GBAD - The return of 'FOBS'

[quadrapiper]

I don’t know how many recruits you netting with the call to defend the Winnipeg Airport. Contrary to your assertion, the time we actually did have a surplus in recruits was when we were engaged in combat operations in recruiting - young people want adventure not to be used as security guards. Now for my next point.

Tangentially, haven't seen much being made of Latvia in recruiting material. "Hey 20-somethings, want to do Army Stuff™, GTFO of Nanaimo, and get to go to Europe while you're doing it? If yes, then (trades) are for you!"

As far as BDF but for civil sites... it's probably something that should be sandtabled in cooperation with everyone else likely to be involved once in a while, along with aid to the civil power, disaster response, etc. Not sure that, given ~40 training nights and ~10 weekends, that it's the highest training priority, and doesn't seem like a particularly compelling role to highlight for recruiting or retention.

Can't see, absent a real threat, airports being keen on air defence sites all over the place, especially if those sites are being used for training.

 

[markppcli]

Except in this case the threat was from terrorist attacks, which various regiments were tasked to deter. Heathrow's been through similar incidents since the 70s.

We don't have a domestic threat to airports like that, and likely never will.

Troops deployed at Heathrow against terror threat

More than 400 soldiers were drafted in to provide extra security at Heathrow Airport and a number of other unspecified sites across London today to combat a new terrorist threat.

www.independent.co.uk

Woah woah woah - are you suggesting that 1970-1990sUK had a different security reality than 2020s Canada ?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Woah woah woah - are you suggesting that 1970-1990sUK had a different security reality than 2020s Canada ?

Based on the number of 1000+lb IEDs detonated in each country by sophisticated international terrorist organizations I'll go way out on a limb here and say 'yes'

 

[Kirkhill]

Give me some indication that Canada is preparing for any security threats.

Note that the Government's priorities have not changed since 1945

Canada
North America
The North Atlantic
The World.

The Air Force got the memo a while ago.

 

[GR66]

If one gun can be acquired for dual purposes then what happens if.....

The RRCA equips all militia regiments with 6 gun 155mm Air Defence Batteries (Archer type self loaders on wheels). The same batteries can also supply General Support.

Similar rationale for infantry and cavalry to acquire 30/35mm cannons for local air defence - but the calibre is sufficiently well developed with a large variety of fuses and warheads to supply counters to personnel and vehicles of all sorts.

Beating the National Defence drum again - trying to sell the need for good equipment to Canadians that perceive no threat.

I believe that the UAS threat is not only real but can be demonstrated to the lads at the lake as real.

Disruptions to air travel are a civilian concern.

I'm reading the article on the hyper-velocity rounds being tested for the 155mm cannon very differently than you.

The service is pursuing such a capability as a potential munition for eliminating cheaper targets, rather than using high-end missiles for the same mission, Rasch told Defense News at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium.

Hypervelocity projectiles are “an order of magnitude cheaper than its equivalent missile,” Rasch said, “but can go really fast to close on the target.”

You seem to be making the assumption from your characterization of an Archer-type system potentially being a "155mm Air Defence Battery" that these hyper-velocity cannon rounds are intended for shooting down incoming missiles/drones/aircraft, etc.

I don't read it that way at all. To me they are simply testing a long range, very fast, indirect fire cannon round that can hit distant targets on the ground much cheaper and faster than a missile. The guidance systems they are talking about are to allow precision strike - possibly even against moving ground targets - not for taking out aerial targets.

 

[markppcli]

Give me some indication that Canada is preparing for any security threats.

Note that the Government's priorities have not changed since 1945

Canada
North America
The North Atlantic
The World.

The Air Force got the memo a while ago.

The Royal Canadian Air Force? At the direction of the Canadian government, elected by the people of Canada would seem to me to be an indication of Canada’s policy. That’s why we participate in NORAD.

Now if you excuse me me and the other barooom layabouts have to get ready to swan around Latvia.

 

[FJAG]

I'm reading the article on the hyper-velocity rounds being tested for the 155mm cannon very differently than you.

You seem to be making the assumption from your characterization of an Archer-type system potentially being a "155mm Air Defence Battery" that these hyper-velocity cannon rounds are intended for shooting down incoming missiles/drones/aircraft, etc.

I don't read it that way at all. To me they are simply testing a long range, very fast, indirect fire cannon round that can hit distant targets on the ground much cheaper and faster than a missile. The guidance systems they are talking about are to allow precision strike - possibly even against moving ground targets - not for taking out aerial targets.

I'm with you. My understanding of hypervelocity (HV) rounds is also quite different.

Time of flight isn't the key factor in a HV round. What is the issue is the terminal effect. A round arriving at a target at HV speed effectively plasticizes or liquifies the metal of both the round and the target providing tremendous penetrating power.

The way that the round achieves HV is by way of its narrow form and the fact that it's a sub calibre projectile similar to a discarding sabot or long rod penetrator. What makes the 155 particulalry attractive for HV is that it has a strong chamber designed to hurl much heavier projectiles thus having the ability to hurl a light sub calibre much further and faster. The M1299 had a 155L58 experimental barrel. That comes with a significantly stronger chamber than the current L39 or RM's L52. All the HV tests were done on the L58. It needs to be seen if the same performance can be duplicated on the L52 without major changes to either the chamber or the round.

Long story short, you do not need an HV projectile to knock down an aircraft. Aircraft are notoriously and relatively thin skinned and fragile. A proximity round that breaks into a web of multiple disruptive particles is very effective against most aircraft and even incoming missiles. That's not to say that an HV round may not be of value when used in a system that is already designed for and tied into an AD system, like most guns on ships are. Most field artillery is not that and again, there is a practicality involved in integrating AD functionality into a field artillery system. For example most of the on-board ammo storage of systems that could be adapted to AD, like Archer or an RCM turret for example, is limited. Then there's all the hardware and systems needed to rapidly slew field guns onto targets and engage while deployed in fd support roles. There are different principles for siting AD and Fd systems. It's not impossible but ... challenging.

I've said this before in about six different ways. AD is important. It's critical. It's not something that should be a secondary duty of some other system. It requires a dedicated organization with a high calibre command and control system and a variety of sensors and effectors.

 

[KevinB]

Let’s be honest. Until the CA reworks the PRes and vastly expanded AD acquisitions, it’s not a realistic concept to have AD units in the PRes, or C-UAS to that matter.

Canada doesn’t really need a dedicated continental defense Army - the RCN and the RCAF (and let’s be honest the USN and USAF) have that role so the Armies (and USMC down here) can be an expeditionary force so no one comes to North American shores to need to be sunk/shot down by the USN, USAF, RCAF and RCN in any sort of numbers.

Canada’s Army needs to be able to demonstrate sovereignty operations, but primarily the focus needs to be going to visit someone before they could visit you.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Give me some indication that Canada is preparing for any security threats.

Note that the Government's priorities have not changed since 1945

Canada
North America
The North Atlantic
The World.

The Air Force got the memo a while ago.

It is difficult to discuss in good faith when you use oblique comments, but I will try.

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and its constituent elements execute missions in accordance with the direction from the government. This is unremarkable in a democracy but also absolutely fundamental to having any understanding of why the CAF is set up a given way.

Strong Secure and Engaged with recent addition of True North Strong and Free are expressions of priorities. Sometimes priorities are not fully stated, and there can be times when a lower-priority task is getting all the attention because of the urgency of it.

Military force is one component of national policy, and this policy seeks to address goals as well as protect against threats. Those threats have two elements: capability to harm and intention to harm. Political science accepts that threat = capability x intention. If either is zero then the threat is zero.

Why do you think that the Canadian Army is in Europe? The CA's contribution to the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) was the result of a government policy decision taken in concert with the other nations of NATO. That was the memo the CA received and understood. The expansion of the eFP announced in 2020 and recently implemented was also a government decision taken in concert with NATO allies. Our training mission in Ukraine as part of Op UNIFIER was also very much a government decision. This is all very normal and appropriate.

The eFP mission will continue to drive the Canadian Army's training and capability development over the coming years even though it falls under the third priority Engaged in the World. This is due to the threat. This does not mean that eFP is the only driver. Since prediction is hard there are other things that the CA prepares for including domestic operations, defence of North America and other places in the world other than Europe.

The RCAF followed by the RCN has the largest share of dealing with actual credible external threats to Canada and North America due to our geographical location. Even then, both the RCAF and RCN have had significant operational commitments to the Engaged in the World line of effort (Air Policing in Romania, SNMG, Op HORIZON in the Indo-Pacific etc). Regarding the defence of Canada and North America, the CA has IRU in each Division for DOMOPS, the Arctic Response Company Group (ARCG) capability in each Division as well as the Territorial Battle Groups (TBG) that can augment/relieve IRU units. The GRTF concept includes the Arctic mission set, and the CA has been conducting exercises/operations in the North for a long time. So its not all-or-nothing.

To the topic at hand, the defence of Canadian airports should continue to be a law enforcement responsibility. There will, no doubt, be cross-over of CUAS lessons between the CAF and law enforcement, and specific events (G8/G20 springs to mind) may call for Requests for Assistance of specific CAF capabilities. That does not mean that we should constitute Army Reserve units with the task of defending Canadian commercial airports against UAS.

Security of arctic FOLs is indeed an appropriate mission set for CA units that does get practiced, but even then the operating environment and potential threats are very different from Ukraine.

Anyhoo.

 

[Kirkhill]

I promised myself I was going to bow out

And yet here I am.

For decades I have imbibed the mantra that the best way to prepare an army is to prepare it for the worst case scenario. You know what? I still kind of believe that.

But...

That army is built on a massive pyramid of supporting capabilities. The Canadian Army, to my mind, has ignored all that necessary support. It has, instead, focused on just the high end battle. And they have missed that mark both in terms of quantity and quality of forces. I will acknowledge the earnestness of the troops but they can't do their jobs without modern tools and lots of support.

The pieces missing from the pyramid are the very pieces that would make the army most visible and most useful to Canadians at home.

....

Better mobility 'key' to Army operations in the extremes of the high north: Official - Breaking Defense

The service has been conducting several R&D and procurement programs to prepare its vehicles to succeed in extreme weather conditions.

breakingdefense.com

Here is where Canadian planning should commence.

And here

"It would have been easier for us to just simply put a marker down, put a date down and it probably would have blunted some of the rhetoric and criticism that we faced," he said.

"But at the same time, I think — as I've said a number of times to our allies — I wanted to be able to come to them with a credible and verifiable path to two per cent for Canada."

That path will include acquiring a number of capabilities the new defence policy suggested were only possibilities: new equipment, such as submarines; an integrated air and missile defence system for Canada and North America; ground-based air defences to protect critical infrastructure from the kinds of attacks launched on Ukraine's electricity grid; long-range surface-to-surface and sea-launched missiles; modern, mobile artillery; and new tanks.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/bill-blair-nato-two-percent-defence-spending-1.7262356

 

[KevinB]

The Canadian Army, to my mind, has ignored all that necessary support. It has, instead, focused on just the high end battle.

I would strongly disagree

And they have missed that mark both in terms of quantity and quality of forces.

In theory Canada has a Corps of Army personnel, a modest Navy (that is rusting out - and the CSC will be arriving late) and the RCAF is in just slightly better shape than the RCN as it's main fighter is very long in the tooth.

As for Quantity and Quality - I think is unfair to not make a differentiation between personnel and equipment.

I will acknowledge the earnestness of the troops but they can't do their jobs without modern tools and lots of support.

It isn't just earnestness, it is also important to admit and acknowledge that the CAF has highly quality of troops for the most part.

The pieces missing from the pyramid are the very pieces that would make the army most visible and most useful to Canadians at home.

I tend to disagree with you significantly there, specifically for the CA as a true Armored Division isn't really useful at home, but it is very much necessary in this day and age.

....

Better mobility 'key' to Army operations in the extremes of the high north: Official - Breaking Defense

The service has been conducting several R&D and procurement programs to prepare its vehicles to succeed in extreme weather conditions.

breakingdefense.com

Here is where Canadian planning should commence.

ground-based air defences to protect critical infrastructure from the kinds of attacks launched on Ukraine's electricity grid
And here

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/bill-blair-nato-two-percent-defence-spending-1.7262356

Sell GBAD however you want but realistically GBAD isn't going to do shit for Canadians in Canada.
BMD and OTHR Radar yes - but trying to frame some sort of alternate reality where Canada's infrastructure is under any sort of threat like Ukraine is just insane.

 

[quadrapiper]

I'm with you. My understanding of hypervelocity (HV) rounds is also quite different.

Time of flight isn't the key factor in a HV round. What is the issue is the terminal effect. A round arriving at a target at HV speed effectively plasticizes or liquifies the metal of both the round and the target providing tremendous penetrating power.

The way that the round achieves HV is by way of its narrow form and the fact that it's a sub calibre projectile similar to a discarding sabot or long rod penetrator. What makes the 155 particulalry attractive for HV is that it has a strong chamber designed to hurl much heavier projectiles thus having the ability to hurl a light sub calibre much further and faster. The M1299 had a 155L58 experimental barrel. That comes with a significantly stronger chamber than the current L39 or RM's L52. All the HV tests were done on the L58. It needs to be seen if the same performance can be duplicated on the L52 without major changes to either the chamber or the round.

Long story short, you do not need an HV projectile to knock down an aircraft. Aircraft are notoriously and relatively thin skinned and fragile. A proximity round that breaks into a web of multiple disruptive particles is very effective against most aircraft and even incoming missiles. That's not to say that an HV round may not be of value when used in a system that is already designed for and tied into an AD system, like most guns on ships are. Most field artillery is not that and again, there is a practicality involved in integrating AD functionality into a field artillery system. For example most of the on-board ammo storage of systems that could be adapted to AD, like Archer or an RCM turret for example, is limited. Then there's all the hardware and systems needed to rapidly slew field guns onto targets and engage while deployed in fd support roles. There are different principles for siting AD and Fd systems. It's not impossible but ... challenging.

I've said this before in about six different ways. AD is important. It's critical. It's not something that should be a secondary duty of some other system. It requires a dedicated organization with a high calibre command and control system and a variety of sensors and effectors.

On top of that, not sure how much of the naval use of guns for AD is driven by a need to make everything shipboard cover as many tasks as possible, in ideally as low mass a way as possible, where a land-based system is much less constrained, and might only have a single nature of threat to counter.