The Canadian Army is fine in terms of "combat", depending on what you interpret that to mean. It is true that for political and domestic approval reasons, the vast majority of our operational deployments are peace-support related. However it is also true that the old days of "classic peacekeeping" a-la Cyprus are (for the most part) long gone. These days, a soldier deployed on peace-support operations is as likely to experience "combat" conditions as a soldier deployed on deliberate combat operations. This is particularly true of the initial contingent rotations within a peace-support mission, while the situation between the warring factions and the UN or NATO force is still unsettled. Recent examples would include (but are not limited to) UNPROFOR Croatia in the early to mid-1990s, IFOR and SFOR Bosnia in the mid-1990s, ISAF in Kabul, etc. Just ask the members of 2 PPCLI Battlegroup if they got "enough" combat action in the Medak Pocket in Croatia. Or the R22er and RCR contingent that secured the Sarajevo Airport. Better yet, do a couple of Google searches and read all about those "peace-support" combat actions for yourself....
Notwithstanding the politically-directed Canadian Army focus on peace-support operations, we do still occasionally engage in deliberate combat operations. 3 PPCLI Battlegroup's 2002 deployment to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom/Apollo in the war on terrorism would be the most recent case in point. Our 850-person infantry battlegroup conducted 6 months of offensive and defensive combat operations as an integral battalion within Task Force Rakassan - 3rd Brigade of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Aside from defending Kandahar Airfield from Al Qaida and Taliban attack, the battlegroup conducted 2 combat air assaults, 1 air-mechanized reconaissance-in-force, and multiple quick-reaction-force tasks to secure downed helicopters in "no man's land", destroy weapon and ammunition caches, etc. The "gloves were off" so to speak, and 3 PPCLI BG did everything that their U.S. counterparts did in terms of combat operations in Afghanistan.
Having participated in both combat and peace-support operations, I would humbly suggest that the the latter are even "hairier", due to the "unknown" factor. During the early days of a peace-support operation the level of uncertainty regarding chance "enemy" contact, the possibility of blundering into an unmarked minefield, etc, is much higher than a declared combat operation where you know up-front that you are going to deliberately seek contact with the enemy.
Go to the link below and scroll down to the second post by "Bartok5" to get a general feel for what it is like to launch on deliberate combat operations. Then ask yourself (honestly) if that is the type of thing you truly want to experience. My comments there may provide you with some food for thought:
http://www.socnetcentral.com/vb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=39191&perpage=20&pagenumber=1
As for the perception of the U.S. Army regarding the Canadian Army? My personal experience in having worked with many different U.S. forces (ranging from National Guard to Rangers, SF and SEALs) is that those who get to know us invariably hold our soldiers and units in extremely high regard. This was certainly the case in Afghanistan with regard to TF Rakassan, TF 11 (composite Special Operations Forces), and the foreign SOF that we dealt with. I have seen precisely the same level of respect for our units and personnel demonstrated by U.S. forces (and other allies) on various training exchanges both in Canada and abroad. Comparatively speaking, at unit level and below our Regular Force combat arms units are very, very good. The majority of our Army Reserve units are also quite capable of holding their own against any of our allies in terms of training and field performance.
Our biggest problem is that we are a very small Army, with rapidly eroding combat capabilities as far as the ability to prosecute medium to high-intensity warfighting operations is concerned. The replacement of our main battle tanks with a fewer number of far less capable "mobile gun systems", the elimination of several integral combat support capabilities within our infantry battalions for reasons of "economy", and various other "Army Transformation" initiatives will soon render our Army fit for only low-intensity combat operations against a degraded "non-peer" enemy. We will still be capable of participating in medium-intensity combat operations within a coalition context (eg. Op Iraqi Freedom), but will be limited to secondary supporting roles such as flank and rear-area security, reconnaissance, etc. Unless of course, the coalition allocates armour and attack helicopter support to the Canadian contingent for specific operations.
Is the deliberate down-grade of our Army's combat capability a "bad thing"? That is a topic which has been debated in numerous other threads on this board. Will it "hurt" our excellent reputation in the eyes of our allies? Not if we demonstrate the political/national willingness to contribute high-quality forces for the types of low-intensity combat and peace-support operations that our Army will soon be optimized to undertake. When it comes to earning the continued respect of our allies, participating in whatever capacity we can as a nation is far more important than having a full-spectrum combat capability that never deploys because we lack the political will to support our friends. Let's just hope that our government doesn't bury it's head in the sand the next time our international friends come calling. THAT is what will cause a significant erosion of the respect that our allies currently hold for the Canadian Army.
A final though concerning the quality of training and pace of activity that you would experience as a soldier. I can only speak to the Infantry, as that is where my experience lies. Suffice it to say that the training you would receive as a Canadian Army "line" infantryman exceeds that of your U.S. Army counterpart at virtually every level of your career progression. One of the virtues of having an extremely small Army is that Canadian soldiers must be comprehensively cross-trained because we do not have the luxury of sufficient manpower to allow "specialization" (read, limited abilities training) like our U.S. friends. A corporal in the U.S. Army infantry will have been trained in basic infantry skills and most likely one "sub-speciality" - radio operator, or driver, or machine gunner, or Bradley gunner, etc. He is expected to perform that specific "sub-specialty" job, and pretty much that job only. His Canadian infantry corporal equivalent (in terms of similar length of service) will have typically been cross-trained as a driver, a machinegunner, a radio operator, and likely more. The Canadian corporal is expected to be able to perform any of those functions on a flexible basis, as the task at hand dictates. The Canadian corporal may have already received junior leadership training, and has undoubtedly served as a Section (Squad) second-in-command. Furthermore, in my experience the Canadian Corporal will have been encouraged and permitted by his leaders to exercise considerable initiative in the execution of his duties. The same cannot be said of his U.S. counter-part.
As for a lifestyle of sitting around all day and playing cards while waiting for something to happen? I don't know what unit "Without Warning" is serving in, but that certainly hasn't been my recent experience. The days of endless "garrison routine" are long over in the Regular Army infantry battalions that I am familiar with. If anything, the troops of today are TOO busy with an endless cycle of MEANINGFUL training and taskings. Ask any soldier in 3 PPCLI how much "down-time" he or she has had over the past 2 years (including the post-Afghan "reconstitution" year) and I think you will find that there wasn't much opportunity to sit around playing cards or doing TOETs "for the 100th time". Service tempo varies by unit, and is often a function of leadership. If there are slow periods, then it is incumbent upon the unit leadership (at ALL levels) to develop and execute innovative, interesting and useful training to fill the gaps between scheduled deployments and major training activities. It doesn't take much in the way or imagination or resources to throw together a 48-hour platoon fighting patrol in the training area adjacent to most unit lines. Have a "slow" afternoon on the schedule? Fine - throw on your rucksacks and go for a 15 km CROSS-COUNTRY orienteering march with rotating responsibility for navigating the next leg. Or throw together a mini "mil-skills" competition with weapons handling, combat first aide, observation/detection skills, knots and lashings, stalking, etc, etc. The bottom line is that if you find yourself sitting on your *** or doing unnecessarily repetitive training, then nothing precludes even the most junior soldier from exercising some initiative and floating a realistic and achievable training proposal up the chain of command. Even a "no imagination required" day in the Small Arms Trainer is better than a game of euchre - at least to those who are suitably motivated to actually DO something about improving their soldier skills.
For what it's worth....
Mark C
