MCG said:
I would have to say I‘m sitting on the fence with this one.
I do not belive that Canada can abandon all tracked vehicles as easily as you would suggest, Brock. Some specialized vehicles cannot be built on a LAV III chassis. Such vehicles include the AEV, AVLB, 155 mm self propelled howitzer, and the MBT. I do not belive that Canada should do without these vehicles either. You have phrased it nicely yourself when you said, "LAV III is not a tank and therefore should not be used as a tank." To assume that there will be no future need for a MBT is to suggest that one knows when, where, and how the next war will be fought. This is never the case.
Agreed.
Your argument does hold some merit however, and as I said, I‘m sitting on the fence with this one.
The potential of the LAV III is highlighted by the recent US decision to equip its medium mechanized brigades with the vehicle. To meet this need there are already a 105 mm FSV, Engineer section vehicle, CP, Ambulance, NBCD Recce, Mortar carrier, and other variants developed and available off-the-shelf. Additionally, the LAV III could be adapted to replace any other M113 variants serving in the CF.
The key word in your paragraph above is 'medium'. A medium brigade can cope with low-to-moderate intensity warfare, especially in a three-block-war setting where the vehicles don't get too close to insurgents with RPG7's sitting on their shoulders, or as follow-on forces after the heavy brigades have done their job in a high-intensity setting.
BUT: the Americans were buying the right tool for the right job. Their plan was to establish rapidly deployable brigades that could get to the fight quicker than the M1A2 Abrams. The LAV brigades would deploy overseas and be capable of defeating lightly armed enemy forces or to delay heavy enemy forces (a la Western Europe defense against the red hoards) until additional forces could be shipped by boat from the US. The MBT is not eliminated from this scheme, nor is the armoured cavalry. A new element is added to fill the void in between.
Correct. It seems counterintuitive, but MBT's have played a crucial and even pivotal role in Iraq in situations involving FIBUA. They provide the heavy punch and take the hits that the lighter, wheeled vehicles cannot possibly provide, or survive.
How does this apply to Canada? If you belive we cannot afford multiple different levels of Mechanized Brigade groups (which we cannot) then you must leave the MBT within the Brigades as they now are and deploy them as needed. This would allow a brigade to upgrade from medium to heavy, through the arrival of its tanks, while deployed. Alternatively, you could suggest that all the MBT be concentrated within a single regiment (LdSH, because they have more room for tanks in the prairies) and have the army restructured into two medium brigades and one heavy. This would correct for the excessive dispersion of the current fleet of Leopards.
Actually Canada *can* afford to maintain at least two different kinds of brigade groups - motorized (based on the LAVIII fleet)
and a mechanized brigade group (or two). We have the wealth and sufficient population to manage this kind of thing. I sense that the Harper government would like to do something like this but cannot do so until they form a majority government. Really, the issue boils down to making one of two choices - do we want to be a meaningful force on the world stage, or will we be content sitting on the margins, waiting for the day the United States absorbs us, lest we become a failed state and a liability to them?
There's a price of admission associated with the first choice -and it ain't cheap, but it's far cheaper than option two, which entails a much greater price - the loss of one's country and any claims to sovereignty we might have had.
Some parting thoughts:
1. Why continue spending funds to train reservists the fire the 76 mm gun on the cougar when the vehicle should never se operational deployment again? Why not replace the turret with the Delco turret of the LAV III and Coyote? This would train reservists in the same gunnery techniques as their regular force counter parts and make it easier to integrate them in to units preparing for overseas duty.
I agree with the first part of point one. The Cougar is very long in the tooth and can't be expected to provide a realistic sense of what it is like to fight as part of a tank crew. Nor can it be used to provide a realistic appraisal of LAV gunnery technqiues, since the ballistic characteristics of a 25mm round are totally different from the 76mm used in the Cougar.
Sure, it can be used to impart basic gunnery techniques, but that's about it. Rather than go through the bother, expense and trouble of switching turrets, why not just acquire a basic version of the LAVIII (or maybe the Coyote DFSV) and issue these to the Primary Reserve - if your aim is to provide LAV/Coyote training? If your aim is to prepare reservists to crew tanks, then you're best off investing the money in simulators and allocating a limited number of real tanks for training only.
The problem with this country is that we always expect our military to use half-measures (to save money, of course!) and then deliver stellar results. I say, either do it right, or not at all.
2. The Australian LAV-25s have the same Delco turrets as on our LAV III, except that some also have TOW launchers on either side of the turret. If Canada had chosen those turrets for the LAV III (or at least on one per Inf Plt) it could have greatly increased tank killing capacity and thereby reduced dependency on MBTs.
The LAV TUA (Tow-Under-Armour) project is supposed to be addressing this issue. However, neither your suggestion nor the LAV-TUA will ever reduce our need for main battle tanks. The idea behind the LAV-25 TOW and TUA systems is to provide light, wheeled forces with some chance of survival if they unexpectedly encounter a tank or two.
It is theoretically possible to deploy wheeled vehicles mounting a TOW-type anti-armour system as primary anti-tank weapons, provided they are in well-chosen and protected defilade positions from which they can exfiltrate rapidly. The main risk in this gambit is that if your enemy has rocket artillery (like the US-made MLRS system), good air support and high-quality tanks crewed by experienced and well-trained soldiers, you are likely to lose your wheeled ATGM systems in large numbers, thus defeating their original purpose.