PERs : All issues questions...2003-2019

[DELTADOG13]

Todays infanteers( not infantryman ) are not as physically toughened or prepared for the rigours of a soldiers life in the frontlines. Be it on Op Apollo's mountains or Op Athena's festering back alleys. Todays troops need to get back to the basics.........................................Marksmanship, Physical fitness and Battlecraft. In my opinion these basics have been lost on our leadership for more high speed, low drag training such as OBUA(Ops in Built up Areas), Amphibious and the like. In my short career up the NCO ladder I've seen the physical fitness standards lowered, shooting being a burden to training and field training at the Platoon and Section level being paid only lip service. This army needs to wake up and smell the rotting decay of the Infantry Corps before it is gone. I've watched the best and brightess leave because they are not challenged anymore. My first years were filled with excellent training exercises and activities that challenged and excited the soldiers and leaders to accomplish. Now I don't know. We need to get back to the basics at our units and really put stock in our low level training. " Hard trained sections are the building blocks of an army, without a well trained section an army is just a group of civilians in uniform "
Also we need to start cleaning out the TC's of the old generation of NCO's and bring in the newer generation of experienced NCO's with vision and keeness to tackle this scenario. Just another NCO's opinion on this state of affairs we call our army. Pro Patria

 

[PJ D-Dog]

To add to this, as I stated earlier, with the current crises of lack of NCOs, it seems to me that the chain of command is more likely to pull someone off the street to be an officer than accept a CFR.

I can relate to this entirely.  As a militia MCpl, I applied for the CFR program and was denied on the basis that "I did not have enough experience at the gun(105 mm) level to become an effective officer".  I had spent most of my time in the regiment in the command post.  Instead, the individual who was selected, was female, less than a year in the artillery and only a private but was attending university.  I protested the decision and warned everyone that she would not be in the unit for more than another year.  She worked for me directly and I knew what her intentions were.  Needless to say, she quit after a year and never completed the phase 3 arty.  I, on the other hand, was still with the unit.  My battery commander told me point blank that I was not selected due to being a man.  It was more politically correct to send the females off.  I bit the bullet but never again applied to become "one of them".

There is a general sense in the officer world in the CF that, if an officer cadet has been in the ranks for too long prior to commissioning, then there is a confusion in his loyalty.  While enlisted, he needs to be loyal to the enlisted side of the house.  Once commissioned, he needs to be loyal to other officers.  That is why, in my opinion, they would rather take a civilian off the street and turn him into an officer with zero prior military experience.

The best officers I met in the CF had been corporals before going to the dark side.  They had an understanding of what it was like to be enlisted and what needs to happen to get the job done on the ground.  In the Marine Corps, we believe in a philosophy of "growing our own".  We like to take prior enlisted and turn them into officers.  We call them Mustangs.  They make the best officers because they know what it is like to be a PFC or a Lance Corporal.

There is a definit need for the MCpl rank.  That is the link between the Sr NCOs and the rest of the enlisted.  As for the DAPs program.  I was a product of DAP but I spent a year as a Cpl before getting promoted.  The last MCpl to be promoted before me had been a Cpl for roughly two months.  He was a qualified disaster.  He was extremely technically knowledgeable but had not leadership ability.  Everyone hated him and demanded that we respect him because he was a MCpl.  Our unit was suffering from the lack of Jr NCO void and selected him because he had his head up the Troop Commander's ass.  Years later, after we both became Sgts, he was forced out because we made life hard on him.  I had a personal hand in making sure his rear end got chewed by the RSM.

Many of the other DAPed MCPls that I knew at other units suffered from the same things:  lack of maturity and lack of leadership but all technically proficient.

Instead of the DAPs program, the CF should just have merritorious promotions to all junior enlisted ranks.  They should be made to compete after meeting basic elegibility criteria.  The competitions could be held based on knowledge, leadership etc.  There could even be a period of observation where the competing members are placed in similar leadership positions and evaluated one against the other.  Food for thought.

PJ D-Dog

 

[ZipperHead]

Good post PJ D-Dog. I agree with you on your opinion on the issue of commisioning from the ranks:

There is a general sense in the officer world in the CF that, if an officer cadet has been in the ranks for too long prior to commissioning, then there is a confusion in his loyalty.  While enlisted, he needs to be loyal to the enlisted side of the house.  Once commissioned, he needs to be loyal to other officers.  That is why, in my opinion, they would rather take a civilian off the street and turn him into an officer with zero prior military experience.

The problem, of course, is that it is misguided loyalty: the only loyalty should be to the CF, and the people of Canada, our employers. Officers and NCO's have a duty to serve the CF and the people of Canada, and to ensure that the needs of our soldiers are looked after. Unfortunately, at all rank levels, the needs of the individual usually win out over the people they command. Careerism is too rampant. Rocking the boat is frowned upon, and it is beaten into people at the beginning of their career. This is where I can see that "they" would prefer to start with a blank canvas: a young impressionable OCdt (or Pte or Cpl to be molded into a MCpl) and mold them into what they want: someone who will do what they are told, without the worry of their "protege" questioning whether what they are told to do is right: just do it. While that is somewhat what the military is about (following orders), I think the ability to know when to disobey an order, and complete the mission in the interest of our employer (the CF and the people of Canada) is more important. There is nothing worse than the prospect of people blindly following orders (Nazi Germany ring any bells? "Why did you assist with the Final Solution?" "Ve vere just following orders!!!"). While I have faith that the CF would never undertake anything near as repulsive as that, the thought of people having more interest in their own careers, or just to look after themselves and their cronies is equally repugnant.

I have seen a few soldiers go forward and do UTPNCM or CFR. Some turned out to be decent enough officers, some very good. Some however....... Let's just say that the lower the rank (or rather the less amount of real experience in the ranks) didn't translate into making a superior quality officer. Some probably wouldn't have ever made it past Cpl.... or Pte for that matter.

Having said that, I would rather see an officer class that has come up from the ranks, so that there is a greater appreciation for what it means to be a "soldier": the shit jobs, the long boring routines, the frustration of watching people who are clearly out of their element be in charge of them (and possibly endanger their lives in battle). Face it: the amount of time that officers spend doing field time, the "grunt work", etc on Phase trg is next to nothing compared to what a Pte would do in their 3 years in a unit, let alone a Cpl or MCpl (or higher). During the first few years of a soldiers career, they learn a lot about the basics, and start to pick up from their superiors, for better or worse, different styles of leadership and dealing with problems. This is where they should look to form the offier corps: a soldier who can perform well, deal with stress, has the ability to perform basic problem solving, using initiative, following orders, etc. I think the current method of plucking people from high school (based on academics), pushing them through BOTC, giving them 4 (or more) years of free education, CAP( the old Ph 2), DP1 (what was Ph3 and 4) and then hoping for the best is a poor use of resources. If they were to spend more time "cultivating" their prospects (watching within the Regiments for soldiers with all the abilities required, and then giving them the "goodies": free education and officer trg) they would end up with a better product, and the CF and Canada would be better for it. We would lose a lot of good soldiers who would "defect" to the officer world, but that is a wrong way of looking at it, as the CF would be the winner over all. A lot of people wouldn't want to be officers anyway (myself included), so they could go on to become the NCO corps.

None of what I suggest is new: I believe the Roman army did this, and police forces, fire fighters, etc do something similar. I'm not sure where our current method originated, but I think it may have outlived it's usefulness. We can't rely on blind luck (ie take a kid out of high school, give him the absolute basics (BOTC, CAP, Phase trg) and hope that they will be an effective leader). I know that there have been quite a few good officers come of it, but how about the piss poor ones? As I suggested, I know of soldiers who CFR'ed or went through UTPNCM and were poison officers, but that is probably more indicative of who they want to be officers (blind obedience, lack of initiative) and then allow to go through those programs, than that of soldiers who SHOULD be pushed to become an officer. Unless I am totally "out of 'er", there is a "glass ceiling" for any officer who comes up from the ranks: the rank of major (and usually only captain). The "ring knockers" and old boy network are more concerned with protecting their cronies from their alma mater than letting one of the "unwashed masses" come into command roles. The days of thinking that officers are "better" are over, people. It's not like the days of nobility and peasants. Yes, officers (generally) have a better education than the soldiers who they are in command of, but it's not like they are a higher life form (sorry to burst anyones bubble here). There are a lot of highly intelligent soldiers out there, many of whom would make excellent officers, but there are too many factors that stop them: the prospect of becoming "one of them" (the us vs them mentality which is bred in both corps (NCO and officer), the aforementioned glass ceiling, being seen as a "mustang" from above (having too strong of a will, opinionated, too much experience and dealings with the "lower class"). I'm probably just rhyming off the reasons why I wouldn't want to become an officer, but there it is.

I don't think there should be a big division between any of the "classes": jr ranks, Snr NCO's, and officers. Due to the way we have been modeled on an antiquated system, that's the case now, where some officers feel that they are an officer by birthright, and some Sr NCO's feel that they have no obligation to serve anybody but themselves and their buddies (usually above). I'm not saying that we shouldn't respect officers or Sr NCO's, who have earned the right to be there, but to make sure that respect flows downwards to the soldiers who we are in charge of, and remember what it was to be one of them (which, again many MCpl's and Sr NCOs seem to forget, probably because their time as a Jr rank was too fleeting) and also because the majority of officers have no concept of this, because they never were in the soldiers position.

Al

 

[George Wallace]

Loyalty

Loyalty is a "Two Way Street".  A good leader is loyal to his subordinants as much as he is loyal to his superiors.  He must nurture and defend his subordinants as much as he carries out his duties to his superiors.  "Brown-nosing Snives" do not fit that bill.

 

[oneill]

A interesting topic, one that dogs all army's.
The British Army has a system that every year there are two reports written on every soldier.
A six monthly assessment and annual confidential report.
Thees detail every thing the soldier has achieved thus far,
Good and bad and ugly.
The six monthly is a performance assessment which lets the recipient know where he needs to improve.
The yearly report goes to the Co if you are due promotion.
at any stage you can question the report but the initiators decision is final.
The soldier then signs the report to say that he has seen it.
end of discussion.

There are usually some grievances but not many.


And don't forget it is a soldiers wright to bitch and moan .

Hope this is of some use.

 

[pbi]

So what's the real difference between the UK system and our PDR/PER system? I don't see any.

Cheers.

 

[CH1]

It sounds like the Brits are using what we used to call the PER/POR system. Have to check it out with a Brit WO buddy. It doen't matter what system is used, it has to be designed to cover the statistical majority (?). Hence the flaws. Never did get a reasonable answer to advancement criteria.

One of the items that is usually missed, when the grapes are running, is personal initiative. We all, at some time pass the buck, for what ever the reason. In my own case, I still look over my shoulder, for what I wanted. The illustrious coat of arms on the sleeve. I still can not figure out how I was really good in trade as a SGT, not good enough for what I wanted, but forced to take a commision.

I also know that I saw potential in some of the people that I did PER's on. I tried my best to encourage them to stretch themselves to attain their goals. Some times they won, some lost, & some made their promotions without rhyme or reason.

Back on point, one controls their destiny, within parameters. When one is passed over, was there a lack of disipline, knowledge, tech skills, attitude, etc? Did they try to determine why they were passed over & take corrective actions instead of IA's like temper(my achilles heel)/attitude. There is also a possibility of overt or subvert personality clash with subordinates/superiors. Most of these are in the candidate's sphere of control. Nepotism is an item that one can not control.

I may stand corrected as most of my time has been spent out of the mainstream, in specialized areas.

 

[parapara]

As a serving member who has experienced the old way things were done and the way the army is being run today , i feel we have finally learned to respect our younger soldiers and look after there welfare far better today than was ever done in the past, and to make a comment on the discipline of the younger soldiers today , the discipline is there its just getting the nco,s to enforce the policies and respect the soldiers at the same time , there are hardly ever any bad soldiers but there are definitely poor nco's.

 

[GO!!!]

DeltaDog13

How interesting that you mention "getting back to basics" and your "quick climb  up the NCO ladder" in the same breath. The two would imply that you are unaware or unable to reproduce the basics in the first place.

But I digress.

1) High speed low drag trg such as FIBUA/MOUT are the war of the future. Such militaries as the USMC have adjusted their training to concentrate 80% on urban and 20% on "green" skills. It is not a sidebar, addendum or other distraction. IT IS the battle of the future. You are one of the dinosaurs you purport to want replaced if you believe that section and platoon attacks accross Wx or Meaford are supplying your troops with anything other than the will to kill figure 11s. We are not trying to delay the Soviet advance through the Fulda gap any longer. By 2010, 70% of the world's population will live in cities. We will fight there.

2) The misconception that FIBUA is not the area of concentration for collective and low level trg is the fault of the NCOs and officers. Just because you cannot find a way to make FIBUA "challenging and exciting" does'nt mean that it can't be done. Units from 3VP have continuously fielded exceptionally well trained sections and platoons precisely because they were not afraid to do only one Coy defensive in Wx and instead concentrate on the skills that they were most likely to use, such as MOE, Urban patrolling, tank/inf co - operation and instinctive shooting.

3) Physically toughened enough for ops? Once again, this is not ultimately the responsibility of the CO. It is your responsibility as a section commander to develop your troops. (remember the leadership principles?) If they are not prepared - you did'nt prepare them, period.

4) As for Op Apollo's mountains - we did mostly what you would derisively describe as "high speed, low drag" and we hardly practiced at all, because our NCO's were so fixated on the things that they knew - that they could'nt expand into things they did'nt. As a result - we all went in cold.

5) In conclusion, you speak in broad terms (we, this army, I've seen..) but offer no concrete fixes. In addition, you yourself perpetuate the same training patterns that have bored and softened you and your unit in the first place. Since NCOs are the backbone of the army, perhaps you should take a more proactive approach. It is not so much NCO's that need to be "cleaned out" as you so eloquently put it, but the attitudes and resistance to change that they go hand in hand with.

 

[bossi]

I really feel that the new soldiers do not posess the maturity that the 031 trade should have. ...

Bang on, Heathan!   I'm only a youngster, but there were still Korean War vets in The Regiment when I joined (and the young pups didn't beak off to them ...)

However, as noted in the Regimental History, there is a parallel phenomenon to "skill fade" - I'd like to coin the phrase "respect fade" (i.e. similar to adolescents and their lack of repect for their parents, some young soldiers think they know it all - they reject "out of hand" anything said by their seniors and label them "dinosaurs", reminding me of the debating technique of accusing somebody of Nazism ... but, I digress ...)

I use hockey as an analogy quite often (since, after all, it's "War On Ice").
Young players usually want to scrimmage or play a game, rather than practice and do drills (and, similar to Le Gros Bill, I do recognise Horrock's concept of "knowing what it's like to run, in order to better learn how to walk ...").

It's worrisome to see how eagerly young troops latch on to "sexy" stuff ... before they've literally and figuratively "earned their stripes" - as an example, in another thread there was an excellent post detailing experience from Iraq (basically, they relearned a lesson the hard way:   "Don't bunch up.")
However, the lure/siren call of Hollywood tactics has hoodwinked many into thinking that it's okay to concentrate troops so closely that a burst or grenade can kill them all ...

It's nice to want to emulate the "Big League" ... but ... they're called "special" for a reason ...

Finally:   DevilDog13 - good job of keeping your eye on the puck.   BZ.

I'll close with Stirling's four tenets:
- A sense of humility
- The relentless pursuit of excellence
- A classless society
- A sense of humour

P.S. (along the lines of Heathan's comments, I've just been reminded there's infinitely more to life than sexy, high-speed, low-drag stuff ... in the BIG picture, which some brash youngsters seem to overlook ...)
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25380.from0.html#new

 

[ArmyRick]

I think GO!!! is correct. Hillier wants to shift the default setting from fighting "the Bear" to the "the Snake"

Kabul is a good example of OBUA and alot of what we are going/already have been doing. Look at all the years we operated in the former Yugoslavia. Each tour I did over there we did the same workup training (combat team on russian type defences live fire with Leos and carriers). Its good training, but sure as well was not relevant to our current ops or even the terrain or anything in Yugo.

Last august B COY, 1RCR set a great OBUA battle scenario for the reserve troops in one of the FIBUA villages. They used miles, SIMUNITION, M69 practice grenades, engineers with real door charges. It was a real wake up call. The scenario reminded me some of the stuff going down in Iraq (only the enemy's will to fight in the exercise was excellent). Not one of the companies could clear the village. This is where we should be heading. There is all kinds of trg that you can do with simunition.
Get the kits out and get trg, emphasis on CQB!!!

 

[Heathan]

For 2 VP we have an example of old vs. new. We have been ram rodding the IBTS training to complete the BN in 2weeks for everything from first aid and environmental safety briefs to ranges for all platforms at our disposal. 9mm, C7, C9, C6, 84mm, 60mm, M72, M203, Grenade, Lav's 25mm, and Eryx. We pumped 2 recce courses through and more LAV course's CC/Drvr than you want to consider, starting our pre-sniper, 3 PLQ's, 2-3 IPSWQ's, and many more, on different ex's now until pretty much November. Our RSM is heading to Kandahar for his recce. To me and most of the, "Old School", for lack of a better term, this is great training, experience, fun. To the pink fuzzy 3 nights in the field is bad cause it takes away from their fun, all the training sucks, especially all these ranges, and just a lazy attitude to the work involved in our tempo right now. And worst of all is passing those who fail PWT's for C-9 and C-7. That means they can go live fire with me. Ouch, if they cant hit a 4 ft screen with a C-9 then is it fine to allow them to fire me in live? The new don't know what field time is, the spend 2 ex's in the field on BIQ, both are 2 nights only, so they moan when they miss dinner or lunch and get a box lunch instead. When packing up in our lines for a 4 day ex I actually heard, " Hey do you think I should pack my rain gear for the field next week?"
Or being out on a day nav ex and being one of 2 in our det that brought water/jacket/something else besides my box lunch to eat. That shows a bit about old vs new. 

 

[ArmyRick]

What i see as "new" is no easier than old school. Simply different.
Recce patrols, OPs and other ISTAR missions are still going to be just as important as always (In fact you are more likely to conduct Recce patrols and OPs in theater than a platoon quick attack flanking in the open field).
Emphasis fighting in urban areas (include everything such as casualty evacuation, pushing ammo forward, etc) is more exhausting than doing the live fire combat team on the open prairie.

My point? new does not mean easier....

 

[bossi]

... Or being out on a day nav ex and being one of 2 in our det that brought water/jacket/something else besides my box lunch to eat. That shows a bit about old vs new.  

Thanks for the chuckle - I remember seeing that "deer in the headlights" look in the eyes of some Newbies when they noticed I always had spare (dry) socks and foot powder ... but, hey - I guess maybe the new curriculum doesn't have time to explain that infantry are also referred to as ... "foot soldiers" ...

 

[Art Johnson]

Mark you are so right, I wonder did you turn your socks inside out also. BTW how is your mother? believe me I can commensurate with you on the hospital care or more so the lack of it.

Aye Dileas

Art J.

 

[c4th]

Any ideas on how to "free" Warrants and Sergeants Major from their desks to dedicate more time to developing the JNCO's?

Pl Warrants, it may be hard.  Deligate as much as practical to Pl Signaler and pl reps if possible, particularly if it involves allot of running around. Pl Comd should be able to take on some of the staffing work.  Might as well get used to it, they'll be Coy 2ICs eventually.

CSM's:  Again delegate to Coy clerk and share with Coy 2IC.  Personally I think blowing the desk 'in place' is probably not a bad idea.

 

[Danjanou]

  Personally I think blowing the desk 'in place' is probably not a bad idea.

Geez I wish I'd though of that when I was a CSM.  ;D

 

[TheHead]

6. What was explained to me by the leadership of the TC, when a soldier leaves the TC, the troops are still Private (Basic) and not consider trained until year 3 or end of 1st BE. They are not considered suitable for deployment until they achieve trained status. It is up to the units to provide additional training.

  Just a note sarge, My TOS is up in Feb (I re-signed though) and I will be getting my trained status on Sept 9, also alot of my friends I went through SQ and BIQ with were sent to B Coy 1PPCLI and sent to Afghanistan 8 months later.

 

[CH1]

We have changed our society, going from a primarily rural population to an urban population since the 2nd Big Scheme.  This has affected many areas of the military.  Also do not forget policy is not set by the grunt on the end  of the rifle.  It is set by politicians with little regard to reality or the real world needs of our military.  We have an extremely competent military inspite of the decades of rust & neglect.

Although I personally do not like sim trg, it does serve a purpose.  I being old school still think the Blood & Guts trg still better prepares a soldier for the "real thing".  Trg has to reflect the changes in the types of theaters we are entering.

Unfortunely, the 1 disadvantage of Blood & Guts, is that ppl will get hurt &/or killed.  This was an unacceptable risk for politicians.  Hence what we have today.

If any body thinks our military is soft, pls rethink that.  I have had the honour of working with military from around the world & even our neihbours to the south.  I would rather have a platoon fresh out of Gagetown than some other "trained" bodies.

In short it is the system that is broken, not the mechanism.  The mechanism can only respond to the system policy.

Cheers

 

[CH1]

Oh Crap!! Don't tell me there going to rubber stamp more M/Cpl's again. They did that in the early 70's.
From my position at that time it was a train wreck with most of these "new M/Cpl's" thinking they were gods.

Cheers