Ricks Napkin Challenge- The Infantry Section and Platoon

[markppcli]

I’m curious if that is just a TOW’ism coloring your view?

I’m also thinking part of this occurs because Canada doesn’t have an AT attack helicopter option and no ATGM integral to the IFV’s

Yes and no. I mean obviously a tow reload is extremely impractical in an IFV just by its nature ( 1 m tall, 70-90 odd lbs), and that has for sure coloured my views on it. That being said I think we sometimes fall into this trap of “just toss it in the carrier” as though it’s the case vacuum of space that can fit anything. In the care of a Bradley for example the racks for tow / javeline reloads takes up a full seat, that’s why they carry 6, in the Spanish vamtacs and Italian Ivecos the Spike reloads also take up a full seat. That’s for 2-3 extra rounds. So don’t get me wrong I want those ATGMs, but I also want dedicated groups who don’t have to worry about fitting a full section in their vehicles and can have 8-12 ready rounds before they need to hit their cache / resupply point.

Helicopter or no, if we don’t have integral tanks I want something with a 4 k plus range covering our movement whenever possible. Even better if it can have a very low signature.

 

[KevinB]

I still think a networked NLOS Missile system in each ISC/IFV would give more ‘reach’ even if they didn’t carry onboard reloads, other than at Coy level.

But perhaps I’m falling into a platform trap, and not seeing the other options available to have those same missiles dispersed.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Doctrinally untrue; the primary task of an armoured regiment isn’t keeping tanks away from the Infantry. The infantry has its AT weapons for that; to include what ever ATGM is selected in the ALAWS and TOW replacement program. It’d be a poor CO that planned to have A Sqn LDSh effect his KZ.



It was all three of the Bns giving up their TOW platoons for form a DFS regiment with an adapts battery and tank Sqn. They stripped the hull of the tow turrets in… 2007? So I doubt much follow up was done. This was in anticipation of the Stryker MGS being bought and some how making the Bn dependant on that regiment for its anti armour defence seemed like a good idea.



I’m at a loss for how to make that clearer. Do you mean pull all the weapons dets and group them higher or do you mean additional PYs for this support Bn?


How does this address that ?



Who’s asking for a section mortar ? I mean the French do it but I didn’t see that suggestion. Maintaining proficiency on a weapon system is an issue, arguably an atgm is actually easier as the simulations are free and the controls that I’ve handled are incredibly intuitive.



A means to project He and a machine gun is hardly what your describing.



Outside of the MG Bns each Bn had its support platoons under their support company; in the context of this discussion what your saying is broadly untrue. There are fairly minimal organizational changes from ww2 until we cut mortars, tow, and pioneers actually. WW 2 infantry didn’t have a Pl level machine gun, but they did have piags and 2 inch mortars. But I digress and that’s probably deviating. Quite apart from what your suggesting the infantry Bn of 1939 had its mortars, pioneers, and AT platoon and was quite self sufficient.


And yet they have to focus on a single supporting platoon role now. You’re tracking those support platoons surely?



Not really the scope of this discussion but I agree. It’s just going to take an act of parliament to do that.

Regarding your first bit. I agree that the Leopard IIs should not be the framework of a battlegroup's anti-armour plan. That should come from integral AT resources (which are currently quite scarce). It would be a strange mechanized battlegroup's (or battalion in a mechanized brigade group) Kill Zone, though, that did not have a plan to layer on at least a tank squadron's fires. Counter-moves can have several tasks, and counter-attacking by fire or simply reinforcing a kill zone are two of those tasks. This gets coordinated at the brigade and battalion level.

A mechanized infantry battalion with four Javelin in each company with another eight to twelve Javelins (or TUA) in a battalion-level platoon should be able to have kill zones that could block (but not necessarily destroy) mechanized battalions and perhaps mechanized brigades attacking them. We layer on a tank squadron (or regiment) to deal with a concentrated thrust of enemy tanks (like a tank battalion or tank brigade) that could overwhelm one sector. Alternatively, our tanks could be used to destroy/defeat a culminated enemy stuck in the kill zone. That's the theory anyway!

Back in reality it can get harder. I recall being a tank troop leader over twenty years ago coming back from the covering force battle and being cut to an infantry company. Of course it was 0400 hrs when I reported to the Coy CP and was given the order to find four spots for my panzers in the defensive position. Real estate was at a premium as the company had already dug in. I found a few spots where a Leopard 1 could snooker into a not so great turret down but a passable hull down. For one of them I was told "No - that spot is for our 60mm mortar" OK. I mean I love the 60mm mortar and everything, but... My WO was concerned about us crushing real soldiers with our very real tanks in a very not real exercise by getting too clever with hides and run-ups, so we picked four spots for our tanks and waited to die.

Anyhoo.

 

[Infanteer]

A mechanized infantry battalion with four Javelin in each company with another eight to twelve Javelins (or TUA) in a battalion-level platoon should be able to have kill zones that could block (but not necessarily destroy) mechanized battalions and perhaps mechanized brigades attacking them. We layer on a tank squadron (or regiment) to deal with a concentrated thrust of enemy tanks (like a tank battalion or tank brigade) that could overwhelm one sector. Alternatively, our tanks could be used to destroy/defeat a culminated enemy stuck in the kill zone. That's the theory anyway!

...and, as the Russo-Ukrainian War is reminding us, if we layer on a Regiment or two of artillery fire, I think we get the real stopping power required.

See page 8 here:

https://tradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/fires-bulletin-archive/2002/NOV_DEC_2002/NOV_DEC_2002_FULL_EDITION.pdf

 

[SeaKingTacco]

...and, as the Russo-Ukrainian War is reminding us, if we layer on a Regiment or two of artillery fire, I think we get the real stopping power required.

See page 8 here:

https://tradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/fires-bulletin-archive/2002/NOV_DEC_2002/NOV_DEC_2002_FULL_EDITION.pdf

Beat me to it.

The real killer in a Bde KZ back in the day was 155mm DPICM. That stuff would eat Russian Tank Bns for breakfast

Not that guns are the be all, end all of the battlefield, but without them infantry and armoured forces have to work much harder and will take proportionally higher casualties.

 

[markppcli]

Regarding your first bit. I agree that the Leopard IIs should not be the framework of a battlegroup's anti-armour plan. That should come from integral AT resources (which are currently quite scarce). It would be a strange mechanized battlegroup's (or battalion in a mechanized brigade group) Kill Zone, though, that did not have a plan to layer on at least a tank squadron's fires. Counter-moves can have several tasks, and counter-attacking by fire or simply reinforcing a kill zone are two of those tasks. This gets coordinated at the brigade and battalion level.

Fair point and thank you for illuminating me.

So then is our real question what is the appropriate man power to dedicate to those section and platoon level AT weapons ? I know I suggested an 84 per section; but re assessing numbers I’m more inclined to see an NLAW / Spike SR in a section, something that’s not crew served. Javelin essentially replacing the 84 for a platoon, it can be fired direct and was used for anti structure work by the Brits in Afghanistan so it should be able to do that “door making” job.

 

[Infanteer]

From the looks of things, doesn't even need to be DPICM - just a bunch of HE will knock a mechanized element around enough to stop it. Of course, we knew this from the Second World War, when our primary defence against the (inevitable) German mechanized counterattack was the call of an Uncle Target.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

From the looks of things, doesn't even need to be DPICM - just a bunch of HE will knock a mechanized element around enough to stop it. Of course, we knew this from the Second World War, when our primary defence against the (inevitable) German mechanized counterattack was the call of an Uncle Target.

That is the thing that is surprising.

The conventional wisdom a couple decades ago was that 155mm HE would do some damage to Russian Armour (antennas, optics) and keep the crews buttoned up, but would not really do much killing.

The Ukrainian war has demonstrated that is clearly not the case.

 

[Infanteer]

The article focuses on "5 Myths" of artillery effects against armoured vehicles:

• Myth #1—It requires a direct hit with an artillery round to damage or destroy an armored vehicle. Not true; 155-mm rounds that impact within 30 meters cause considerable damage (Figure 5). Air bursts using VT or dual purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) can strip away communications, sights, vision blocks and anything stored on the outside of the vehicle. These air bursts are especially effective against soft targets such as multiple-rocket launchers (MRLs). (See Figure 6.)
• Myth #2—It takes 50 artillery rounds to destroy or damage a tank. Not true. It takes one round (Figure 7). If an artillery battalion engages an armored formation (54 rounds), more than one tank will be destroyed or damaged.
• Myth #3—Artillery cannot engage moving targets. It is difficult, but it can be done. The issue is not lethality, but the tactics, techniques and procedures to hit the moving target. Units must train to shift fires.
• Myth #4—Modern armor cannot be defeated by artillery. Tanks are designed to kill tanks, and most of the armor is designed to protect against direct fire. HE rounds with VT or delayed fuze and DPICM are very capable of defeating “modern” armor (Figure 8).
• Myth #5—Armored vehicles can button up and drive through artillery fire. Yes, they can. But as soon as they button up, their ability to see is reduced by approximately 40 percent. And as they drive through the artillery fire, there is a high probability they will have mobility and firepower damage or that the formation will change its direction of attack. The results are delay and suppression of armor.

Ukraine appears to be reinforcing the fact that these are myths, as we saw with the footage and imagery of the destruction of Russian BTGs caught by Ukrainian artillery at Brovary (9 Mar) and the Donets River Crossing at Bilohorivka (5-13 May).

 

[KevinB]

Keep in mind precision munitions further change that formula as well.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Why does the Company need a separate system then the platoon or nothing? Why is a separate system needed at each echelon?

Honestly, the "or nothing" was based on faulty premise. There's no section detailing a doctrinal Company weapons det in either Infantry Section and Platoon in Operations, or Infantry Battalion in Battle, and I missed the single line in each alluding to an undefined weapons det as part of HQ. So I assumed it didn't exist. What do they hold currently?

But basically the thought - especially re: the AGL/ mortar progression is that in my completely uninformed opinion the LAV platoon weapons det takes the weapons locker concept too far. 4 guys, 4 crew served weapons = weapon(s) either un or undermanned at all times = capability not being used (and potentially unavailable). My "solution" was to kick mortars up to company and make them permanently manned, reducing the burden on the platoon weapons detachment, the opportunity cost of choosing a given weapon system, and enabling more weapons to be part of the fight concurrently. But I could be completely wrong, the handle was chosen for a reason.

Similarly the Spike SR-LR progression- I thought that the reduced weight and complexity of the SR- no CLU, lighter missile would reduced the burden and make it easier to employ at platoon level. Not for tank hunting, just readily available defensive capability (maybe carried by the assistant C6 gunner?)

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Fair point and thank you for illuminating me.

So then is our real question what is the appropriate man power to dedicate to those section and platoon level AT weapons ? I know I suggested an 84 per section; but re assessing numbers I’m more inclined to see an NLAW / Spike SR in a section, something that’s not crew served. Javelin essentially replacing the 84 for a platoon, it can be fired direct and was used for anti structure work by the Brits in Afghanistan so it should be able to do that “door making” job.

I think the point you made in your post was a great one - the anti-armour plan cannot just be relying on the Leopard 2s! I was just adding that it can and should include them.

Bringing this to the thread at hand, I was a Leo 2 Sqn Comd on Capability Development Experiment 10. This was conducted in 2011 and imagined a Cdn BG on operations in 2020. The infantry had a CCV company, a LAV company and a TAPV company and we were spread out across an East African country with insurgents, warlords (that had some T55s) and a conventional enemy across the border. Because the infantry companies had no anti-tank beyond 84mms and 25mm cannons my tanks were split up to protect the infantry companies. As a result, when the conventional threat did come our force there was overwhelmed by a battalion of T72s that my squadron could have easily handled had we been concentrated. Instead, we were spread out to "protect the infantry" and thus a combat team was destroyed.

So the infantry must be able to be the framework of the anti-armour plan. Battle Group in Ops tells us that there are many plans that make up the defence: Information Management (yes-its a thing); Barrier Plan, Defensive Fire Plan (arty); ISTAR Plan; Coutermoves Plan; Air Defence Plan; EW Plan; CSS Plan and the Direct Fire Plan. The good book says that the Direct Fire Plan is composed of all direct fire weapons in the BG from hand-held anti-tank weapons through to tank cannons. It is closely coordinated with the barrier plan, countermoves plan and defensive fire plan. KZs are established on approaches and are tied to the range of the company's direct fire weapons. Other weapons are then overlaid.

So the range of the company's direct fire weapons is important. This question is a bit like asking how long should a piece of string be, but how far should the company's anti-tank weapons shoot? I think a 2K range is a good start to ensure mutual support and some depth of the KZ?

Which weapons belong in the company and which ones belong in the battalion?

 

[FJAG]

the call of an Uncle Target.

Now there's a term you don't hear much anymore.

Bringing this to the thread at hand, I was a Leo 2 Sqn Comd on Capability Development Experiment 10. This was conducted in 2011 and imagined a Cdn BG on operations in 2020. ... As a result, when the conventional threat did come our force there was overwhelmed by a battalion of T72s that my squadron could have easily handled had we been concentrated. Instead, we were spread out to "protect the infantry" and thus a combat team was destroyed.

So the infantry must be able to be the framework of the anti-armour plan.

Two fundamentals that were hammered into us constantly in the old days.

I'm puzzled by the fact that with a structured evaluation program that restates and confirms fundamental principles, why, 11 years later, we are discussing the capability deficiencies we have in the infantry rather than how they should use the weapon systems that they should have been given after the trials? Time after time, I see valid lessons learned that are forgotten in a filing cabinet somewhere.

And yes, its a rhetorical question.

 

[KevinB]

So I finally found an open source article about some of the previously non public aspects of LWCLU for Javelin.

The Army's Anti-Tank Javelin Missiles Are Getting A Range Upgrade

The U.S. Army and Raytheon plan to enter production of a new Lightweight Command Launch Unit for the Javelin designed to bring a new level of “precision lethality to an infantry squad.”

nationalinterest.org

There is also a command and control “networking” dimension to the CLU, as it can operate with a Sentinel radar in some instances and use its sensing systems to share targeting information.

There is more to it than that, but I’m not sure what is public domain at this point.

Javelin 5km+
Hellfire 10km+
With both of those systems you have NLOS methods to lock targets. They are also made down here, which for Canada I think is an important strategic logistic issue in a larger conflict.

 

[GR66]

I think the point you made in your post was a great one - the anti-armour plan cannot just be relying on the Leopard 2s! I was just adding that it can and should include them.

Bringing this to the thread at hand, I was a Leo 2 Sqn Comd on Capability Development Experiment 10. This was conducted in 2011 and imagined a Cdn BG on operations in 2020. The infantry had a CCV company, a LAV company and a TAPV company and we were spread out across an East African country with insurgents, warlords (that had some T55s) and a conventional enemy across the border. Because the infantry companies had no anti-tank beyond 84mms and 25mm cannons my tanks were split up to protect the infantry companies. As a result, when the conventional threat did come our force there was overwhelmed by a battalion of T72s that my squadron could have easily handled had we been concentrated. Instead, we were spread out to "protect the infantry" and thus a combat team was destroyed.

So the infantry must be able to be the framework of the anti-armour plan. Battle Group in Ops tells us that there are many plans that make up the defence: Information Management (yes-its a thing); Barrier Plan, Defensive Fire Plan (arty); ISTAR Plan; Coutermoves Plan; Air Defence Plan; EW Plan; CSS Plan and the Direct Fire Plan. The good book says that the Direct Fire Plan is composed of all direct fire weapons in the BG from hand-held anti-tank weapons through to tank cannons. It is closely coordinated with the barrier plan, countermoves plan and defensive fire plan. KZs are established on approaches and are tied to the range of the company's direct fire weapons. Other weapons are then overlaid.

So the range of the company's direct fire weapons is important. This question is a bit like asking how long should a piece of string be, but how far should the company's anti-tank weapons shoot? I think a 2K range is a good start to ensure mutual support and some depth of the KZ?

Which weapons belong in the company and which ones belong in the battalion?

@TangoTwoBravo beat me to responding to @markppcli. Poor choice of wording on my part perhaps leading @markppcli to think that I was suggesting removing integral AT assets from the Infantry Battalion and placing them in a separate MG/CS/AT/Whatever Battalion instead. My point was that an Infantry Battalion's AT defence plan (ideally) already makes use of other Brigade assets (Armour, Engineer, Artillery, etc.) so augmenting the Infantry with additional outside CS assets from a new Brigade-level unit would be no different in practice.

To further clarify, here's what sparked the question in my mind:

I guess the question is what do we define as a "regular combat setting" these days.
I think just do to the same of Armies these days, the vast density and depth of WW2 is never going to happen -- too many mass effect weapons also make that sort of strategy self defeating.

Watching the videos of Russia pouring thermobarric and straight incendiary explosives into areas of Ukraine means that grouped forces will suffer significant casualties - even non OS footage doesn't show significant force densities on the attack or defense.

Maybe I have been drinking too much SOF cool-aid over the years, but I think one will see more and more dispersed operations in both defense and offensive actions, both due to the hazard of close groupings of a number of forces, and due to the effectiveness of ranged weapons.
I'm not suggesting penny packing Tanks, or isolated Section/Squads expected to cover massive areas - but as VAS systems get better you can detect forces further away even by direct vision, and the ability of ISR systems to capture data in multi spectrum ways and allow it to be analyzed means that in certain theaters cam and concealment will be extremely tough, and stealth almost impossible against a well equipped enemy.

I think because of all that the expectation of a Section/Squad only to have a sub 1km engagement range is extremely limiting and short sighted.
Even if you are fighting a technologically inferior foe - why fight them in an even manner - why not destroy them long before they can destroy you?

*This is coming from someone who absolutely despised the "Networked Army" and all the Digital Warfare symposiums for years.
I've come to the sad acceptance that information management and data transfer are key components of modern warfare.

I like the ability to push additional C6, CG, 60mm, GMG and Javelin down to the sections as needed.

I think flexibility is needed in arming to account for the variety of situations one may see.

In areas that result in defensive positions - where one is generally not nearly as mobile, firepower advantages can significantly change force ratios.
Of course the additional equipment comes with a logistics burden as well, not just in terms of ammunition supply, but also accounting for the movement of those without unnecessarily burdening the section and platoon.

We have the suggestion that troop densities may drop in the areas to be covered by forces between the areas we are concentrating to fight and that in response to this and enabled by improved ISR and better precision weapons, we may want to have the ability to push more long-range, crew-served weapons down to the Section Level.

I'm wondering how that intersects with the following in relation to a 7-man dismounted LAV section (tiny highlighted portion in particular but included the entire original post because if you haven't read it yet you should):

Yes. In the Canadian context. We moved away from an "asymmetric section" that we used for six decades to a "symmetric approach" that mimicked the American Army. I'm not convinced it was the right decision.



I alluded to this before, but number really isn't important. I'd offer that first principles are, so here is my guess at first principles:

1. Infanteers don't do things as individuals, but as teams. The fundamental building block is a team/group/detachment/brick (call it whatever you want) of 3-6 infanteers. A section is a group of teams. Multiple observations in combat support this; dismounted infanteers will tend to move in little gaggles from a good position of fire to another good position of fire.
2. For Canada, each team is controlled by a junior NCO (MCpl). Each section is controlled by a senior NCO (Sgt). A Sgt can also command his or her own team as well as the section as a whole.
3. A team can be assigned one "thing" to do; these "things" are broadly defined by the core functions of Find, Fix, Strike. In a rifle platoon (and even company), I'd argue there are two things a team could do - support (engage with crew served weapon) or assault (close with an enemy/protect the crew served weapon. So a section, platoon, and company is composed of a variety of assault and support teams.
4. History tells us that shock wins engagements, shock comes from neutralization, and neutralization comes from the suppressive and destructive power of crew served weapons. Crew served weapons also have the advantage of encouraging participation of those who would otherwise be non-firers; repeated observations (beyond S.L.A. Marshall) have demonstrated that some soldiers simply bow out of engagements due to the psychological effect of battle. A crew served weapon, requiring a team to operate, reinforces participation. A crew-served weapon is more than the sum of its parts, and is at the core of Infantry effectiveness.
5. History tells us that assault elements are not generally required to be too large. Tactical case studies continuously indicate that high ratios of support:assault elements tend to be the most successful (in Rommel's case in WWI, 8:1 support:assault was not uncommon). Support elements suppress and neutralize enemy, and assault teams clean up and secure.
6. In the attack, support elements "fire in" assault elements. In the defence, assault elements provide protection to support elements that do all the killing.
7. Only in specific cases would sections, and even platoons, operate on their own, so when you organize a section, you should consider how it would be used within the context of a platoon. Likewise, when you organization a platoon, you should consider how it would be used in the context of a company.

Based on these first principles, I'd argue that a section should be able to find, fix, and strike. A section with an assault team and a support team can find with either (usually just by spotting something), fix with a support team, and strike with the assault team. It is, as I mentioned above, difficult to conceive of a situation where a section is taking a single objective completely on its own. So the platoon has to be able to configure its sections and teams to find, fix, and strike. As mentioned above, the ratios for doing this are not equal, so most of the platoon can be fixing while a small element strikes. The same phenomenon exists for a company; as there is rarely a lone enemy squad wandering around waiting to fight, in isolation, with a platoon.

So, how does the Canadian Army organize its sections? In the mechanized context, let's keep our restraint of 7-seats in a LAV, as there is little point to sweeping this away for some other platform if you want to have a concept that is actually useful for us today. This gives us a 7-pers section. 1x Sgt (Sect Comd) composed of an assault team and a support team. The assault team is three soldiers with rifles (perhaps one with a grenade launcher), while the support team is a two-person weapons team led by a MCpl (Sect 2iC). The weapons team can be equipped with a GPMG or a Carl G (mission dependent), which to me are the mainstays of the infantry platoon - the GPMG for the sustained suppressive power, and the Carl G for its neutralization power in a close fight. The Sgt, if he or she wishes, can take command of the support team and send the 2iC with the assault team, and could also kick the grenadier over to the support team. Flexibility is the key.

Now pair this up with a LAV 6. This team dismounts and gets behind the LAV or (even better) a tank. They "handrail" the vehicle into a suitable position relative to their objective, providing protection to the vehicle that possesses a preponderance of firepower. The support team breaks off to a position of fire, and the assault team cleans up. Note that even in a mechanized organization, terrain may not permit intimate support, so sections and platoons require a degree of independence - even though a LAV or tank could provide all the suppressive fires required, it shouldn't be expected to.

We can't design sections without considering platoons. A Canadian platoon could be 21 pers (3 veh), 28 pers (4 veh), or 35 pers (5 veh). I think we are fine with our four vehicle loadout, so lets stick with 28 pers. Three sections as organized above, with a small HQ (a platoon commander, his or her signaller, and a platoon 2IC) and a Platoon support team; this team can consist of a MCpl comd, a platoon designated marksman, and two-pers with a crew served weapon (GPMG or Carl G, perhaps even a MRAAW - Spike or Javelin - that is carried in the HQ LAV). Again, flexibility is the key. Tactically, the most basic configurations on the attack would see the Pl Comd can mass his or her 4x support teams under the Pl 2IC to fire in 2-3 assault elements that he or she leads and, in the defence, would have the Coy Comd site the 4x support teams of each platoon, and the Pl Comd emplace the 3 assault teams in positions that provide protection to those hardened bases of fire.

Moving away from a mechanized setting and looking at light infantry (which we define as "vehicle agnostic"), I wouldn't go much larger as I think fitting a platoon into a Chinook (max 33-pers in seats) is a useful guide to apply. I'm not going to split hairs and say 32 is better than 28, but I'd offer that there is a certain elegance with simply keeping the same organization throughout. Since a Light Company does not have the firepower of the LAVs, it should have a Weapons Platoon, which we now have in the CA LIBs, to supplement the Rifle Platoons. A Weapons Platoon is simply a bunch of sections composed of support teams.

Note: history also teaches us that in a conventional war with a regular adversary, infantry sections and platoons will take casualties and generally always operate with less people than the book says. This is one reason why arguing over "6 versus 8 versus 12" is so silly and pointless; you won't have any of those numbers after crossing the LD! In the face of this reality, Section and Platoon commanders need to always remember principle (4) and to keep those crew-served weapons manned. I can think of a bunch of different ways a platoon of 19 organizes itself on week two of a war because it has taken casualties in the preceding days.

The more crew-served weapons (C6, Javelin, etc.) we push down to a dispersed Section, the fewer riflemen we have remaining to protect those crews. Does this pose a risk, as the crew-served weapons can only engage a single point target at a time and if dispersed (and outnumbering their protecting riflemen) become more vulnerable to enemy action?

That to my mind raised the question, is there any advantage to having that additional CS support (beyond what is already available from the existing integral Weapon Detachments and Battalion CS Company) that can be pushed out to the Battalion as required? Do greater dispersion and longer engagement ranges really suggest that more crew-served support weapons then are already in the current Battalion structure are required down at the Section and Platoon Level? If so, is this the best place to embed them, or are additional higher echelon assets the better place for them?

 

[KevinB]

My issue with pushing troops down from higher with assets is that in places like a static front trench warfare situation, that would increase troop density without any significant increase in lethality.

If a trench has a C6 and a lot of ammo, it doesn’t really need a lot of riflemen, if it’s mutually supported by another C6 or 2-3

@Kirkhill has posted some pretty nifty Unmanned Support Systems in the past - and perhaps one of those systems could bring up a GPMG, and act as a ammo bearer to keep it supplied.

The same goes for other systems.

Of course at some point in time, that autonomous system will maybe able to man the trench mostly itself, however currently it doesn’t seem to be able to load the C6 or perform a barrel change by itself yet.

I had that thought on the ATGM aspect when responding to @markppcli, as perhaps the LAV doesn’t need an ATGM itself, it just has a ‘little buddy’ that rides shotgun with ATGM’s and is networked into the higher Armor Defense plan.

 

[FJAG]

That to my mind raised the question, is there any advantage to having that additional CS support (beyond what is already available from the existing integral Weapon Detachments and Battalion CS Company) that can be pushed out to the Battalion as required? Do greater dispersion and longer engagement ranges really suggest that more crew-served support weapons then are already in the current Battalion structure are required down at the Section and Platoon Level? If so, is this the best place to embed them, or are additional higher echelon assets the better place for them?

One thing that I have always found interesting is the difference in the way that the US Army structures its combined arms, Stryker and light infantry battalions. In particular, both the combined arms and Stryker battalions do not have a "weapons company" like the light infantry battalion does. (And incidentally, battalion mortars, recce and snipers are not in a CS company but are part of the Bn HQ & HQ company. Similarly, over and above the mortars in the HHC, pairs of mortars are part of each light infantry (60mm) and Stryker rifle company (81/120mm))

The "weapons company" which only exists in the light infantry battalion is one of the battalion's few permanently wheeled elements (HMWWVs) and basically forms a direct fire component of four platoons of two sections of two squads each (a total of 8 sections / 16 squads). It operates on an arms locker concept and each platoon has, in total 2 x TOW ITAS, 2 x Javelin, 2 x Mk19 grenade launcher and 2 x .50. Each squad has a crew of 4. The platoons can be tailored for specific missions and allocated out in a number of ways by the battalion commander. Allocating a platoon to a rifle company is not unusual but not the only way to use them.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not we really need a CS company for mortars, recce and snipers in the first place, is the question of what prompts the need for a weapons company in the light battalions? Obviously system weights play a big role, but I would think as well that in a light battalion, the ability to mass all your heaviest anti-armour/anti-personnel weapons according to the battalion's overall need is also a crucial requirement. In the CA and Stryker battalions, the heavy armament is tied directly to each section's vehicle therefore, it can't be easily redistributed throughout the battalion.

It may be that the fundamental difference as between what a light company/platoon/section can carry and what heavy weapons already come as part of the EIS of the LAV 6.0 that makes it clear that we need two very different establishments and TTPs when it comes to how we distribute and employ the heavier crew-served weapons.

 

[markppcli]

The "weapons company" which only exists in the light infantry battalion is one of the battalion's few permanently wheeled elements (HMWWVs) and basically forms a direct fire component of four platoons of two sections of two squads each (a total of 8 sections / 16 squads). It operates on an arms locker concept and each platoon has, in total 2 x TOW ITAS, 2 x Javelin, 2 x Mk19 grenade launcher and 2 x .50. Each squad has a crew of 4. The platoons can be tailored for specific missions and allocated out in a number of ways by the battalion commander. Allocating a platoon to a rifle company is not unusual but not the only way to use them.

Much like a light Bn ‘s DFS platoon?

It may be that the fundamental difference as between what a light company/platoon/section can carry and what heavy weapons already come as part of the EIS of the LAV 6.0 that makes it clear that we need two very different establishments and TTPs when it comes to how we distribute and employ the heavier crew-served weapons.

Yes at company and beyond I would agree. Platoon and below, the topic of this conversation, less convinced.

 

[markppcli]

Honestly, the "or nothing" was based on faulty premise. There's no section detailing a doctrinal Company weapons det in either Infantry Section and Platoon in Operations, or Infantry Battalion in Battle, and I missed the single line in each alluding to an undefined weapons det as part of HQ. So I assumed it didn't exist. What do they hold currently?

There’s 4 C16s per company so they hold one of them.

But basically the thought - especially re: the AGL/ mortar progression is that in my completely uninformed opinion the LAV platoon weapons det takes the weapons locker concept too far. 4 guys, 4 crew served weapons = weapon(s) either un or undermanned at all times = capability not being used (and potentially unavailable).

Which four crew served weapons ?

My "solution" was to kick mortars up to company and make them permanently manned, reducing the burden on the platoon weapons detachment, the opportunity cost of choosing a given weapon system, and enabling more weapons to be part of the fight concurrently. But I could be completely wrong, the handle was chosen for a reason.

 

[KevinB]

Which four crew served weapons ?

I think he’s still counting 60mm Mortar, plus the C6, C16, and Carl G.

Is Eryx still around?