Short-service Army

[pbi]

I agree. IIRC, those two "automatic" promotions were brought in shortly after Unification as retention/QOL moves. A mistake, IMHO-no promotion should ever be "automatic" as it cheapens the meaning of the rank. Cheers.

 

[Roy1]

They've been saying the same thing forever - "A Canadian submarine catches fire, this military if finished".   However, we seem to keep on doing our job with what we have.

You just seem to be regurgitating things that guys like David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein like to say.   Here is an idea, why don't you thing "outside of the box" and give us something more substantial then "the military is on a one way trip to oblivion" and (this is the key) provide an idea for a solution.

The essential problem is that the capital account has been raided for 10 years to pay for operations. Ya the CF keeps doing what is asked of it, but the future force is being gutted as ageing equipment is not replaced. Its too tiresome to go into the details. Read "Canada Without Armed Forces?" by Doug Bland, Howie Marsh and others.

There is little that can be done at this stage to pull the CF out of the nose dive its in. But if we are going to have a capable force in 20-years then we have to start by totally rethinking every aspect of defence policy. Every program, every institution, our entire approach to defence has to be reviewed and rethought. The review should start with NDHQ!!

I doubt it will happen, but without it the CF is doomed to reduce to a New Zealand level of capability - ie. limited territorial capability and occasional symbolic presence overseas. That may be in Canada's interest, but no review has ever decided that. The problem is that right now thats happening by inertia rather than as a result of any thought out strategy. Indeed, its happening while we are pretending that we are a major power. 

 

[Infanteer]

OK, Now I am really worried. A one word post from Infanteer!

I was thinking about a few things....

WO/Senior NCO Promotion: I do believe that we have drifted backwards on this one: I recall that when I took my Junior NCO course in 1975 (taught by P Coy/3 RCR), the Cpls and MCpls who taught us were IMHO far, far too old. By the time I joined the Regular Army in 1982, we had just begun to reverse this trend with DAPS, and IMHO in the following decade produced a good mix between youth/keenness and maturity/experience. However, I fear that we are starting to "age out" again in the Sgt/WO grades. Five-six years is probably adequate on average to produce a well-rounded Section Commander(age 24), and about ten-twelve for a Platoon 2IC(age 30). CQMS a couple of years more, and CSM in at about 20 yrs. (age 38). Soldiers who have maintained a regular PT program and watched their weight and health are quite capable of being fit for the field at that age.

Sounds about right to me.   I agree with the "age out" principle and the general amount of time required for each position.

The essential problem is that the capital account has been raided for 10 years to pay for operations. Ya the CF keeps doing what is asked of it, but the future force is being gutted as ageing equipment is not replaced. Its too tiresome to go into the details. Read "Canada Without Armed Forces?" by Doug Bland, Howie Marsh and others.

Remember, the moral is to the physical as 3 is to 1.   We cannot measure the fate of the CF simply by looking at equipment issues - case in point; the Germans were very capable of producing a proficient fighting force under the debilitating restrictions of Versailles in the Weimar years.   Although we have the same problems with many equipment issues as we've always had, I think we've managed to make huge leaps in the overall level of dedication to the mastery of the profession of arms in a "peacetime" Army.

There is little that can be done at this stage to pull the CF out of the nose dive its in.

I still don't know how you can say we are in a nose-dive.   We made it through the hard "nose-dive" of the 1990's (a very tough time for the Forces) and still performed admirably in Afghanistan and in the GWOT in general.

But if we are going to have a capable force in 20-years then we have to start by totally rethinking every aspect of defence policy. Every program, every institution, our entire approach to defence has to be reviewed and rethought. The review should start with NDHQ!!

I agree with you here.   This is something we should constantly be doing as an institution, even if something seems to be running well.   One can never rest on one's laurels; in the ever changing security environment constant re-evaluation and constructive criticism in necessary to remain relevent.   We do this well informally and to different degrees at different levels - it is a concept that should be institutionalized.

I doubt it will happen, but without it the CF is doomed to reduce to a New Zealand level of capability - ie. limited territorial capability and occasional symbolic presence overseas. That may be in Canada's interest, but no review has ever decided that. The problem is that right now thats happening by inertia rather than as a result of any thought out strategy. Indeed, its happening while we are pretending that we are a major power.

I don't think we've declined to that level.   In 2002 we had just as many troops deployed as we did 10 years before in the dark days of UNPROFOR.   However, you could say we were better equipped then we were then.   We have superior personal equipment, the best series of small arms in the world (although we do some odd things with them coughcough-C-79), uniforms that everybody else is copying, some of the best comms systems, fancy new IFV's (which, like any other piece of kit, cannot do everything, but they do excel at some roles).

Compare that to the guys cruising around Croatia in aging M113's with Vietnam era helmets and uniforms, even less public and government support, no ammo, and poor pay.   I don't know what you're using for a baseline, but I think we have made some great strides in many areas of equipment.   Sure, not everything is perfect and there are glaring deficiencies (MBT, Strategic Lift, etc, etc), but find me an Army in history that had everything right.

Don't lose sight of the forest for the trees, or something like that....

 

[paracowboy]

I gotta agree with Infanteer, pbi, et al. To interject a personal note, I've got about 10 years' service, and I'm just starting to feel like I'm getting the hang of this job. I find myself running to Sgts, WOs, and CSMs for clarification, opinions, and advice on a daily basis.

Maybe I'm just thick...

 

[Edward Campbell]

... I believe that Canada, as primarily an expeditionary force, needs to have its core mostly composed of career professionals.   Like the legions of Rome, the state demands the abilities that only a professional force can offer, as the notion of the citizen-soldier, serving when needed, is insufficient to meet the security demands of the international arena.   I do believe there is a place for a certain percentage of "short-service" rank and file; these would be attracted by the Canadian version of the Montgomery GI Bill.   Attracted to a post-secondary education fund in return for three years of good service, this could help to "fill out the ranks" and expose many more Canadians to the Canadian Forces.

I agree and I think that's what English wished he had said.

Re: semantics â “ 40+ years ago we were all reading Sam Huntington's new book (it was new then) The Soldier and the State and we were debating the differences between what Huntington reported, accurately we reckoned, about civil-military relations in the US and what we though should be the proper form of military professionalism in Canada â “ a nation with quite different traditions. certainly   not the three 'strands' (technicism, populism andprofessionalism) Huntignton identified as being the main components of the 'thread' which had run through the American military for 100 years, then.   There was much support for a vocational moel of military professionalism â “ where vocation represents a calling rather than a job.   There was a strong sense, nearly a half   century back, that the military profession needed to be less and less like most other professions â “ law, accounting, engineering, etc, and more like a priesthood in which one served  ...

 

[Infanteer]

I'm a big fan of Huntington.  I'll have to go back to it, its been a while since I last read it (although I agree with the notion of a "calling").

 

[pbi]

Infanteer: I think you have identified an important point: not all of the "end-of-the-worlders" have sufficient historical perspective to be able to measure (comprehensively) where we are now against where we were 10, 20, or 30 years ago.  I was on the Croatia mission you refer to, and the difference in kit is night and day. The flow of new items to troops on  ops is impressive, whether or not you like each item on its own merits. Our main "old kit" problems in the Army now are in our support vehicle fleet, especially the ML/HL families. Some "old kit" that we had in Croatia like the .50 and the 60mm mor are still doing just fine thanks, but overall we are ahead on comparison. Our level of personal kit is superior to most Americans (Army and Marines) that I see here at Bagram (the better gear may be getting pushed out to the field so perhaps I don't see it all...) We have problems but we are not dead, nor even IMHO dying. The performance of our units on operations proves that beyond any doubt. Cheers.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Our level of personal kit is superior to most Americans (Army and Marines) that I see here at Bagram (the better gear may be getting pushed out to the field so perhaps I don't see it all...) We have problems but we are not dead, nor even IMHO dying. The performance of our units on operations proves that beyond any doubt.

So here is the question that is buried underneath all of this nay-saying...why is it that it falls to older more experienced fellas like us to point that out?  What are we doing wrong in our socialisation that makes relatively new soldiers so down on themselves?  Or is it just the relentless bad press and cheap posturing of (mostly) oppostition politiicans talking out their arses?

Or perhaps it is that we are too senior to see how bad it really is???

<Dave wanders away muttering to himself...again>

 

[a_majoor]

Relentless bad press has a lot to do with it, especially since most reporters are like cockroaches: scurry away at the first sign of discomfort, and like to score cheap points (snow shovels, anyone?). They also feel that watching a few hollywood movies gives them the proper background to report on military affairs. How often have you read a Canadian reporter talking about our "fatigues" or "foxholes"?

The socialization process also has a lot to do with it. Basic and advanced training really isn't what it used to be, and so the shock of hitting the field or operations with a unit is that much greater. The fact we don't have large scale exercises like RV on a regular basis also makes the field a pretty alien place for the new guys.

In my "If I were the CDS" rants I always kick the standards of basic training upwards by making Basic resemble a militarized "Outward Bound", and bring back the Infantry Section Commanders Course (ISCC) which relentlessly emphasized decision making under pressure rather than the canned PLQ course of today, which emphasises PowerPoint. (OK, maybe an overstatement, but this is the rant).

In the end, we still come out all right because most of the people who join the Forces are motivated by challenge and adventure, and are willing to do almost anything to get the job done. As long as we still can get and keep those kinds of people, we will still reach the objective.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

In my "If I were the CDS" rants I always kick the standards of basic training upwards by making Basic resemble a militarized "Outward Bound", and bring back the Infantry Section Commanders Course (ISCC) which relentlessly emphasized decision making under pressure rather than the canned PLQ course of today, which emphasises PowerPoint. (OK, maybe an overstatement, but this is the rant).

You will be pleased to know that we are starting up the PLQ(I), which will look quite a bit like the old ISCC - in fact, there asre supposed to be trial courses being run in all Areas this fall.

As to RVs - I seem to remember spending an awful lot of time sitting around, or in the canteen/mess...  The BTE is a good go, and the jury os still out for CMTC.

 

[pbi]

PPCLI Guy: I think it is a combination of things;

First of all, we DO have problems, some of them (such as the IT backlog) potentially destructive and at any rate difficult to solve. The right road for transformation is another, as is the search for a truly integrated Foreign/Defence policy. We must never deny these problems or we become mindless cheerleaders (YAY! YAY! ITS OK!  EVERYTHING IS GREAT TODAY!, etc). At the same time, we must not demonize these problems such that they induce fatalism and paralysis;

Second, we do not do that great a job (IMHO) at passing clear, simple explanations right down to the bottom in a timely manner. Now, you can say "well-go and look it up on the WWW!" but that does not relieve the CofC  of its responsibility to keep people informed. It is a difficult and frustrating fight: I know we try very hard in our Bde but I am endlessly amazed at how poorly we can do sometimes. The result of all this is that soldiers(esp Res soldiers) may not really know "why things are seen" and go on shithouse rumour instead. A great antidote to this is senior commanders (with their RSMs) getting out and listening to the troops, then giving straight answers;

Third, military commentary in our popular media is not always dominated by the well-informed or current. Rather IMHO we see a plethora of self-designated "military experts" who are sometimes laughably off the mark. We have seen a few examples on this site where members have posted various articles by "respected" or "well known" commentators or journalists that other members have subsequently shown to be largely or completely false or significantly disconnected from current reality. This disinformation rubs off on us; and

Canadians still have a pessimistic, self-deprecating streak a mile deep. We must get rid of this. The best way for soldiers to cure this is to go on a couple of misions and really see other armies up close. They will get a dose of reality and see very quickly that while we have problems, we have lots to be proud of. No excuse to rest on our laurels, but no reason to trash ourselves either.

Cheers.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

First of all, we DO have problems, some of them (such as the IT backlog) potentially destructive and at any rate difficult to solve. The right road for transformation is another, as is the search for a truly integrated Foreign/Defence policy. We must never deny these problems or we become mindless cheerleaders (YAY! YAY! ITS OK!  EVERYTHING IS GREAT TODAY!, etc). At the same time, we must not demonize these problems such that they induce fatalism and paralysis;

Yep.  Finding the balance is incredibly difficult - and something that I struggle with every day.  So far I can still shave - but mindless boosterism or abject dejection will be sure signs that it is time to go...

Second, we do not do that great a job (IMHO) at passing clear, simple explanations right down to the bottom in a timely manner.

Yep.  The AReas had to hector the LS into issuing a Transformation Directive, that translated slides into words.  Even then, it was very big on intent, with no scheme of manoeuvre, and a secret end-state...

Third, military commentary in our popular media is not always dominated by the well-informed or current. Rather IMHO we see a plethora of self-designated "military experts" who are sometimes laughably off the mark. <snip> This disinformation rubs off on us

There must be a way to combat that?  A designated spokesman that has a get ot of jail free card?  More senior pers willing to risk the whack on the pee-pee to tell it like it is?

Canadians still have a pessimistic, self-deprecating streak a mile deep.

O yeah..

We must get rid of this. The best way for soldiers to cure this is to go on a couple of misions and really see other armies up close. They will get a dose of reality and see very quickly that while we have problems, we have lots to be proud of. No excuse to rest on our laurels, but no reason to trash ourselves either.

And that is definitely the internal answer - although there are plenty of pers, even on this forum, who have recent operational experience and still self-flagellate.

Sigh.  I'll just keep on keeping on I guess.

Other Dave

 

[pbi]

Sgt Majoor: I have to side with PPCLI Guy on the RV series. The series looked impressive, but it was largely a waste of money, with the greatest expenditure of effort not being in producing good, demanding training but on the monstrous logistical effort involved in concentrating our Army in one place and sustaining it there. Far, far too much time was wasted being reserve pl of reserve cbt tm of reserve BG(=sitting in a hide or a BP doing SFA for hours...). The quality of training was generally not superior in any way to what can be achieved today by a BTE, and there was very little attention paid to actually learning anything. There was NO need to go to all that hideous expense to achieve what good training was actually done Except for Suffield, we do not own a training area that can support this scope of FTX in an intelligent manner. (Combat Teams passing each other on opposing axes is not, IMHO, intelligent use of the trg area: it is over-use). Most of the arguments used to defend it are IMHO spurious or OBE. The series was IMHO, a legacy of the Germany mentality in which huge exercises that looked good on the overlay but were of limited value for the troops were all too common.

We are IMHO far better off where we are now, with the AAR process, proper use of BTS (if and when we do that..), MILES/SIMMUNITION, JANUS, BCT and BTE. We will, I think, be even better off when CMTC comes on line. As for the exercise of higher HQ, that can be done in a far moer demanding, urgent manner than any FTX can affordably achieve, by conducting a FCPX (Field CPX) in which the C2 is stressed by simulation-driven events that can be as complex and demanding as we want, while the human beings in the HQ can be stressed by making their existence as miserable as you like. But through it all, we are not wasting millions of dollars, tank cars full of POL, or tons of scarce ammo sorting out a Comd and his staff. Those scarce resources can be better spent where it will achieve real results: at BG and below.   Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

I do tend to look at RV with rose coloured ballistic lenses, since getting out and doing things is better than not going at all. I was also a young and impressionable soldier, so seeing a Brigade battlegroup advancing in all its glory was an amazing sight! (Not to mention the add-ons like air power and foreign troops)

And to think I am accused of being a cold hearted realist.

If the BTE series of exercises can be sustained with the modern training methodology that PPCLI Guy and PBI pointed out, then we will have a fantastic platform to build and grow from.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

If the BTE series of exercises can be sustained with the modern training methodology that PPCLI Guy and PBI pointed out, then we will have a fantastic platform to build and grow from.

For BTE 03, we had 12 live F18 and 12 live F16 missions - as well as more ammo than you can shake a stick at ($14M).  If we an keep up the bar that high (although future iterations will be WES, not live, then we are laughing.

 

[pbi]

so seeing a Brigade battlegroup advancing in all its glory was an amazing sight! (Not to mention the add-ons like air power and foreign troops)

When people defend the RV series, this is one of the most common reasons that get trotted out. My response would be that if we consider our scarce resources, and then group our training objectives in terms of priority for those resources, seeing masses of vehicles lumber over the landscape would be a "Could Do". In reality, soldiers in action will rarely ever see much more than what's in the same gridsquare (if that). The real value for tactical trainng lies at BG and below: actually training with a tank troop or an engineer section.

You're right: we have the tools in hand to make our training truly excellent, if we are willing to take our time (ie: not 50 BTS but 5...) and accept mistakes. Cheers.

 

[735_winnipeg]

i kinda like the idea of our military being part compulsory service like in israel and part conscription like in russia.  this is just my thoughts when i'm bored or playing command & conquer.  for the compulsory part, i would like to see young people sign up to join the military when they finish or about to finish high school and are not working or going to post-secondary schools.  they can serve their country for 2-3 years and keep them out of trouble.  this, in my thinking, would produce career officers and senior NCOs if they decide to stay and would also fill in any gaps in the trades that they find interesting as a career choice later on.  as for the conscription part, i would like to see the the homeless, jobless and criminals get dragged into boot camps so that the military can have the needed people to fill in the mundane manual labour jobs.  think about it, the homeless get food and shelter plus minimum wage for their service.  the criminals can have a clean record in exchange for doing military service, plus i would think that some of them could be straightened out into normal people again.  i think.  the jobless could have a job during their service, depending on how long they stay and some of them could apply to be officers and NCOs because some might have diplomas and degrees.

from what i see in today's CF, we need more money and more people to apply in the CF.  i once heard that the CF will get more money from the government if the CF can get a LOT of people to join.  the above scenario COULD fill that latter part if worst comes to worst.  that's just my thoughts.

 

[pbi]

735: Unfortunately (or fortunately, however you look at it...) conscription in this country has such a loaded history (especially in Quebec) that it is almost a guaranteed non-starter except in some replay of WWII (if we had enough time to organize it...) Remember that one of the few times Canadian soldiers have ever fired on Canadian citizens happened because of disputes over conscription in WWI. Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

I couldn't disagree more.

Short answer, If the soldiers around you DIDN'T want to be there, would you trust them with your lives?

Long answer, the homeless, unemployed and criminal elements have exhibited undesirable traits for the military, either through some sort of mental illness (most homeless people, sad to say), unsuitable education/skill sets (chronic unemployed), or inability to live within the rules (criminals). Unless you are willing to do some really horrific things like Soviet style mine clearing battalions, (who were force marched in front of Guards regiments to detonate mines with their bodies), or Iranian style "human wave" attacks to force defenders to expend ammunition prior to the "real" military units advance, there are no uses for these people in a modern military environment. An Infantry corporal has to be instructed how to program a manpack radio, and the amount of technical knowledge just increases from there.

I think 735_Winnipeg is really thinking of some sort of "National Service" plan which scoops up high school graduates and gives them a sort of forced socialization in military values and virtues for one basic engagement. Once again, I am not convinced simply because so much of what we think of as morale is based on will; if you didn't want to be there, you won't have the will to succeed (or even make the attempt). In the summers I am tasked to do recruit training in Meaford, I am always disgusted by the whining recruits "Mom" pushed into the reserve to learn how to grow up. They hate being theere, don't try, often infect the wavering troops with their negative attitudes (Instructors cannot "live" with their charges, so for 16 hours a day, the candidates can stew in their own juices), and can only be described as "half assed" soldiers at the end. My patience is gone by then since these clowns have eaten up 80% of my time and effort which should have gone to instruct and mold the motivated ones. End of Rant

 

[pbi]

Sgt A Majoor: I agree with your assessment. I think sometimes people incorrectly extrapolate from the European experience to Canada. IMHO if you really looked into it, you would find that peacetime conscription was brought into these European countries not so much to build up civic virtues, but to provide masses of manpower in a hurry for the land wars that have been a feature of European history for the last millenium. I also bet that you will find that in many of these countries compulsory service is not popular and probably produces a rather mediocre soldier who may be useful for Home Defence and not much else. (An exception would be the UK National Servicemen who fought the Malaysian Emergency). Most European countries are forced to use their Marines, Legion, Airborne, or SF for anything serious because those ares the only places they can be guaranteed to get quality troops. France, in particular, is in the process of professionalizing its Army. IMHO we cannot afford an Army of lukewarm timeservers who are there only because they have to be. Cheers.