The responses to this article are a tad discouraging. It seems that thinking outside of the box is in short supply in Canada.
Like I said, there is "thinking outside of the box" (ie: interesting approaches to further professionalizing our Army) and there is "forgetting what the box looks like" (ie: destroying the professional Army in an attempt to lower personal costs).
If you're trying to label the Army.ca members here as unoriginal and dogmatic, I think you've neglected to read a majority of the good posts here in the last year or so.
The Canadian military is on a one way trip to oblivion. And its going to require a hell of a lot more than money to save it.
They've been saying the same thing forever - "A Canadian submarine catches fire, this military if finished". However, we seem to keep on doing our job with what we have.
You just seem to be regurgitating things that guys like David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein like to say. Here is an idea, why don't you thing "outside of the box" and give us something more substantial then "the military is on a one way trip to oblivion" and (this is the key) provide an idea for a solution.
OK, a lot of you don't like some of the specifics of Jack English's proposals. But the essence of what he says is correct. The CF is WAY too top heavy and the army is increasingly only a second echelon force. It cannot deploy anywhere on its own and it is incapable of sustaining anything more than a battlegroup overseas. The CF is composed of 22% officers. The equivalent in the US Marine Corps is less than 12%!
...and this is different from when? We've always required our big-brother Army (whether it be British or American) to move us,sustain us, and command us from the our first forray into the expeditionary world in South Africa. If we haven't been rendered irrelevant in the last 100 years or so, why would this all the sudden spell our doom.
As for the officer percentage, I agree with you; I've argued that point many times on this page - but you have to really develop a plan for a proposal like that. Simply cutting the Officer Corps from 25% to 12% would most likely leave the CF headless and really incapable. Institutional change and transformation is also required.
As for the idea of short enlistments: The Israeli army operates on the basis of three (compulsory) enlistments. NCOs are picked from the ranks after a year or two (as are officers for that matter). The French Foreign Legion operates on the basis of five year enlistments with NCOs picked from the ranks after only a few years. Obviously experienced NCOs receive incentives to reenlist.
Surely there is SOMETHING that Canada can learn from others.
Neither of these examples are really relevent for the CF. The Israeli system is compulsory - we don't have the guaranteed influx of short term conscripts. The FFL is a special case all together, and usually relies on foreigners with other reasons for serving.
The professional nature of the Canadian military demands that we aim for career soldiers. As such, we should build our notion of career progression, NCO development, and Officer selection around the notion of the professional career. This is a concept English has apparently thrown out the door, much to the consternation of his earlier (excellent) writing.
If you want to read an excellent thread of selection from the Canadian perspective, check this one out:
http://army.ca/forums/threads/18201.0.html