Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[NavyShooter]

As a CPO2, and having proven somewhat...versatile....they tend to give me some latitude now.

As mentioned, setting something up so that the training goal is met for evaluation purposes, then adding something 'extra' into the mix is a good plan.

I'm pondering this fall to see if I can pull the old 60mm mortar from the unit museum holdings for the weekend (it's been de-activated) and set it up on our 'objective' area during the Recce Phase to see how much I can freak out the Recce folks. For the most part, Company level attacks are planned to overmatch the objective. How would a light infantry company 'overmatch' a 60mm HE delivery system?

My thoughts - C-6 in the SF Role to suppress and deny access to the mortar position, then as they approach, M203 barrage of XXX rounds.

Or.

See if the Company Commander reaches up the chain to speak with Shelldrake and ask for a bit of help.



That's just one of the 'rabbits' in my hat. I have others which I've run by Formation level Authorities to get approved already.

 

[daftandbarmy]

As a CPO2, and having proven somewhat...versatile....they tend to give me some latitude now.

As mentioned, setting something up so that the training goal is met for evaluation purposes, then adding something 'extra' into the mix is a good plan.

I'm pondering this fall to see if I can pull the old 60mm mortar from the unit museum holdings for the weekend (it's been de-activated) and set it up on our 'objective' area during the Recce Phase to see how much I can freak out the Recce folks. For the most part, Company level attacks are planned to overmatch the objective. How would a light infantry company 'overmatch' a 60mm HE delivery system?

My thoughts - C-6 in the SF Role to suppress and deny access to the mortar position, then as they approach, M203 barrage of XXX rounds.

Or.

See if the Company Commander reaches up the chain to speak with Shelldrake and ask for a bit of help.



That's just one of the 'rabbits' in my hat. I have others which I've run by Formation level Authorities to get approved already.

Whatever you do, for Gawd's Sake, keep it short, snappy and simple to start with.

"Take the lone trench" for example, 100m away near the lone bush. Do that a few times, then up the game later.

The number of times I've seen people task 'the point section in NATO' to defeat the enemy Division on its own....

 

[NavyShooter]

Simple is very important. The execution is fairly easy. The 'hard' part is shaping the attack so that it comes from the direction I wish it to.

 

[Blackadder1916]

Simple is very important. The execution is fairly easy. The 'hard' part is shaping the attack so that it comes from the direction I wish it to.

Mines. Lots of mines.

 

[markppcli]

Simple is very important. The execution is fairly easy. The 'hard' part is shaping the attack so that it comes from the direction I wish it to.

Which sort of gets to the points early where we talked about not giving the small unit leaders real options to use the ground. Any moron can follow the yellow brick trail between mine fields. Let them do infantry things and read / use ground.

Whatever you do, for Gawd's Sake, keep it short, snappy and simple to start with.

"Take the lone trench" for example, 100m away near the lone bush. Do that a few times, then up the game later.

The number of times I've seen people task 'the point section in NATO' to defeat the enemy Division on its own....

No, don’t put stuff by the lone bush. Make them work to find the contact. That’s the part of battle drill we fuck off as a given. Find locate the enemy and win the fire fight isn’t as simple as giving a grit and robotically yelling rates of fire.

 

[KevinB]

Which sort of gets to the points early where we talked about not giving the small unit leaders real options to use the ground. Any moron can follow the yellow brick trail between mine fields. Let them do infantry things and read / use ground.

100%. The enemy is going to want to channel the attack. This is either neglected or DS’d away most of the time.
You can put some obstacles in the way, but the obstacles should be covered by fire - so any attempt to breach them needs to have a deliberate plan.

No, don’t put stuff by the line phish. Make them work to find the contact. That’s the part of battle drill we fuck off as a given. Find locate the enemy and win the fire fight isn’t as simple as giving a grit and robotically yelling rates of fire.

Totally agree.
See the hill -> Take the hill leads to very unimaginative and uninspiring lessons.

Even basic attacks in BSL should have a degree of locate the enemy part of it.
The enemy whooping around a lone tree in desert combats doesn’t teach anyone anything good.

Also most (well motivated) people learn more from failure that successes.
So a failed attack with a solid debrief and Lessons Learned can often lead to better results than a successful attack. Not I’m suggesting ever attack scenario should be a Kobayashi Maru, but if the leadership doesn’t structure the attack correctly, and react to how things unfold they should be not rewarded by success from dumbing down the exercise.

 

[childs56]

biggest thing is crawl before you walk, walk before you jog, jog before you run and run before you sprint.
as mundane as it seems teaching the basics and going over the basics such as already stated by daftandbunny attack the trench first and then build upon it.

When I use to train my Gun Detachment we would go over recording the gun first, then use the gunner quadrant, use the compass. The change up the members and have my 2ic fill in as the Det Commander and move people up and I would fill in as loader. Then change round again.
If we were going for a Direct fire training, ( which was rarely done) I would walk through, talk through then dry drills until all the troops (except one) understood their roles and the roles of everyone around them. Then we would practice practice, then throw in GPO's open action, practice that then go back direct fire until my troops were comfortable enough that everyone knew their role and at least two roles above them in their duties (except one guy). Ultimately all my Gunners could record the gun, shoot the gun and tow the gun (except that one guy).

Once my Gun det was good at their basic drills we add depth such as local defence, such as support weapons. We may not need to engage the tank with the 105mm if we hit it with the 84mm. Keep the 105mm banging at its original target. (realistically if a enemy tank was that close we would be dead, hid very well in defilade or left the area). I would not add anything out of the basics until my Gun Det knew the and were proficient with the task at hand.

Direct fire would start with a bunker, then go to a moving target then multiple targets stationary and moving. It worked well and built the team up. I said it back then and still stand by it today. Id put my Gun Det up against any det. they were well trained at their job, we often if not all the time first in and out of action,(except the one time when we snapped the gun axle) Hit target rounds and messed everything else up and drank copious amounts of beer. All the while using the worst GT (pieced together from parts found at base transport) on the west coast, the cursed gun and the and staffed by banjo misfit Gunners as described by our counterparts.

We did pretty good filling in a infantry role and playing enemy force when required, to achieve the Commanders intent of training. We always had a warm brew and a cold one for anyone visiting.

 

[KevinB]

biggest thing is crawl before you walk, walk before you jog, jog before you run and run before you sprint.
as mundane as it seems teaching the basics and going over the basics such as already stated by daftandbunny attack the trench first and then build upon it.

When I use to train my Gun Detachment we would go over recording the gun first, then use the gunner quadrant, use the compass. The change up the members and have my 2ic fill in as the Det Commander and move people up and I would fill in as loader. Then change round again.
If we were going for a Direct fire training, ( which was rarely done) I would walk through, talk through then dry drills until all the troops (except one) understood their roles and the roles of everyone around them. Then we would practice practice, then throw in GPO's open action, practice that then go back direct fire until my troops were comfortable enough that everyone knew their role and at least two roles above them in their duties (except one guy). Ultimately all my Gunners could record the gun, shoot the gun and tow the gun (except that one guy).

Once my Gun det was good at their basic drills we add depth such as local defence, such as support weapons. We may not need to engage the tank with the 105mm if we hit it with the 84mm. Keep the 105mm banging at its original target. (realistically if a enemy tank was that close we would be dead, hid very well in defilade or left the area). I would not add anything out of the basics until my Gun Det knew the and were proficient with the task at hand.

Direct fire would start with a bunker, then go to a moving target then multiple targets stationary and moving. It worked well and built the team up. I said it back then and still stand by it today. Id put my Gun Det up against any det. they were well trained at their job, we often if not all the time first in and out of action,(except the one time when we snapped the gun axle) Hit target rounds and messed everything else up and drank copious amounts of beer. All the while using the worst GT (pieced together from parts found at base transport) on the west coast, the cursed gun and the and staffed by banjo misfit Gunners as described by our counterparts.

We did pretty good filling in an infantry role and playing enemy force when required, to achieve the Commanders intent of training. We always had a warm brew and a cold one for anyone visiting.

Don’t teach a fault…
By spoon feeding Poor constructs people don’t learn the correct manner of doing things.

You don’t need to waste training time and ammunition doing a crawl through of a trench attack. That can be done anywhere, and should have been done early on a BSL course.


FWIW I started as a Gunner and for whatever reason every Gunner unit Reg and Res seemed to think they could actually do Infantry stuff credibly. Outside of E Bty Para non could (and E Bty had some faults there too).

 

[suffolkowner]

Mines. Lots of mines.

lots of mines

https://twitter.com/x/status/1698180109189120131

 

[childs56]

Don’t teach a fault…
By spoon feeding Poor constructs people don’t learn the correct manner of doing things.

You don’t need to waste training time and ammunition doing a crawl through of a trench attack. That can be done anywhere, and should have been done early on a BSL course.

Actually you do, until you get it perfect, that does not mean it goes perfect. What that means is your troops get use to shifting machine gun fire off the objective, your machine gunners get use to firing in close proximity to friendly troops.
The first time I ever posted a grenade into a trench with the C6 shifting the target at the last second, had to be practiced dry a few times, We all new our jobs and what we were expected to do. It never hurts to walk through talk through and do.

It is always good to go back to basics especially when you get a new group of people who have not worked together.

FWIW I started as a Gunner and for whatever reason every Gunner unit Reg and Res seemed to think they could actually do Infantry stuff credibly. Outside of E Bty Para non could (and E Bty had some faults there too).

the infantry guys I worked with seemed to think we did a good job. Along with the Americans Army and Marines we worked with. I take that for what it is worth.

 

[markppcli]

biggest thing is crawl before you walk, walk before you jog, jog before you run and run before you sprint.
as mundane as it seems teaching the basics and going over the basics such as already stated by daftandbunny attack the trench first and then build upon it.

When I use to train my Gun Detachment we would go over recording the gun first, then use the gunner quadrant, use the compass. The change up the members and have my 2ic fill in as the Det Commander and move people up and I would fill in as loader. Then change round again.
If we were going for a Direct fire training, ( which was rarely done) I would walk through, talk through then dry drills until all the troops (except one) understood their roles and the roles of everyone around them. Then we would practice practice, then throw in GPO's open action, practice that then go back direct fire until my troops were comfortable enough that everyone knew their role and at least two roles above them in their duties (except one guy). Ultimately all my Gunners could record the gun, shoot the gun and tow the gun (except that one guy).

Once my Gun det was good at their basic drills we add depth such as local defence, such as support weapons. We may not need to engage the tank with the 105mm if we hit it with the 84mm. Keep the 105mm banging at its original target. (realistically if a enemy tank was that close we would be dead, hid very well in defilade or left the area). I would not add anything out of the basics until my Gun Det knew the and were proficient with the task at hand.

Direct fire would start with a bunker, then go to a moving target then multiple targets stationary and moving. It worked well and built the team up. I said it back then and still stand by it today. Id put my Gun Det up against any det. they were well trained at their job, we often if not all the time first in and out of action,(except the one time when we snapped the gun axle) Hit target rounds and messed everything else up and drank copious amounts of beer. All the while using the worst GT (pieced together from parts found at base transport) on the west coast, the cursed gun and the and staffed by banjo misfit Gunners as described by our counterparts.

We did pretty good filling in an infantry role and playing enemy force when required, to achieve the Commanders intent of training. We always had a warm brew and a cold one for anyone visiting.

Yes that’s why we have things like pairs dry before moving up to pairs live then section live and dry. This isn’t really a topic about training methodology. Well maybe it is in terms of how things get assessed. Regardless that we break things down simply and the. Increase collective complexity has been a given for most of my career.

The point was that what is considered “the basics” should be adjusted. I expect anyone coming off their DP1 to be able to do their job in a section attack in the mechanical sense of flowing through the steps. I want them to be able to identify and find targets and we do that by pushing it in unit level training.

 

[Fabius]

The squad and platoon attack need to be viewed as more training aberrations than expected routines. Very few enemy positions will be occupied solely by an enemy fire team or squad. Realistically a company position will be the minimum enemy force.
Now yes sometimes one will find isolated pockets of enemies, either due to locations, attrition or whatnot.

Which sort of gets to the points early where we talked about not giving the small unit leaders real options to use the ground. Any moron can follow the yellow brick trail between mine fields. Let them do infantry things and read / use ground.

Given KevinB’s above statement on the probable likelihood of a Section or even Pl attack occurring completely independently, how much ground and option should be given?
360 degrees, 90 degrees? Battle field geometry is I think a factor in real life as much as a live range constraint.

It goes back to what we are training. If we are training TTPS or drills we should be focusing on them within a fairly tight set of metaphorical arcs.
Once the troops and leaders have proven they are capable of executing the TTPs and drills to a sufficient degree we then introduce situations where the element has to make more challenging and nuanced decisions where they get more option space.

However much of that option space might not be present in a real situation and it is equally important for understanding.
Example could be a Section attack against an En position where the Pl is already advancing against the En positions flank and any sort of flanking would either have the section attacking the En from the En front or firing into the rest of the Coy.

 

[Fabius]

Yes that’s why we have things like pairs dry before moving up to pairs live then section live and dry. This isn’t really a topic about training methodology. Well maybe it is in terms of how things get assessed. Regardless that we break things down simply and the. Increase collective complexity has been a given for most of my career.

The point was that what is considered “the basics” should be adjusted. I expect anyone coming off their DP1 to be able to do their job in a section attack in the mechanical sense of flowing through the steps. I want them to be able to identify and find targets and we do that by pushing it in unit level training.

Thinking about how to train an Infantry Attack fits I think.

How to identify and find targets. It’s a key question and point to train for. I know 1 PPCLI has in the recent past rehearsed and practiced advance to contact in a mech context but in conversation with several other Bns the focus has been on raids or semi deliberate attacks with a defined 8-12 figure En Gr and disposition.

It’s been an ongoing observation, that advances to contact as a part of find and identify the En are posing challenges for the Canadian Infantry Corps at multiple levels from section to battalion.

 

[markppcli]

Given KevinB’s above statement on the probable likelihood of a Section or even Pl attack occurring completely independently, how much ground and option should be given?
360 degrees, 90 degrees? Battle field geometry is I think a factor in real life as much as a live range constraint.

If you go back to my previous post you’ll see what I’m talking about. Context and viable options included.

It goes back to what we are training. If ywe are training TTPS or drills we should be focusing on them within a fairly tight set of metaphorical arcs.
Once the troops and leaders have proven they are capable of executing the TTPs and drills to a sufficient degree we then introduce situations where the element has to make more challenging and nuanced decisions where they get more option space.

It’s a bit of both isn’t it. While yes the section attack is a drill, and yes it’s an unlikely scenario to assault a position in supported, a platoon commander sectoring the objective and assigning them to the section commanders is very reasonable. In either a deliberate or hasty attack, there’s value for the section commanders in the case having worked through problems in training vs replicating drills.

However much of that option space might not be present in a real situation and it is equally important for understanding.
Example could be a Section attack against an En position where the Pl is already advancing against the En positions flank and any sort of flanking would either have the section attacking the En from the En front or firing into the rest of the Coy.

I mean that’s a bit of an extreme example and also a prime example of why you have to give options in training so people can make mistakes and learn.

Thinking about how to train an Infantry Attack fits I think.

How to identify and find targets. It’s a key question and point to train for. I know 1 PPCLI has in the recent past rehearsed and practiced advance to contact in a mech context but in conversation with several other Bns the focus has been on raids or semi deliberate attacks with a defined 8-12 figure En Gr and disposition.

It’s been an ongoing observation, that advances to contact as a part of find and identify the En are posing challenges for the Canadian Infantry Corps at multiple levels from section to battalion.

And that’s the rub, going back to the article @Infanteer posted, the critical point of so many of those simulations was correctly identifying then Suppressing the enemy. To me that’s one major take away, and it’s an easy fix, start using Fig 12 and 13s in cammed positions as target. Make it the norm to look for an enemy on the ground vice standing up. Simply quick fix that drives the solution.

 

[Fabius]

It’s a bit of both isn’t it. While yes the section attack is a drill, and yes it’s an unlikely scenario to assault a position in supported, a platoon commander sectoring the objective and assigning them to the section commanders is very reasonable. In either a deliberate or hasty attack, there’s value for the section commanders in the case having worked through problems in training vs replicating drills.

Do you have any specific problem sets that you would want to have a Section Comd work through?

A Pl example of what I am thinking would be when, where, how and why a Pl Comd would commit a depth section to the assault.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Do you have any specific problem sets that you would want to have a Section Comd work through?

A Pl example of what I am thinking would be when, where, how and why a Pl Comd would commit a depth section to the assault.

A Pl Comd leads the depth sections into the assault after the point section gets ground up, or pinned down.

As per the Platoon Battle Drills, of course

Here's a pretty good video produced by the CAF:

And a British version...

 

[Brad Sallows]

Does the US still have a dedicated OPFOR at NTC? Are they pushovers?

 

[markppcli]

A Pl Comd leads the depth sections into the assault after the point section gets ground up, or pinned down.

As per the Platoon Battle Drills, of course

Here's a pretty good video produced by the CAF:

And a British version...

Yes he means give the section commander the task and have the work the problem. Not the general concept which is pretty clear and you can safely assume we all grasp. The Brit’s suffer a similar problem to us wrt to sect attacks being very canned from conversations with them; the difference being they always do right flankings and we always do frontals.

@Fabius i pointed out an example in a previous reply, but the context of clearing out a small position with some platoon support to coordinate and 2-3 options for the axis of advance would be my ideal. Essentially problems of route selection, getting everyone onto the enemy, really just fighting their section vs following a drill to check a box.

Does the US still have a dedicated OPFOR at NTC? Are they pushovers?

They do and by all accounts they are not. Part of that being that NTC is far less “PTA much achieve x y z” and thus they don’t have problems sending an entire BN HQ to zombie land.

 

[Fabius]

@Fabius i pointed out an example in a previous reply, but the context of clearing out a small position with some platoon support to coordinate and 2-3 options for the axis of advance would be my ideal. Essentially problems of route selection, getting everyone onto the enemy, really just fighting their section vs following a drill to check a box.

Sounds good, I guess I was thinking more granular. Based off of the Three Hundred Assaults articles, I could see the following problem sets being important to train in terms of decision making for a section Comd as just a few examples pulled from the article:

1. En Det has repositioned after initial contact unbeknownst to the section until after the LD on the assault.

2. Knowing when your section is ineffective and you need help due to casualties prior to your actual assault.

3. Balancing ground, fires, movement techniques to maintain tempo while conserving the energy of your soldiers. I think this goes into the assault distances discussed in the articles in addition to using dead ground and maximizing fires.

4. Paired with the above, when to prioritize a longer assault vs a short assault assuming ground enables both. Based on the article it seems it’s a balance based on certainty of the En position and strength. More fidelity meant a short assault was better with the inverse being true.

You could take these questions, which are all judgment calls based on MET-TC and set up situations either live or with an OPFOR ( my preference ) to allow the commander to encounter and work through each problem.

Gives you something tangible to AAR as well so that everyone can learn from the decisions made.

 

[KevinB]

So let’s talk about effective fire…
Or more importantly what isn’t.

https://x.com/visegrad24/status/1699365619378917475?s=46&t=fCYJdxwzyypPWGOhHnLHLw

When you put a bunch of rounds into your fighting position, you clearly are not aiming.

Aim more, Shoot less.
If you cannot hit the enemy or at least put rounds within a few inches of them, the enemy isn’t going to be really that concerned about your fire and it can have all the volume in the world and it won’t be suppressive.

There is a reason why 1-4, 1-6 and 1-8x LPVO (low power variable optic) have become common in Militaries these days.
The original LPVO, the S&B 1-4 Short Dot came out of CAG’s lessons learned from Somalia. The red dots didn’t allow for decent target discrimination in crowds or to see targets that were hiding in rubble or deeper into window openings. It really didn’t get appreciated by Big Army down here until GWOT, as variable engagement distances required one to be able to switch from 1 to 4+.

Again the importance of locating the enemy - while the theory of a Sect/Squad Leader using binoculars and saying follow my tracer is great in theory - it doesn’t always work in practice. Seeing something in Binos doesn’t always equate to being able to also identify the same with a 1x (or 3.4x ELCAN) and in a lot of terrain tracer isn’t going to do much.
So all members need to be able to see the enemy and also self correct their fire (while range errors inside 150m aren’t significant, range errors at 400+ are).