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LAV III Mobile Gun System (MGS)

  • Thread starter Thread starter mattoigta
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    If we are going to pay more for the MGS than the M1A2, then we should be buying the M1A2.  For a direct FSV, having a vehcle that can be repaired and resupplied in tandem with the US and UK units along their supply lines would make us a more effective contributor in overseas deployments.  The US would rather add a small number of extra Abrams to the supply chain, than try to keep a small number of oddball 105 MGS supplied.  Any overseas deployment requiring direct fire support in any number will be an allied opperation, so why complicate the supply chain to supply a less effective, more vulnerable, MGS?
 
The sad part of this all is all the arguments would end (although we will have lots of new ones  ;D) if we simply ditched the LPT and replaced it with the CT_CV turret. (http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28961/post-281193.html#msg281193)

CMI Defence is offering a credible drop in turret alternative to the MGS, with a 105mm high velocity gun in a Wegmann style turret for LAV sized vehicles. The CT_CV turret has a 16 round bustle and autoloader, and a video was displayed which showed the LAV firing at targets both stationary and on the move, traversing 900 from the centerline while doing so. This turret is also suitable for retrofit onto existing tanks.

The turret also supports elevation up to 420, allowint DF against targets in a "3D" environment (those annoying people on the rooftops with RPGs) or indirect fire like an artillery piece. Very versatile nes pas?
 
I've heard a rumour that the MGS program has been cancelled.  Can anyone authenticate this or is it only wishful thinking?
 
Still a go, as Gunner said.  Deliveries have been delayed until 2007 at the earliest.  I'm not sure that the vehicle is in production yet, although there are posters on this site who might have better information than I do...

(notice my remarkable restraint in not using this opportunity to criticise yet again a deeply-flawed direct fire strategy and procurement concept...  ;D )
 
Well maybe if we can finally throw the Lieberals out of office, we can get the program scrapped also.

Hear the screeching as this screams right off the rails? :)
 
Of course, they don't need to cancell the MGS, just rethink it a bit:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28961/post-281321.html#msg281321

105mm high velocity cannon, 16 round bustle feeding the autoloader, full firing solution demonstrated up to 900 from the centerline both stationary and on the move, fits on an unmodified LAV III hull, air transportable on a Herc, and can fire at up to a 420 elevation.

I wonder how many we could get for the same amount of money being laid out for the MGS as it currently is?
 
Why not a low velocity gun -- with AT missles attached -- we can use the 105LV for breaching and other HE tasks and use the missle for anti armour...
 
"I wonder how many we could get for the same amount of money being laid out for the MGS as it currently is?"

New tanks are cheaper.  Take the money you save, and pay for shipping.  We have lots of money in the shipping budget - we sent winter tent groups to Kandahar and back in 2002, after all.

Tom
 
Tom,
You, I and every other sane member wants TANKS -- but the gov't says no...

  Sadly it is doing the best without a Tanks (and thus no real high intensity conflict capability)  Creating a niche force - a niche w/o any armour. 

 
I often wondered what would have happened had we taken Vickers up on their offer to build tanks in Montreal in the eighties...

Oh well.

Tom
 
A bunch of desk pilots would have told them what to build and how to build it.... kind of like an LSVW on tracks...shudder.
 
KevinB said:
You, I and every other sane member wants TANKS -- but the gov't says no...

The thing is, is it the government?  Everything I've been told to date indicates that the "no tank" decision was not a government decision (as was Trudeau's attempt to eliminate the fleet in the 70's) but rather an internal one (I understand there was a schism in the Armoured Corps over it - from top to bottom).  I may be wrong, but this is the way I understand it.

When looking at the MGS, we need to figure out what we want it for.  Do we want a high-velocity gun?  Would a low velocity gun work?  I linked the articles on the 120mm mortar and how it could act as a low-velocity direct fire weapon.  Is the low protection of the LAV (it is light armour, after all) going to allow it to perform many of the tasks required of intimate Direct Fire Support that the Infantry will require (a la Fallujah, where 2-tank sections were supplied to Marine Rifle companies and platoons)?  If it isn't, what role are we going to use it for?

As far as letting our MBT capability whither away and die, I will take every chance I get to point to the folly of doing so.  For today, I point to the Australians who recently purchased a small fleet of M1's.  When rationalizing the purchase, the Australian Chief of the Army (CA), Lieutenant General Peter Leahy stated that "it would be irresponsible to the point of immorality to risk the lives of Australian soldiers by exposing them to this threat in the complex and ambiguous environment which will now prevail on the battlefield without adequate protection....The most efficient and safest way to enhance our combat weight and protect our soldiers is through the replacement of the aging Leopard tank by a more robust main battle tank which will rebalance the combined arms team."

I guess the Canadian Army just "agreed to disagree" (or ignored) that assessment.... ::)
 
As a former tanker I'm going to weigh in with seeral thouts on this matter.

First of all, the MGS decision.

I liken it to the decision to buy the Grizzley/Cougar/Husky plan of the 70's/80's. At the time it was no more than a "stopgap" measure until the CF could come to grips with what sort of combat fleet it really wanted.

Instead they remained in service until '97 when the coyote was delivered with the lat of them phazed out in 2000 whn the first of the LAV 3's arrived for duty.

From personal experince (and other armoured types will agree) I've heard the Cougars called tank trainiers, mobile support vehicles, Fire support vehicles and a host of other names as the CF tried to find the 'niche' that would 'fit' the vehicle...Not the other way around.

The decision makers for the MGS seem to be enamoured of the veh itself, rather than the use that it would be put to...Its already been proven that the thing has many problems and cannot defend itself against anything other than the bad smell it generated the very first time someone brought up the idea to buy it.

Ask the guys, the crewmen on the ground and they'll tell you very quickly what our army in general and the Armoured Corps specifically needs in orderto do its job in the field of modern combat.

An up to date modern main battle tank.

Do they cost more than the MGS will...Well the oponents of the tank (and oddly enough supporters of the Mobile Gun System) will tell you the hrror stories about broken torshion bars, lack of parts, wear and tear on the vehicles themselves and the amount of echelon required to support them.

But what about crew surviability? The LAV3 already has extra armour plates glue to the sides to protect the crew from IED's along the side of the road in A'stan, where there is no such thing as stand off warfare, which is what the MGS was primarliy designed for.

What about cross country movement? We all know how restrictive the wheeled combat veh design is. What about survivability in the face of a mine strike?! I wonder how the MGS wold stand up to that?

There is a perfectly good design of tank sitting just across the border from us. It is battel tested and the crews know it works. Not onlyu that but many of the components are made right in Canada to begin with.

I'm sure the US would be glad to give us a deal on them...After all we've had them offered in the past for next to nothing! And the US being good neighbours (certainly better to us than we are to them) would give us parts and warrantees and training and the like...Everything we would need to operate OUR small fleet of M1 Abrams MBT's....Too bad its not POLITICALLY CORRECT to buy US kit. (of course the MGS is a US product as well, isn't it)

Time to face the reality of the situation...

IN the end the MGS is nothing more than a Cougar with two more wheels and a bigger gun.
 
TCBF said:
I often wondered what would have happened had we taken Vickers up on their offer to build tanks in Montreal in the eighties...

Oh well.

Tom
And then there was Kraus Maffi who wanted to set up a plant in Cape Breton, close to Sydney and the Steel Plant, to have an AFV plant outside of Europe.   Peaceniks were very vocal in encourageing the Canadian Government not to become a 'Major" Arms Manufacturer.
 
Here is a post from the Armour news bulletin (a couple months old):
General Dynamics Awarded $69 Million Stryker Reset Contract

Sterling Heights MI (SPX) - The U.S. Army TACOM Lifecycle Management Command has awarded General Dynamics Land Systems a $69 million contract for Stryker eight-wheeled combat vehicle sustainment or "reset" work.

Through this contract, General Dynamics will service, repair and modify 265 Stryker infantry combat vehicles which are returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom, restoring them to a pre-combat, like-new condition in advance of reissuing the vehicles prior to their next deployment. These vehicles have been in service in Iraq since October 2003, supporting two 3,900-soldier Stryker Brigade Combat Team rotations.

The reset work is slated to begin in mid-November by existing General Dynamics employees in Sterling Heights; London, Ontario, Canada; and at Fort Lewis, Wash. Work is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2006.

During their service in Iraq, these vehicles were driven more than six million miles, participating in assignments ranging from Fallujah, Baghdad and the Euphrates River Valley to the Tigris River Valley and Mosul. The vehicles maintained an operational readiness rate above 95 percent throughout their deployment in Iraq.

The armored vehicles enable Stryker Brigade Combat Teams to maneuver easily in close and urban terrain, while providing protection in open terrain. Performance highlights include C-130 transportability; networked command, control, computing and communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability; integral 14.5mm armor protection and 152mm artillery airburst protection; self-deployment and self-recovery capability; reduced vehicle acoustic signature; ability to carry a nine-man infantry or engineer squad; and bunker and wall breaching capability.

Stryker is the Army's highest-priority production combat vehicle program and the centerpiece of the ongoing Army Transformation. The Stryker family of eight-wheel-drive combat vehicles can travel at speeds up to 62 mph on highways, with a range of 312 miles.

Stryker vehicle configurations include carriers for mortars, engineer squads, infantry squads, command groups, and fire support teams; a nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance vehicle; anti-tank guided missile and medical evacuation vehicles; and the Mobile Gun System, a 105mm cannon mounted in a low-profile turret that is integrated into the Stryker chassis.

The Army recently approved the Mobile Gun System and the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle for low-rate production, and the first MGS and NBCRV are slated for delivery to the Army this month.
 
The MGS has been ordered on a diet.  The current version, which is currently in low rate production in Alabama, has been deemed to heavy.  The diet includes deletion of handrails and footsteps on the hull and turret, deletion of the drivers windscreen (along with the windshield washer), deletion of the second heater, a change from steel to magnesium seats, and a change from a steel engine grill to one made of composite plastic (which will be labelled "no step", similar to some areas on aircraft).  There are a few other deletions, none good.

The autoloader is still giving everyone fits, in that it still cannot differentiate between types of rounds, and (still) cannot reload on the move cross country.

The low rate initial production will remain in force until another set of trials is completed on the newer version.  Full production will not be ordered for at least another 18 months, which means Canada cannot get its copies until late 2007/early 2008 at the earliest.  It would seem that the Leo will just have to soldier on in the west for another five years anyway.....

Keep in mind that Canada has not yet ordered the MGS.  It has been "promised", but not ordered, so there still may be hope.........
 
I was going through that long list of deletions and "Safety Concerns" all came to mind.  Down grading a lot of the Armour and such, just to reduce weight and with the intention of adding Bolt On armour seems to defeat the purpose of the whole exercise.  Either a vehicle is sufficiently armoured to begin with or it isn't a Combat vehicle...These cost and weight cuts pose serious concerns to me.  Crew safety seems to have been completely disregarded.
 
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