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Type 31 for Canada?

Oldgateboatdriver

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I am looking through the publicly available information on various warship shipbuilding programs in Canada and the UK, and on the projected schedules in particular.

The Canadian River class current projection is for FRASER to commission in the early 2030's (I will be generous and assume it will be actually in 2030) and the first 9 vessels to commission by 2040, with the last 6 commissioning between 2040 and 2050 (last one). Why a slower rate of production in the second decade is not made clear, but I will assume that it is because in that same decade (40 to50), the first five years will also include the development and designing of the next gen of RCN warships and they will start to build in parallel with the last Rivers during the second 5 years so that they (next gen) start to replace the older Rivers from 2051 on. At least that is what the Shipbuilding Strategy envisioned: continuous build.

When I look at all the various Type 26 derivatives construction schedules, I note that the production speed seems fairly constant throughout at a little over five years from "keel" laying (I put that in brackets because nowadays, the process starts differently than in the old days). On the other hand, the production speed for the Type 31 seems to be a little over three years.

Assuming no slippage in the River class production schedule occurs and assuming the HAL's will self retire the same way and at about the same age as the IRO's (44 years average), then the last HAL will self retire in 2040, at which time we will only have 9 River's in service. Not only do we not hit 15 warships in service, but we are 25% below current fleet levels. Any slippage in the River's production increases that gap.

If, on the other hand, we ran the following program, what would happen?

Program: A one time, one bid deal whereby the Government of Canada invites any Canadian shipyard to present a bid for the construction of six minimally Canadianized Type 31 frigates, the first one to be "laid down" no later than end of 2025, be in service NLT 2029 and the last one delivered by NLT end of 2035. Each bidder would have to negotiate its own deal with Babcock. Any Canadian yard could bid, but the ones that are already "selected" yard under the NSBS would have to guarantee, under severe penalties if they fail, that taking on such extra work would not delay their other productions by even one day.

By "minimum Canadianizing", I mean the following: Hotel services to be at North American electrical standards and, if they see fit and is easier to make it work, use CCS330 instead of TACTICOS as the combat system.

Under my "plan", one HAL would be retired every time either a Canadian Type 31 or a River class commissions so that all 12 HAL's would be retired by about 2037-38. After that year, you let the fleet build up to 15 ships with further River commissioning, at which point for every River coming into the fleet, you start selling the Canadian Type 31 to acceptable secondary markets.

What say you all?
 
Why leave the bidders to negotiate with Babcock vs the GoC?
Do we have the capacity as a country to build another class concurrently? Davie maybe?

If we have another yard that can build a Type31 why not use them to simply build the River Class faster?
 
Why leave the bidders to negotiate with Babcock vs the GoC?
Do we have the capacity as a country to build another class concurrently? Davie maybe?

If we have another yard that can build a Type31 why not use them to simply build the River Class faster?
Would each module be portable enough to transport from another yard for final assembly at Irving? There are probably several yards in the east that could handle that type of work. After all, Davie had a yard in Europe build units for the Asterix. And if more ground space is available for assembly Irving still owns St. Johns.
 
What are you on about? We have enough issues with the CSC and you want to stand up another class of ship? All this does is give a future government cause to cut the amount of CSC's and use type 31's instead. Not to mention having to staff another project office that we don't have people for and operating a mixed fleet that will consume more resources that we don't have. You mention "minimum Canadianizing" and that's all and good however we also have different occupational health and safety standards to account for as well at a minimum, you have a very simplistic understanding of how we build ships in Canada. The whole idea of building 15 CSC's and not 3 air defence ships and 12 CSC's was to prevent exactly what you're proposing. No Canadian shipyard is going to accept a contract with the penalties as you describe.

There is only several ways in my opinion to increase production to account for any shortfall in keeping with the NSS, if there is any and your numbers seem off to be honest.

1. Increase capacity in building multiple CSC's either from the prime contractor building a separate site ie (in NS or reactivation of the Saint John site)

2. Invest in a government owned shipyard as a strategic asset and if the capacity exists design work and production of the CSC replacement.
 
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The solution seems to be to not slow the last CSC build timelines, but somewhere in the delivery schedule the RCN and NSS should be looking into the CSC replacement, and/or adding hulls to the fleet to replace the older CSC.
 
Assuming no slippage in the River class production schedule occurs and assuming the HAL's will self retire the same way and at about the same age as the IRO's (44 years average), then the last HAL will self retire in 2040, at which time we will only have 9 River's in service. Not only do we not hit 15 warships in service, but we are 25% below current fleet levels. Any slippage in the River's production increases that gap.

I do think this is a legitimate problem but I am not convinced Canada has the will to solve it.
The best bet is to seek to accelerate River Class production and by 2040 have the design of the next ship well underway regardless of whether it’s an upgraded River or a new clean sheet design, production of which should aim to have the first of class being delivered at the same time as last of the River Class.

We are likely too late to fix the identified problem but we can aim not to repeat it.
 
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