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Forgot who said it but all plans rarely remain after contact. Teach flexablity in thought, read the grpond and plain do it!
Thinking about the Infantry Attack
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Seeing @daftandbarmy 's Canadian battle drill video made me feel all warm and fuzzy. 40 years after I learned them the same drills are being used.
There were three things that kind of stuck out though. One was that weird crouching and focusing through the optics while advancing across an open field and another was reacting to effective enemy fire.
In the advance we would normally have kept our rifles in our shoulder but pointed down at the ground, on safe and fingers on the trigger guard. Our heads were on a swivel and the eyeballs were looking everywhere from our buddy on the left to the buddy on the right and scanning near, middle and far. Of course we didn't have sights then but don't you lose some situational awareness staring into that little tube all the time? And if you are in an open field what is the point of crouching? Why not just walk comfortably? The alternative movement in the upright position would have been to run like a bugger.
Which brings me to the "effective" fire bit and the reaction thereto. I clearly remember WO Angus Muise informing us that our section leader would let us know when the fire was effective and that would be the time to dash-down-observe-sights-fire. The implication was that fire was only effective when it started to achieve effect and that we were to continue to follow the last order given and advance to contact. Just because there were bangs, snaps and whistles that didn't mean the fire was effective.
The third thing was the gap between burning loads of ammunition to win the firefight and the start of the section leader's planning process with the instructions being that the 2iC is supposed to maintain the fire on the objective while the squad leader figures out how to get there. Do you really have that much ammunition on you? With 100 rounds per rifleman and 150 rounds for each C2 gunner we were a little more parsimonious with the ammunition. The net tendency was, once the enemy had been located to keep them under observation from cover while the section leader figured out what he wanted to do. The ammunition would be expended by the section leader to suppress the enemy and cover movement if necessary. The ammunition would then be conserved to actually cover the assault with the gun group doing the expending.
The instruction manual looks the same but the interpretation seems different.
There were three things that kind of stuck out though. One was that weird crouching and focusing through the optics while advancing across an open field and another was reacting to effective enemy fire.
In the advance we would normally have kept our rifles in our shoulder but pointed down at the ground, on safe and fingers on the trigger guard. Our heads were on a swivel and the eyeballs were looking everywhere from our buddy on the left to the buddy on the right and scanning near, middle and far. Of course we didn't have sights then but don't you lose some situational awareness staring into that little tube all the time? And if you are in an open field what is the point of crouching? Why not just walk comfortably? The alternative movement in the upright position would have been to run like a bugger.
Which brings me to the "effective" fire bit and the reaction thereto. I clearly remember WO Angus Muise informing us that our section leader would let us know when the fire was effective and that would be the time to dash-down-observe-sights-fire. The implication was that fire was only effective when it started to achieve effect and that we were to continue to follow the last order given and advance to contact. Just because there were bangs, snaps and whistles that didn't mean the fire was effective.
The third thing was the gap between burning loads of ammunition to win the firefight and the start of the section leader's planning process with the instructions being that the 2iC is supposed to maintain the fire on the objective while the squad leader figures out how to get there. Do you really have that much ammunition on you? With 100 rounds per rifleman and 150 rounds for each C2 gunner we were a little more parsimonious with the ammunition. The net tendency was, once the enemy had been located to keep them under observation from cover while the section leader figured out what he wanted to do. The ammunition would be expended by the section leader to suppress the enemy and cover movement if necessary. The ammunition would then be conserved to actually cover the assault with the gun group doing the expending.
The instruction manual looks the same but the interpretation seems different.
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Crappy CGI graphics to blame there.
Again I’d blame the CGI. It’s poorly done in that respect.
Enemy fire is effective when you take a casualty or very close calls.
See my above
IIRC the basic load is now
300rds / rifleman
600 / LMG (or more)
M72
M203 18ish per grenadier
Even with well aimed effective fire and managing firing rates, ammo can go very fast though if the enemy is dug in and/or if you’re in close terrain with multiple enemies.
Honestly I’d blame the graphics setup more than anything.
daftandbarmy
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TangoTwoBravo
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I am not an infantryman, but I see that much of the last two or three pages has been on Collective Training. I offer the following from our Training doctrine (BGL-300-008 Training Canada's Army) and relevant amplifying CAO 23-21 Foundation Training. These need to be used in conjunction with relevant Battle Task Standards which in turn refer to doctrine and TTPs.
Section level training is defined in BLG-300-008 as Level 2, and is "Generally battle drills, aimed at executing battlefield tasks to a high standard. Combat battle tasks training should generally culminate in a Level 2 live fire event (stand or FTX)." Culminate does not mean that it is only live fire, just that at Level 2 the training should conclude with live fire.
Platoon level training is Level 3 and has "Increased Command control challenges. Tactical situations should be less predictable than Level 2, and battle drills should be less detailed." I note that Level 3 BTS for the Infantry also has "Clear a Trench System" which I think would be quite relevant today. Assuming you can get to Level 2 section attacks and Level 3 platoon attacks with some time/ammo left over before hitting Level 4, do you invest in more section attacks or do you conduct platoon trench clearing? Its not strictly either/or, but do we invest our spare capacity in independent Sections or Sections that work very well in a Platoon?
BGL-300-008 also offers that there should be logical progression with each level having preliminary stages, practice stages and confirmation stages (which we use for Validation with the new terminology). The preliminary stage for a section attack training event would be rather short, but the practice stage could have Battle Stands, Field Training Exercises and Field Firing training. Regarding live fire, BGL-300-008 also offers that "The value of live fire training culminates at Level 5...While live fire training is a critical component of training for operations, the safety restriction it places on movement and the application of fire limits its value as a tactical training method. At Level 2-5, force on force simulated training events can greatly enhance the effectiveness of training." So our doctrine does not say that live fire is the be-all and end-all.
The CAO on Foundation Training states that "the pros and cons of conducting FTXs dry or live must be considered to provide the most training value - this is a command assessment. The ability to conduct force-on-force with immersive simulation or augmented with WES is as important as the ability to conduct live ranges..." Doctrine and CAOs provide guidance but there is absolutely scope for judgement and imagination. Commanders have quite a bit of latitude, but time and other resources are always limited.
Anyhoo. Back to your regularly scheduled programing.
Section level training is defined in BLG-300-008 as Level 2, and is "Generally battle drills, aimed at executing battlefield tasks to a high standard. Combat battle tasks training should generally culminate in a Level 2 live fire event (stand or FTX)." Culminate does not mean that it is only live fire, just that at Level 2 the training should conclude with live fire.
Platoon level training is Level 3 and has "Increased Command control challenges. Tactical situations should be less predictable than Level 2, and battle drills should be less detailed." I note that Level 3 BTS for the Infantry also has "Clear a Trench System" which I think would be quite relevant today. Assuming you can get to Level 2 section attacks and Level 3 platoon attacks with some time/ammo left over before hitting Level 4, do you invest in more section attacks or do you conduct platoon trench clearing? Its not strictly either/or, but do we invest our spare capacity in independent Sections or Sections that work very well in a Platoon?
BGL-300-008 also offers that there should be logical progression with each level having preliminary stages, practice stages and confirmation stages (which we use for Validation with the new terminology). The preliminary stage for a section attack training event would be rather short, but the practice stage could have Battle Stands, Field Training Exercises and Field Firing training. Regarding live fire, BGL-300-008 also offers that "The value of live fire training culminates at Level 5...While live fire training is a critical component of training for operations, the safety restriction it places on movement and the application of fire limits its value as a tactical training method. At Level 2-5, force on force simulated training events can greatly enhance the effectiveness of training." So our doctrine does not say that live fire is the be-all and end-all.
The CAO on Foundation Training states that "the pros and cons of conducting FTXs dry or live must be considered to provide the most training value - this is a command assessment. The ability to conduct force-on-force with immersive simulation or augmented with WES is as important as the ability to conduct live ranges..." Doctrine and CAOs provide guidance but there is absolutely scope for judgement and imagination. Commanders have quite a bit of latitude, but time and other resources are always limited.
Anyhoo. Back to your regularly scheduled programing.
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This could be of some interest to the topic
markppcli
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If you think of what a platoon attack looks like, and even a company attack frankly, good sections make for good platoons. A section that can rapidly identify the location of enemy fire and begin engaging is going to make it much easier for the platoon to establish a fire base. Like wise good section approaches to, and assaults of, the objective(s) are very similar in function. I favour section attack ina platoon context, but to me it’s less either or and more the platoon being a sum of its sections.
Interesting to see clearing a trench system as a battle task standard, it’s been don’t very rarely. I think a trench clearance is a prime example of an environment for SIM / FX marking rounds. Quite frankly 80 percent of the benefit of SIM rounds is that it can be used essentially anywhere with a 100 m buffer around it and even inside the buffer you just need eye wear. It makes training in urban environments or trench (or tree lines with trenches) much easier to coordinate.
Fabius
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Two items I took from this analysis that I think are interesting.
First, the focus on assault tactics or just offensive operations to the detriment of defensive tactics.
Outside of the Ukraine forces specifics, our tendencies are also to focus on offensive tactics.
Case in point, this month will see a certain Bn conducting a L3 and L5 Live trench assaults, good training to be sure. However, this Bn will be responsible for tactical tasks such as delay, block, retain, possibly as a fly over force. Do our BTS that we are training match up to our probable assigned mission tasks?
Second interesting item was the positioning of the Coy Comd. That is one of the key decisions of any combat leader, Where do I position myself to best exercise command? Where do I best position myself to exercise control? How do I switch between them and when do I need to switch.
It would seem the UKR commanders lean towards control informed via their ISTAR fusion system DELTA.
Separate point from other various OSINT of interest is that they are heavily using both DELTA down to the Coy and maybe Pl level to inform both red and blue PA, access multiple ISR feeds from anything within range and also feed their own data into it.
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I’m always of the opinion of one excels at offensive operations that Defensive tasks are easier to accomplish without as much detailed training.
Not to say that it shouldn’t be trained - but it’s generally easier to reverse engineer a defensive operation from extensive training in offensive operations, than it is to conduct offensives from only defensive training.
I think the major issue is the targeting of command elements. Until you can control the information battle, commanders will be identified and targeted.
More C-UAS systems are needed even down to the Squad/Section level.
I find it interesting that despite the data that integration of fire support is still a fairly lengthy process.
The lack of Section/Squad UAS seem to be a major issue from some units.
As they don’t seems to have great artillery coordination and thus heavily really on UAS to locate enemy positions prior to attacking to focus certain positions with direct fire systems.
There are a number of deliberate attacks that have been infantry heavy and reliant on small arms fire and hand grenades that, I would have prefer to be hit earlier with artillery and mortars then use grenade launchers and rockets on remaining pockets prior to committing to a ground assault.
daftandbarmy
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The return of the good old dismounted flanking...
The Ukrainians ultimately retreated from the minefield, leaving behind more than two dozen of their best vehicles, including German-made Leopard 2A6 tanks and ex-American M-2 fighting vehicles.
Reeling from the losses, Ukrainian forces switched up their tactics. Instead of deploying large formations of armored vehicles in direct assaults on Russian fortifications in the hope of achieving major breakthroughs, the Ukrainians slowed down, dismounted from their vehicles and pressed their attacks only where they could flank the Russians.
But the Mala Tokmachka debacle wasn’t the only, or even the first, operation where Ukrainian commanders learned this hard lesson. A smaller assault by army and territorial brigades on Russian positions in Novodarivka, in Zaporizhzhia 40 miles east of Mala Tokmachka, ended no less disastrously—and compelled the brigades to shift to more deliberate, and much slower, flanking efforts.
All across the front in the first week of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainians learned the same thing: direct assaults on Russian defenses were too costly. If the counteroffensive were going to succeed, it would succeed slowly—and on foot.
This is a major conclusion of an important new study from analysts Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds from the Royal United Services Institute in London. After the failure of the initial assaults, “the emphasis for Ukrainian troops moved to taking ground while conserving equipment and personnel,” Watling and Reynolds wrote.
The decision to attack the Russian garrison in Novodarivka came late on June 3, following weeks of escalating artillery and drone attacks on Russian positions across southern Ukraine. Four Ukrainian brigades—the army’s 23rd and 32nd Mechanized and a pair of territorial brigades—staged for the assault.
www.forbes.com
Disastrous Armored Assaults Taught The Ukrainian Army To Flank Russian Defenses Instead
The Ukrainians ultimately retreated from the minefield, leaving behind more than two dozen of their best vehicles, including German-made Leopard 2A6 tanks and ex-American M-2 fighting vehicles.
Reeling from the losses, Ukrainian forces switched up their tactics. Instead of deploying large formations of armored vehicles in direct assaults on Russian fortifications in the hope of achieving major breakthroughs, the Ukrainians slowed down, dismounted from their vehicles and pressed their attacks only where they could flank the Russians.
But the Mala Tokmachka debacle wasn’t the only, or even the first, operation where Ukrainian commanders learned this hard lesson. A smaller assault by army and territorial brigades on Russian positions in Novodarivka, in Zaporizhzhia 40 miles east of Mala Tokmachka, ended no less disastrously—and compelled the brigades to shift to more deliberate, and much slower, flanking efforts.
All across the front in the first week of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainians learned the same thing: direct assaults on Russian defenses were too costly. If the counteroffensive were going to succeed, it would succeed slowly—and on foot.
This is a major conclusion of an important new study from analysts Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds from the Royal United Services Institute in London. After the failure of the initial assaults, “the emphasis for Ukrainian troops moved to taking ground while conserving equipment and personnel,” Watling and Reynolds wrote.
The decision to attack the Russian garrison in Novodarivka came late on June 3, following weeks of escalating artillery and drone attacks on Russian positions across southern Ukraine. Four Ukrainian brigades—the army’s 23rd and 32nd Mechanized and a pair of territorial brigades—staged for the assault.
Disastrous Armored Assaults Taught The Ukrainian Army To Flank Russian Defenses Instead
Instead of deploying large formations of vehicles in direct assaults, the Ukrainians slowed down, dismounted and pressed their attacks only where they could flank.
www.forbes.com
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Maybe a battalion commander would benefit from having under command both offensive and defensive minded Majors with the rifle companies being led by the hard chargers and the Combat Support Company being defensively minded. It seems to me that the CS Coy is all about "Fires" and the establishment of Fire Support Bases. It's inclination is to go firm. The defensive battle is all about being firm and winning firefights. Minefields and wire are pioneer tasks which are also found in the CS Coy.
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It’s not necessarily minded - it’s what time frame can you allocate to training on either.
There is only so much time, and frankly not enough to do everything.
Combat Support Company isn’t all about fires. Mortar Platoon, Armor Defence (TOW) and for LI the DFS Platoon are that, but Sniper’s, Recce, and Pioneers (do they still exist?) are not.
Combat Support supports all combat activities- both defensive and offensive.
Anyone can generally run or conduct a static defense, active mobile defense and blocking tasks are somewhat related to offensive tasks as well.
Camouflage of positions, vehicles and personnel apply to both defender and attacker, the proliferation of UAS with EO/IO systems just means the camouflage/deception tactics needs to include that as well.
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See my comments about Pioneers and minefields and wire. Add in other counter mobility tasks like blowing bridges and building overhead protection.
Snipers and Recce, as you know, also have roles in the defensive battle. Arguably the origin of the sniper is in the defensive warfare of the WW1 trenches. The sniper is a DFS system, amongst other things, including an OP.
I'll give you recce/scout which, I believe, is often attached directly to the HQ and Int.
TangoTwoBravo
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What is an "offensively-minded Major" as opposed to a "defensively-minded Major?" Is this something that would be found on their MPRR? I have found that some leaders may have a prediction towards deliberate planning/methodical conduct while others may prefer to improvise. Some may be comfortable with mission command while others may actually prefer to use more directive control. All of this can change with the situation. Somebody might be a dashing risk-taker on exercise but become much more methodical when lives are actually on the line. A commander might prefer to employ mission command but the situation may drive them to hold the reigns tighter than they would like.
Infantry battalions are expected to be able to operate across the full range of tactical tasks. Fire support is required for offensive and defensive tasks. A defence could be area or mobile. Both will feature counter-attacks. An deliberate attack may transition into a hasty defence. To your point, combat support company does not fight as a company (if it does then things have gone badly). It supports the battalion.
daftandbarmy
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I was just drawing from Kevin's comments about how he perceives it easier for a offensively trained unit to adapt to the defence than it is for a defensively trained unit to adapt to the offence.
My thoughts turned to how do you achieve both in one battalion with the thought being that perhaps it would be useful to have within the battalion one individual or team who are allowed to focus on the defence even when the unit is on the offence.
That led me to thinking that the defence, as I said, is largely a matter holding a firm base which covers its arcs with fire and which digs in. To me that sounded a lot like the attributes of the Combat Support Company which, as I understand it, in the offence largely works by moving its weapons to fixed positions to cover zones with fire.
It strikes me that adding an Air Defence / LAA / C-UAS platoon to the CS company is only going to reinforce its defensive characteristics.
Personality wise - I have no real opinions beyond wondering if there might be a selection bias towards officer candidates that exhibit the necessary elan.
I have no doubt that there are all sorts of personalities in the army. Do some personalities, some characteristics, prevail in different trades?
Combat Support Company may not fight as a company but I thought it was responsible for generating the fire support plan, the armoured defence plan, the MG/DFS plan, the mining and wiring plans and the air defence plan. In the defence the rifles then used to fall in on those fixed points. I also seem to recall that the intent was to keep the rifles out of the line as much as possible and conserve them to the rear for counter-attacks and the assault. To my mind, again, that sounds a lot like the hard skeleton of the battalion is the Combat Support Company which the rife companies flesh out.
Like any other skeleton it needs to be mobile and flexible. But on a bite and hold battlefield then wouldn't a planning consideration for the CS Company, when establishing fire bases, be how to defend that base if the battalion is pushed back on to the defence?
In the offence, it appears to me at any rate, that the CS company supports the Rifle Companies but on the defence the Rifles play second fiddle to the CS Company.
Presumably I have that all wrong.
Fabius
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Just another thought but in terms of cam and concealment paired with cover. I have seen several Canadian elements in the last several years now surprised to a significant degree by an US CTC OPFORs ability to easily see them via thermal sights.
The Canadian elements had sited themselves for visual spectrum camouflage but did not consider how to defeat thermal systems.
End result was not pretty and the OPFOR thermals were all ground based not UAS which likely would have been better at detecting the positons.
My conclusion was that even with thermal blankets etc. from the ground perspective our forces need to be more diligent in using dirt to mask thermal signatures from both En dismounted and IFV based thermal sights.
Also has the benefit of blocking bullets.
The Canadian elements had sited themselves for visual spectrum camouflage but did not consider how to defeat thermal systems.
End result was not pretty and the OPFOR thermals were all ground based not UAS which likely would have been better at detecting the positons.
My conclusion was that even with thermal blankets etc. from the ground perspective our forces need to be more diligent in using dirt to mask thermal signatures from both En dismounted and IFV based thermal sights.
Also has the benefit of blocking bullets.
daftandbarmy
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I hate the term fixed. Because unless you are conducting a static defense to the last man (or woman) nothing is fixed. Temporary is a much better word IMHO for firing positions. As offensive positions will continue to move as consolidation or further advancement allows, and blocking force or mobile defenses will do the same sort of thing but in reverse gear
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