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Scotland Independence Movement

The one thing I will say is I like how clear all of it has been.

The simple yes or no question.  How teh Bank of Scotland said it would relocate, how teh PM stated that this would be a permanent non revocable thing etc etc.  It's the sort of thing needed here if seperation becomes a thing again.
 
The "New Scot's" army will likely have to whore themselves out to the UN to maintain jobs and any form of a budget. When they divy up the equipment I wonder if the Scots will get the "Clansman system"?  8)
 
The Scots will continue to divide along Highland Catholic, Lowland Protestant lines with the Highlanders siding with the Fenians.
Don't know where you're getting this. According to the polls I've seen, the Highlands and Islands are split with advantage to the NO side. As far as I can tell, the SNP is largely a creature of the urbanites to the south that make up most of the Scottish population.
 
One interesting second order effect that no one has talked about yet is where will the disaffected go in the event of a Yes vote? Will Canada suddenly receive a flood of Scottish immigrants looking for opportunities out West since their own nation imploded?

And of course, just what sorts of people will these Scots be? Will they bring the Scottish work ethic of the 19th century, or the 21rst? Who would they vote for? What other sorts of changes would they bring to Canada?
 
I don't pretend to understand Scotland's social-political culture, but I can read a government balance sheet and I can read e.g. OECD data and I believe that there is no rational economic argument for a "Yes," vote. That doesn't mean the Scots will not vote "Yes," it doesn't even mean they shouldn't vote "Yes," it just means that a "Yes," vote will be economically unsound.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I don't pretend to understand Scotland's social-political culture, but I can read a government balance sheet and I can read e.g. OECD data and I believe that there is no rational economic argument for a "Yes," vote. That doesn't mean the Scots will not vote "Yes," it doesn't even mean they shouldn't vote "Yes," it just means that a "Yes," vote will be economically unsound.

Edward, given the last names of Kirkhill, you and me, we probably all have at least a genetic inkling of the tendency of the Scots to do the wrong thing despite all the data that emphatically plead don't do it. See the common Celtic tactic of running as fast as they can at sharp, pointed objects.
 
Perhaps it's time for a chorus of "A Song of Patriotic Prejudice"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vh-wEXvdW8

(Flanders & Swan)

The rottenest bits of these islands of ours
We've left in the hands of three unfriendly powers
Examine the Irishman, Welshman or Scot
You'll find he's a stinker as likely as not

    The English the English the English are best
    I wouldn't give tuppence for all of the rest

The Scotsman is mean as we're all well aware
He's boney and blotchy and covered with hair
He eats salty porridge, he works all the day
And hasn't got bishops to show him the way

    The English the English the English are best
    I wouldn't give tuppence for all of the rest

The Irishman now our contempt is beneath
He sleeps in his boots and he lies through his teeth
He blows up policemen or so I have heard
And blames it on Cromwell and William the Third

    The English are moral the English are good
    And clever and modest and misunderstood

The Welshman's dishonest, he cheats when he can
He's little and dark more like monkey than man
He works underground with a lamp on his hat
And sings far too loud, far too often and flat

    The English the English the English are best
    I wouldn't give tuppence for all of the rest

And crossing the channel one cannot say much
For the French or the Spanish, the Danish or Dutch
The Germans are German, the Russians are red
And the Greeks and Italians eat garlic in bed

    The English are noble, the English are nice
    And worth any other at double the price

And all the world over each nation's the same
They've simply no notion of playing the game
They argue with umpires, they cheer when they've won
And they practice before hand which spoils all the fun

    The English the English the English are best
    I wouldn't give tuppence for all of the rest

It's not that they're wicked or naturally bad
It's just that they're foreign that makes them so mad
The English are all that a nation should be
And the pride of the English are Chipper and me

    The English the English the English are best
    I wouldn't give tuppence for all of the rest
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I don't pretend to understand Scotland's social-political culture, but I can read a government balance sheet and I can read e.g. OECD data and I believe that there is no rational economic argument for a "Yes," vote. That doesn't mean the Scots will not vote "Yes," it doesn't even mean they shouldn't vote "Yes," it just means that a "Yes," vote will be economically unsound.
As someone who supports the "No" side (and who incidentally is of Highland descent and is probably the only person registered to Army.ca who speaks passable Scottish Gaelic), on principle I would remind you that economics isn't everything. The tendency of both socialists and neoliberals to reduce everything to cold hard material goods is somewhat disconcerting to me, even with the understandable disclaimers you make.

On the other hand this could be some sort of subconscious knee-jerk reaction against anything related to clan Campbell, my ancestors' sworn enemies.  :)
 
Part 1 of 2

Unrelentingly elitist, I suppose, but here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Economist, are two articles, one reflecting on attitudes, albeit those of tweedy university dons and <shudder> economists, and the other all about the dismal science:

http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2014/09/scottish-nationalist-movement
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Of Oxford, Edinburgh and Glasgow

Sep 16th 2014

By J.C. | EDINBURGH

A FEW years back, your correspondent was in a pub in Oxford with two other students. One, a Scot active on the political left at the university (and a member of its doughtiest left-leaning college, Balliol), was bemoaning the lack of political choice back home in Glasgow. The Labour Party there was insipid, he complained. The Scottish Socialist Party was mired in scandal. What was the alternative? “The nats?” the other asked, raising an eyebrow. The three of us looked at each other, then burst into laughter.

Half a decade later, my old Balliol friend is now a leading light in Yes Scotland, the campaign for Scottish independence, in Glasgow. What happened to Scottish politics in those five years to change his outlook? What was the grand strategy, and who hatched it?

Little though we knew it back in 2009—in the dog days of Gordon Brown’s spell in Downing Street—the seeds of the separatist surge now bearing fruit had been sown long before our conversation.

Back in the 1970s and 1980s, when Scottish National Party (SNP) types were known as the “tartan Tories” for their middle-class backgrounds and pro-business outlook, a gang of young turks begged to differ. Gathered around Alex Salmond, a left-wing economist known to display a bust of Lenin in his office, they envisaged an unremittingly anti-bourgeois nationalism. Scottish independence, they reckoned, could be a means to social change, not an end in itself. Others in this circle included Stephen Maxwell (later a Cambridge academic), Owen Dudley Edwards (who went on to lecture at Edinburgh University) and Margo McDonald (the landlady of the Hootlet’s Nest, a pub outside Glasgow). Wherever they lived, they were “Glasgow” in spirit—tough, communitarian and mostly blue-collar in background.

Other young leftists on the Scottish political scene saw these sorts as turncoats. In 1975 the precocious rector of Edinburgh University brushed nationalism aside as: “less an assertion of Scotland’s permanence as a nation than a response to Scotland’s uneven development”. His name? Gordon Brown. He turned out to be “Edinburgh” to the core—moderate, pragmatic and middle-class in background.

Over the following years, however, Mr Salmond became more “Edinburgh”, too. He was elected MP for Banff and Buchan, on the north Aberdeenshire coast, in 1987. In the early 1990s he split from his old radical comrades in the nationalist movement, including Jim Sillars, Ms McDonald’s left-wing husband. As the Labour Party came round to and then championed devolution—under Tony Blair and Mr Brown, as the shadow-chancellor and then chancellor—Mr Salmond reconciled his party to gradualism. Devolution was a stepping-stone to independence, he argued (not entirely incredibly, given intervening developments). In 2000 he stepped down after a decade at the helm of the SNP and after much ugly in-fighting. But in 2004, having ruled out running for the leadership, he returned (in his own words) “with a degree of surprise and humility, but with a renewed determination.” He went on to become first minister of a minority SNP government of Scotland in 2007.

In 2011 Mr Salmond led the SNP to a shock majority in the Scottish Parliament. This was his chance to call a referendum endorsing the independence that his younger, more radical self had craved (though whether he still felt the same way is debated to this day). In 2012 he signed the Edinburgh Agreement with David Cameron. While Mr Salmond had been hatching grand plans to rid Scotland of the capitalist (read: English) yoke, Mr Cameron had been carousing in Brasenose College, Oxford, as a member of the Bullingdon Club, a private drinking society known for smashing up the venues at which it drank. The referendum, the two agreed, should take place on September 18th 2014.

What has happened since that day nearly two years ago can be seen as a grand competition on two axes. The horizontal one is simple: Balliol versus Brasenose, or in other words left versus right. The vertical one is more complicated: Edinburgh versus Glasgow, or establishment versus insurgency (readers from both cities will hopefully forgive the generalisation).

Initially the Yes to independence campaign was what one might call “Balliol-Edinburgh”. That is: the old middle-class instincts of the SNP prevailed. Yes Scotland, when it was established in 2012, was a predominantly SNP outfit. For the first months of the campaign, it stalled. Angus Robertson, the party’s leader in Westminster, dithered over big questions like which currency a sovereign Scotland would use, and by which legal channel it could stay in the European Union. When the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament came out for secession, it did so on the initiative of its Labour members, not its SNP ones—the nationalists were initially overwhelmed by the power now in their hands.

By early 2013 things had not got much better. The Yes campaign had a shiny office in Glasgow (on Hope Street, employees proudly trilled). It had branded mouse mats. It had branded coffee mugs. But if it had a strategy, it was vague at best. At a planning meeting participants argued that the campaign needed to appeal to aspirational, middle-class voters. Scots would choose independence if they thought they would make them a tad richer, it was argued. Beyond this, the Yes pitch remained Delphic. With just over a year to go until the referendum one leading nationalist admitted to having barely thought about which currency an independent Scotland would use.

This disorganisation was evident on the ground, too. In Lanarkshire a campaign manager from headquarters addressed a meeting of the nascent Yes campaign. Questions abounded. Had the campaign a single canvassing system? He was not sure. What should we say about the currency? He prevaricated. Should we set up bank accounts for campaign funds? No idea. The best the Yes campaign could do was to urge people to press on with local campaigns as they saw fit.

By the spring of last year meetings at Hope Street, combined with reports from local groups, were driving those on the left of the nationalist movement—the “Balliol-Glasgow” types—to despair. An SNP-dominated campaign, they concluded, would remain insufficiently focused on the blue-collar, public-sector and female voters who would decide the referendum's result. The radicals, they concluded, would have to take things into their own hands. So they did. The result was a cross-party coalition of left-wingers committed to independence and gathered around the Radical Independence Campaign (RIC). Along with Common Weal, a related body drawing on working-class and artistic groups, RIC began to campaign on wages, jobs and the future of the state-funded National Health Service.

Others followed suit. Soon there were myriad sub-groups within the Yes campaign. Teachers for Yes, Lawyers for Yes, even Davids for Indepedence made their voices heard. This unplanned, decentralised structure brought advantages, particularly as it enabled local groups to segment their messages. Not bound by the discipline of the Better Together campaign, Yes campaigners could craft their pitches according to their target voters. Students queuing for the cinema were given leaflets explaining “how to disarm a nuke” (the answer: vote Yes to force Britain’s deterrent from Scottish waters). Parents waiting at school gates got literature on childcare. Flats in blue-collar areas received fliers outlining the many ways in which the union had failed them, entitled: “Britain is for the rich. Scotland can be ours.”

Yet the official Yes campaign had little purchase on these foot soldiers. At a pro-independence away day at Murrayfield, a rugby stadium in Edinburgh, last July delegates listened engrossed as two campaigners lectured on how to craft clear, punchy, lefty messages. The session was already over-running when the fire alarm was triggered. Those present trooped into the car park outside. All gossiped together, leaving Blair Jenkins, the director of Yes Scotland, to stand on his own—evidence, if it were needed, of the independent-mindedness of the independence movement.

In some areas, like Inverness, the SNP kept control of the campaign. In such places its strategy was “could, should, must” (explain why independence is possible, why it is desirable and why the alternative is undesirable). But across most of Scotland the party’s local presence dissolved into the wider Yes movement. By the final stages of the campaign, Balliol-Edinburgh types like Mr Salmond were taking lines from Balliol-Glasgow types. The first minister’s decision to concentrate on healthcare in his televised debates with Alistair Darling, the leader of the No campaign, drew directly on slogans pioneered and popularised by the pro-independence left.

When, a couple of weeks ago, the countdown to the deadline for voter registrations reached its final, evening hour, residents of Glasgow council estates were hurtling through the twilight streets in their pajamas to sign up, and urging their neighbours to do the same. So when the campaign pulled ahead of No in polls a few days later grassroots Yes types were not the slightest bit surprised. The absence of a single, clear strategy had enabled local groups to say and do what they needed to win over voters—indeed, even Mr Jenkins accepts that this was his side’s strength. Through lack of a deliberate strategy, the pro-independence campaign stumbled across a formula that suited it perfectly: pluralism.

Your correspondent finds himself walking the hilly, neo-Gothic alleys of Edinburgh wondering how this nation will vote in a little over 24 hours’ time. In this city folk will probably lean towards No. But a mere 40-minute train-ride to the west, on the coldly rational, neo-Classical and Modernist terraces of Glasgow, it is more likely that they will vote Yes. Looking at the polls, it is quite conceivable that this latter camp will prevail, probably ending the career of Mr Cameron (Brasenose-Edinburgh) and thrusting Mr Salmond (Balliol-Glasgow, then Balliol-Edinburgh) onto the pages of history books thanks to the efforts of my old Oxford friend (Balliol-Glasgow) and others like him. Those five years separating Scotland tonight from that carefree evening in an Oxford pub seem like an age.

End of Part 1
 
Part 2 of 2

And now from one of The Economist's resident economists:

http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2014/09/scottish-referendum
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48 hours

Sep 16th 2014

By Buttonwood

JUST 48 hours to go before Scots will vote on whether to become independent and thus break-up a 300 year old entity, the United Kingdom. Those gambling their own money are betting heavily on a No vote  (you can get 3-1 on a Yes vote) but I am not sure on what this confidence is based (the polls are only marginally pointing that way). Some believe in a repeat of the 1995 Quebec result, where voters seem to have had second thoughts in the polling booths and opted against independence; it may also be that voters are reluctant to say No to pollsters for fear of being thought unpatriotic. On the other hand, some argue that the sheer passion of the Yes campaign mean their supporters are more likely to turn out. Age may make a difference; the young are more enthusiastic for independence than the old, but the latter are more likely to turn out (and may already have voted by post, as Nate Silver's colleague points out ). If that betting reflects the consensus, that implies the markets are not pricing in a Yes vote which could make for a very turbulent Friday.

On the economic case, it is virtually impossible to write anything about this without being accused of bias (especially if the writer is English) but that doesn't mean it is wrong to try. (One should not assume, by the way that opponents of independence are Tories. The loss of Scoland would be very disadvantageous to the Labour party, which has 40 Scottish MPs to one Conservative; the right-wing blogger Paul Staines  seems to be campaigning quite strongly on this issue, perhaps for that reason.)

Of course, it would be ridiculous to argue that Scotland cannot be independent and prosperous but it still seems worthwhile to argue about whether its people (and the British people more generally) would be better off if they leave the UK. To my mind, the answer is pretty clearly No, given the balance of probability.

There are two big areas of debate - fiscal policy and currency union. On the first, the best thing to do is to look at the Institute for Fiscal Studies report  (generally seen as the authoritative, and politically independent, voice on these issues). Both sides can take some comfort from the report. The IFS says, for example, that

    "Public spending per head is about £1,200 a year higher in Scotland than in the UK as a whole (about £11,800 against £10,600 in 2010-11), and is higher across most areas of government activity. This is
    despite the fact that household disposable income per head in Scotland is very similar to the UK average"


On the other hand, this could be justified depending on how one allocates Scotland's share of North Sea oil revenues. The IFS adds that

    "Without oil and gas revenues or, equivalently, assigning them on a population basis, there has been a bigger gap between spending and tax receipts in Scotland in recent years than in the UK as a whole.
    With a geographic assignment of oil and gas revenues, on the other hand, the gap between revenues and spending in Scotland and in the UK has been similar, indeed somewhat smaller in Scotland.
    Over recent years, tax revenues from the North Sea, if allocated on a geographic basis, would have slightly more than paid for the additional public spending per head that currently occurs in Scotland
    relative to the UK as a whole."


This is a crucial part of the independence case. Of course, oil revenues are highly variable. Using the same geographic basis, the IFS points out that oil would have comprised 20% of revenues in 2008-09 but just 12% in 2009-10. Can one make long-term spending decisions on the basis of such variability?

That brings up the related issue of the future path of oil revenues. Here the dispute is whether there is plenty of oil and gas that can be exploited economically or whether resources are running down. A detailed piece on this was written by John McDermott of the FT . I can only summarise but the key conclusions are that the Scottish government assumes a 90% share of UK revenues (on the high side of forecasts); it assumes a range of oil prices from $99 a barrel to $128 (all, bar the first, higher than the futures price); it assumes that production will rise by 14% or more over the next few years (in recent years, production has tended to come in below forecast); and it assumes that production costs will increase in line with revenues whereas they have in fact been rising much more quickly (if that continues, the tax take will be lower). In short, the independence campaign has assumed a very optimistic case.

This optimism then translates into the promises made on tax and spending policy. Here is a link  to the Yes campaign's case, mentioning as it does the provision of free childcare for three-to-four year olds, an increase in the carer's allowance, a promise that benefits, tax credits and the basic rate tax allowance will always keep up with rising costs (i.e. inflation), a £5 a week higher pension for new pensioners, and protection for NHS and education spending. On top of all this, Scotland will set up a rainy day oil fund (which implies a budget surplus, of course). Where will the money come from? Remember that the campaign is proposing a 3 percentage point cut in corporation tax as well. A lot depends on those oil assumptions.

But perhaps that doesn't matter. There is a general belief that an independent Scotland would be able to pursue a fairer policy than a UK condemned to endless Conservative governments. "Social harmony and inequality trump chasing GDP" as one person tweeted me. What about raising taxes on the rich? The Conservatives cut the top rate of tax (on those earning more than £150,000 a year) from 50% to 45%. A report  by the Institute of Chartered Accountants found there were only 13,000 such people in Scotland who currently pay £1.2 billion in tax; double the rate to 90% and even if one assumes that there is no avoidance, you would only get a further £1.2 billion. Besides, one of the Yes campaign's arguments revolves around attracting businesses via lower corporation taxes; the businesses won't come if the bosses fear for their own tax position.

And then there is the currency. The Yes campaign wants to keep the pound. Two distinguished non-English economists, Paul Krugman  and Paul de Grauwe  have warned about the dangers of having currency union without fiscal union. Since the latter has been a shrewd commentator on the euro crisis, let us focus on his comments. The problem is what happens in a crisis, as occurred in 2008 when the British government had to step in to rescue Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds HBOS (formed in part from the Bank of Scotland). As Mr de Grauwe writes

    "When the future Scottish government will issue bonds (as all governments of independent nations do) it will do this in pound sterling. But this will be a currency over which the Scottish government will have
    no control. For all practical purposes the pound will be like a foreign currency from the point of view of the Scottish government.

    The implication is far-reaching. It means that the Scottish government will not be able to give an ironclad guarantee to its bondholders that the cash (pounds) will always be there to pay them out at maturity.
    As a result, when the Scottish economy experiences bad times and the Scottish government budget deteriorates, the fragility of this arrangement will become manifest. Distrust and even fear may be set in motion
    in financial markets leading to large-scale sales of Scottish government bonds precipitating a liquidity crisis.

    Is this a far-fetched scenario? This is exactly what happened in countries like Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece; all countries, member of the Eurozone, that have given up their monetary sovereignty and have
    taken over a currency over which they have no control.

    The core of the problem of these countries and of the future Scotland is the absence of a lender of last resort in the government bond market. The Scottish government will not be backed by a central bank that
    can be forced to provide unlimited amount of liquidity support in times of crisis. Therefore it will not be able to give a guarantee to bondholders that the cash will always be there to pay them out at maturity.

    The British government enjoys such a backstop. It can and it will force the Bank of England to provide the support in times of crisis. The Scottish government will lack this power. As a result its power as a sovereign
    nation will be limited. It is surprising that the proponents of Scottish independence are so much insisting on creating a nation with limited independence."


In a crisis, Scotland would also have much less flexibility on fiscal policy. Remember that Scotland may well be required to commit to euro adoption by the EU (if it is allowed to keep its membership, which is far from certain). The consequences of currency union without fiscal union in the euro zone are clear. Mr de Grauwe again

    "How limited this independence will be can be gauged from what happened to “independent” nations of the Eurozone. We have seen that when these countries where hit by deep recessions and resulting budgetary
    deficits, the liquidity support that was provided by the other member-countries was highly conditional. The “Troika” (i.e. a group of foreigners) travelled to the countries in question (Ireland, Portugal, Greece) and
    dictated the terms under which liquidity support would be given. These terms were so intrusive that it is no exaggeration to say that these countries lost much of their sovereignty in the process.

    If Scotland becomes independent and keeps the pound it could negotiate the terms under which it will obtain the support of the Bank of England in times of crisis. But these terms will necessarily involve budgetary
    rules dictated by Westminster, pretty much like the member-countries of the Eurozone have to accept these budgetary rules set in Brussels."


Now why should there be a crisis? Well, the Scottish banking system is 12.5 times GDP, much bigger than the banking sectors of Ireland and Iceland before the crisis. Of course, the banks have indicated they will move their registration (or HQ, or both) to London in order to benefit from the Bank of England's protection. These moves have been dismissed as "scaremongering" or as merely nameplate changes that will not affect jobs. It seems hard to simultaneously argue that Scotland can be better off alone and that it needs to depend on a foreign central bank to come to its rescue in times of trouble. And as Paul Marsh of the London Business School writes

    "Re-domiciling the banks need not necessarily cut employment in Scotland. But my belief is that, over time, it would. Once a company moves its focus from one country to another, it is inevitable that the pattern
    of employment will eventually follow, and that more and more functions and activities would be moved "down south"."


Standard Life, the insurance company, has indicated that businesses will move south of the border (where its customers are) and this will surely have a jobs impact.

What could the Scottish government do to offset such a risk? It may well want to run a surplus (both in budgetary terms and on the balance of trade) in order to accumulate the necessary reserves to defend its currency and protect its banks. Then there is the crucial point that an independent Scotland will have to prove its own credentials with the bond markets which will mean paying higher interest rates for the forseeable future, which means more of the budget will go on interest costs. On £100 billion of debt, an extra percentage point on rates will cost £1 billion a year, or almost all the revenue from higher earners. How can that be combined with the spending promises? So much for the idea of pursuing social harmony and countering inequality.

Of course, all this reflects the views of an ignorant Sassenach who should mind his own business, yadi yada. But if you feel your friends are about to make a mistake, shouldn't you do your best to tell them?


So, I repeat: there is no rational argument for a Yes" vote, but this is about a dream, isn't it? And dreams, by their very definition, are irrational.
 
One of my favorite blogs has a nice explanation of Scottish independence for Americans.Alot of info I didnt know.

http://ace.mu.nu/

The Scottish Wars of Independence, and Why That Has Nothing to Do With Any of This

Scotland was an independent state before the Wars for Scottish Independence depicted (inaccurately) in Braveheart, too. English control of Scotland was a fairly short-lived affair. The Scottish king, Alexander III, died, and then so did his daughter and heir at a young age, leading to a disputed succession.

Edward I -- who I'll just call "Edward Longshanks," because we all know him from Braveheart -- graciously offered to mediate the succession dispute, and came up with a terrific solution pleasing to all parties: He invaded Scotland and declared himself "Lord Paramount," overlord over whatever king should eventually take the Scottish throne.

Longshanks was depicted as the villain in Braveheart, but you gotta admit: That's a Pimp move, man.

This sparked the First and Second Wars of Scottish Independence, which were fought in rapid succession.

Ultimately, Robert the Bruce became King of Scotland and managed to drive out Edward and his pretender to the throne (a man named Edward Balloi), and Scotland was free once more.
 
Thucydides said:
One interesting second order effect that no one has talked about yet is where will the disaffected go in the event of a Yes vote? Will Canada suddenly receive a flood of Scottish immigrants looking for opportunities out West since their own nation imploded?

And of course, just what sorts of people will these Scots be? Will they bring the Scottish work ethic of the 19th century, or the 21rst? Who would they vote for? What other sorts of changes would they bring to Canada?

Gacckkk! Could we really be able to put up with that many immigrating into top executive union spots. I'm always amazed at how many say they're leaving because of the weather. They leave one, waterlogged island and fly half way around the world to take up residence in another off the west coast.
 
Some food for thought of another major implication of an independent Scotland:

Business Insider

Scottish Independence Could Indirectly Lead To The End Of Britain's Nuclear Arsenal

A Scottish vote to leave the United Kingdom on Thursday could ultimately lead to the end of the country's nuclear arsenal, which consists of 225 warheads.

The UK's nuclear deterrent is currently housed in western Scotland — and if the newly independent Scots decide to banish the UK's major nuclear base London could decide that the weapons are simply too expensive and impractical to retain.

Britain was the third country in the world to develop a nuclear capability. In the 61 years since its first nuclear test, the United Kingdom has lost almost all of its once-sprawling empire, which included places like Sudan, Belize, and Malaysia the day the UK detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1953.

Back then the UK saw itself as a superpower that needed nukes, partly as a matter of national prestige. "We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs," Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin said in October of 1946. "We have got to have [a] bloody Union Jack on top of it."

(...FULL ARTICLE AT LINK ABOVE)
 
The day of decision...

Agence France Presse

SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO? | Scotland votes on independence
By: Agence France-Presse
September 18, 2014 3:02 PM

EDINBURGH -- Scotland began voting Thursday on whether to become independent from Britain in a referendum that has electrified the nation, dominating debate in homes and pubs from Edinburgh to the Highlands.

While the outcome looks too close to call, the pro-independence camp has seen support surge in recent weeks as the "No" side's long-term lead in the opinion polls shriveled away.

"This is our opportunity of a lifetime," Scotland's pro-independence First Minister Alex Salmond told a cheering crowd of supporters in Perth at a final rally on Wednesday.

"It's the greatest, most empowering moment that any of us will ever have," he said, as supporters waved Scottish flags and chanted "Yes we can!"

British Prime Minister David Cameron has pleaded with Scots to vote in favor of staying in "our home" and has warned that a break-up would be a "painful divorce" full of economic uncertainty.

(...EDITED)
 
A good one.

http://thechronicleherald.ca/editorial-cartoon/2014-09-18-editorial-cartoon
 
A young friend asked me a question yesterday, about how Scotland might manage its currency, and it occurs to me that a few (even one or two?) members might find my answer of mild interest.

There are several ways to manage a national currency.

    1. The most common way, for advanced economies, is to float the currency - to, essentially, allow the currency trading markets to decide its value. This is how the Canadian dollar and US dollar and most major
        currencies are managed. Floats are almost never free of interference by central banks. Even avowed "free floaters" like David Dodge and Mark Carney at the Bank of Canada intervened in currency markets,
        by buying or selling Canadian dollars, to moderate the effects of some swings;

    2. The other very common method is to peg the values of a currency to that of another very stable, globally traded currency, like the Swiss Frank, but, as we saw in 2011, even the Swiss are not above interfering
        and devaluing their currency to help national competitiveness. For many years Canada tried to mix a float with periodic pegs which led us, in 1962, to:

             
22c15a724b4d1feab8cb745e30100bba.image.500x360.jpg

              Prime Minister Diefenbaker's surprise devaluation of the in 1962 gave us the Diefnbuck

        That, a mix of a float and periodic pegs against the US dollar, is how China manages its currency, the RMB.

        A peg does not require a 1:1 ratio between currencies. A country can decide to peg its currency at whatever level it wants 50 Marks or Pounds or Pesos or whatevers to the Frank or 50 Franks to the Mark, etc.
   
    3. There was, for a while, a middle way in Europe: the European Monetary System (1979 until the arrival of the € in 1998) which we called the EMS the snake because member countries were allowed to
        float their currencies in a range between fixed upper and lower pegs, so you can imagine a currency moving up and down, within that range, rather like the track a snake makes in the sand.
        The snake was, in theory, a great system because it gave you common currency while still leaving sovereign nations with some, albeit not compete, control over their monetary policy, something
        which € states cannot have. The problem was that the snake depended upon nation-states being honest about their financial affairs and some, at least one major European power refused to follow the rules
        and, equally, refused to be called to account.

    4. The final way is to simply use another currency - which is what Scotland's First Minister Alex Salmond and Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau suggested might happen. And it can happen, it does happen, consider e.g. Ecuador and
        El Salvador. But, there's a problem, the US Administration and the Federal Reserve make monetary policy to suit US interests, not those of East Timor. Further, a country that wants to use another's currency
        (as opposed to just peg to it) must make arrangements to have sufficient supplies of that currency which, de facto means it becomes dependent on the US banking system.
 
At the same time, merchants may just place a fixed value on an item, with a currency exchange rate list for several currencies to match that value.  This was common in the EU when the process of converting to the Euro was being done.  It placed a strain on cashiers manning the tills, but was legal until such time that Euro became the only accepted currency.  You may still find examples of this in some International Airports where travelers may be doing some Duty Free shopping.
 
Niall Ferguson

Scottish referendum: Alone, Scotland will go back to being a failed state

Scottish history offers proof that even the most failed state can be fixed – by uniting with a richer and more tranquil neighbour. For most of the early modern period, the Scots kingdom was Europe’s Afghanistan. In the Highlands and the Hebrides, feudal warlords ruled over an utterly impoverished populace in conditions of lawlessness and internecine clan conflict. In the Lowlands, religious zealots who fantasised about a Calvinist theocracy – government by the godly Elect – prohibited dancing, drinking and drama. John Knox and his ilk were the Taliban of the Reformation. Witches were burnt in large numbers in Scotland, not in England.

Being the Scottish monarch was one of Europe’s most dangerous jobs. James I was murdered. James II died besieging Roxburgh Castle. James III also died in battle. So did James IV, at Flodden in 1513. James V died after yet another defeat at the hands of the English at Solway Moss. Mary I – Mary Queen of Scots – was actually imprisoned and executed by the English. James VI’s reaction on hearing that he had succeeded the woman who had condemned his mother to death was not one of repugnance but relief. As King James I of England, he could not wait to relocate south.

A key difference between Scotland and Sweden in this era was that Scotland was both small enough and weak enough to be the object of constant interference by its bigger neighbours, England and France. The Reformation made the problem especially severe because it divided Scotland between the Calvinist Lowlands and the mainly Catholic Highlands. This meant that, after Henry VIII’s Reformation, the Catholic powers of the continent could always look to the north of Scotland for support. Yet, as Charles I discovered, the Lowlands Scots were so zealous in their Protestantism that they were just as likely to revolt against an Anglican King if he showed signs of “Popery”. The net result was that from the 1630s until the 1740s Scotland was a far bigger source of political instability than Ireland.

The Union of the Parliaments in 1707 turned “Scotlanistan” into the Silicon Valley of 18th-century Europe, with Glasgow University as Stanford. The Union was a success partly because it sublimated these bitter Scottish divisions in a larger United Kingdom, while at the same time launching the country on an extraordinary economic boom that only really ran out of steam in the Sixties....

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-independence/11102126/Scottish-referendum-Alone-Scotland-will-go-back-to-being-a-failed-state.html

Just a thought about Tcheuchters and Sassenachs.  To Tcheuchters Sassenachs were anybody from south of the Highland Line (roughly the line south of Stirling.  Lowlanders called the Gaelic speaking Highlanders Tcheuchters.  As far as the British government was concerned all the Highlanders spoke Erse and the Highland Regiments were originally listed on the Irish Establishment.

The Highlanders that didn't leave Scotland during the clearances or the Potato Famine (the same one that hit Ireland) all ended up washing up in Glasgow, in the same tenements as the Irish, doing the same low wage jobs.

With respect to currency

Scots banks have a tradition of issuing their own paper money

blfrnt2.jpg


unfrnt.jpg


The legal position with regard to Scottish Banknotes is as follows:

Scottish Banknotes are legal currency – i.e. they are approved by the UK Parliament.  However, Scottish Bank notes are not Legal Tender, not even in Scotland.  In fact, no banknote whatsoever (including Bank of England notes!) qualifies for the term 'legal tender' north of the border and the Scottish economy seems to manage without that legal protection.

HM Treasury is responsible for defining which notes have ‘legal tender’ status within the United Kingdom and the following extract from Bank of England’s website may help to clarify what is meant by “legal tender” and how little practical meaning the phrase has in everyday transactions.

“The term legal tender does not in itself govern the acceptability of banknotes in transactions. Whether or not notes have legal tender status, their acceptability as a means of payment is essentially a matter for agreement between the parties involved. Legal tender has a very narrow technical meaning in relation to the settlement of debt. If a debtor pays in legal tender the exact amount he owes under the terms of a contract, he has good defence in law if he is subsequently sued for non-payment of the debt. In ordinary everyday transactions, the term ‘legal tender’ has very little practical application.”
(Ref. www.bankofengland.co.uk/banknotes/about/faqs.htm.)

It is also interesting to note that, if the strict rules governing legal tender were to be observed in a transaction, then the exact amount due would need to be tendered since no change can be demanded.

The majority of banknotes circulating in Scotland are issued by Scottish banks.  Scottish notes circulate and are accepted quite freely in Scotland and, for the most part, they are also readily accepted in England & Wales, although branches of Scottish banks there may not issue them.  However, you should not rely absolutely on Scottish notes being accepted outside Scotland and this is particularly true when travelling abroad.  Our general advice would be not to carry large amounts of banknotes of any description and to make use of facilities such as travellers’ cheques, credit/debit cards and ATM cards for access to funds whilst abroad.

http://www.scotbanks.org.uk/legal_position.php

ERC - if you hadn't brought up the subject I would never have learned about this.  It's why I love this site.
 
I read about this a few months ago and is failry well summerized here.  Something I was unfamiliar with but may hold some interesting lessons.

http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/09/17/why-scotland-is-part-of-great-britain-disastrous-17th-century-colony-in-panama-behind-union/
 
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