Progress in the Army

[Kat Stevens]

Which is very true, but I think what he was trying to show is that there are life-long Captains who do great jobs also but someone with no military knowledge reading most of this thread would think they were the disease of the army.

I once had a fresh out of the box Troop Comd say to me after my CD presentation, "12 years in and still a Cpl? What's the matter with you?"  I replied " Talk to me when you get your CD, sir." Saluted, did a smart about turn and marched away.  On parade 9 years later,, the same officer slouched out like a sack full of hammers to receive his CD, a Captain.  Couldn't resist a parting shot across his bow.. "12 years in and still a Captain, eh, sir?....."  guess the rest....
  Not relevant to the topic, I know....

Kat

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

sweet!

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

AMajoor,

Perhaps we could design a set of JCATs scenarios to put a Lt or junior Captain through his paces.  I'd be reluctant, however, to base promotion on success or failure at the scenarios.  They are a lot of folks out there who excell at computer games but who would be absolute disasters as field commanders!

A scenario similar to the one I described (the square combat team with three "players" from different arms) would be a useful primer for Lieutenants to take before becoming Captains.  My aim, however, would be to demonstrate the value and application of combined arms as opposed to weeding out people. 

My thought is that if we base promotion on success or failure in simulations we will end up with an officer corps that avoids risk and learns to jump through prescribed hoops. 

Cheers,

2B

 

[Edward Campbell]

...

My thought is that if we base promotion on success or failure in simulations we will end up with an officer corps that avoids risk and learns to jump through prescribed hoops. 
...

That was, I think, one of the major objections to written tactics examinations and to the carefully constructed Part 2 TEWTs - too much regurgitating of the principles laid out in the manuals, nothing to indicate that the candidate (for promotion) could think or lead.

Full circle?

 

[Haggis]

Perhaps we could design a set of JCATs scenarios to put a Lt or junior Captain through his paces.   I'd be reluctant, however, to base promotion on success or failure at the scenarios.   They are a lot of folks out there who excell at computer games but who would be absolute disasters as field commanders!

Agreed.

Have 'em do it in JCATS until they get it right.  Then strap a ruck on 'em and have them do it for real as a "hard assessment"

Once done, the results must be reported objectively and in detail.  This is how some marginal leaders at all levels slip throughn the net.  Documenting success is easy and it makes the reporting officer (for lack of a better term) look good.  Documenting failure is more difficult and more politically damaging to all involved.

One way to approach writing the assesment is to ask yourself "would I want this person leading my troops.... or me?"

 

[a_majoor]

Haggis is quite correct that there are no substitutes for hard assessments in the field, and perhaps I have been very unclear in my posts as well. Multi factored simulation exercises seem to be a fairly simple and flexable way of finding out if the person under evaluation knows his stuff. Arranging twelve company level "Urban Ops" missions in a three year period like LCol Kilcullen was able to do (as described in "Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat" Australian Army Journal Vol 1 No 1 pg. 29-39) would be very difficult to pull off, and of course only evaluates the commanders and troops in Urban Ops conditions.

With simulation you can do this many times, imput different terrain and climactic variables, have "Red Teams" to simulate the PLA, Al Qaeda, the Martians, the Marines or what ever sort of opponent is thought to be most important. By playing around with the variables, candidates can be evaluated in terms of application of knowledge rather than their ability to "game" a particular simulation system. Spreading out a series of evaluations over the candidate's posting should allow the examiner/evaluating officer to see a progression as time goes by. (A candidate who flames out three years in a row might have some issues affecting their ability to lead at the next higher level). What I would suggest is using simulation exercises in conjunction with FTX and perhaps written examinations (unless you can do Mil Law with J-CATS  ) in order to evaluate the candidate in his application of knowledge in the art of war. Putting everything on a single "pass/fail" simulation is unfair, and will lead to the type of risk adverse behavior that you are rightfully concerned about.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I said it earlier, but junior officers today are indeed put through some "hard assessments" in the form of BTEs, night live exercises and operational deployments.  I think that OCs and COs have ample opportunity to judge the abilities of their junior officers in trying circumstances and I think that they do so.  We also have  "observer/controllers" on exercises to provide some outside looks (I've been on both sides of that one).

PERs are certainly an interesting subject.  Honesty should, hopefully, be the norm.  We do tend to be reluctant to slam people in PERs, but one can also be "damned with faint praise."   Mistakes should not be hidden, but neither should they be automatically career-ending.

If anything, this discusion is forcing me to have another look at our new officer professional development system.  It was changing so often in the last few years (I did the "old" OPDP) that I lost track of just what new officers must do!

Cheers,

Iain Clark

p.s. LCol English mentions the sytem of regimental godfathers and regimental Mafioso WRT promotions in Lament for an Army.  Exams on staff data and the conduct of a TEWT on their own will not, in my opinion, slay those particular dragons.  Do we need checks on the Regimental System?  If so, what would be the most suitable kind of checks?  I would argue that the problems in the 90s that prompted the book were of an ethical as opposed to tactical nature.