The War in Ukraine

[Skysix]

History has typically shown that when you have company + elements surrendering. It doesn't slow down, and can collapse armies.

I read that as it doesn't slow attackers and can collapse defenders. Is that correct?

 

[Skysix]

Regarding the Kerch bridge, Taurus and JASSM will need a LOT of hits/sorties to take it off line totally (2 years or more). 2000# JDAMS/JDAMS-ER will be a lot more effective and resource efficient.

Given the degradation of GBAD in the area and the arrival of some F16's, the deciding factors affecting the timing of it's destruction still remaining are the modification of the highly GPS dependant guidance package (add AI (or an inertial system with some accuracy loss) to compensate for Russian EW) and political/military/strategic concerns.


And those GPS enhancements will also be needed on a truly VAST array of NATO weapon systems. Or the fielding of a new constellation of military only satellites they can link to for guidance now that the joint use civilian/military GPS network is effectively useless in any LSCO (and rapidly even in COIN). Accuracy has been degraded from a 70% hit probability to 6%.

Perhaps multiple receivers so they can use the Russian or Chinese (GLONASS or BeiDou) signals as well and AI to compare/contrast the information and match it against visual information preloaded or obtained in flight from its own or fused sensors.

 

[Skysix]

Interesting analysis re: how to squeeze USSR 2.0 harder ....

Institute for the Study of War

Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has simply not been exploiting. On the contrary, US incrementalism has helped the Kremlin offset and mask its weaknesses. The Kremlin’s weaknesses include its inability to rapidly pivot, dependence on others for R

www.understandingwar.org

Juiciest bits here
View attachment 87286
The writer doesn't appear to be concerned about the potential of "backing a wild animal into a corner" lash out. Mind you, given her background ...

Institute for the Study of War

Nataliya Bugayova is a non-resident Russia Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) focusing on the Kremlin’s foreign policy decision-making, information operations, and global campaigns from Ukraine to Africa. Nataliya previously led ISW’s Rus

www.understandingwar.org

... she might be at least unlikely to want to give Putin anything approaching a clear, easy doorway out the back, so to speak.

I think her background is an irrelevant red herring.

Nothing in that piece is new or radical to those that have been following this genocidal invasion since 2/22 (or earlier). Much of it has previously been publicly stated by officials from countries with significant humint and an understanding of the Russian psyche. Estonian Military Intelligence being a good example.

To me the key point that needs to be driven through thick blinkered skulls like a U-238 nail is:

'The West must abandon its reactive mentality that seeks to contain Russia through countermeasures. Countermeasures are inherently reactive. The effort to limit the Kremlin’s access to Western technologies is an example of a cat-and-mouse game, in which the West grants Russia turns to adapt its sanction-evasion techniques. The West can instead anticipate Russia’s likely pivots to pre-emptively block its moves. This non-trivial effort would require the United States to proactively coordinate across theaters with partners. Any war that the United States will fight or help to fight, however, will have the same requirement.'

 

[suffolkowner]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1824080752239120475

apparently second time in a few days. Russian friendly fire continues its campaign of destruction

 

[Eaglelord17]

That Russia/Rifle thing from WW2 seems to be a bit of a myth. It certainly happened on at least a couple of occasions, but was not a widespread practice.

I wouldn’t say it was a myth as it did happen. It just didn’t happen everywhere and nearly as much as people portray it.

In WWI it was a huge issue, Russia’s arms production never was able to keep up and they failed to effectively ramp up production. Logistically it was a nightmare too just trying to get rifles to the front. Some of their actions actually actively hurt it such as no exemption for conscription of their skilled tradesmen and by time they realized they sent their skilled rifle makers to the front they were basically all dead.

 

[Skysix]

Vlad Vexler, for those who do not know, is a Russian born UK based Political Philosophy PhD who has consistently provided nuanced and relevant analysis of the political dimension of Russia's genocidal invasion of Ukraine. And often, as with the current Ukrainian breeching operation, providing discouraging analysis.

And, slightly patronising accent aside, some good cautionary retrospective analysis of the previous failed Ukrainian breaching operation. Not really dwelled upon was the use of newly formed units with little to no combat veterans and not rotating in veteran units from elsewhere and replacing them with these new units. Unfortunately that was an early decision whose inertia and logistics prevented changing closer to zero day.