dapaterson said:
That's about as *** backwards as you can get. If you're paying someone 24/7, they are the logical ones to respond to short-notice tasks - like domestic emergencies. For deployed ops where there is a longer ramp-up time for roto 1 and beyond, leverage the Reserves. Indeed, since a large chunk of such missions tends to be the combat arms, which are the lower-training skillsets, it makes more sense to vest them in the Reserves with a small Reg F that can do roto 0 unsupported, roto 1 augmented, and roto 2+ with 30%+ from the Reserves, saving those 68000 positions (not really that many - read on) for the high-skillset personnel needed.
As for 68000: there ain't no such animal. Historic attrition is 7% (surges and down, year over year, but the long-term plan should be based on 7%). Current training times average about 2 years to the OFP (that's the point where someone can be employed in their military occupation. This is heavily weighted by the long time it takes to train ROTP officers). Thus, at any one time, we have two years worth of attrition in the training pipeline - that's 14% of our 68000, or about 9500, leaving 58500 trained strength. There's usually about 500 ending their careers and thus on final leave, and another 1000 or so with long-term medical conditions. Thus, you're left with 57000 of 68000 who are employable; and about 1000 of those are on advanced training of some sort, meaning our 68000 are now winnowed down to 56000.
I disagree that it's *** backwards as it gets.
Your comments on a Roto 0, Roto 1 scenario are entirely correct and that's why I stated that Reserve training could be up to a Coy level (not because a Coy will deploy, but because it would expose Pl Comds/Pl WOs to a larger op before augmenting a regular force unit. There is no requirement to train reserves any higher than this in a COMBAT role as the days of industrial age warfare that would require a Reserve bde to deploy whole are gone. There's no task, no equipment, and no desire for it, so why waste money training for no need?
As for the DOMOP task, I would argue that it makes sense that local units would be able to better react to local needs than to bring in Regular force units. Granted, this would require a significant modification of the current reserve charter and protection for workers, but having reserve/militia units called out "in support of the local power" is not unprecedented and was extremely common in the past (before we moved to our current reserve structure). Moreover, being engaged in DOMOPs would also be a legitimate task for a reserve Bde HQ and leadership.
As this thread is about budgets and how we can save money, my point is that we (the CAF and government) need a REALISTIC and not emotional valuation of what it is that the CAF will be expected to perform. In a perfect world Canada would have a division size army, including divisional force multipliers (real GS regiment, AH, etc) and a reserve structure fully equipped to move up to support the regular force. However, this is unfeasible under current funding and government direction. So, understanding that the reserves will provide 1 for 1 augmentation and rationalizing reserve capabilities/formations accordingly (perhaps up to disbandment of reserve armour for example) would be a way to focus resources on a task that the reserves could really be expected to do.
As for your numbers on the 68,000, I also track that we are usually -15% to -25% of effective strength due to various reasons, with the higher number being attributed to TCAT/PCAT pers. However, the CAF cannot come close to meeting the 56,000 that you state as a winnowed state, let alone the 68,000. So, as stated, we cannot meet our 68,000 PYs due to retention and recruitment shortfalls, regardless of their status in the force.
