Well, in light of pbi's post, perhaps I will amend the notion of "have no mission".
There is the complaint that we "have no mission". Well, since we have been using the USMC as a good example of a corps with very strong sense of identity and esprit, I'd like to suggest that the Marines "have no mission" either, but do just fine.
By "no mission" I mean what I assume posters mean when they say we have "no mission": no nice, chunky, delineated, focused task on a certain piece of ground against a certain foe, ala 4 CMBG in the old days.
We in the Army know exactly what we kit up for; to fight and win wars. However, perhaps the notion of "have no mission" would be the disjunction that exists between the mission we train from day one and the way the Canadian public perceives us and the Canadian government chooses to use us.
Despite the fact that we train to fight wars, and by all accounts of our allies, are very capable when we are fielded to do so, the Canadian public still views the CF as some sort of Peacekeeping Force. In order to pander to public perceptions of the Military, the government puts out defence policies that advocate "peacekeeping brigades", purchases equipment that is vital for "peacekeeping missions", and tends to avoid warfighting in Iraq or in the Pashtun mountains and instead ops to be the police force for the Mayor of Kabul, Hamid Karzai.
This is what I was aiming at with no mission. I don't doubt that many good soldiers have questioned their commitment to the forces due to the fact that they see their mission of warfighting, their sense of purpose, constantly overridden by an oblivious Canadian public and a docile Government. I bet you guys have said, "Why the hell should I give a rats ass about staying fit and practicing platoon fighting drills, I'm just getting deployed to Bosnia for ROTO 31 to go sit in coffee shops..." Of course this is an exaggeration, but there are many in the Forces, especially in the CS and CSS, that probably do not possess the requisite stamina and capabilities to operate beyond a mature theater in a peacekeeping mission (Case in point: I remember a news story about the trouble 1 SVC Battalion was having prior to deployment on OP APOLLO).
This is where we need the "sense of mission"; we need the views of the fighting soldier (we exist to fight battles and win wars) and the Canadian government and public (we need the military to further our national interests in
all contingencies along the spectrum of conflict) to become more inline to ensure that our soldiers no that what they are training for is in line with what they will be utilized for.
Well, the Marines as a Corps don't really have that either: they are America's fire brigade. They are assigned to the various CINCs, and of course they are fighting in places like OIF and here in OEF, but that is specifically mission dependent. As a past Commandant once said: "America doesn't need a Marine Corps-It wants a Marine Corps" It doesn't need a Marine Corps because they are not really wired to any specific long-term mission: that is overwhelmingly an Army task. The Marines are not focused on doing A mission: they are focused on doing ANY mission, and not all of those are conventional warfighting by any stretch of the imagination.
They have a sense of mission, that of the fire-brigade. The term "Send in the Marines" had to come from somewhere
. The United States Marine Corps is blessed with numerous factors that engender a high degree of "esprit de corps" within their units:
- They have traditionally searched for missions that the Army wouldn't take in order to prove to the Pentagon that they were still relevent, this sense of having to show that they were different then the Army in order to avoid being rolled up has led to the Marines being able to identify themselves as a unique part of the American Defence establishment.
- They are American's "Naval Infantry", their existence is still centered around littoral warfare and their organization (the MEU/MEB/MEF) is formulated with the notion of Amphibious Operations.
- Also, as Naval Infantry, they, like the Royal Marines, possess a very acute sense of history and identity and have the (IMO) damn finest dress uniforms of any Armed Force in the World
.
What have these characteristics given the USMC? I would argue that being a Marine is a mission in itself. My buddy who just joined the US Army said most recruits he met were intimidated by US Marines because they were "hardcore". The Marines, like US Army Rangers and Navy SEALs, are glamorized by the US public and for the most part US Marines (and servicemen in general) are treated well when they are in the public in uniform.
Due to the amphibious warfare background that engenders them as the "go-to-guys", I would argue that the Marines in particular know that they are at the tip of the spear of US foreign policy. What is also important is that the US public knows this, respects this, and supports this. I would argue that this characteristic is not as strong in Canada, even though we operate under the same sort of "fire-brigade" role.
I would argue that fixation on a certain mission is not necessarily healthy at all. It could be said that it cramped the thinkin of our Army in a manner that we have only recently begun to shake off. As well, armies (especially small armies) that become overly focused on one mission actually become of limited use for anything else. The Scandinavian and Swiss armies are IMHO good examples of this. They are very heavily (almost exclusively) focused on territorial defense operations, with highly developed and focused schemes giving certain battalions specific tasks, etc. Very focused, and very inward-looking. Their collective combat experience, or even ops in high-risk areas, since WWII is minimal to none. Whatever else can be said about us, you cannot say that. Although, having said that, I am leery of this endless prattle that we need to fixate on peacekeeping missions.
I agree that "niche rolling" the Forces is the wrong direction. The more you specialize your force to some target, the more irrelevant it becomes in the face of contingencies other then that which one's niche. As well, this increases the variety of asymmetrical vulnerabilities present in ones force structure, giving potential badguys more ways of of striking at us (Tanks, we are peacekeepers, who needs tanks?!?).
However, I put forward the notion of specialization in order to bring forward the idea that different parts of the Army would focus on different aspects of warfighting. As opposed to the USMC or the RM, the Canadian Army must maintain a broader outlook due to the fact that it is the nations ground-fighting force. Some sort of specialization could give different units of the Army an extra-incentive to building a higher degree of capabilities and thus forming greater cohesion. If units were specialized to some extent, they could do so with the knowledge that they were "unique" within the Army and are the "go-to-guys" if Canada is required to send troops in that capacity. This specialization does not even have to be permenant, it can be a revolving tasking. This is what the British Army does; when I was in Bosnia I trained with the 1st Battalion, the Royal Scots. They were just coming off a cycle as a "Jungle Warfare" unit spent training in Brunei and Belize (plus four days R&R in Cancun during American Spring Break
). They had just converted to a Mountain Ops Role, hence the "Mountainous and Difficult Terrain" Cadre was hosted by them and I was fortunate enough to attend. Here is how the Brits task their infantry:
http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/organisation/roles.htm
Anyways, just throwing an idea out under the notion of further developing "esprit de corps". Not everybody can be an Airborne soldier, but perhaps we can let them be something.
And, IMHO, you cannot say it simply because we have not been wired to one job (Germany aside, and even then...). We have (in a haphazard way) been expeditionary and often "firefighters". I would submit to you that there are very, very few armies as small as ours that are as flexible and capable (at low levels), or have the same "can do" that I see in our little force as compared to others of its size.(Or, even bigger...) Now, we also know that sometimes this "can do" kicks us in the ***, but we have it all the same.
For my vote, I do not want to see us specialize, or tie ourselves to one nice, intellectually and doctrinally digestible mission or role. I believe that we need to build an Army very much like the USMC, with all the good attributes that various posters here have identified in that Corps, set within a truly joint Armed Forces that can mount, project, sustain, protect and recover modest but capable Army forces. In other words, do what we have been doing, but better.
I'm a big fan of the way the Marines do things as well. They are a truly joint force (what the CF tried and failed to do with Unification) that intergrates land, naval, and air assets into a combined arms warfighting team. The MEU(SOC) offers a combined arms approach that perhaps the CF could guide its force structure off of.
As opposed to the ideas I proposed above, perhaps the "fire-brigade specialization", such as the USMC's role, could help to further a "sense of mission" and esprit de corps within the Canadian Forces. There is a bit of a discussion about this starting over in this thread:
http://army.ca/forums/threads/18919/post-99968;topicseen#msg99968
As well, Maj Lizotte (another attendant of Quantico) wrote an article in a recent Doctrine and Training Bulletin that argued for forming the CF around a MEU(SOC) capability.
http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/adtb/vol_6/ADTB_vol6.2_e.pdf
Anyways, perhaps our military could take this path. Looking at the MEU(SOC) roles provided by Colonel Daniel Bolger in
Death Ground: Today's American Infantry in Battle I see twenty-two capabilities:
- Amphibious Assault
- Amphibious Raid
- Limited Objection Attack - Deception Raid
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Security Operations
- Military Operations in Urban Terrain
- Seizure/Destruction of Offshore Platforms
- Reinforcement Operations
- Show of Force Operations
- Humanitarian Relief Operations
- Civic Action Operations
- Mobile Training Teams
- Specialized Demolitions Operations
- Initial Terminal Guidance
- Fire Support Control
- Tactical Recovery of Aircraft, Equipment and Personal
- Clandestine Recovery Operations
- Clandestine Reconnaissance and Surveillance-Counterintelligence
- Signal Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations
- In-extremis Hostage Rescue
Proficiency in these roles involve every unit of the Army, from a Service Battalion to the JTF. These missions also incorporate Naval and Air assets as well. I believe the kicker is that these are to be specialized in an expeditionary setting. This is relevent to Canada because we have been an expeditionary force since the Boer War. Moving in this direction would involve big changes in the way all three branches of the CF, both Regular and Reserve, operate. This would require closer, joint doctrine between the branches of the of the CF to ensure a maximum level of cohesion and interoperability between Naval, Air, and Ground assets. As well, the government would have to commit itself in foreign and defence policy to staying away from "mission-creep"; to have rotating cycles of expeditionary units locked down in the Balkans seriously hampers the flexible, global nature of such a force. A re-rolling of Army, Navy, and Air Force tasks could look something like this:
Army: Reg Force units focus on ATOF cycle of expeditionary readiness. Workup involves preparing for capabilities required while serving as "Canadian Expeditionary Force" (where have we heard that before?) such as 22 MEU(SOC) capabilities defined above. The Army Reserve assumes a dual role of Homeland Defence and Sustainment and Follow on Forces (perhaps deployment in mature theaters?) which means that alot of the heavier capabilities will reside with them.
Navy: Reg Force units focus on ATOF cycle of expeditionary readiness. Cycles of Naval Task forces must be ready to provide worldwide support as the Naval Component of the standing "Canadian Expeditionary Force"; they provide fire support (?), logistics and sustainment, offshore command and control, transportation, and as a possible mobile base for initial entry of CEF land components into conflict area. The Naval Reserve assumes Homeland Defence role and conducts sovereignty patrols and works with Coast Guard for border enforcement.
Air Force: Reg Force units focus on ATOF cycles of expeditionary readiness. Cycles of Air Expeditionary Forces must be ready to provide global support as Air Component of standing CEF; the Air Force provides Tactical Air Superiority and CAS (hopefully from a Naval Asset), Strategic logistics and sustainment (hopefully with C-17), and initial entry of Ground Forces into conflict area (Airborne drops, Air Assaults from friendly airbases, etc, etc). Hopefully, the combination of the VTOL JSF and a suitable attack helicopter can provide the required close in support that the Ground Component of the CEF would require; High Flying Air Superiority Fighters like the CF-18 can be left to the reserves. The Air Reserve will have the task of Homeland Defence (eg: patrols over Canadian Airspace with F-18).
Corresponding readiness cycles that incorporate all CF units will give the CEF Commander a wide variety of resources to react to any contingency that affects the national interest of Canada. In a situation like Afghanistan, he can deploy Ground/Air Forces to support coalition efforts while using naval logistical support in the Indian Ocean. The next cycle may require that a Canadian Naval-borne task force appear of the Coast of Africa to evacuate an embassy and deploy a force to prevent violent civil war. The next cycle may have to commit a landing force to Iraq, relying on forces inserted and supported from Naval and Air assets (think Umm Qasr and Basra). The point is that this is a truly flexible force structure with a doctrine that supports this expeditionary nature.
Why does this proposal fit into our discussion on fighting spirit? A structure like this can arm our military, from top to bottom, with "sense of mission"; that of the "fire brigade". Every soldier, regardless of their trade, knows what he is preparing for; the Canadian public and the government, well aware of who is tasked as Canadian Expeditionary Force, has a clear notion of the forces available for commitment and what they are trained to carry out. Highly visible expeditionary forces send the image of a military that aggressively pursues the national interest, whether it be a sudden humanitarian operation or acting with coalition forces in the "War on Terror". As well, the reserves are given a definite and unique mandate of Homeland Defence to focus their efforts towards; no more of this ad hoc, "farmteam" for badly-stretched Reg Force units.
I am sure you guys have you own ideas on how to rebuild "esprit de corps" through organizational reform and restructure; I'd be delighted to hear your input.
To be a truly expeditionary force requires an esprit and an ethos that sustains the force no matter what the mission, especially when (just like the USMC) it may be difficult to identify an immediate threat to our sovereignty, but we are going to risk Canadian lives anyway. That, IMHO still requires some building in our force, but it must be done in an intelligent way, not just by sucking up all US methods lock stock and barrel. I do not believe our soldiers would respond to some of these measures such as running around singing, etc. but that is just my opinion. Cheers.
Agree. We must build our Forces to fit our uniquely Canadian situation.
Anyways, I'm starting to babble. I'll turn the mike over to the floor for comments.
Cheers,
Infanteer