Esprit de Corps and Fighting Spirit

[pbi]

Infanteer: that was a very fine post. I must admit that I have had to do a bit of thinking (but only a bit.....it's quite strenuous...).


After my post (the one you quoted), I got to wondering how accurate my thoughts about the USMC were. I called the Senior Marine here in the HQ(a Col of Marines), and went to see him for a bit to chat about all this. I feel confident now that I am pretty close to the mark. Regardless of that, I believe you have made some excellent points, which I will comment on.

Despite the fact that we train to fight wars, and by all accounts of our allies, are very capable when we are fielded to do so, the Canadian public still views the CF as some sort of Peacekeeping Force.  In order to pander to public perceptions of the Military, the government puts out defence policies that advocate "peacekeeping brigades", purchases equipment that is vital for "peacekeeping missions", and tends to avoid warfighting in Iraq or in the Pashtun mountains and instead ops to be the police force for the Mayor of Kabul, Hamid Karzai.

I think you are right. The shameful attempt to hide Medak Pocket exemplifies this at its worst.(However, I believe that has since been more than put right by Her Excellency the GG.)  WRT your comment on the present role of TFK, let's be very careful not to appear in any way to denigrate our soldiers, who are at this moment in a potentially lethal environment, should the threats of the ACF to disrupt the Presidential election materialize. Being in Kabul is NOT being in Nicosia. However, in principle I agree with you that we should have stayed with OEF: we would be very welcome and could do well.

This is what I was aiming at with no mission.  I don't doubt that many good soldiers have questioned their commitment to the forces due to the fact that they see their mission of warfighting, their sense of purpose, constantly overridden by an oblivious Canadian public and a docile Government.  I bet you guys have said, "Why the heck should I give a rats *** about staying fit and practicing platoon fighting drills, I'm just getting deployed to Bosnia for ROTO 31 to go sit in coffee shops..."  Of course this is an exaggeration, but there are many in the Forces, especially in the CS and CSS, that probably do not possess the requisite stamina and capabilities to operate beyond a mature theater in a peacekeeping mission (Case in point: I remember a news story about the trouble 1 SVC Battalion was having prior to deployment on OP APOLLO).

OK-I'm with you now. On the latter point I talked specifically with the Col about the Marine claim of "every Marine a rifleman". While he stated that a Marine Infantryman go on to take more training after Basic, he was confident that CSS marines could fight and not just in perimeter defense. What they could not do, he said, would be to be highly proficient in Infantry tactical leadership if they were, say, a truck company or a supply unit. However, he expected that they could fire all the company weapons and execute basic tactics. He also pointed out that the US Army, after the Jessica Lynch incident, has embarked on a crash course of combat training for its CSS troops; something the Marines would not have to do.

Due to the amphibious warfare background that engenders them as the "go-to-guys", I would argue that the Marines in particular know that they are at the tip of the spear of US foreign policy.  What is also important is that the US public knows this, respects this, and supports this.  I would argue that this characteristic is not as strong in Canada, even though we operate under the same sort of "fire-brigade" role.

You are on to something here. However, you might be interested to know that when I was in Quantico 96-97, one of the biggest complaints of the US types was that their public neither understood nor supported them. I laughed out loud.

I agree that "niche rolling" the Forces is the wrong direction.  The more you specialize your force to some target, the more irrelevant it becomes in the face of contingencies other then that which one's niche.  As well, this increases the variety of asymmetrical vulnerabilities present in ones force structure, giving potential badguys more ways of of striking at us  (Tanks, we are peacekeepers, who needs tanks?!?).

This is the false belief that the world will only demand of us what we are ready and willing to give.

I'm a big fan of the way the Marines do things as well.  They are a truly joint force (what the CF tried and failed to do with Unification) that intergrates land, naval, and air assets into a combined arms warfighting team.  The MEU(SOC) offers a combined arms approach that perhaps the CF could guide its force structure off of.

In my chat with the USMC Colonel today, we agreed that although the USMC is four divisions strong, its operational focus is the MEU(SOC) or in other words a battle group. So, we can play in that game too, if we have the will, and we focus on the goal.

This is relevent to Canada because we have been an expeditionary force since the Boer War. 

My point exactly.

Agree.  We must build our Forces to fit our uniquely Canadian situation.

And I believe we can do it. Some will immediately lean back from the precipice, protesting: "Oh-the politicians will never allow that". I say we can do it , intelligently and with well thought out justifications, and actually get them onside. This is a huge leadership challenge, but we are getting a higher percentage of our senior leaders with op experience, including with our Allies, than at any time for decades. Cheers.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Good novel, Infanteer!

One other thing that the Marines have done well is market themselves.  You never see the US president going off Air Force 1, or his helicopters, without Marines around.  They are at every US embassy.  I'm sure that, in your travels, you've seen US embassies, compare that with the Canadian embassies.  They are everywhere, in the very fine looking Blues.  (Hm, maybe we should have kept our patrols?)  While we in the last few years seem to change our uniforms to darn often, the Marine dress uniform has endured.

The Marines have one more thing that we seem to lack.  They have an identifiable commandant, front and centre.  Even more, he is front, centre, in your face, and leading by example.  Every Marine has a standard to maintain, something like our "universality of service" which is not universal in our army.  How many fat, out of shape Marines have you ever seen?  Compare that with what you see leaving NDHQ or Louis St Laurent at the end of a working day!

The Marines have much to emulate, that is sure.  Just how much, is the question. 

Our unification plan under given us by Hellyer would not work, how much does a submariner identify with the Vandoos?  Should he even try?  The Marines do all have a purpose, seperate from the army, navy and air force.  And while they own their own army, navy and air force, they are structured to support the ground element, unlike our forces.  So, I don't think that reforming our Forces into the Marine model would work, there is a whole bunch of stuff that would work.

 

[pbi]

Lance Wiebe: I also do not think that a complete repeat of Unification under the guise of emulating the Marines would work. What I do believe is that our Army should adopt some of the good traits we have all commented on. Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

WRT your comment on the present role of TFK, let's be very careful not to appear in any way to denigrate our soldiers, who are at this moment in a potentially lethal environment, should the threats of the ACF to disrupt the Presidential election materialize. Being in Kabul is NOT being in Nicosia. However, in principle I agree with you that we should have stayed with OEF: we would be very welcome and could do well.

Sorry, that was the biting sarcasm of a late night post aimed at our National policies, it was in no way aimed at the guys with their boots on the ground.  Perhaps this is what angers me more though; with our limited resources our government has put our soldiers into an extremely dangerous job that is on the peripheral of the War on Terror, and we've done the job admirably and lost very good men in the process of doing so.  I would rather see our small commitment at the main effort with the Americans as we were in Op APOLLO instead of being "tucked away" (in an equally dangerous location, no leass) for political reasons.  In a political sense, Afghanistan democracy is a farce; when ISAF is all said and done with and Afghanistan regresses back to the tribalism that it has been for millenia, I really don't want to say "what was that for?".

However, we in the military will remember that even when the cards were not in our favour, we performed our duties honourably and I think we can live with that.

You are on to something here. However, you might be interested to know that when I was in Quantico 96-97, one of the biggest complaints of the US types was that their public neither understood nor supported them. I laughed out loud.

Ha.  If only they knew.  We in Canada are the definition of "public neither understood nor supported them."

This is a huge leadership challenge, but we are getting a higher percentage of our senior leaders with op experience, including with our Allies, than at any time for decades. Cheers.

I'm with you on this one.  One thing I can say is that, to Scott Taylor's lament, I am continually impressed by some of the senior leadership that I have come into contact with in my relativly short career.  We are starting to see guys get promoted up with six or seven gongs on their chest, indicating that our leadership has a vast amount of real operational experience.  All hope is not lost yet!

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Interesting thread - I wish that I had found it earlier.   The MEF or CEF idea is not a new one - in fact it was proposed as a viable option for the re-write of the Strategic Operating Concept - and sadly not accepted.   A few comments:

Infanteer said:

But lower level commanders can do certain things in the meantime to help build up the notion of fighting spirit.   Smart commanders can analyse current world trends and study the most probable sources of conflict, highlighting the enemies we may fight in the immediate future and building training around that.   This, perhaps combined with the notion of specialization mentioned above, can help to arm soldiers with a sense of mission.   As well, they can design innovative and difficult training that challenges the soldiers abilities (free play is a good example); this can be aided through the gradual "raising of the bar" through the notion that we are all volunteers.

In the planning for the BTE (03), it was directed that the scenario and exercise design "look an awful lot like a Canadian Brigade or Battle Group securing the flank of an American or British Division advancing into Iraq", which is essentially exactly how we wrote it.   The exercise was designed to be as challenging as possible within a rather narrow margin of safety.   As it turned out, the troops that were declared OPRED on that exercise (from a warfighting perspective) went somewhere else - but the point is that the Comd had identified a probable scenario, and trained to it.   What is even more impressive is the fact that he did so against the counsel of many of his peers and certainly of many members of the LS - I know this because we spent an inordinate amount of time in Jan 03 on the 19th floor justifying the exercise.   So do not dispair - their are a number of enlightened commanders out there who know what needs to be done, and have the willpower and fortitude to see that it is done.

Infanteer also said:

How to promote fighting spirit without engendering regressive "elitism"?   My guess would be to ensure that all soldiers, regardless of their role, are taught a Professional Ethos that engenders the notion of the disciplined, professional fighting soldier.   Attitudes that promote the notion that specialized units do not need the "inferior" abilities of the rest of the army must be watched for and vigilantly stamped out by NCO's.   Soldiers in specialized roles will develop a good "esprit de corps"; we must ensure that this high level of cohesion and motivation is focussed in the right direction by promoting the notion that their specialized status fulfills a unique and required role within the greater team effort of the Army.

One of the problems of elitism is that it is relative; you need someone to compare yourself to.   It is hard to judge how good you are without others with whom to compete.   And there is the rub.   How do you engender that sense of pride without it coming at someone else's expense?   The line is very fine.   I served in 3 VP from 98-00, and it was a kick*** unit.   We had trained very hard under a demanding and professional CO who had quite frankly turned the unit around in a very short period of time.   We were good, and beginning to realise it.   In retrospect, I now realise that I found myself looking to other units in a less flattering light - and beyond the normal "track toad" type of stuff that comes with the territory.   Perhaps I am more venal than most, or perhaps I misread the situation, but then again perhaps not.

So how does one develop esprit de corps whilst avoiding the pitfalls of elitism?   I quite frankly don't know.   I do however realise that the line must be found.

 

[LowRider]

Ex Coelis,


Unfortunately, there are a whole host of reasons why we have "lost" the collective combat-capability edge over the past 10 years or so.   Starting with an institution that increasingly promotes the "rights" of the individual over the needs of the group.   Since when was "the man" more important than the collective mission?   I don't know precisely where we have collectively gone so wrong, but I can see the current results -    And quite frankly, they are sickening.  

Instititution that promotes the rights of the individual over the needs of the group?You just described Canada.The whole problem lies within our extremely socialist government.A generation worth of social engineering has taken it's toll,it was only a matter of time before it spread into the CF as well.
If you want to fix the morale problems in the CF,our political leadership must be fixed first.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Instititution that promotes the rights of the individual over the needs of the group?You just described Canada.The whole problem lies within our extremely socialist government.A generation worth of social engineering has taken it's toll,it was only a matter of time before it spread into the CF as well.
If you want to fix the morale problems in the CF,our political leadership must be fixed first.

Hang on a second - surely the military will always, to some degree (and one could argue over what degree is appropsiate) reflect the society that it is charged with defending? 

 

[LowRider]

That is true PPCLI guy,but i'm sure you will agree that military service takes a differnt sort of mindset than the typical Canadian.I may not be full time,but i would consider my personal values and beliefs outside the typical Canadian norm.
My point is that typical "Canadian values" are for the most part a reflection of Liberal propaganda.
If you ask the average Canadian what makes them proud to be Canadian,you will get the typical CBC response(multiculturalisim,health care,tolerance..etc.),stir in a smug sense of moral superiority and anti-Americanisim and you have the average Canadian eh!
Anyway i'm getting to a point here.You can't blame leadership in the CF because the problem starts at the top.