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AOR Replacement & the Joint Support Ship (Merged Threads)

We'll simply have to agree to disagree on this issue.

I'll just leave one final thought here on air deployment.

General Shinseki of the US Army developed the Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCT - essentially similar to our CMBGs) back at the turn of the century because the air transportable infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) were too weak and vulnerable once deployed and the heavy armoured brigade combat teams (ABCTs) were too heavy to deploy rapidly. The SBCT was to be light enough to deploy by air and yet robust enough to hold their own once deployed.

The principle aim of the SBCT was to be able to deploy one from the continental United States to anywhere in the world using the US Air Force's transport resources within 96 hours. There was also a provision for the follow on forces. There were numerous studies conducted at the time, most notably a GAO one and a Rand one which clearly indicated that notwithstanding the use of all the US Air Force's vast transport capabilities, such an objective could simply not be achieved especially when one took into account the number of vehicles and personnel to be transported, the number of aircraft and crew available the transit and turnaround time involved in each sortie and the need to incorporate lift required to sustain the force.

I know that the rate of deployment is not an issue for the CAF which measures activities in months rather than days, however, the limited capacity of our 8 Wing's three CC-177, CC-130J and CC-150 squadrons to deploy and sustain any sized mechanized force severely limits our options. Both the RCAF and Navy continue to focus their attention on their principle weapons systems (fighter jets and surface combatants) rather than the tools needed to get the Army deployed and supported. Would we ever have gotten the CC-177 or the CC-130J if we hadn't been stressed out supporting our land operations in Afghanistan? How many decades did the AOR replacement cool it's heels until disaster finally forced it out of hibernation?

In the words of LGen (ret'd) Belzile:

... Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war. This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.The Canadian Forces needs a plan
Click to expand...

:cheers:
 
Good article on the cost of a gator navy - and in a sideways manner explains I think how we can all see or at least envisage that our Canadian procurement and design processes would almost certainly fuck this up and deliver probably next to nothing useful to the army or the navy for that matter.

http://cimsec.org/cost-and-survivability-acquiring-the-gator-navy/39784

We also don’t have the fleet train or spare escorts for such a ship to arrive on station and  then land and support forces ashore. Even if they are not amphibious assault forces but landing at a pier unopposed (initially). 

The estimate is that it takes 19 ships to transport and land a single MEB. I gather that an MEB is probably greater in strength than the entire Canadian army or close to it.
It’s not as simple as buying a Mistral or an LPD- Have to sustain and support the forces in theatre.  Right now I suspect somebody else, at great cost, is doing this for our small Latvian deployment.
 
The CAF reason for being can be boiled down to one thing....The defense against "Help"

After that there is SAR, civil help etc. but I see that the government main reason is if we don't do the very bare minimum the US will.  This is especially true with NORAD.  The whole mission screams the defence against "help"  If we did not put the minimum effort in the Americans would.
 
Spencer100 said:
The CAF reason for being can be boiled down to one thing....The defense against "Help"

After that there is SAR, civil help etc. but I see that the government main reason is if we don't do the very bare minimum the US will.  This is especially true with NORAD.  The whole mission screams the defence against "help"  If we did not put the minimum effort in the Americans would.
Click to expand...

Indeed. In Canada there appears to be little serious political or media concern over our strategic outlook, what with the only major direct threats to North America–other than ICBMs/SLBMs–being related to NORAD in terms of Russian cruise missiles from bombers and from subs in the North Atlantic. That lack of concern is in fact not indefensible given our immediate defence and political realities but it does put us very much in the position of being essentially a defence free rider trying to get away with a bare necessary minimum.

Our security remains very much an important, direct interest of the Americans for the simple reason of geography. And keep in mind that if they finally get fed up with our free riding--if we do not do enough to “defend against help”--they may demand access to air and naval bases in Canada in order to defend themselves.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Well guys it seems pretty clear that Canada *could* get by without standing military forces at all and simply add a medium weight constabulary to patrol the seas and hand SAR to CHC. That’s not what a responsible G7 country and founding NATO member would do, but it could be the officially stated policy instead of the stealthy outcome we are on course for, SSE notwithstanding.
 
It keeps boiling down to this: national defence should meet multiple roles which can be conveniently broken down into 1) meeting immediate and ongoing peacetime defence missions and needs; 2) providing a credible deterrent to make potential opponents think twice about any acts of hostility against us; and 3) have a "break glass in case of emergency" capability to be able to quickly ramp up our defence forces in case deterrence fails to work.

Defence spending as well can be conveniently broken down into three categories as follows: 1) capital cost for acquiring new equipment; 2) personnel costs; and 3) costs for operations and maintenance of the force.

While I fully agree that the funding of the national defence forces is a discretionary political decision, one must never forget that the request for such funding, and, just as importantly, the rationale behind such funding is very much part of the internal decision making process and the advice which is provided to the political leadership by the civilian and military bureaucracy. Similarly, the strategic outlook that the political leadership adopts is based on the intelligence and evaluations provided by, in large part, that same bureaucracy.

My own feeling is that our current lack of operational defence outputs and capability gaps and our inability to properly grow a proper defence capability from the reserves in the case of an emergency is because for several decades our own bureaucracy has skewed defence spending in favour of too many full-time personnel (with by far too many of those eaten up by the central administrative headquarters) and thereby reducing available funding for operations and maintenance and equipment.

The result is that while we have a modest capability to meet our current peacetime defence needs, we have very little credibility as a deterrent force and have virtually no capability to ramp up the force in the event of an emergency.

That has to change and, if our political leadership has no interest for a proper strategic outlook, then that change has to come from within DND/CAF. After all, the military leadership has both the responsibility and authority to properly assess and plan for our country's defence requirements. The country already gives DND $23.4 billion. Let's stop spending over half of it on full-time personnel.

:cheers:
 
Just throwing out something I hope I haven't missed in previous pages....

What about mimicking the Private Finance Initiative that the UK is using with their Point-Class Ro-Ro's.

They have six owned and operated by a private cargo company with a contract to be able to buy access within fixed windows incase of national need.

Their model is based on 6 ships of which 4 are currently dedicated to the MOD and the other 2 are recallable with 20 and 30 days respectively.

As Canada does not have the same overseas commitments as the UK, we likely could build our own alternative.

Hypothetical Option:
1. In concert with a Canadian Private Cargo Company, spec out what is both commercially viable to operate and useful to the CAF in case of national emergency.
2. RFQ for minimum of four ships to be built sequentially in same yard to our newly equipped Canadian ship builders (building a long term strategic pipeline of construction, rather than our typical boom & bust methodology).  Of note, ships could either be new builds or retrofits of existing ships (like the Asterix) to ensure cost competitiveness.
3.  All four ships to start on civilian contracts with two based in Vancouver and two in Halifax, to limit DND expenses during non-emergency periods.
4.  First two ships recallable within 30 days.  Second two recallable with 45 days. (This would be longer than the UK contract as our ships would likely be further from home ports than their ships).
 
Seaspan reports that they ship is 40% complete and 90% of the blocks are under construction
146215470_1357900594571672_7365460063597008372_o.jpg
 
Cdn Blackshirt said:
Just throwing out something I hope I haven't missed in previous pages....

What about mimicking the Private Finance Initiative that the UK is using with their Point-Class Ro-Ro's.

They have six owned and operated by a private cargo company with a contract to be able to buy access within fixed windows incase of national need.

Their model is based on 6 ships of which 4 are currently dedicated to the MOD and the other 2 are recallable with 20 and 30 days respectively.

As Canada does not have the same overseas commitments as the UK, we likely could build our own alternative.

Hypothetical Option:
1. In concert with a Canadian Private Cargo Company, spec out what is both commercially viable to operate and useful to the CAF in case of national emergency.
2. RFQ for minimum of four ships to be built sequentially in same yard to our newly equipped Canadian ship builders (building a long term strategic pipeline of construction, rather than our typical boom & bust methodology). Of note, ships could either be new builds or retrofits of existing ships (like the Asterix) to ensure cost competitiveness.
3. All four ships to start on civilian contracts with two based in Vancouver and two in Halifax, to limit DND expenses during non-emergency periods.
4. First two ships recallable within 30 days. Second two recallable with 45 days. (This would be longer than the UK contract as our ships would likely be further from home ports than their ships).
Click to expand...

I love this idea. A Non-DND Crown Corp could contract 1 or 2 to run food/fuel/medical equipment/etc... to help reduce the cost of living up north too. Use these summer delivery runs to train with AOPS, visit northern communities/build gov't-FN relations. Make these ships convertible hospitals, use them as hospital ships as needed (on 30D contract).
 
LoboCanada said:
I love this idea. A Non-DND Crown Corp could contract 1 or 2 to run food/fuel/medical equipment/etc... to help reduce the cost of living up north too. Use these summer delivery runs to train with AOPS, visit northern communities/build gov't-FN relations. Make these ships convertible hospitals, use them as hospital ships as needed (on 30D contract).
Click to expand...
That would probably brown off civilian contractors doing the job now as well as make some log types warming chairs in a headquarters unhappy but all-in-all that would be a great idea to build relationships and a valuable info net.

🍻
 
FJAG said:
That would probably brown off civilian contractors doing the job now as well as make some log types warming chairs in a headquarters unhappy but all-in-all that would be a great idea to build relationships and a valuable info net.

🍻
Click to expand...
Which would be the death knell of this initiative, woe that we actually interject any new ways of thinking/service delivery.
 
I just realized people unaware of this little encounter may not get what I am driving at:

The old PROTECTEUR class did not repeat not have bulbous bows. PENELOPE was rolled over to a list of almost 60 degrees in the collision, which occurred near her middle. There were only minor injuries in her crew - none in PRESERVER. Had PRESERVER been a ship with a bulbous bow, PENELOPE's engine room and boiler room would have been opened like sardine cans and flooded in minutes. There is no recovering from that - she would have sunk like a brick with many sailors going down with her.

P.S. It's not a coincidence that replenishment-at-sea are quite rightly considered to be the most dangerous seamanship evolution.
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
I just realized people unaware of this little encounter may not get what I am driving at:

The old PROTECTEUR class did not repeat not have bulbous bows. PENELOPE was rolled over to a list of almost 60 degrees in the collision, which occurred near her middle. There were only minor injuries in her crew - none in PRESERVER. Had PRESERVER been a ship with a bulbous bow, PENELOPE's engine room and boiler room would have been opened like sardine cans and flooded in minutes. There is no recovering from that - she would have sunk like a brick with many sailors going down with her.

P.S. It's not a coincidence that replenishment-at-sea are quite rightly considered to be the most dangerous seamanship evolution.
Click to expand...
From what I have been able to glean, one of Penelopes's throttles got stuck in the open position while she was coming alongside for a RAS, rendering her almost un-navigable.

Does not change your point about bulbous bows.
 
They do more than save fuel. They improve seakeeping and stability. Also assuming PRESERVER had a bulbous bow, PENELOPE may have glanced off of it and not been driven underneath, but pushed aside instead. Still would have been a bad collision but not as disastrous as you describe. We'll never know of course, but I appreciate where you are coming from.
 
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