Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs)

[Swampbuggy]

I've a question re:25mm...Is it possible to sink/halt a large vessel with that weapon? I'm thinking about a ship up to container vessel size.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Braunschweig class hull and engines would fit the bill. It would need to be stripped down for Canada's needs.

No need for 76mm. Too heavy of a gun to deal with Op Caribbe type operations, and EEZ patrolling.
Definitely no need for missiles of any type. Expense with no advantage in our case. An OPV won't have the sensors to locate a target for ASM in the North Pacific or Atlantic and would need to rely upon other assets. Those same other assets could just take the shot themselves.
Crew a bit high, numbers closer to 40 might be better.

Given those changes likely the range could be increased as the weight comes down and the crew comes down (no need to operate/maintain all those combat systems).

The Braunschweig class was designed for operations in the North Sea and Baltic, which means it doesn't need legs and needs to be heavily armed for its size to deal with the Baltic threats. War in the Baltic is a knife fight in a phone booth in naval terms. With Sweden and Russia stabbing swords at each other through it.

Of course, all of this is assuming a certain "non-combatant" status for an MCDV replacement. Keep them cheap, good seakeeping, and relatively fast and I bet it's a winner.

I know that I've beaten this drum here before, but save money, training and time and just re-purpose the 57's when they start coming off the Halifax's. Add a BAE Mk38 or CIWS and a pair of 50's and be done with it.
Why build a ship to meet just today's existing operations, Op Caribbe and EEZ? Build a ship to meet those operations and potential new ones over the horizon yet to be adequately seen or perceived. Some light weight ASW work should be a min. consideration as well. These ships will not see surface threats but air and underwater threats are most likely to be considered.
Eight would be nice, 10 better, once you have to divide by 2 for each coast, 4 means 2 ready, 1 in work ups and 1 in maintenance, so what can 2 ships really do in the grand scheme of things among thousands of km of coastline? Besides if any shooting ever does begin all the AOPS will be tied to pier because they will have zero value to add.

 

[Maxman1]

Or, put the 57s on the AOPS.

 

[JMCanada]

I would not be surprised if an MCDV replacement was 6-8 ships. AOPS are a thing and will be tasked with some current MCDV jobs and eating up crew from the MCDV fleet. 8 ships is probably a good number. 6 is the minimum.

I agree with that. Nevertheless I think some of us are mixing ideas by trying to be pragmatic and rational.

If the replacement could be one-to-one, assuming that AOPS are an addition of capabilities, maybe the best option would be to have a mix of a few (6 to 8) small, lightly armed, updated MCDVs, for patrol duties AND a few (4 to 6) small ASW/GP frigates capable to join a task group but mostly intended for ASW patrol in Northern Atlantic and NATO commitments in the Mediterranean for half the cost for crew and fuel of a CSC. For the smaller Pacific coastline, which is also "covered" by the US, the updated MCDVs might use TRAPS and have at least a helipad.

What I try to say is that both types of vessels are necessary and would result into useful tools.
The lighter type being based on the West coast and the latter on the Eastern.

 

[Underway]

I've a question re:25mm...Is it possible to sink/halt a large vessel with that weapon? I'm thinking about a ship up to container vessel size.

Halt, possible depending on a number of factors. The larger the ship the harder it is to hit critical engineering equipment. You could also threaten the bridge crew. If you use incendiary rounds and start fires well there you go. Sink? Not really. It takes a lot to sink any ship with even large guns. Missiles don't even sink ships.

However, if you really want to halt a container vessel I would recommend a boarding operation. Much more effective to take control over the ship and crew, with less damage to the scenery.

Which is why I agree with @Stoker. They stated the initial idea is to have a 25-knot ship. That's fast enough to get a boarding party on pretty much anything big out there. And the gun is fast enough to argue the smaller faster stuff stops

 

[Underway]

If the replacement could be one-to-one, assuming that AOPS are an addition of capabilities, maybe the best option would be to have a mix of a few (6 to 8) small, lightly armed, updated MCDVs, for patrol duties AND a few (4 to 6) small ASW/GP frigates capable to join a task group but mostly intended for ASW patrol in Northern Atlantic and NATO commitments in the Mediterranean for half the cost for crew and fuel of a CSC. For the smaller Pacific coastline, which is also "covered" by the US, the updated MCDVs might use TRAPS and have at least a helipad.

Here is an interesting article about modern ASW and what it requires. The author mirrors my thoughts almost exactly.

Why the Royal Navy Does Not Need New ASW

In particular, the following items which I've quoted below.

The reality is that modern ASW is not something that can be done cheaply or via a simple platform. A credible and effective ASW frigate requires three key assets, firstly the sonar processing power to identify, track and prosecute an attack against an extremely quiet target that does not want to be found. Secondly, it needs the means to deliver this attack as far away from the escort ship as possible – which calls for a platform capable of operating a long range helicopter capable of prosecuting an attack. Finally to prevent detection and attack, the frigate is required to be as quiet as possible to avoid notifying submarines of its presence – this requires extensive silencing and mounting of machinery to prevent it giving away a ships presence.

In turn these three characteristics raise the cost of the platform. Modern sonar equipment is incredibly expensive – particularly if you want to opt for things like Towed Array Sonars. If you want it to be able to work effectively against a highly capable target, you need to be prepared to spend a lot of money on it. There may be plenty of ‘cheap’ ASW frigate designs out there, but they almost certainly skimp on the complex underpinning sonar and software architecture required to be effective – and they are not intended to go up against peer threats like the latest Russian SSNs.

The problem though is Merlin Cyclone is a very big helicopter – when you stand alongside one you realise it is, literally, as tall as a house. This immediately imposes constraints on the design of the ship you want to operate it from – the hangar and support facilities need to be big enough to maintain it. Additionally, to make full use of the phenomenal capability of the Merlin Cylcone,you need to have invested fully in the sensors and systems required to make it effective. A failure to do so means the value and utility of the helicopter and the ships is massively reduced.
The two problems here are firstly there simply aren’t enough Cylcones in the Fleet to spare for use on a Corvette style platform. The Cyclone is arguably in terms of capability a ‘flying ASW frigate’ and its use at sea is focused on ASW platforms and the Carrier. With limited Cyclones available, and none likely to be available or affordable, putting them on a barely capable ASW corvette makes absolutely no sense.

In reality, while it sounds impressive to suggest that the Navy acquire a fleet of cheap corvettes to solve its ASW problems, such a suggestion is likely to do more harm than good. These vessels would either be so cheap as to lack capacity to do the job (and thus making them essentially floating targets like the Type 14), or they would grow in cost to the point where they became highly capable and thus vastly more expensive (like the Type 23).

A corvette construction programme would not solve any of the challenges that the RN RCN has today. It doesn’t solve a gaping hole in the nations defences, nor would it necessarily provide ships for the needs that the Navy has of it. An ASW corvette would be of little use in a winters gale in the North Atlantic tracking a Russian submarine that could threaten our nuclear deterrent if it cannot operate the helicopters needed to find it, or possess the suitable sensors to track it.

 

[dimsum]

Here is an interesting article about modern ASW and what it requires. The author mirrors my thoughts almost exactly.

Why the Royal Navy Does Not Need New ASW

I was going to write some rant until I realized the article said "ASW Corvettes".

Then yes, I agree.

However, the RN (RCN, etc) does need new ASW capabilities - just maybe not of the "skimmer" variety.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Here is an interesting article about modern ASW and what it requires. The author mirrors my thoughts almost exactly.

Why the Royal Navy Does Not Need New ASW

In particular, the following items which I've quoted below.

Thank you for posting this and laying it out in a clear fashion.

My question is this, pivoting away from the above Euro-centred analysis that is interchangeable between the Motherland and us, how does this analysis hold up if we apply it to our other major coast, the Pacific? Does any of this change? Does the need for some 'light weight' ASW platform become apparent? Should we (do we??) be looking at the needs of the Pacific coast differently than the Atlantic, more than just putting 7 Halifax's on the East coast and the remaining 5 on the West.

 

[GR66]

Here is an interesting article about modern ASW and what it requires. The author mirrors my thoughts almost exactly.

Why the Royal Navy Does Not Need New ASW

In particular, the following items which I've quoted below.

My criticism of the article is that he equates modern Corvettes with the Flower Class of WWII. The word "Corvette" is the only similarity between a modern Corvette and the Flower Class.

I don't think anybody is looking for a small, slow, poorly armed trawler conversion to go up against SSNs.

The Flower Class was around 1,000 tons, 62m long and had a speed of 16kn. There are multiple "Corvette" designs out there in the 2,500-3,000 ton range, 100-120m long with speeds of 25+kn, towed array sonars, facilities to handle a 10+ton class helicopter, and their own UAV assets. They're really what previously would have been called Frigates or even Destroyers.

Should you look at one of these Corvettes as a stand-alone platform in the ASW fight? No. You'd pair them with CSCs to give another tail in the water, additional UAV sensors for the hunt and a lilly pad for the CSCs Cyclone to land on for re-arming and refueling to extend their search range and endurance. You'd also hopefully work together with our own subs (SSK or SSN), MPAs and our Allies assets.

Are these going to be as cheap as a Kingston-type ship? HELL NO! But we are the country with the longest coastline in the world. Is 15 x combatant vessels enough for a country our size and expeditionary commitments along with our own self-defence requirements? HELL NO!

We as a country need to grow up and stop thinking so small. The Chinese Navy has 355 ships (74 subs). The Russian Navy has 606 ships (62 subs). Personally I don't think 15 x CSCs and a dozen (or less) River-Class OPV equivalents will cut it for us. The Government may say we don't have enough money to expand our combatant fleet (and MPAs/MHs), but our Admirals (and Generals) should not stop screaming out for our need to increase our fleet until someone hears them.

[end rant]

 

[Swampbuggy]

My criticism of the article is that he equates modern Corvettes with the Flower Class of WWII. The word "Corvette" is the only similarity between a modern Corvette and the Flower Class.

I don't think anybody is looking for a small, slow, poorly armed trawler conversion to go up against SSNs.

The Flower Class was around 1,000 tons, 62m long and had a speed of 16kn. There are multiple "Corvette" designs out there in the 2,500-3,000 ton range, 100-120m long with speeds of 25+kn, towed array sonars, facilities to handle a 10+ton class helicopter, and their own UAV assets. They're really what previously would have been called Frigates or even Destroyers.

Should you look at one of these Corvettes as a stand-alone platform in the ASW fight? No. You'd pair them with CSCs to give another tail in the water, additional UAV sensors for the hunt and a lilly pad for the CSCs Cyclone to land on for re-arming and refueling to extend their search range and endurance. You'd also hopefully work together with our own subs (SSK or SSN), MPAs and our Allies assets.

Are these going to be as cheap as a Kingston-type ship? HELL NO! But we are the country with the longest coastline in the world. Is 15 x combatant vessels enough for a country our size and expeditionary commitments along with our own self-defence requirements? HELL NO!

We as a country need to grow up and stop thinking so small. The Chinese Navy has 355 ships (74 subs). The Russian Navy has 606 ships (62 subs). Personally I don't think 15 x CSCs and a dozen (or less) River-Class OPV equivalents will cut it for us. The Government may say we don't have enough money to expand our combatant fleet (and MPAs/MHs), but our Admirals (and Generals) should not stop screaming out for our need to increase our fleet until someone hears them.

[end rant]

That's a fair point, but if you wanted all that capability, why not just build 6-8 more CSC? Seeing as how it's the sensor suite/equipment that drives the cost, not the displacement or length of the hull, is it really any cheaper to go for a corvette over a hot production line of your frigate? Probably not, especially when you factor in the development costs etc. And if the savings are to be felt in crewing, I'd take a long look at USN personnel burnout on minimally crewed yet well armed warships like the LCS. It's seemingly too high a demand on the compliment.

 

[Underway]

My criticism of the article is that he equates modern Corvettes with the Flower Class of WWII. The word "Corvette" is the only similarity between a modern Corvette and the Flower Class.

I don't think anybody is looking for a small, slow, poorly armed trawler conversion to go up against SSNs.

The Flower Class was around 1,000 tons, 62m long and had a speed of 16kn. There are multiple "Corvette" designs out there in the 2,500-3,000 ton range, 100-120m long with speeds of 25+kn, towed array sonars, facilities to handle a 10+ton class helicopter, and their own UAV assets. They're really what previously would have been called Frigates or even Destroyers.

Should you look at one of these Corvettes as a stand-alone platform in the ASW fight? No. You'd pair them with CSCs to give another tail in the water, additional UAV sensors for the hunt and a lilly pad for the CSCs Cyclone to land on for re-arming and refueling to extend their search range and endurance. You'd also hopefully work together with our own subs (SSK or SSN), MPAs and our Allies assets.

Are these going to be as cheap as a Kingston-type ship? HELL NO! But we are the country with the longest coastline in the world. Is 15 x combatant vessels enough for a country our size and expeditionary commitments along with our own self-defence requirements? HELL NO!

We as a country need to grow up and stop thinking so small. The Chinese Navy has 355 ships (74 subs). The Russian Navy has 606 ships (62 subs). Personally I don't think 15 x CSCs and a dozen (or less) River-Class OPV equivalents will cut it for us. The Government may say we don't have enough money to expand our combatant fleet (and MPAs/MHs), but our Admirals (and Generals) should not stop screaming out for our need to increase our fleet until someone hears them.

[end rant]

I think you missed the point. Any modern ASW platform is expensive and requires the ability to carry a helicopter.

We don't have enough helo's to make the ship ASW. We don't have enough money to make the ship ASW. There are other jobs the navy does that need cheap ships.

If Canadian ASW is important more MPA's would be a better investment. As would submarines. So you make the call. Submarines or high-end ASW MCDV replacement. There isn't enough money or people for both.

 

[dimsum]

I think you missed the point. Any modern ASW platform is expensive and requires the ability to carry a helicopter.

We don't have enough helo's to make the ship ASW. We don't have enough money to make the ship ASW. There are other jobs the navy does that need cheap ships.

If Canadian ASW is important more MPA's would be a better investment. As would submarines. So you make the call. Submarines or high-end ASW MCDV replacement. There isn't enough money or people for both.

To paraphrase Murphy:

If a submarine is in range of an ASW ship's sensors/weapons, the ASW ship is in range of the submarine's sensors/weapons.

 

[daftandbarmy]

To paraphrase Murphy:

If a submarine is in range of an ASW ship's sensors/weapons, the ASW ship is in range of the submarine's sensors/weapons.

John would agree. Point to note: Glass half full - the failure of your weapon systems to operate as intended may increase your likelihood of being decorated for bravery

John Cruickshank - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Air Office, 1st September, 1944.

The King has been graciously pleased to confer the Victoria Cross on the undermentioned officer in recognition of most conspicuous bravery: —
Flying Officer John Alexander Cruickshank (126700), Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. No. 210 Squadron.

This officer was the captain and pilot of a Catalina flying boat which was recently engaged on an anti-submarine patrol over northern waters. When a U-boat was sighted on the surface, Flying Officer Cruickshank at once turned to the attack. In the face of fierce anti-aircraft fire he manoeuvred into position and ran in to release his depth charges. Unfortunately they failed to drop.

Flying Officer Cruickshank knew that the failure of this attack had deprived him of the advantage of surprise and that his aircraft offered a good target to the enemy's determined and now heartened gunners.

Without hesitation, he climbed and turned to come in again. The Catalina was met by intense and accurate fire and was repeatedly hit. The navigator/bomb aimer, was killed. The second pilot and two other members of the crew were injured. Flying Officer Cruickshank was struck in seventy-two places, receiving two serious wounds in the lungs and ten penetrating wounds in the lower limbs. His aircraft was badly damaged and filled with the fumes of exploding shells. But he did not falter. He pressed home his attack, and released the depth charges himself, straddling the submarine perfectly. The U-boat was sunk.

He then collapsed and the second pilot took over the controls. He recovered shortly afterwards and, though bleeding profusely, insisted on resuming command and retaining it until he was satisfied that the damaged aircraft was under control, that a course had been set for base and that all the necessary signals had been sent. Only then would he consent to receive medical aid and have his wounds attended to. He refused morphia in case it might prevent him from carrying on.
During the next five and a half hours of the return flight he several times lapsed into unconsciousness owing to loss of blood. When he came to his first thought on each occasion was for the safety of his aircraft and crew. The damaged aircraft eventually reached base but it was clear that an immediate landing would be a hazardous task for the wounded and less experienced second pilot. Although able to breathe only with the greatest difficulty, Flying Officer Cruickshank insisted on being carried forward and propped up in the second pilot's seat. For a full hour, in spite of his agony and ever-increasing weakness, he gave orders as necessary, refusing to allow the aircraft to be brought down until the conditions of light and sea made this possible without undue risk.

With his assistance the aircraft was safely landed on the water. He then directed the taxying and beaching of the aircraft so that it could easily be salvaged. When the medical officer went on board, Flying Officer Cruickshank collapsed and he had to be given a blood transfusion before he could be removed to hospital.
By pressing home the second attack in his gravely wounded condition and continuing his exertions on the return journey with his strength failing all the time, he seriously prejudiced his chance of survival even if the aircraft safely reached its base. Throughout, he set an example of determination, fortitude and devotion to duty in keeping with the highest traditions of the Service.[5]

​

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Here is an interesting article about modern ASW and what it requires. The author mirrors my thoughts almost exactly.

Why the Royal Navy Does Not Need New ASW

In particular, the following items which I've quoted below.

What about a smaller corvette using AUV's to hunt for the subs? Basically the Corvette is the mothership to a couple of AUV's happily making active searches for subs, perhaps they carry 4 AUV's with 2 in the water and 2 being recharged/prepped. Coupled with UAV that investigate contacts and perhaps even a dipping sonar at some point?
If the sub is chased off or can't make the attack, then it's done it's job. One of the challenges is going to escorting all the other critical targets, including AOR's, amphibious ships, merchant ships, cable layers, etc. With the high end model, you may have super effective ships that can't cover all the potentiel targets, navies may have to live with a high/low mix meaning the lower end cover the 2nd tier targets, while the high end prosecute attacks or guard the critical targets? My guess is that their is no easy answer and budgets/crewing are going to be the primary limitations.

 

[JMCanada]

The article says the Brits don't need more ASW platforms, yet they are building five Type 31 GP (general purpose) frigates to increase the numbers...
and obviously because of a question of resources, both human and financial. Originally they were going to build 13 Type 26 but had to revert and proposed to replace five of them with five Type 31.

Not saying to cancel any single CSC, not saying either that ASW/GP frigates should be prioritized over other platforms such as subs or MPAs. But I insist, the RCN should aim to replace the twelve MCDVs with twelve new vessels, a bunch of OPVs and a bunch of ASW/GP corvettes/frigates.

It must be possible to design and build a good ASW ship, with state of art ASW sensors and silent propulsion which, operating within a task group, or in peace time, or far from enemy land (hence low probability of aerial attack), should not need a top performer radar suite for AAW, nor a impressive multimission bay, nor a crew of some 180-200.

Please consider one CSC paired with one GP frigate. The latter would add an additional helicopter and one more tail in the water (as said above). Consider lower risk scenarios such as those foreseen for Type 31... wouldn't it be cheaper to deploy a GP frigate and keep the CSCs for tougher duties?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

That would mean standing up a new Helicopter Squadron, with a completely new airframe, likley either the Merlin or Cougar, not sure about the appetite by anyone to build more Cyclones?

In the meantime buy some more Bell Textron 412 or429's (same helicopters as the CCG) run them with Transport Canada pilot and maintainers leased to DND to equip the AOP's and AOR's with. they can do transport, SAR, ice recce, Humanitarian, Vertrep and other duties.

 

[GR66]

I think you missed the point. Any modern ASW platform is expensive and requires the ability to carry a helicopter.

We don't have enough helo's to make the ship ASW. We don't have enough money to make the ship ASW. There are other jobs the navy does that need cheap ships.

If Canadian ASW is important more MPA's would be a better investment. As would submarines. So you make the call. Submarines or high-end ASW MCDV replacement. There isn't enough money or people for both.

Yes to more MPAs. Yes to more MH. Yes to (more) replacement subs. Yes to more combatant capable ships.

Canada's Defence spending in 2020 as a % of GDP = 1.4151%. Stated target spending as per NATO agreements = 2%.

The contract for the Cyclones is for 28 helicopters. We're going to have 15 CSCs and not all are going to be deployed at the same time so if we're pairing Corvettes with CSCs then there should be Cyclones available.

If the cost of a new ship design is too much and the majority of the cost of the ship is in the systems rather than the hull and mechanical elements then look at a 2nd flight of CSC hulls with the SPY7 radar replaced with a cheaper system and don't install the VLS.

That being said, a country the size and wealth of Canada CAN afford the above items. It just needs the will to make that commitment. And if we have to sacrifice spending in some other areas, then as we are effectively an island nation I'd be willing to prioritize Naval and Air spending over the Army.

 

[KevinB]

Yes to more MPAs. Yes to more MH. Yes to (more) replacement subs. Yes to more combatant capable ships.

Canada's Defence spending in 2020 as a % of GDP = 1.4151%. Stated target spending as per NATO agreements = 2%.

Minimum of 2% is it not?

The contract for the Cyclones is for 28 helicopters. We're going to have 15 CSCs and not all are going to be deployed at the same time so if we're pairing Corvettes with CSCs then there should be Cyclones available.

About that contact...

If the cost of a new ship design is too much and the majority of the cost of the ship is in the systems rather than the hull and mechanical elements then look at a 2nd flight of CSC hulls with the SPY7 radar replaced with a cheaper system and don't install the VLS.

Ugh -- it will get forced into the CSC role regardless

That being said, a country the size and wealth of Canada CAN afford the above items. It just needs the will to make that commitment. And if we have to sacrifice spending in some other areas, then as we are effectively an island nation I'd be willing to prioritize Naval and Air spending over the Army.

Bingo

 

[Maxman1]

In the meantime buy some more Bell Textron 412

No more Griffons. Let's upgrade to big boy helicopters, UH-1Y Venom, and AH-1Z Viper.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Yes to more MPAs. Yes to more MH. Yes to (more) replacement subs. Yes to more combatant capable ships.

Canada's Defence spending in 2020 as a % of GDP = 1.4151%. Stated target spending as per NATO agreements = 2%.

The contract for the Cyclones is for 28 helicopters. We're going to have 15 CSCs and not all are going to be deployed at the same time so if we're pairing Corvettes with CSCs then there should be Cyclones available.

If the cost of a new ship design is too much and the majority of the cost of the ship is in the systems rather than the hull and mechanical elements then look at a 2nd flight of CSC hulls with the SPY7 radar replaced with a cheaper system and don't install the VLS.

That being said, a country the size and wealth of Canada CAN afford the above items. It just needs the will to make that commitment. And if we have to sacrifice spending in some other areas, then as we are effectively an island nation I'd be willing to prioritize Naval and Air spending over the Army.

Unfortunately we are down to 27 Cyclones when the contract wraps up due to the loss of one last year. So unless it’s replaced we are already down one before we even had 28.