interesting, I ask the following questions:
- How do you carry any amount of shore side pers?  In containers?
- Where do you stow the boats?  Or the jetty they envisage?  Mexeflote https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexeflote, discussed http://www.navalreview.ca/2017/10/the-utility-of-mexeflote/ seems a good option, note that Davie claims Mexflote ready for Asterix (http://www.davie.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/DEFSEC-FOR-WEB.pdf, slide 13 of 28).
- With just the stern ramp how capable of boat operation is it?  What sea state?

Note that the concept of Ro-Ro to improvised jetty or lighterage is certainly not new; if interested I suggest read up on the Maritime Prepositioning Force.  Here's some interesting links:
- http://www.msc.navy.mil/sealift/2013/August/exercise.htm
- https://www.slideshare.net/robbinlaird/seabasing-and-maritime-prepositioning-ships
- https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/organizations/marine-air-ground-task-force/maritime-prepositioning-force-mpf
- http://www.msc.navy.mil/sealift/2017/June/lighterage.htm

However, those concepts are all for after the MEU or larger kicked in the door / secured the beach.  It seems to me that the proposal in the first article I quoted assumes someone else has done that; wouldn't we need something more flexible?

... but *much* smaller than a MEU...

 

[Baz]

Our AORs are much more than a gas tank.  They are floating 1st line logistics organization.  Basically and a navy Svc Bn.

We had 6-7 massive warehouses on Preserver for spare parts, huge ammo warehouses.  The biggest fridges and freezers in the fleet.  As a storesman on Preserver we supported not just our own ship but those that were in consort with us as well.

Concur with all that; however, they are still there to support the task group.  The discussion is about the fact the most (*all?* major blue water aspiring) navies center a task group on a capability to project *something*, not on the ability to support oneself.

I wonder if the term Fast Attack Replenishment Tanker (ie F.A.R.T.) is still around???

 

[Baz]

... one more tangent.  A small LHD / LHA also makes an excellent way to mass your ASW helicopter force within the task group.  When you do so the survivability as a whole goes up.  You then use the consort decks as places to get fuel to extend your on-sta time (Brits used to do this a lot).  It was also Bonnie's final role in life (well, and she also had a bunch of ASW Trackers...)

 

[Halifax Tar]

Concur with all that; however, they are still there to support the task group.  The discussion is about the fact the most (*all?* major blue water aspiring) navies center a task group on a capability to project *something*, not on the ability to support oneself.

I wonder if the term Fast Attack Replenishment Tanker (ie F.A.R.T.) is still around???

In a Canadian task group the Tanker is at the center as it must be protected.  With out logistic support you cannot project anything.  And projection of ones "capabilities" is really just a projection of ones logistical ability to support a desired military outcome.  Victory is easy, sustaining a victory is hard.

So until we have something more offensive than a Tanker, they will continue to be to the center of the task group.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Here's a one-liner from the attached document -

"As the officer continued: “If your navy is essentially one carrier battle group, you can do one thing well, but nothing else.”
I guess that same could be apply to our current discussion/situation (or train of thought), with our single AOR.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/19/nuclear-weapons-uk-defence-review-russia

 

[Underway]

These are all great ideas.  The RCN however is 700 people short, especially in a few critical trades/senior positions.  There is practically a press gang to get submariners.  700 pers works out to about 300 pers unable to go to sea (given ship to shore ration between 50/50 and 60/40) which is the entire crew complement of 5 AOPS.  All the equipment in the world won't work if we don't have enough people.  The loss of the 280's and AOR's has papered over a huge manning shortage by liberating 4 crews worth of people. 

Let's see if we can actually crew 5-6 AOPs, 3 AOR (includes Asterix) and 3 AAW destroyers on top of the 12 Frigates, 12 MCDV's and 4 Subs we already have before we go out and buy Mistrals which are frankly a second tier requirement to the real business of the navy.

 

[Baz]

...Mistrals which are frankly a second tier requirement to the real business of the navy.

Please provide a doctrinal quote, perferably Allied not Canadian, as to what you believe the real business of *a* navy is.

The reason I ask is because most blue water aspiring navies include power projection, littoral maneuver, and maritime based strike, 3 capabilities which Canada has forced the RCN to ignore.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Please provide a doctrinal quote, perferably Allied not Canadian, as to what you believe the real business of *a* navy is.

The reason I ask is because most blue water aspiring navies include power projection, littoral maneuver, and maritime based strike, 3 capabilities which Canada has forced the RCN to ignore.

Agreed! And power projection is the one thing that the Navy is uniquely prepared/able to do without escalating tensions in a way that deploying air and land forces must do. A proper Navy gives real weight to diplomacy. Joseph Nye in 'Soft Power' makes the point that you cannot really have and use soft power unless you have enough hard power to make people pay attention in the first place. A Navy that can project power is the base for all that.

 

[Uzlu]

Well it appears that Davie will get their wish and provide icebreakers for the Coast guard, so their whining will diminish.

Maybe not as easy as that.

A Finnish company has raised red flags over the Trudeau government's decision to launch negotiations with Quebec shipyard Davie for the lease of four icebreakers without conducting a competition.

http://thechronicleherald.ca/canada/1538255-finnish-company-raises-red-flags-over-federal-negotiations-for-davie-icebreakers