Ricks Napkin Challenge- The Infantry Section and Platoon

[Underway]

Couple of questions/thoughts and then I'll sit back and read.

UAS. Platoon level, or section level? Who operates it (signaler seems like a bad idea as their job is to signal), and were does it go?

What type is it (small rotor, loitering munition, disposable or reusable?). What's it used for (recce, attacking, or like the Coyote to take out enemy UAS').

Where does it launch from? LAV? Puma type hand launch?

This likely ties into the platoon organization/weapons as a complementary system or one that is deployed depending on the mission/threat (a platoon with more indirect fire may want a spotting UAS, one with LAV's may want Coyote's to protect their rides etc...).

 

[markppcli]

Question. Do the extra CS weapons that are situation dependent have to be integral to the Platoon/Section and available when needed, or can they be attached/detached from above as required. I mean at a level beyond the normal Platoon/Company Weapon Detachments and Battalion CS Company?

Short answer is yes. An infantry battalion ought to be fairly self sufficient and not dependant on the Bde to provide its Anti Tank defence. Interestingly enough we did try a Bde anti tank company and it was not a positive experience for the Bde, units, and those involved. There’s a couple other parts to this about having the ability to move new bodies into those positions, and the often overlooked advisory roles that those *9As filled on the Bn CP.

Almost along the lines of the Machine Gun Battalions of WWII. A Brigade-level resource that could see additional CS Companies attached to Battle Groups as required by Brigade. As Company-level attachments they would presumably see a better coordination of effects than individual Section/Platoon support weapons operating the same systems in greater isolation.

The MG Bns we’re essentially heavy mortar and HMG companies; the Bns themselves maintained their own CS platoons. Maybe I’m missing your point and your talking about an in addition to and not an instead of ? If it’s the later I’m staunchly against it, if it’s the former I think it’s superfluous.

This could be an ideal role for Reserve units as they would typically only be required during major combat operations. It would allow units to concentrate on specific skill sets.

Not really, we’re doing this now and with respect to the reservist involved it’s simply not a reliable force generator.

 

[markppcli]

Couple of questions/thoughts and then I'll sit back and read.

UAS. Platoon level, or section level?

To me no lower than platoon.

Who operates it (signaler seems like a bad idea as their job is to signal), and were does it go?

Signaller is really more the Pl IT guy now that 152s as standard. So it’s probably not excessive to give them that task.

What type is it (small rotor, loitering munition, disposable or reusable?). What's it used for (recce, attacking, or like the Coyote to take out enemy UAS').

Small rotor for recce. Anything that strikes should be held by people with accesses to reloads, that a big strain on the platoon logistically.

Where does it launch from? LAV? Puma type hand launch?

Hand launch, a buddy with RCMP ERT flies them into houses from his armoured truck could do that with a hand launch quad copter in a LAV.

This likely ties into the platoon organization/weapons as a complementary system or one that is deployed depending on the mission/threat (a platoon with more indirect fire may want a spotting UAS, one with LAV's may want Coyote's to protect their rides etc...).

You mean Coyote as drone defence ? I’d probably rather had dedicated AA assets, as Everything I just looked up about Coyote seems like it’s a fairly large launch platform. Most loitering munitions to be are logistically intensive enough that they’d be a better asset for a support platoon that has the benefit of being tasks focused.

 

[Infanteer]

UAS. Platoon level, or section level? Who operates it (signaler seems like a bad idea as their job is to signal), and were does it go?

I would want to do a trial with each Section 2IC having something like this:

That being said, at $200k a pop, we'd have to wait until these became much cheaper, almost disposable.

Pl and Coy could have something like this in their support elements

 

[GR66]

Short answer is yes. An infantry battalion ought to be fairly self sufficient and not dependant on the Bde to provide its Anti Tank defence.

Unless you're one of those that believe that hand-held ATGMs have made the tank obsolete the primary anti-tank defence for an Infantry Battalion does depend on the Brigade...in the form of the Armoured Regiment.

Interestingly enough we did try a Bde anti tank company and it was not a positive experience for the Bde, units, and those involved. There’s a couple other parts to this about having the ability to move new bodies into those positions, and the often overlooked advisory roles that those *9As filled on the Bn CP.

I'd be very interested in knowing more about this experiment. What form did this AT Company take? Was it formed by drawing away the AT assets from the various Weapon Detachments and grouping them in a centralized Company or was it a new Company added to the ORBAT with personnel and weapons above and beyond the Battalion's standard configuration? What were the major issues that were found with the set-up? What changes were made in follow-up iterations of the experiment to try and resolve the issues identified or was this a one-off experiment with no follow up?

The MG Bns we’re essentially heavy mortar and HMG companies; the Bns themselves maintained their own CS platoons. Maybe I’m missing your point and your talking about an in addition to and not an instead of ? If it’s the later I’m staunchly against it, if it’s the former I think it’s superfluous.

Definitely an "in addition to" as opposed to an "instead of". I'm simply raising this as a possible solution to the observation by KevinB and others that the nature of modern peer warfare (improved ISR, increased range of hand-held ATGMs, long range precision munitions, etc.) is making the concentration of forces, especially outside of complex terrain, extremely dangerous and is resulting in a much more dispersed deployment of troops.

This then led to some suggestions that due to the greater area each Section may have to cover/defend that longer range band weapons such as additional C6's and ATGMs like the Javelin may need to be pushed down to the section level.

My concern is this. How much can you push down to a 7-soldier dismounted infantry section and expect them to be proficient in the use of all of these assets? Carbine and LMG with Grenade Launcher and Disposable Rockets for the assault. GPMG and Recoilless Rifle for the fire base. Additional GPMG(s) and ATGM in the weapons locker for defence. DMR and UAV for additional support. Throw in a 60mm Mortar as well?

Due to casualties you then need to be able to cover off each member of the Section if they are killed/wounded. Never mind the requirement to perform vehicle maintenance and cover for vehicle crew losses as well.

At what point are we looking more like a SOF team rather than an Infantry Section? By overly centralizing all of our assets and capabilities into a single "standard" force structure are we in effect watering down their effectiveness? In WW2 there were a much wider variety of units, sub-units and attached specialty Battalions/Companies within a Division/Brigade than we have in our current military.

Maybe that's a good thing and a sign that we've improved upon the combined arms structures that they were putting together in WW2. Or maybe it's a sign that peacetime economic constraints have caused us to forget some of the lessons learned in hard combat and we need to rely more on supporting arms rather than developing all-singing, all-dancing, self-sufficient units that can do everything. I don't claim to have the answer to that, but I think it may be a question worth asking.

Not really, we’re doing this now and with respect to the reservist involved it’s simply not a reliable force generator.

In some ways it's understandable that the Reserves can't be a reliable force generator. If the expectation is that the member of an Infantry Section must be capable of their basic infantry tasks as well as being capable of stepping in with a wide variety of additional supporting tasks as noted above then of course a part-timer won't be able to step into that role.

That being said, we better hope that we can find a way to make our Reserves into reliable force generators because if we ever to get involved in a major war our small army will likely get much smaller quite quickly.

 

[daftandbarmy]

That being said, we better hope that we can find a way to make our Reserves into reliable force generators because if we ever to get involved in a major war our small army will likely get much smaller quite quickly.

The Reserves did pretty well at FG for Afghanistan over several years, but it took about a year to get 'the machine' up and running in a way that was fairly reliable as I recall. The supply was, more or less, able to meet the demands of a fairly low intensity conflict.

In the short term, if there's a major war, your immediately available Reserves - those parading in the units right now - would be used up fairly quickly.

The challenge will be to how to keep the 'pipeline of heroes' flowing when the well runs dry after the first few months of a higher intensity conflict.

However, the 100+ year old training infrastructure units suffer with at their old armouries, many of which (unlike the Regular Force facilities which are languishing out of sight/mind in the Canadian Gulag Archipelago) are situated within urban areas representing a large proportion of Canada's population, is a serious handicap and continues to be the lowest priority.

For example I note, at my old unit, they recently spent big bucks installing solar powered lighting in the parking lot. This represents the largest single infrastructure investment and modernization in that facility in over 50 years, maybe longer. Meanwhile, the training facilities continue to occupy their traditional priority in the CAF list e.g., one ancient brick armoury, a large parade square, six licensed establishments/ messes, one small and very bare training room unimproved since the building was constructed in 1915.

 

[markppcli]

Unless you're one of those that believe that hand-held ATGMs have made the tank obsolete the primary anti-tank defence for an Infantry Battalion does depend on the Brigade...in the form of the Armoured Regiment.

Doctrinally untrue; the primary task of an armoured regiment isn’t keeping tanks away from the Infantry. The infantry has its AT weapons for that; to include what ever ATGM is selected in the ALAWS and TOW replacement program. It’d be a poor CO that planned to have A Sqn LDSh effect his KZ.

I'd be very interested in knowing more about this experiment. What form did this AT Company take? Was it formed by drawing away the AT assets from the various Weapon Detachments and grouping them in a centralized Company or was it a new Company added to the ORBAT with personnel and weapons above and beyond the Battalion's standard configuration? What were the major issues that were found with the set-up? What changes were made in follow-up iterations of the experiment to try and resolve the issues identified or was this a one-off experiment with no follow up?

It was all three of the Bns giving up their TOW platoons for form a DFS regiment with an adapts battery and tank Sqn. They stripped the hull of the tow turrets in… 2007? So I doubt much follow up was done. This was in anticipation of the Stryker MGS being bought and some how making the Bn dependant on that regiment for its anti armour defence seemed like a good idea.

Definitely an "in addition to" as opposed to an "instead of".

I’m at a loss for how to make that clearer. Do you mean pull all the weapons dets and group them higher or do you mean additional PYs for this support Bn?

I'm simply raising this as a possible solution to the observation by KevinB and others that the nature of modern peer warfare (improved ISR, increased range of hand-held ATGMs, long range precision munitions, etc.) is making the concentration of forces, especially outside of complex terrain, extremely dangerous and is resulting in a much more dispersed deployment of troops.

This then led to some suggestions that due to the greater area each Section may have to cover/defend that longer range band weapons such as additional C6's and ATGMs like the Javelin may need to be pushed down to the section level.

How does this address that ?

My concern is this. How much can you push down to a 7-soldier dismounted infantry section and expect them to be proficient in the use of all of these assets? Carbine and LMG with Grenade Launcher and Disposable Rockets for the assault. GPMG and Recoilless Rifle for the fire base. Additional GPMG(s) and ATGM in the weapons locker for defence. DMR and UAV for additional support. Throw in a 60mm Mortar as well?

Who’s asking for a section mortar ? I mean the French do it but I didn’t see that suggestion. Maintaining proficiency on a weapon system is an issue, arguably an atgm is actually easier as the simulations are free and the controls that I’ve handled are incredibly intuitive.

Due to casualties you then need to be able to cover off each member of the Section if they are killed/wounded. Never mind the requirement to perform vehicle maintenance and cover for vehicle crew losses as well.

At what point are we looking more like a SOF team rather than an Infantry Section?

A means to project He and a machine gun is hardly what your describing.

By overly centralizing all of our assets and capabilities into a single "standard" force structure are we in effect watering down their effectiveness? In WW2 there were a much wider variety of units, sub-units and attached specialty Battalions/Companies within a Division/Brigade than we have in our current military.

Outside of the MG Bns each Bn had its support platoons under their support company; in the context of this discussion what your saying is broadly untrue. There are fairly minimal organizational changes from ww2 until we cut mortars, tow, and pioneers actually. WW 2 infantry didn’t have a Pl level machine gun, but they did have piags and 2 inch mortars. But I digress and that’s probably deviating. Quite apart from what your suggesting the infantry Bn of 1939 had its mortars, pioneers, and AT platoon and was quite self sufficient.

In some ways it's understandable that the Reserves can't be a reliable force generator. If the expectation is that the member of an Infantry Section must be capable of their basic infantry tasks as well as being capable of stepping in with a wide variety of additional supporting tasks as noted above then of course a part-timer won't be able to step into that role.

And yet they have to focus on a single supporting platoon role now. You’re tracking those support platoons surely?

That being said, we better hope that we can find a way to make our Reserves into reliable force generators because if we ever to get involved in a major war our small army will likely get much smaller quite quickly.

Not really the scope of this discussion but I agree. It’s just going to take an act of parliament to do that.

 

[IKnowNothing]

It was all three of the Bns giving up their TOW platoons for form a DFS regiment with an adapts battery and tank Sqn. They stripped the hull of the tow turrets in… 2007? So I doubt much follow up was done. This was in anticipation of the Stryker MGS being bought and some how making the Bn dependant on that regiment for its anti armour defence seemed like a good idea.

How did it work with 4 CMBG having AT Coy's in place of platoons?

 

[markppcli]

How did it work with 4 CMBG having AT Coy's in place of platoons?

4 CMBG is a fair bit before my time, I’d love to see the orbats from when they had AT Coys if you have it. In another thread, more focused on general changes, I asked about the AT Coy that’s mentioned in the Infantry Bn in Operations and no one had ever served with one integral to the Bn. Lamentably there’s very little documentation of the Cold War Canadian army, but given that my quick searches don’t turn up independent AT companies I would assume they functioned in very similar ways to AT platoons, just larger.

Edit: in retrospect you may have meant the grouping of those platoons into E Company LdSH? This was circa 2004 so 4 CMBG didn’t exist, and I don’t know if 2 or 5 CMBG did similar things or not.

All this aside are we going to get back to sections and platoons ?

 

[FJAG]

I'd be very interested in knowing more about this experiment. What form did this AT Company take? Was it formed by drawing away the AT assets from the various Weapon Detachments and grouping them in a centralized Company or was it a new Company added to the ORBAT with personnel and weapons above and beyond the Battalion's standard configuration? What were the major issues that were found with the set-up? What changes were made in follow-up iterations of the experiment to try and resolve the issues identified or was this a one-off experiment with no follow up?

From CanadianSoldiers

In the autumn of 1964, a brigade anti-tank company armed with ENTAC and SS11 missiles as well as the 106mm recoilless rifle had been formed, stationed at Fort Anne and based on "B" Company of 3rd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment. The company remained in existence until the brigade reorganized in 1970.

The DFS regiment in the early 2000s was a whole different animal.

 

[IKnowNothing]

4 CMBG is a fair bit before my time, I’d love to see the orbats from when they had AT Coys if you have it. In another thread, more focused on general changes, I asked about the AT Coy that’s mentioned in the Infantry Bn in Operations and no one had ever served with one integral to the Bn. Lamentably there’s very little documentation of the Cold War Canadian army, but given that my quick searches don’t turn up independent AT companies I would assume they functioned in very similar ways to AT platoons, just larger.

Edit: in retrospect you may have meant the grouping of those platoons into E Company LdSH? This was circa 2004 so 4 CMBG didn’t exist, and I don’t know if 2 or 5 CMBG did similar things or not.

All this aside are we going to get back to sections and platoons ?

Yeah that's what I'm going off of too.

Re: Sections, and Platoons, I think GR had a good point about needing to know what comes in from above to know what they have to have, the comprehensive layering of effects.
Section / Platoon / Company / Battalion / Bde
AT: M4 CG 84 / Spike SR / NA / Spike LR / NA
Mortar/Grenade : Underslung / AGL / NA / 81mm / NA

Having Spike NLOS / 120mm mortars had Bde, is fairly off topic, but I think addressing the NA at company is meaningful. For the US both Stryker and Light Infantry have a 2 tube 60mm section at coy. Would that make sense for Canada? Similarly, would adding the two car (each with vehicle mount and dismounted ATGM) det like you mention from the Italians round things out?

Re MG, I like the British model with no LMG, optional GPMG that when drawn pivots the section from two fire teams to assault and gun

 

[markppcli]

Yeah that's what I'm going off of too.

Bear in mind this PAM also lays out 4 rifle companies, and that hasn’t been the case since the Second World War so I take it with a grain of salt.

Re: Sections, and Platoons, I think GR had a good point about needing to know what comes in from above to know what they have to have, the comprehensive layering of effects.

I agree I just don’t think we should outsource AT defence or mortars to the Bde. Wholesale at least, NLOS and 120mm not withstanding.

Section / Platoon / Company / Battalion / Bde
AT: M4 CG 84 / Spike SR / NA / Spike LR / NA
Mortar/Grenade : Underslung / AGL / NA / 81mm / NA

Having Spike NLOS / 120mm mortars had Bde, is fairly off topic, but I think addressing the NA at company is meaningful. For the US both Stryker and Light Infantry have a 2 tube 60mm section at coy. Would that make sense for Canada? Similarly, would adding the two car (each with vehicle mount and dismounted ATGM) det like you mention from the Italians round things out?

Theoretically we used to have 3 mortars in every company; I’ve always believed they should be grouped. I’m also a big fan of the Italian company orbat, which I think gives a good spread of capability and stays within its span of control.

Re MG, I like the British model with no LMG, optional GPMG that when drawn pivots the section from two fire teams to assault and gun

Yeah my understanding is the GPMG is habitually drawn by the light infantry and habitually left in the warrior by the mechanized.

 

[FJAG]

I'd be very interested in knowing more about this experiment. What form did this AT Company take? Was it formed by drawing away the AT assets from the various Weapon Detachments and grouping them in a centralized Company or was it a new Company added to the ORBAT with personnel and weapons above and beyond the Battalion's standard configuration? What were the major issues that were found with the set-up? What changes were made in follow-up iterations of the experiment to try and resolve the issues identified or was this a one-off experiment with no follow up?

To follow on. In the early 2000s when it was decided to remodel the Army away from its Cold War structure it was also decided that tanks would be eliminated as, amongst other things, they were not capable of rapid air deployment.

The solution was to create a regiment with three elements. The LdSH was chosen as the testbed unit.

Its first element was to be the then armoured corps' new M1128 MGS, with a 105 mm gun. The MGS was never a good vehicle but was an initiative favoured by Hillier. We ordered 66 but cancelled the contract for various reasons and ended up with Leo 2s because of Afghanistan. Incidentally the US Army took the MGS out of its Stryker battalions but kept a few for the Stryker cavalry squadron. Recently it decided to divest all MGS.

The second element was the infantry's TOW Under Armour. This took our TOW systems and put it onto a LAV3 with a specialized turret.

We built 33 of those but after the project fell apart, the turrets were ripped out and they were reconverted to section carriers.

The third component was the artillery's ADATS, the dual anti-air and anti-tank capable system.

We had some 36 of these and the plan was to transfer the weapon suite onto a LAV chassis under the Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle project which was also shelved once the whole sorry mess fell apart with the acquisition of the Leo 2.

A number of test exercises were held by the LdSH (employing Leo 1s in lieu of the MGS) and in fact in 2004/5 the ADATS of 4 AD Regt fired many more missiles in the anti-tank role then in its anti-air role.

I've never actually seen an organizational structure of the proposed DFS unit but based on the number of units (and setting aside spares and training systems) there would appear to be enough for 3 or 4 sqn/company sized subunits. Since at the time we were very much turning to battlegroup centric organizations, I would suspect that a battlegroup would be allocated a DFS squadron made up of composite MGS/TOW UA/ADATS troops. Some of our veteran armoured members might be able to offer some additional details on the trial organization and tactics of the DFS unit/subunit.

Concurrently we were experimenting with ISTAR as both an entity and a concept to amalgamate and concentrate all the various ISTAR elements (such as reconnaissance and artillery target acquisition etc) within a brigade. At one point we did have a trial ISTAR company. That too went by the wayside in the mid 00s as ISTAR being developed thereafter in favour of a process and not a specific unit/subunit.

Sorry from the divergence from the main topic.

 

[Infanteer]

Bde/Bn AT capability could use it's own thread, but to wit:

• First introduction of AT missiles in the Canadian Army resulted in the ENTAC experiment with 3 R22eR in the 1960s. I believe the intent was to turn this into an AT Bn, but was eventually abandoned. Have to dig through War Without Battles to find the details again.
• Inf Bn in the 1970s/1980s were doctrinally slated to have an Anti-Tank company, which was to have 4xPls of 3 Sections (2x TOW each) for a total of 24 TOW systems for the Bn. I'm almost positive this never manifested itself practically, and was only a doctrine fairy. See our pitifully outdated Infantry Battalion in Battle manual, which references this.
• The E Sqn experiment in the LdSH(RC), which saw all the AT Pls combined into a single Squadron, was supposed to be the first step in converting the LdSH(RC) into a DFS Regiment. It was to feature an Sqn of TOW, a Sqn of MGS (105mm gun) and a Sqn of MMEV (ADATS mounted on LAV chassis). This was the sop concept to have "light deployable armour" once the Leopards 1s were shelved, except that the LAV chassis was not deployable by C-130, which undermined the whole concept.

but I think addressing the NA at company is meaningful.

Why does the Company need a separate system then the platoon or nothing? Why is a separate system needed at each echelon?

 

[FJAG]

I agree I just don’t think we should outsource AT defence or mortars to the Bde. Wholesale at least, NLOS and 120mm not withstanding.

Unsurprisingly, I both agree and disagree with you.

I'm fully in favour of anti-armour resources being within the battalion, layered from the section to the battalion.

OTOH we now have the ability to have anti-armour resources at the brigade level by way of a further layer (namely artillery and loitering munitions) that can and should reach deeper to support the screen/guard battle and to concentrate additional firepower in critical brigade sectors.

The ability to have NLOS launchable precision weapons, from mortars, guns or their own launcher systems providing an ability to destroy and degrade attacking armour forces all the way from the deep right up to the rifleman's slit trench. Its best analogy is to air defence which is a system that employs multiple layers of coverage. We need to get away from the concept that the anti-armour battle is a direct fire event and see it as a whole of force one coordinated through the various FSCCs at each level.

 

[markppcli]

Why does the Company need a separate system then the platoon or nothing? Why is a separate system needed at each echelon?

To my mind ATGMs are more effective if their in a dedicated team, with their own vehicle that can carry enough reloads for them to shift positions a couple times. They should also be independent enough to move to their overwatch positions. To me that means company level at a minimum.

 

[Kirkhill]

Robots and remotes

 

[SeaKingTacco]

4 CMBG is a fair bit before my time, I’d love to see the orbats from when they had AT Coys if you have it. In another thread, more focused on general changes, I asked about the AT Coy that’s mentioned in the Infantry Bn in Operations and no one had ever served with one integral to the Bn. Lamentably there’s very little documentation of the Cold War Canadian army, but given that my quick searches don’t turn up independent AT companies I would assume they functioned in very similar ways to AT platoons, just larger.

Edit: in retrospect you may have meant the grouping of those platoons into E Company LdSH? This was circa 2004 so 4 CMBG didn’t exist, and I don’t know if 2 or 5 CMBG did similar things or not.

All this aside are we going to get back to sections and platoons ?

It is not before my time.

My recollection was that, circa 1989-90, there was no 4 CMBG Bde Anti-armour Coy. Each of the two Infantry Bns did have an anti-armour platoon of 18 TUA systems, each. so 36 for the Brigade.

The anti-armour plan was a Brigade level plan (I know, because I actually saw the war plans and the traces), so both anti-armour platoons were employed on brigade tasks- generally understood to be within the boundaries of their parent Battalions, but sections could be tasked away for other missions, as required.

By today’s standard, the frontage of 4 CMBG was shockingly small. We would have been tripping over each other if it had ever gotten hot in germany.

 

[Blackadder1916]

4 CMBG is a fair bit before my time, I’d love to see the orbats from when they had AT Coys if you have it. In another thread, more focused on general changes, I asked about the AT Coy that’s mentioned in the Infantry Bn in Operations and no one had ever served with one integral to the Bn. Lamentably there’s very little documentation of the Cold War Canadian army, but given that my quick searches don’t turn up independent AT companies I would assume they functioned in very similar ways to AT platoons, just larger.

Edit: in retrospect you may have meant the grouping of those platoons into E Company LdSH? This was circa 2004 so 4 CMBG didn’t exist, and I don’t know if 2 or 5 CMBG did similar things or not.

All this aside are we going to get back to sections and platoons ?

If one hangs around here long enough discussion of a subject is repeated and faint memory of something someone posted years ago leads to resurrection.

In the early sixties the Canadian army did a serious anti-tank study involving its tactics and doctrine board, the war gamers and a full scale FTX in Gagetown named "Tribulation" if I recall correctly. At several stages in the exercise we were ordered to stand fast and Lancasters flew over and photographed the exercise area so it could be war gamed. The decision was taken to convert 3 R22R to an anti-tank battalion and one of it companies, B I think, was posted to 4CIBG as the brigade anti-tank company. It had three platoons of mixed 106mm RR and Entac ATGM (four of each per platoon I think) and one platoon of SS11 ATGM. The Entac had a range of about 2000m while the SS11 could reach out to about 3km. The battalions had a section of 106mm in each of its four companies and an anti-tank platoon of another four RRs. The 106s and Entacs were jeep mounted while the SS11s were originally mounted on 3/4s, but this eventually was changed to M113s. If my recollection is correct, 4 CIBG had 48 106mm, 12 Entac and 15 SS11 anti-tank weapons, plus the armoured regiment.

Edited to add: The example for the anti-tank battalion probably was the Second World War anti-tank regiment which was a gunner organization. I recall before the exercise we had a brigade officer training session on coordinated anti-tank defence. One of the presenations was by a BC in 1 RCHA who had been a troop commander in an anti-tank regiment during the war.

In the early sixties the Canadian Army was very, very concerned about the Warsaw Pact's preponderance in armour and undertook a major re-organization. In 1963 in Gagetown the 3 CIBG exercise included an anti-tank trial with a brigade anti-tank company. (I believe the exercise was titled Tribulation. The pace was hectic and periodically we would receive a stand fast. At these points RCAF Lancaster photo reconnaissance aircraft would photograph the exercise area for use by the Op Research folks in AHQ.) It was determined that a brigade anti-tank company was the best available solution. Out of this came a decision to convert 3 R22R to an anti-tank battalion and Cie B was stationed in Fort Anne near Werl in the 4 CIBG area. The company had four platoons, three of which were mixed 106mm and Entac ATGM, while the fourth platoon had 15 SS11s. These were originally mounted on 3/4 ton trucks, but eventually received M113A1 modified as launcher vehicles.

 

[KevinB]

To my mind ATGMs are more effective if their in a dedicated team, with their own vehicle that can carry enough reloads for them to shift positions a couple times. They should also be independent enough to move to their overwatch positions. To me that means company level at a minimum.

I’m curious if that is just a TOW’ism coloring your view?

I’m also thinking part of this occurs because Canada doesn’t have an AT attack helicopter option and no ATGM integral to the IFV’s