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The War in Ukraine

I don't think the Chinese would ever green light a Russian nuclear adventure. They make a big deal out of non-first use for their own strategic reasons. The Chinese also understand that the consequences would be unpredictable, but severe, and that they could easily be dragged in to a very bad situation.

Nukes are most valuable when not used and when you can retain the threat of them. The Russians getting away with using a nuke on a country that were forced to give up all their strategic weapons (including nukes) undermines everybody else's deterrent and all but guarantees massive proliferation. At that point places like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would and should be asking if they can really rely on the American nuclear umbrella. The Scandinavians, Balts and Poles would also have to consider if they can leave nuclear deterrence to NATO. Most people just aren't thinking of the wider implications. And to the Chinese all of this would be a Five Alarm fire that Putin has gone from useful idiot to dangerous drunk idiot with a lit match and full gas can.
 
Russification is official colonial policy of the Russian and Soviet Empires. It appears to be official policy of the Russian Empire 2.0 Tsar-wannabe Putin as well.

FTFY.

A handful of bordering Oblasts you cannot pacify or secure does not an Empire make.

It's also another form of genocide under international law, not that it's been a pressing concern of Vlad the Impotent in any of this.
 
One of the many concerning things about the treaty between the living God and the wannabe Tsar is the importation of North Korean workers to Russia. At it 's face it will allow the replacement of many Russians and former CIS workers no longer the workforce and allow an increase in military production.

But that also implies more Russians available to mobilise - and likely (if not by intent which I have my suspicions about) a bunch of North Korean lower enlisted 'workers' who can immediately be sent or can be mobilised to fight in Ukraine.
 
The ISW website has an excellent article on the effects of US restrictions on the use of donated weapons against targets in Russia on Ukraine's ability to defend itself:


Current US policy prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation is severely compromising Ukraine's ability to defend itself against the renewed cross-border invasion Russia has recently launched in Kharkiv Oblast. US policy has effectively created a vast sanctuary in which Russia has been able to amass its ground invasion force and from which it is launching glide bombs and other long-range strike systems in support of its renewed invasion. Whatever the merits of this US policy before the Russian assault on Kharkiv Oblast began, it should be modified immediately to reflect the urgent realities of the current situation.

The Russian military began an offensive operation along the Russian-Ukrainian border in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 10 — an effort that will pose serious challenges to Ukrainian forces over the coming months. The operation seeks to fix Ukrainian forces across the theater and thin them out along the 600-mile frontline to create opportunities, specifically in Donetsk Oblast, among other significant objectives that ISW has warned about at length.[1] Russian forces will likely leverage their tactical foothold in northern Kharkiv Oblast in the coming days to intensify offensive operations and pursue the initial phase of an offensive effort likely intended to push back Ukrainian forces from the border with Belgorod Oblast and advance to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.[2] The operation could set conditions for a major offensive operation that seeks to seize Kharkiv City, though Russian forces’ current limited efforts do not suggest that Russian forces are immediately pursuing a large-scale sweeping offensive operation to envelop, encircle, or seize Kharkiv City.[3] Russia’s operation is still nonetheless dangerous and is already diverting some Ukrainian forces and resources from Donetsk to Kharkiv.[4] Russia’s Kharkiv operation will force Ukraine to make difficult prioritization decisions that can generate significant operational effects in favor of Russia in the coming months.
The war may seem "quiet" due to the lack of large areas of territory changing hands, but the Russian offensive is still continuing in a serious way and the ability of Russian forces to have a sanctuary across the border from Kharkiv enables that. It also draws Ukrainian forces away from other areas of the front where Russia can try to use their manpower advantage to attrit Ukrainian units.

To get a sense of how much fighting is going along the entire 600-mile front just look at the list of locations where the Russians have been attacking over just the last 24-hours from ISW's Daily Update:

  • The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe (immediately east of Vovchansk) in the evening of June 20 but noted that Russian forces did not conduct active offensive operations in this direction on June 21 and instead conducted heavy guided glide bomb strikes from Belgorod Oblast. Kharkiv Oblast Police Chief Volodymyr Tymoshenko reported that Russian forces launched 17 guided glide bombs at positions north and northeast of Kharkiv City as of 1200 local time on June 21.
  • Russian sources additionally claimed that intense fighting continued in Vovchansk, with one milblogger reiterating claims that Russian forces have seized the entire Vovchansk Aggregate Plant and another claiming that Russian forces seized territory in the northern part of the Aggregate Plant, including near the children's music school.
  • Ukrainian military sources have not yet confirmed that Russian forces used an FAB-3000 glide bomb to strike Lyptsi on June 20 despite widespread Russian reporting that June 20 marked the first-ever strike using an FAB-3000 with this particular glide bomb modification.
  • Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk)
  • Additional geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novovodyane (southwest of Svatove)
  • Fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Pishchane, and Berestove; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove, Hrekivka, and Nevske; and south of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on June 20 and 21
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on June 20 and 21.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, including in the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar); north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka on June 20 and 21
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk; east of Toretsk near Pivnichne; southeast of Toretsk near Shumy; and south of Toretsk near Niu York on June 20 and 21
  • Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers near Niu York and Toretsk and entered the outskirts of Pivnichne
  • Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 21 that Russian forces are attacking in the Toretsk direction, including near Niu York and Shumy from Horlivka (west of Torestk), in order to develop an offensive on Chasiv Yar from the south.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Arkhanhelske, Novooleksandrivka, Sokil, Novopokrovske, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on June 20 and 21
  • Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the northern bank of the Karlivske Reservoir and west of Netaylove (both southwest of Avdiivka)
  • Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City)
  • A large number of heat anomalies detected by NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System on June 21 indicates fighting in central Krasnohorivka. Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka, Maksymilyanivka, and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Pobieda, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on June 20 and 21.
  • Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 21.
  • The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 21 that Russian forces conducted guided glide bomb strikes on Novoukrainka (east of Velyka Novosilka). Russian forces have also reportedly recently increased glide bomb strikes against Staromayorske, possibly in preparation for future ground attacks near the settlement.
  • Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Verbove and Mala Tokmachka on June 21.
  • Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky and Kozachi Laheri and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on June 21.
I don't see how anyone can take from this that Russia will be content with just holding on to what they've captured so far. They continue to attack all along the front - despite heavy losses in personnel and equipment and obviously believe that they can ultimately win a war of attrition against Ukraine in terms of manpower and in terms of their industry's ability (along with Chinese, North Korean and Iranian support) to ultimately outpace the West's ability to supply Ukraine.

We need to let Ukraine take the gloves off and use every tool at their disposal to defeat the Russians. And the West needs to really put our military industry into high gear to pump out enough weapons to let Ukraine do the job. Ukraine needs that serious firepower advantage to win because frankly unless we put NATO boots on the ground (which would take this war to a whole new level that I don't think anyone wants to see), Russia has the potential to bleed Ukraine dry of manpower to the point that they will be unable to generate enough forces to conduct any significant offensive operations.

$0.02
 
One of the many concerning things about the treaty between the living God and the wannabe Tsar is the importation of North Korean workers to Russia. At it 's face it will allow the replacement of many Russians and former CIS workers no longer the workforce and allow an increase in military production.

But that also implies more Russians available to mobilise - and likely (if not by intent which I have my suspicions about) a bunch of North Korean lower enlisted 'workers' who can immediately be sent or can be mobilised to fight in Ukraine.
North Korea may also send "observers" to the front in order to get some real-life combat experience which their army is lacking.
 
The ISW website has an excellent article on the effects of US restrictions on the use of donated weapons against targets in Russia on Ukraine's ability to defend itself:



The war may seem "quiet" due to the lack of large areas of territory changing hands, but the Russian offensive is still continuing in a serious way and the ability of Russian forces to have a sanctuary across the border from Kharkiv enables that. It also draws Ukrainian forces away from other areas of the front where Russia can try to use their manpower advantage to attrit Ukrainian units.

To get a sense of how much fighting is going along the entire 600-mile front just look at the list of locations where the Russians have been attacking over just the last 24-hours from ISW's Daily Update:

  • The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe (immediately east of Vovchansk) in the evening of June 20 but noted that Russian forces did not conduct active offensive operations in this direction on June 21 and instead conducted heavy guided glide bomb strikes from Belgorod Oblast. Kharkiv Oblast Police Chief Volodymyr Tymoshenko reported that Russian forces launched 17 guided glide bombs at positions north and northeast of Kharkiv City as of 1200 local time on June 21.
  • Russian sources additionally claimed that intense fighting continued in Vovchansk, with one milblogger reiterating claims that Russian forces have seized the entire Vovchansk Aggregate Plant and another claiming that Russian forces seized territory in the northern part of the Aggregate Plant, including near the children's music school.
  • Ukrainian military sources have not yet confirmed that Russian forces used an FAB-3000 glide bomb to strike Lyptsi on June 20 despite widespread Russian reporting that June 20 marked the first-ever strike using an FAB-3000 with this particular glide bomb modification.
  • Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk)
  • Additional geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novovodyane (southwest of Svatove)
  • Fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Pishchane, and Berestove; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove, Hrekivka, and Nevske; and south of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on June 20 and 21
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on June 20 and 21.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, including in the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar); north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka on June 20 and 21
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk; east of Toretsk near Pivnichne; southeast of Toretsk near Shumy; and south of Toretsk near Niu York on June 20 and 21
  • Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers near Niu York and Toretsk and entered the outskirts of Pivnichne
  • Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 21 that Russian forces are attacking in the Toretsk direction, including near Niu York and Shumy from Horlivka (west of Torestk), in order to develop an offensive on Chasiv Yar from the south.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Arkhanhelske, Novooleksandrivka, Sokil, Novopokrovske, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on June 20 and 21
  • Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the northern bank of the Karlivske Reservoir and west of Netaylove (both southwest of Avdiivka)
  • Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City)
  • A large number of heat anomalies detected by NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System on June 21 indicates fighting in central Krasnohorivka. Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka, Maksymilyanivka, and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Pobieda, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on June 20 and 21.
  • Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 21.
  • The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 21 that Russian forces conducted guided glide bomb strikes on Novoukrainka (east of Velyka Novosilka). Russian forces have also reportedly recently increased glide bomb strikes against Staromayorske, possibly in preparation for future ground attacks near the settlement.
  • Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Verbove and Mala Tokmachka on June 21.
  • Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky and Kozachi Laheri and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on June 21.
I don't see how anyone can take from this that Russia will be content with just holding on to what they've captured so far. They continue to attack all along the front - despite heavy losses in personnel and equipment and obviously believe that they can ultimately win a war of attrition against Ukraine in terms of manpower and in terms of their industry's ability (along with Chinese, North Korean and Iranian support) to ultimately outpace the West's ability to supply Ukraine.

We need to let Ukraine take the gloves off and use every tool at their disposal to defeat the Russians. And the West needs to really put our military industry into high gear to pump out enough weapons to let Ukraine do the job. Ukraine needs that serious firepower advantage to win because frankly unless we put NATO boots on the ground (which would take this war to a whole new level that I don't think anyone wants to see), Russia has the potential to bleed Ukraine dry of manpower to the point that they will be unable to generate enough forces to conduct any significant offensive operations.

$0.02
Its not a matter of ability of the West to supply Ukraine but will or desire. How many Patriot systems have been ordered out of Raytheons 12 a year capacity for example?
 
I wouldn't sell their strategic arsenal short. I think it's reasonable to conclude that the bulk of their warheads are serviceable and that the delivery systems work

Black market sale by oligarchs of tritium gas that should have been used to maintain the boosted output of the strat warheads probably has most likely served to significantly impact their serviceability.

Agreed - I am not suggesting that the arsenal isn't deadly - just that it isn't as big as they want everyone to think

Yup.
 
Black market sale by oligarchs of tritium gas that should have been used to maintain the boosted output of the strat warheads probably has most likely served to significantly impact their serviceability.

I don't doubt the Russian capacity for corruption, but they do take nuclear weapon security quite seriously. Nuclear facilities are operated by a special branch of the Ministry of Defence that does not answer to the General Staff, while the warheads themselves are guarded by SOF troops from the FSB.
 
Asset protection and level of maintenance to ensure serviceability are not necessarily correlative.
 
I don't doubt the Russian capacity for corruption, but they do take nuclear weapon security quite seriously. Nuclear facilities are operated by a special branch of the Ministry of Defence that does not answer to the General Staff, while the warheads themselves are guarded by SOF troops from the FSB.
I know some folks who’ve walked right into some of their storage sites. Ones with large holes in rusted fences, and cracks and major openings to secure concrete buildings. As well as ventilation systems that don’t work, so doors are opened to allow air flow…

The word miracle has been used multiple times when dealing with Russia Nuclear non-proliferation and safety.


I’m curious how many warheads have been bought by USG entities as well.
 
I know some folks who’ve walked right into some of their storage sites. Ones with large holes in rusted fences, and cracks and major openings to secure concrete buildings. As well as ventilation systems that don’t work, so doors are opened to allow air flow…

The word miracle has been used multiple times when dealing with Russia Nuclear non-proliferation and safety.


I’m curious how many warheads have been bought by USG entities as well.

Well, for sure they have a couple of warheads, although they don't officially acknowledge it: Project Azorian - Wikipedia
 
Regarding air to air combat (FPV) drones, now drone strike packages and air tactics are (with modifications) becoming more common. Given the pace of innovation, development and manufacturing the move to FPV 2.0 (supplemented or almost completely AI piloted) will have a noticeable impact (😁) on the utilization and effectiveness of ISR drones. For however long that advantage lasts that does will be able to mass units which currently is almost suicidal.
 
Is hunting a fellow down (possibly already wounded) who is running away, unarmed, from the battlefield fair cricket?

Depends on their ROE for drone use. My opinion would be yes, no ability for a drone to take a prisoner away from the zero line to a secure POW holding area and even if lightly wounded he is obviously not hors de combat and could just as easily pick up s weapon again thus is still a combatant whereas a surrender to another soldier on the ground does remove him from combat.

Lots of new laws of war to be developed as a result of the explosion in drone warfare tactics and capabilities.
 
Depends on their ROE for drone use. My opinion would be yes, no ability for a drone to take a prisoner away from the zero line to a secure POW holding area and even if lightly wounded he is obviously not hors de combat and could just as easily pick up s weapon again thus is still a combatant whereas a surrender to another soldier on the ground does remove him from combat.

Lots of new laws of war to be developed as a result of the explosion in drone warfare tactics and capabilities.
In reality, this is not so different from soldiers in trenches a hundred years ago, who might be disarmed and injured by the shelling yet they can't surrender because there is no way to surrender to artillery.

It's just that in this day and age, the shells have eyes.

It is difficult to watch. I don't know if I could do it. I heard drone pilots had pretty high rates of PTSD/suicide.
 
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The Ukrainians have dropped messages and leaflets to soldiers who want to surrender. Asking for mercy isn't enough. They have to show intent to surrender by moving to Ukrainian lines. If they drop their rifle and move towards Russian lines they should be fair game. That's just a guy coming back to kill you tomorrow.
 
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