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I try not to "google', and I had the material somewhere but could not find it. 
You have the floor Sir
geo said:
You have the floor Sir
Question of the Hour
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I figure you and a couple of the others would in fact have the information either at hand or in mind. I just hate 'wicki' and we have an excellent case in point. As for google I have been playing around with the "scholarly article" feature and it seems to narrow the amount of hits and eliminates allot of the unsubstantiated.
Back to the task at hand.
Which was the greater defeat for Germany on the Eastern Front ? The Battle of Stalingrad in 1942/43 or the collapse of Army Group Center in June 1944.
Back to the task at hand.
Which was the greater defeat for Germany on the Eastern Front ? The Battle of Stalingrad in 1942/43 or the collapse of Army Group Center in June 1944.
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Operation BAGRATION, which commenced on 22 June 1944 (3 years to the day after BARBAROSSA) was the greatest defeat of the Wehrmacht anywhere in the war. I don't have the figures, but the Soviets employed "MASKIROVKA" (deception) to such an extent that the Germans felt that the North was not going to be the point of attack for the Soviets: they thought that they were going to keep pressing in the south.3rd Herd said:
After URANUS, SATURN and so forth in 1943, the Soviets were over extended and suffered much greater losses than the Germans suffered (and inflicted) around STALINGRAD. von Manstein had mounted his "back hand blow" and retook KHARKOV in the third battle named for that city. After his "Back hand Blow", the Germans were still able to mount offensive operations, though blew it after CITADEL that summer.
(All this is from the depths of my head: I am not looking this up). So, in terms of effects following both battles, the Germans were much better off and suffered less at STALINGRAD than they after BAGRATION, which took the Soviets to the banks of the VISTULA, and not only caused the collapse of Army Group Centre, but it's destruction as a fighting force.
There, that's my stab at it.
How'd I do?
exspy
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I agree, the collapse of Army Group Centre was the greater defeat for the German Army whether or not one measures it in number of troops lost, the effect of the loss on the morale of the troops or for the devastating pall it cast upon the home front.
Up until the end of 1942, at the height of the Battle for Stalingrad, the Germans were still winning the war. For example, although Montgomery defeated Rommel at El Alamein in October of that year, no one on either side was under any illusion that this alone was going to tip the course of the war in the west in the allies favour. Likewise, even after Stalingrad with its hundreds of thousands of German casualties, it was perceived that the loss occurred at the tip of the German spear deep inside Russia. A spear which was still very sharp. The Russian Army still had a long way to go to recover all of its lost territory and the Germany army, while battered and bruised, still had the resources to continue battling the Russians for years to come.
While in hindsight it can be seen that this period of late 1942 early 1943 (El Alamein and Stalingrad) was in fact the turning point in the war, neither side was prepared to end the fighting with so much left to fight with.
By 1944 the perception of the possibility of victory had changed for the German soldier. The loss of Army Group Centre coupled with the collapse of Army Groups B and G in the western theatre were now a part of a pattern of inevitable destruction. The homeland was under constant air attack, the Italians were out of the war and the allies (after Casablanca) had agreed to accept nothing less than unconditional surrender. This ruled out any chance of Germany (with or without Hitler) making peace with the western allies alone and leaving the Russians out.
Both the eastern and western fronts were close to falling back onto the German borders, and the resources in men and materiel to continue fighting the war were all but exhausted.
So, looking at the collapse of Army Group Centre from the perspective of lost resources, the loss of troop morale and the irreversible negative effect it would have in Germany, it was the greater loss.
Up until the end of 1942, at the height of the Battle for Stalingrad, the Germans were still winning the war. For example, although Montgomery defeated Rommel at El Alamein in October of that year, no one on either side was under any illusion that this alone was going to tip the course of the war in the west in the allies favour. Likewise, even after Stalingrad with its hundreds of thousands of German casualties, it was perceived that the loss occurred at the tip of the German spear deep inside Russia. A spear which was still very sharp. The Russian Army still had a long way to go to recover all of its lost territory and the Germany army, while battered and bruised, still had the resources to continue battling the Russians for years to come.
While in hindsight it can be seen that this period of late 1942 early 1943 (El Alamein and Stalingrad) was in fact the turning point in the war, neither side was prepared to end the fighting with so much left to fight with.
By 1944 the perception of the possibility of victory had changed for the German soldier. The loss of Army Group Centre coupled with the collapse of Army Groups B and G in the western theatre were now a part of a pattern of inevitable destruction. The homeland was under constant air attack, the Italians were out of the war and the allies (after Casablanca) had agreed to accept nothing less than unconditional surrender. This ruled out any chance of Germany (with or without Hitler) making peace with the western allies alone and leaving the Russians out.
Both the eastern and western fronts were close to falling back onto the German borders, and the resources in men and materiel to continue fighting the war were all but exhausted.
So, looking at the collapse of Army Group Centre from the perspective of lost resources, the loss of troop morale and the irreversible negative effect it would have in Germany, it was the greater loss.
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The first main offensive in a series that Stalin planned for the summer of '44 was intended to bring about the destruction of Army Group center and the liberation of Belorussia, the last area of the Soviet Union under German occupation. it removed nearly 30 Divisions from the German Order of Battle.
The main difference between it and Stalingrad as brought up was that after Stalingrad germany still had the manpower and resources to maintain the initiative. But after the debacle of Kursk, and the losses of the summer of '44, combined with theincreasing drain of manpower and materiel in the west meant that the end for Germany drew inexorably nearer.
The main difference between it and Stalingrad as brought up was that after Stalingrad germany still had the manpower and resources to maintain the initiative. But after the debacle of Kursk, and the losses of the summer of '44, combined with theincreasing drain of manpower and materiel in the west meant that the end for Germany drew inexorably nearer.
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Excellent answers,
I tossed this question into the thread to get away from the usual google/wicki hunt. What I was looking for was more of a justification of an answer than a quick hit a couple of keys. Yes, I tend to agree with the posted answers that the collapse of army group center was a greater defeat. Yet until recently most historians and the general public at large would firmly state the Battle of Stalingrad was more decisive. Partly, because it has received more 'press' than other battles in this area of conflict. Both Paul Adair, in Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 and in Robin Cross's The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 point out that up until early/mid 1943 the German General staff, ie. von Manstein still had somewhat of an operational control. Hence his victory in reducing the Soviet gains. As Cross points out at this time the Soviets were flush with 'victory fever' and the reassembling of German panzer forces was not a full blown retreat but the preparation of a counter offensive. After the initial success of this operation, Hitler proclaimed himself "C of C" of the German army. The result Kharkov taken by direct assult rather than surrounded. Which in turn led to the escaping of large amounts of Soviet forces from the 'bag". This in turn led to the Battle of Kursk.
Next question:
Three faults that contributed to the massive losses of a superior armored vehicle against a lesser on the eastern front. In this you can read in T-34/76 and the German Panzer III and IV.
I tossed this question into the thread to get away from the usual google/wicki hunt. What I was looking for was more of a justification of an answer than a quick hit a couple of keys. Yes, I tend to agree with the posted answers that the collapse of army group center was a greater defeat. Yet until recently most historians and the general public at large would firmly state the Battle of Stalingrad was more decisive. Partly, because it has received more 'press' than other battles in this area of conflict. Both Paul Adair, in Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 and in Robin Cross's The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 point out that up until early/mid 1943 the German General staff, ie. von Manstein still had somewhat of an operational control. Hence his victory in reducing the Soviet gains. As Cross points out at this time the Soviets were flush with 'victory fever' and the reassembling of German panzer forces was not a full blown retreat but the preparation of a counter offensive. After the initial success of this operation, Hitler proclaimed himself "C of C" of the German army. The result Kharkov taken by direct assult rather than surrounded. Which in turn led to the escaping of large amounts of Soviet forces from the 'bag". This in turn led to the Battle of Kursk.
Next question:
Three faults that contributed to the massive losses of a superior armored vehicle against a lesser on the eastern front. In this you can read in T-34/76 and the German Panzer III and IV.
foresterab
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Well...I only have two comments on the reasons for the disparity in losses vs. accepted quality.
The German Army using it's less suitable Panzer MkIII's and IV's was in part able to inflict a large kill/loss ratio upon Russian T-34 tanks due to it's ability to recover and repair damaged vehicles. While German tanks were damaged often the supporting logitics train allowed for the return of these damaged units sometimes in a matter of hours...Russian tanks however were usually left to the battlefield where they lay and potentially only recovered after the Russian armies captured the ground. Given the large numbers captured in the German advances in 1942/1943 and the larger battles of 1944 (Kursk for example) where German tanks entered the battle, were damaged, repaired, entered the battle, damaged, repaired....
Secondly is the concept of combined arms. The german army tended to intergrate mechanized and non-mechanized troops to a much higher degree than the Russian Army (at least during the first few years of battles). This meant that infantry where able to contribute a much higher kill ratio on Russian Tanks than the indepent Russian armoured or infantry formations where able to achieve upon German tanks. As the Russian Army gained the experience and numbers required to counteract the German forces this advantage was reduced but still remained an integral part of both nations tactics. Of interest is the number of mechanized german forces that fought as infantry when lacking vehicles (often for base defense or logistic center defense) which in my opinion allowed for a better understanding of the mechanized/infantry roles.
Will have to return to the libary to find the book I'm basing many of these comments on.
The German Army using it's less suitable Panzer MkIII's and IV's was in part able to inflict a large kill/loss ratio upon Russian T-34 tanks due to it's ability to recover and repair damaged vehicles. While German tanks were damaged often the supporting logitics train allowed for the return of these damaged units sometimes in a matter of hours...Russian tanks however were usually left to the battlefield where they lay and potentially only recovered after the Russian armies captured the ground. Given the large numbers captured in the German advances in 1942/1943 and the larger battles of 1944 (Kursk for example) where German tanks entered the battle, were damaged, repaired, entered the battle, damaged, repaired....
Secondly is the concept of combined arms. The german army tended to intergrate mechanized and non-mechanized troops to a much higher degree than the Russian Army (at least during the first few years of battles). This meant that infantry where able to contribute a much higher kill ratio on Russian Tanks than the indepent Russian armoured or infantry formations where able to achieve upon German tanks. As the Russian Army gained the experience and numbers required to counteract the German forces this advantage was reduced but still remained an integral part of both nations tactics. Of interest is the number of mechanized german forces that fought as infantry when lacking vehicles (often for base defense or logistic center defense) which in my opinion allowed for a better understanding of the mechanized/infantry roles.
Will have to return to the libary to find the book I'm basing many of these comments on.
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Pz II & IVs.... VS the T34s
German armour were mechanical marvels. But real monsters to maintain in the field.
The 3s and 4s with their boxy silhouette VS the T34s sloped armour.
The germans built their AFVs to last for years VS the russians, like the americans, didn't & utilised their manufacturing capacity to overwhelm their opponents.
The Panther first saw action at Kursk on July 5, 1943. Early tanks were plagued with mechanical problems: the track and suspension often broke, and the engine was dangerously prone to overheating and bursting into flames. Initially, more Panthers were disabled by their own failings than by enemy action. For example, the XLVIII Panzer Corps reported on July 10, 1943, that they had 38 Panthers operational and 131 awaiting repair, out of about 200 they had started with on July 5.
German armour were mechanical marvels. But real monsters to maintain in the field.
The 3s and 4s with their boxy silhouette VS the T34s sloped armour.
The germans built their AFVs to last for years VS the russians, like the americans, didn't & utilised their manufacturing capacity to overwhelm their opponents.
The Panther first saw action at Kursk on July 5, 1943. Early tanks were plagued with mechanical problems: the track and suspension often broke, and the engine was dangerously prone to overheating and bursting into flames. Initially, more Panthers were disabled by their own failings than by enemy action. For example, the XLVIII Panzer Corps reported on July 10, 1943, that they had 38 Panthers operational and 131 awaiting repair, out of about 200 they had started with on July 5.
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So, basically seeking three faults that lead to the massive losses of a superior armored vehicle against a lesser on the eastern front. In this you can read in T-34/76 and the German Panzer III and IV.
First has been identified, I believe, in the German recovery of "knocked out" vehicles. In many cases, the hulk just needed to be towed back, gone into with a garden hose and a garbage bag, fixed the odd component, and then crewed with fresh Teutons. The Soviets were not so good at this, as stated.
Next, I would say, would be leadership. The germans had radios in virtually all, if not literally all, of their tanks. Even though the inferior 37mm and 50 mm tank guns were barely able to kill the T-34s, the Germans would be able to take that out of the equation and simply bypass them, use AT assets to deal with the tanks, whatever. (I think that this is similar to combined arms, but is manifested by superior command/leadership)
Finally, an aspect of command, Auftragstaktik, or "Mission Command". Using the flexibility inherent in the German command system, they were able to slip away from the Soviet Schwerpunkt and focus instead on cutting the logistical tail of the Soviet armour. That and the ability to destroy tanks using men.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STQHH_hJlhM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bb7SixS9PAw&mode=related&search=
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQiQO2kOcwI
(Enjoy the clips)
First has been identified, I believe, in the German recovery of "knocked out" vehicles. In many cases, the hulk just needed to be towed back, gone into with a garden hose and a garbage bag, fixed the odd component, and then crewed with fresh Teutons. The Soviets were not so good at this, as stated.
Next, I would say, would be leadership. The germans had radios in virtually all, if not literally all, of their tanks. Even though the inferior 37mm and 50 mm tank guns were barely able to kill the T-34s, the Germans would be able to take that out of the equation and simply bypass them, use AT assets to deal with the tanks, whatever. (I think that this is similar to combined arms, but is manifested by superior command/leadership)
Finally, an aspect of command, Auftragstaktik, or "Mission Command". Using the flexibility inherent in the German command system, they were able to slip away from the Soviet Schwerpunkt and focus instead on cutting the logistical tail of the Soviet armour. That and the ability to destroy tanks using men.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STQHH_hJlhM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bb7SixS9PAw&mode=related&search=
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQiQO2kOcwI
(Enjoy the clips)
foresterab
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Found the book I was thinking of..
Anvil of War: German Leadership in Defense on the Eastern Front.
http://www.amazon.ca/Anvil-War-Generalship-Defense-Eastern/dp/1853671819/ref=sr_1_2/702-1988546-8078444?ie=UTF8&s=books
Very interesting read from the perspective of tactics when facing a larger foe.
Anvil of War: German Leadership in Defense on the Eastern Front.
http://www.amazon.ca/Anvil-War-Generalship-Defense-Eastern/dp/1853671819/ref=sr_1_2/702-1988546-8078444?ie=UTF8&s=books
Very interesting read from the perspective of tactics when facing a larger foe.
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As usual excellent answer for a debate;
I threw the question out based on Robin Cross's book. The T-34 although a superior vehicle had limitations; no internal radios until later,the crew commander fighting the tank and the battle at the same time, seating which did not rotate with the turret causing the crew to become gymnastics, and the storage of ammunition in the floor resulting in delay of fire while sections of the floor were removed to access ammunition.
Next Question:
What was the "Animal Killer". Name three animals it killed.
I threw the question out based on Robin Cross's book. The T-34 although a superior vehicle had limitations; no internal radios until later,the crew commander fighting the tank and the battle at the same time, seating which did not rotate with the turret causing the crew to become gymnastics, and the storage of ammunition in the floor resulting in delay of fire while sections of the floor were removed to access ammunition.
Next Question:
What was the "Animal Killer". Name three animals it killed.
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On the Siberian front
......Concerned at a possible threat to the Trans-Siberian Railway occasioned by these expanded hostilities, the Soviet Defence Ministry dispatched to the sector its ablest commander, Lieutenant-General Georgi Zhukov, later a Marshal of the USSR and Stalin's most renowned commander in the German war. Zhukov arrived in June 1939. He arrived to find that the Kwantung Army had secured some vital high ground and quickly concluded his need for.......
http://zhukov.mitsi.com/Russo.htm
......Concerned at a possible threat to the Trans-Siberian Railway occasioned by these expanded hostilities, the Soviet Defence Ministry dispatched to the sector its ablest commander, Lieutenant-General Georgi Zhukov, later a Marshal of the USSR and Stalin's most renowned commander in the German war. Zhukov arrived in June 1939. He arrived to find that the Kwantung Army had secured some vital high ground and quickly concluded his need for.......
http://zhukov.mitsi.com/Russo.htm
exspy
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3rd,
You're original question was OK. I thought maybe you were referring to the husband and wife 'illegals' who were deported from Canada for spying on behalf of the Russians well after the break-up of the old Soviet Union. To my embarrassment I cannot think of who you mean.
You're original question was OK. I thought maybe you were referring to the husband and wife 'illegals' who were deported from Canada for spying on behalf of the Russians well after the break-up of the old Soviet Union. To my embarrassment I cannot think of who you mean.
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