The Defence Budget [superthread]

[Edward Campbell]

I was on my CWO course many years ago in Edmonton. We discussed new tanks, LAVS, LAV and tank barns etc.

I made the point "none of this will matter if you can't crew the systems".

Our greatest resource is the most neglected and low on the priority list.

Spot on! And within our most important and most neglected "resource" the key is the NCO leadership level. If we don't get the right people in right jobs at the right times - in terms of age and experience - then we are likely doomed to fail.

I was told, many, many years decades ago, by a then retired Chief of the General Staff, that he could have run his regiment, in war, Italy 1944, with only a handful (less than six) officers, himself included IF he had enough of the right corporals and sergeants; he only needed 25+ officers to make up for shortages of the right NCOs in the right jobs at the right time. My own experience as a CO was not too much different. Most of my junior officers where there to be trained to fill the handful of senior captain slots that I did, really, need to "command" while teams of NCOs, junior and senior, got on with making things work. I cannot speak for other arms and services but I note that many armies work with much different officer:NCO ratios, say: two officers in a company of 120 fighting soldiers.

In may opinion, a good junior NCO - a leader of two or ten soldiers with some complex equipment - can be trained and developed in well under 10 years and the best should be ready to command at about age mid-20s after, say, five years of training and experience. A platoon/troop 2IC should be, my opinion, again, about age mid 30s and a Sqn/Bty/Coy and Regimental sergeant major should be in her or his mid 40s.

Again, in my opinion most junior officers should be in their 20s; 30 and 40 years old subalterns are a waste of time and effort. Generals should be in their 50s which means that ship, regiment and battalion and RCAF squadron COs should be about 35.

"At your target in front (above) ... FIRE!"

 

[Good2Golf]

Non accountable positions including war establishments were supposed to be deleted...

…by 1997.

 

[FJAG]

It’s pretty clear when one looks at the authorized strength of units, versus what a fully equipped unit would have that there is indeed a Peacetime strength acknowledged or not, versus what would be needed.

If a Mech BN can only field 2 Rifle Coy and a partial Cbt Spt Coy with the numbers allowed under the PY caps, that’s not a wartime establishment.

Kevin

I've looked at any number of TOEs for Canadian units but my knowledge stops somewhere after the Force 2013 restructure. Coming out of that bns were targeted for 599 PYs each but eventually drifted towards an allocation of appx 590 PYs for mech bns and light bns at appx 560 PYs. As you know at that time they did not have mortar or ATGM or pnr pls but did have recce and snipers.

When I look to making comparisons I tend to look at inf bns in the SBCT and IBCT. Their establishments are 737 and 727 respectively (inclusive of the BSB's affiliated FSC). While they are structured differently, there are analogous functions in each. When you add the roughly 120 pers that should make up the mor, ATk and pnr pls in a Cdn bn then Cdn Bns come up to roughly 700 and 680 respectively. That is short of the US bns but not terribly so.

IMHO, what the infantry is proposing now, which is effectively to convert one rifle coy to fill the mor and ATk pls and to make up unfilled positions is a good idea. It doesn't change the orbat but provides for a better opportunity to train and career develop all the necessary skill sets needed throughout the ranks.

You should note, however, that Canada the peacetime unit establishments are the force generation base establishments and that consideration has been given to the anticipated force employment structures (call those the war establishment if you want). In the CLS's Force 2013 Master Implementation Plan, everyone, including the artillery and infantry, provided structures that identified both the peacetime force generation structures and anticipated FE models and indicated which positions would be filled by reservists - in some cases distinguishing between roto 0 establishments (RegF) and subsequent rotos (Mixed RegF and ResF). In the case of the Infantry the FE Bn was envisioned as having 4 rifle coys (1 made up of ARes in TLAVs) and a Cbt Sp coy (with no mors or ATk) for a total establishment of 982. The artillery also showed various FE establishments which mixed RegF and ResF at the troop levels. The maximum output for them was a LOO-4 Expeditionary - Non Sustained Single Roto regiment with 3 X 6-gun batteries, an STA battery, an AD battery, 12 FOOs and 3 JTACs with a total establishment (mixed RegF / ARes) of 1,106. (essentially a full establishment to support a brigade group)

So while there is no peacetime establishment with annotated restricted positions to be filled in wartime like we had in the 1970s, Canada has given consideration for and identified all the people and equipment required to fill various deployed FE structures. Tomayto - tomahto.

You need to remember that the army still works on a building block system that still revolves around coy-sized modules and that the size of any roto generated will be limited in numbers to the size authorized for the specific mission. That ultimately leads to compromises resulting in ad hoc establishments.

 

[IKnowNothing]

IMHO, what the infantry is proposing now, which is effectively to convert one rifle coy to fill the mor and ATk pls and to make up unfilled positions is a good idea. It doesn't change the orbat but provides for a better opportunity to train and career develop all the necessary skill sets needed throughout the ranks.

You should note, however, that Canada the peacetime unit establishments are the force generation base establishments and that consideration has been given to the anticipated force employment structures (call those the war establishment if you want). In the CLS's Force 2013 Master Implementation Plan, everyone, including the artillery and infantry, provided structures that identified both the peacetime force generation structures and anticipated FE models and indicated which positions would be filled by reservists - in some cases distinguishing between roto 0 establishments (RegF) and subsequent rotos (Mixed RegF and ResF). In the case of the Infantry the FE Bn was envisioned as having 4 rifle coys (1 made up of ARes in TLAVs) and a Cbt Sp coy (with no mors or ATk) for a total establishment of 982. The artillery also showed various FE establishments which mixed RegF and ResF at the troop levels. The maximum output for them was a LOO-4 Expeditionary - Non Sustained Single Roto regiment with 3 X 6-gun batteries, an STA battery, an AD battery, 12 FOOs and 3 JTACs with a total establishment (mixed RegF / ARes) of 1,106. (essentially a full establishment to support a brigade group)

Wait....

There's been a lot of digital ink spilled on this board about reserve reform, hybrid units, etc.

Now you're telling me that all along the plan has been to use de facto hybrid units when forced.

But formalizing said plan, establishing reporting relationships, and incorporating it all into peacetime organizations to make de jure hybrid units and better enable the plan is a bridge to far?

 

[FJAG]

Wait....

There's been a lot of digital ink spilled on this board about reserve reform, hybrid units, etc.

Now you're telling me that all along the plan has been to use de facto hybrid units when forced.

I wouldn't go that far.

"Units" effectively means a battalion-sized organization. I've seen none of that. The artillery annex to the Force 2013 Consolidation MIP operated at having ARes at the troop level (such as the third troop for a roto 1 and above 6-gun battery) and individual dismounted FOO parties. ARes armoured units were tasked to be able to generate an up to 8-car recce troop or a 48-man armoured assault troop. The infantry annex uses various types of augmentation up to and including a full rifle coy of reservists. Note, however, that all ARes units was LOO 1 and 2 domestic ops such as Territorial Battle groups.

But formalizing said plan, establishing reporting relationships, and incorporating it all into peacetime organizations to make de jure hybrid units and better enable the plan is a bridge to far?

That's a fair conclusion. While the MIP gave end states and directed further staff work, the manner of implementation was anything but consistent. Like many such major efforts there was push back and bureaucratic friction. For the artillery, equipment was and continues to be, a challenge. While you could interchange the CP techs as RegF and ARes computing devices are the same, you could only train dismounted FOOs as the ARes does not have LAV OPVs and the training on them is extensive. RegF regiments would run M777 conversion courses for up to det 2i/c and some ARes did qualify as det comds. LCMR, HALO and UAVs never really made it to the armoury floor where keeping C3 howitzers was already proving a challenge. Occasionally joint training exercises would occur, however, RegF units and ARes personnel generally do not work on the same schedules to make that routine. Many ARes COs responded negatively to the plan as it seemed difficult to implement.

I'm a firm believer that hybrid organizations are the only way to save the army and to make it both useable on day-to-day peacetime training and missions while concurrently being able to grow the structure into an efficient and credible force for wartime employment. However, in order to create such hybrid structures there needs to be a wholesale redesign of both the RegF and the ARes simultaneously. The current construct is incapable of such transformation.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm a firm believer that hybrid organizations are the only way to save the army and to make it both useable on day-to-day peacetime training and missions while concurrently being able to grow the structure into an efficient and credible force for wartime employment. However, in order to create such hybrid structures there needs to be a wholesale redesign of both the RegF and the ARes simultaneously. The current construct is incapable of such transformation.

The Army needs to make up its mind about a few things, and then keep the plot going for more than the tenure of the last Army Commander. Kind of like this report says:

"Overall, we found that Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for major international missions. We also found that although the Army Reserve had clear guidance on preparing for domestic missions, formal confirmation that they were prepared was not required. In addition, Army Reserve units and groups lacked access to key equipment on deployments and training exercises." Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Flavours of the month like 'Op Taskings', 'Total Force', '10/90' - and the even more ephemeral '3 Block War' - have likely left the ARes more dazed and confused than usual. Territorial Defense Battalion Groups anyone? I mean, I guess they were supposed to defend against something...

Nevertheless, I'm sure yet another Tiger Team will come out with some fresh churn sooner or later

 

[Rudburg]

The Army needs to make up its mind about a few things, and then keep the plot going for more than the tenure of the last Army Commander. Kind of like this report says:

"Overall, we found that Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for major international missions. We also found that although the Army Reserve had clear guidance on preparing for domestic missions, formal confirmation that they were prepared was not required. In addition, Army Reserve units and groups lacked access to key equipment on deployments and training exercises." Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Flavours of the month like 'Op Taskings', 'Total Force', '10/90' - and the even more ephemeral '3 Block War' - have likely left the ARes more dazed and confused than usual. Territorial Defense Battalion Groups anyone? I mean, I guess they were supposed to defend against something...

Nevertheless, I'm sure yet another Tiger Team will come out with some fresh churn sooner or later

 

[FJAG]

The greatest Joker of all time.

Could you imagine Heath Ledger and Margot Robbie's Harley Quinn in the same movie?