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NCS_Eng said:I take it you've never worked in a PMO before?
Too true!
Gen. Eisenhower and his staff didn't have to calculate regional benefits and offsets for the South Downs, Normandy and Pas de Calais.
DND may be shopping for new subs, sources say
- Thread starter GAP
- Start date
Too true!
Gen. Eisenhower and his staff didn't have to calculate regional benefits and offsets for the South Downs, Normandy and Pas de Calais.
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I agree with Ex-Dragoon and Navy_Blue, considering how long the acquisition and work up to full operational process can take, the sooner we get the ball rolling the better. I for one am rooting for the Navy getting the 212/214 or Skorpene.
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A long neglected article in the Canadian Defense Quarterly proposed a long range conventional sub built around the design principles of the Italian "Foca" class midget submarine. Basically, the hull is made up of a series of donut shaped segments joined together something like a stack of tires laid on their sides. Each "donut" is quite strong in compression (useful when diving) and also serves as a container for fuel or oxygen (high pressure air, since LOX is pretty tricky stuff), allowing the use of fairly conventional engines in AIP mode. The use of these donut shaped sections also provides some of the same benefits of stand off space that Soviet era double hull construction offered.
While Foca's are quite small, scaling up vastly increases the amount of fuel or air that can be carried, while the construction is relatively simple compared to more conventional. Conventional submarines built this way can have quite long ranges running submerged using AIP. There are no electronic copies I can find, but here is the reference:
1990:01319 Alternative submarines -- minitruders and green nukes Cdr (rtd) Richard Compton-Hall RN Canadian Defence Quarterly
Offers advice to the Canadian government on submarine types and capabilities best suited to Canada's maritime needs.
Category Codes: J12, A2.02
Keywords: SUBMARINE
Geographical Index: CANADA
While Foca's are quite small, scaling up vastly increases the amount of fuel or air that can be carried, while the construction is relatively simple compared to more conventional. Conventional submarines built this way can have quite long ranges running submerged using AIP. There are no electronic copies I can find, but here is the reference:
1990:01319 Alternative submarines -- minitruders and green nukes Cdr (rtd) Richard Compton-Hall RN Canadian Defence Quarterly
Offers advice to the Canadian government on submarine types and capabilities best suited to Canada's maritime needs.
Category Codes: J12, A2.02
Keywords: SUBMARINE
Geographical Index: CANADA
Although I must stress that it is entirely speculation, but one month earlier I had engaged in one of my once every couple of decades or so exercises in offering my advice/opinions on national defence strategy to the government (in this case sent to the PMO). As it pertained to submarines,
Arctic Class Submarines [‘Hecla’ Class(?), 10-12 Units]
Roles:
Submarine Systems Development, Coastal & Arctic Sovereignty Patrols, Survey & Scientific Research, ASW-ASuW-Mine Warfare
Displacement:
700-1000 tons, Advanced Steels or Aluminum Alloys or Alternate Hybrids, Multiple Pressure Hull Zones (actually selection of materials and hull design could evolve through series production, and may permit somewhat unique units in the class); diving depth of up to 500 Metres (could very throughout the class due to technical, budgetary, or cost-benefit considerations)
Complement:
14-25 (through automation and/or restriction of systems based on their manning requirements).
Safety:
Multiple Escape Trunks (integrated with pressure hull arrangements), Mutual SSAR Capable, Distributed Power Supply & Access, primary propulsion driven Air-Water Jets for ice boring, cutting, and clearing, back-up ice boring auger
Propulsion:
10MW Ducted Propellers and Steering Vents, retractable Hydroplanes; Isotope and/or Aluminum-Air (atmospheric and/or compressed) Fuel Cells, NiMH/Li Ion Batteries, Stationary Hydro Power Regeneration, Long Range Transit Auxiliary Fuel Cell Pods; 2-10 Knots Cruise Speed, 10-25 Knots Long Range Snorkelling (Transit Pods), 30-40 Knots Dash Speed.
Weapons Outfit:
4x4 Missile/Torpedo and/or 2-4 UUV Canisters; abeam aft, diagonally inclined, launchable in either direction. (Early boats would emphasize Arctic surveillance and survey functions and have no armament installed as commissioned, weapons being installed on a limited scale as the class matures).
Program Notes:
Small coastal submarines suitable for all three ocean fleets, supplementing and succeeding the 'Victoria' class submarines (adding 4 units for Arctic deployment, replacing on a 1-1 basis, adding 4 further units).
A long term program producing one minimum sized boat about ever 3 years at a average cost of ~$150-200 million/year, although likely requiring assorted start-up infrastructure costs in the range of $500-1000 million; Canada already has an established but limited industrial/technological skills base in the submaritime field, which this program would further consolidate and enhance without entrenching a big boat infrastructure.
Program strategy to follow the MCDV model of platform construction without overemphasis on immediate or complete outfit of advanced systems and subsequent project budgetary inflation, with some emphasis towards the build up of hull numbers.
The small size of these boats would allow them to extend their Arctic patrol endurance for prolonged periods year round from nearby shore depots, air transport, and any SOE frigates and auxiliaries operating in or dispatched to the area. Submarines deployed to the Arctic in winter or far under the prevailing icepack would by necessity operate in pairs, given the time and distance from rescue and assistance beyond mutual support from the other boat.
Icebreaking air-water jets would draw large quantities of compressive power from the primary propulsion outfit at little displacement penalty; a pair of mechanical ice augers could provide emergency provision of air to boats under the ice. The boats could temporarily surface and/or dock/anchor anywhere in stable ice of substantial thickness, and even continue operations as UUV/UAV control stations while concealed and protected by the ice.
Isotope power cells could provide low levels of electrical energy for continuous and emergency power. Although likely having a very low power to weight ratio, the energy required of them need only be sufficient to maintain basic life support & critical systems power, with any practical and affordable additional power being available for the chemical storage batteries or low speed (1-3 Knots) propulsion. [Microelectronically captured energy from selected (surplus or bred) radioisotopes heavily encased in solid inert multiple cell units].
NiMH and Li Ion batteries would multiply available battery power on a reduced margin of total displacement over conventional lead-acid cells; lithium cells have a extremely small but statistically significant tendency to corrode and catch fire, but remedial safety monitoring and fault isolating that is not economically feasible for most commercial uses could mitigate the problem. Any battery system could and should be tested and monitored on limited trials with Victoria class boats, quite possibly on HMCS Chicoutimi with due respect for the fatal incident that occurred on this boat.
It might be possible to develop a grade of aluminum 'fuel' that can be operated at low power levels from oxygen extracted from seawater.
Power sources and ice clearing equipment could be trialled and/or retrofitted on a limited scale on all Victoria class submarines, even though they have limited hull life remaining and an unfortunate history of maintenance issues and should be retired as soon as practical.
The small size of these boats would limit their capabilities as autonomous ocean range vessels, but it is high unlikely they would be deployed globally outside of a major naval task force; larger 2000+ ton vessels could be built within 2-3 years under an emergency global war shipbuilding program.
Canada has an overcapacity of hydro-electric aluminum smelters, the economics of aluminum fuel cells are in the same range as conventional fossil fuels, the aluminum is not effectively volatile and would require no special infrastructure beyond straight-forward handling and loading equipment, and the aluminum can be recycled and regenerated through modest hydro-electric and similar energy sources in remote areas that can not feasibly transmit that energy to major population areas.
My submission may only have triggered the renewed interest by pointing out that submarine operations in the constricted waterways of the Arctic archipelago only require a U-boat sized vessel to be effective, and that it is not particularly vital from a sovreignty standpoint that the vessels even need to be armed initially (PM-mapping the seabed?). The Class 5 patrol vessels would make good patrol corsair tenders for small submarines like this as well, but although I have come to like the idea of a vessel in this class as a big hull substitute for some numbers of a patrol corvettes, it did not originate from anything I suggested.
Even if the document initiated a discussion, it may have little to no resemblance to where their discussions went to. They likely chose to restrict the conclusions of their discussions because no decision would have been made regardless. Even I could not say with any certainty whether or not the boats are a sound design approach without thorough detail research by multiple engineering disciplines.
Furthermore, the timing of my submission may have been entirely coincidental with the announcement a month later, since the impetous could have come from many sources.
Finally, I would advise against flooding the PMO or MND with 'ideas'; I had other reasons for engaging in the exercise that have nothing to do with defence strategy proposals.
Arctic Class Submarines [‘Hecla’ Class(?), 10-12 Units]
Roles:
Submarine Systems Development, Coastal & Arctic Sovereignty Patrols, Survey & Scientific Research, ASW-ASuW-Mine Warfare
Displacement:
700-1000 tons, Advanced Steels or Aluminum Alloys or Alternate Hybrids, Multiple Pressure Hull Zones (actually selection of materials and hull design could evolve through series production, and may permit somewhat unique units in the class); diving depth of up to 500 Metres (could very throughout the class due to technical, budgetary, or cost-benefit considerations)
Complement:
14-25 (through automation and/or restriction of systems based on their manning requirements).
Safety:
Multiple Escape Trunks (integrated with pressure hull arrangements), Mutual SSAR Capable, Distributed Power Supply & Access, primary propulsion driven Air-Water Jets for ice boring, cutting, and clearing, back-up ice boring auger
Propulsion:
10MW Ducted Propellers and Steering Vents, retractable Hydroplanes; Isotope and/or Aluminum-Air (atmospheric and/or compressed) Fuel Cells, NiMH/Li Ion Batteries, Stationary Hydro Power Regeneration, Long Range Transit Auxiliary Fuel Cell Pods; 2-10 Knots Cruise Speed, 10-25 Knots Long Range Snorkelling (Transit Pods), 30-40 Knots Dash Speed.
Weapons Outfit:
4x4 Missile/Torpedo and/or 2-4 UUV Canisters; abeam aft, diagonally inclined, launchable in either direction. (Early boats would emphasize Arctic surveillance and survey functions and have no armament installed as commissioned, weapons being installed on a limited scale as the class matures).
Program Notes:
Small coastal submarines suitable for all three ocean fleets, supplementing and succeeding the 'Victoria' class submarines (adding 4 units for Arctic deployment, replacing on a 1-1 basis, adding 4 further units).
A long term program producing one minimum sized boat about ever 3 years at a average cost of ~$150-200 million/year, although likely requiring assorted start-up infrastructure costs in the range of $500-1000 million; Canada already has an established but limited industrial/technological skills base in the submaritime field, which this program would further consolidate and enhance without entrenching a big boat infrastructure.
Program strategy to follow the MCDV model of platform construction without overemphasis on immediate or complete outfit of advanced systems and subsequent project budgetary inflation, with some emphasis towards the build up of hull numbers.
The small size of these boats would allow them to extend their Arctic patrol endurance for prolonged periods year round from nearby shore depots, air transport, and any SOE frigates and auxiliaries operating in or dispatched to the area. Submarines deployed to the Arctic in winter or far under the prevailing icepack would by necessity operate in pairs, given the time and distance from rescue and assistance beyond mutual support from the other boat.
Icebreaking air-water jets would draw large quantities of compressive power from the primary propulsion outfit at little displacement penalty; a pair of mechanical ice augers could provide emergency provision of air to boats under the ice. The boats could temporarily surface and/or dock/anchor anywhere in stable ice of substantial thickness, and even continue operations as UUV/UAV control stations while concealed and protected by the ice.
Isotope power cells could provide low levels of electrical energy for continuous and emergency power. Although likely having a very low power to weight ratio, the energy required of them need only be sufficient to maintain basic life support & critical systems power, with any practical and affordable additional power being available for the chemical storage batteries or low speed (1-3 Knots) propulsion. [Microelectronically captured energy from selected (surplus or bred) radioisotopes heavily encased in solid inert multiple cell units].
NiMH and Li Ion batteries would multiply available battery power on a reduced margin of total displacement over conventional lead-acid cells; lithium cells have a extremely small but statistically significant tendency to corrode and catch fire, but remedial safety monitoring and fault isolating that is not economically feasible for most commercial uses could mitigate the problem. Any battery system could and should be tested and monitored on limited trials with Victoria class boats, quite possibly on HMCS Chicoutimi with due respect for the fatal incident that occurred on this boat.
It might be possible to develop a grade of aluminum 'fuel' that can be operated at low power levels from oxygen extracted from seawater.
Power sources and ice clearing equipment could be trialled and/or retrofitted on a limited scale on all Victoria class submarines, even though they have limited hull life remaining and an unfortunate history of maintenance issues and should be retired as soon as practical.
The small size of these boats would limit their capabilities as autonomous ocean range vessels, but it is high unlikely they would be deployed globally outside of a major naval task force; larger 2000+ ton vessels could be built within 2-3 years under an emergency global war shipbuilding program.
Canada has an overcapacity of hydro-electric aluminum smelters, the economics of aluminum fuel cells are in the same range as conventional fossil fuels, the aluminum is not effectively volatile and would require no special infrastructure beyond straight-forward handling and loading equipment, and the aluminum can be recycled and regenerated through modest hydro-electric and similar energy sources in remote areas that can not feasibly transmit that energy to major population areas.
My submission may only have triggered the renewed interest by pointing out that submarine operations in the constricted waterways of the Arctic archipelago only require a U-boat sized vessel to be effective, and that it is not particularly vital from a sovreignty standpoint that the vessels even need to be armed initially (PM-mapping the seabed?). The Class 5 patrol vessels would make good patrol corsair tenders for small submarines like this as well, but although I have come to like the idea of a vessel in this class as a big hull substitute for some numbers of a patrol corvettes, it did not originate from anything I suggested.
Even if the document initiated a discussion, it may have little to no resemblance to where their discussions went to. They likely chose to restrict the conclusions of their discussions because no decision would have been made regardless. Even I could not say with any certainty whether or not the boats are a sound design approach without thorough detail research by multiple engineering disciplines.
Furthermore, the timing of my submission may have been entirely coincidental with the announcement a month later, since the impetous could have come from many sources.
Finally, I would advise against flooding the PMO or MND with 'ideas'; I had other reasons for engaging in the exercise that have nothing to do with defence strategy proposals.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 360
T.S.Rea said:
I'm curious as to the need to launch in either direction; do current operating practices for submarines make this desirable?
It isn't really a vital capacity, just one that could have some advantages in terms of operating under the ice. Normally, torpedo tubes would be oriented forward. If the vessel is hiding near the surface under the ice, possibly with an air line poking through, lateral tubes might be blocked. The same might be true if the sub were on the bottom, since the water is not always deep in some areas, particularly where big SSN's would generally never try to go. Vertical orientation is not practical, the fish would be too long and might experience dangerous bending stresses will being launched at speed. Diagonal orientation allows launch up or down, also allows launch of torpedos with a minimum of installed launch energy and/or launch rearwards merely by ejecting the weapons out backwards with a modest impulse (the weapons would be orientated forward, wire guidance and similar considerations would not be difficult to accomodate for dual directional launching).
Sixteen torpedos might be a large load out, but a UUV of any useful size might take up the space of four weapons. This is needlessly to say, a paper submarine, so nothing is definitely set, and might not be until the third or fourth boat assuming it went anywhere. I don't think it is critically vital to rush to arm the vessels (not like they are going out to immediately hunt and kill nuclear boats), but the exercise of mapping the seafloor, conducting surveillance, and developing tactics in the confined waters of the Arctic archipelago would implicitly go a long way towards establishing our sovreignty over the region.
The Kriegsmarine came close to winning the war with similar sized boats, can't see any reason why it would be critical to build larger ones. Nothing prevents building a few of the latter vessels to a larger displacement for a greater patrol range once the core design and its technology has matured. We have a modest small submarine technology industry in Canada, it might be to great a jump to build more than the smallest practical size of vessel, and even then it might require some help from the Europeans and elsewhere.
Sixteen torpedos might be a large load out, but a UUV of any useful size might take up the space of four weapons. This is needlessly to say, a paper submarine, so nothing is definitely set, and might not be until the third or fourth boat assuming it went anywhere. I don't think it is critically vital to rush to arm the vessels (not like they are going out to immediately hunt and kill nuclear boats), but the exercise of mapping the seafloor, conducting surveillance, and developing tactics in the confined waters of the Arctic archipelago would implicitly go a long way towards establishing our sovreignty over the region.
The Kriegsmarine came close to winning the war with similar sized boats, can't see any reason why it would be critical to build larger ones. Nothing prevents building a few of the latter vessels to a larger displacement for a greater patrol range once the core design and its technology has matured. We have a modest small submarine technology industry in Canada, it might be to great a jump to build more than the smallest practical size of vessel, and even then it might require some help from the Europeans and elsewhere.
- If it isn't armed, you are not exercising sovereignty.
- We can SOSUS the heck out of the waters in and around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago as well, but unless we back it up with a big fist, it would be meaningless.
- The neutral Swedes never had any problems dropping depth charges on intruding submarines. Should we take a page out of their book? Be carefull...
- We can SOSUS the heck out of the waters in and around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago as well, but unless we back it up with a big fist, it would be meaningless.
- The neutral Swedes never had any problems dropping depth charges on intruding submarines. Should we take a page out of their book? Be carefull...
- Reaction score
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Yikes. I think you may have under-estimated the developmental costs of a uniquely Canadian Submarine by at least a factor of 10- I'm thinking $5-10 billion might be more realistic. That's before you even build one boat. Our homegrown submarine industry is indeed modest. Trying this on our own would be like Bombardier deciding it can go into the Stealth fighter business tomorrow. Would a better use of scarce defence dollars not be buying AIP Kokums or Type 212s to eventually replace the Victoria class?
- Reaction score
- 10,327
- Points
- 1,260
As a side note, the Kriegsmarine never came close to winning anything with their U-Boats. It was more psychological than anything, with tonnage sunk never pushing over 2% of total Allied shipping for any given month, even in the "Happy Times." Read this and this; his argument is pretty solid as he goes over EVERY U-boat sortie and EVERY ship sunk during the war.
Not sure how it pertains to this thread, but don't use German U-Boats as an argument for an effective naval strategy....
Not sure how it pertains to this thread, but don't use German U-Boats as an argument for an effective naval strategy....
- Reaction score
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- Points
- 1,040
Infanteer said:
Had the psychological aspect been exploited, then the U-Boot campaign could have been more effective, but that dog don't hunt. Take, however, the 1982 example of one boat sinking the General Belgrano in the South Atlantic. It sent the Argie fleet packing, freeing up the lanes for the UK force to sail south, relatively unimpeded.
- Reaction score
- 10,327
- Points
- 1,260
Submarines now and submarines then are two different things. Considering the US or Russia can park 1 submarine off the coast of a country and effectively destroy a society in minutes means we are dealing with a new phenomenon in sub-surface power.
The analogy with U-boats was just off the cuff, so I would read too much into it in as far as the potential or the actual effect of them.
The preference for aluminum is a product not only of the low volatility and high power density of them, but also that it was viable back in the early 1980's when the concept originated. There already is some use of them for large back-up power supplies in some office buildings, hydrogen fuel cells have been struggling for many years to reach a critical level of viability. I haven't looked recently, don't know where they are right now, and don't know what the current status of submarine AIP programs are exclusive of industrial hype, so my inclination is to the safer and more certain outcome. Might also give the country a lead in the consumer technology, since its been cited often as a candidate for cellphones and laptops.
Admittedly, my cost estimate is probably quite low, part of the reason for buiding smaller boats than the original 1980's concept of 2500 ton sized vessels and retaining the Upholders for a while, and as was stated, latter boats could be made larger when the outcome is more certain given the many well known time and cost risks. Small boats might have some advantages in the littorals of the Arctic and elsewhere as well. Its a start point with the shortest route to an initial operating capacity.
The preference for aluminum is a product not only of the low volatility and high power density of them, but also that it was viable back in the early 1980's when the concept originated. There already is some use of them for large back-up power supplies in some office buildings, hydrogen fuel cells have been struggling for many years to reach a critical level of viability. I haven't looked recently, don't know where they are right now, and don't know what the current status of submarine AIP programs are exclusive of industrial hype, so my inclination is to the safer and more certain outcome. Might also give the country a lead in the consumer technology, since its been cited often as a candidate for cellphones and laptops.
Admittedly, my cost estimate is probably quite low, part of the reason for buiding smaller boats than the original 1980's concept of 2500 ton sized vessels and retaining the Upholders for a while, and as was stated, latter boats could be made larger when the outcome is more certain given the many well known time and cost risks. Small boats might have some advantages in the littorals of the Arctic and elsewhere as well. Its a start point with the shortest route to an initial operating capacity.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 360
TCBF said:
I disagree; sovereignty can be asserted by other means. It can be enough just to use the land or water for whatever purpose.
As an example, Canada is hanging on to Machias Sea Island with a staffed lighthouse (the only one left in the Maritimes I believe), not with a garrison.
- Reaction score
- 35
- Points
- 560
Neill McKay said:
But the lighthouse crew ultimately depends on the State being able to send it's armed power. One of the big questions explored in another thread is how will we be able to maintain our sovereignty in the hight arctic without a realistic ability to project power there?
Up until the 1950's the question was effectively moot, no one cared since no one get there in force or operate there effectively. After the 1950's the question took on a great deal of importance since several States could flout our claims with impunity by sailing unmolested through the hight arctic with their nuclear submarines. Since many of these submarines had the power to effectively level our society, this should have had a very high priority, but since it was also in the interest of the United States to look after the problem, we did not press our claims very aggressively in return for their help. In any event, it was still very difficult to move large quantities of manpower or operate in the high arctic. Today, the shared interests have evaporated with the passing of the USSR, while we are now in competition with several nations over the potential resources thought to be available in the high arctic. It is also much easier than ever before to move and operate in the high arctic, with or without Global Warming.
Given all these factors, any future Canadian military program or formation should be considered with the ability to operate in the Arctic in mind. WRT submarines this really means either going nuclear (which has advantages for deploying naval forces in far flung theaters like the Arabian sea) or some sort of exotic AIP or energy storage solution. Either way will be an expensive and long drawn out process.
Given our rather strange set of naval circumstances (needs to operate in the Arctic and littoral regions, needs the ability to deploy globally, has a very small manpower and technical base to work with), catalogue shopping will only get us an 80% solution. We need to decide which 80% is the most important, since I don't think we have the political will or resources to go it alone.
The discussion here may be going off topic a bit, but that is a little unavoidable since a decision about submarines would have to factor in the whole of the naval and general military strategy involved.
I agree entirely with the notion that any ships built should have an intrinsic Arctic capability at at least a minimum fundamental level. I have been shifting in my views towards a small submarine, because the core fleet unit would be huge by the common standard we go by today. I am sure it will raise some eyebrows, but the 10 SOE (Sovreignty-Ocean-Expeditionary) Frigates would displace around 15,000 tons light and 25,000 tons deep load on a double ended ice and sea bowed hull driven by 25kbhp direct drive and 20MW electrical drive propulsion (ie. 25 knots) and incorporate hangar space for up to eight medium sized aircraft as well as a proportionate amount of the equipment of an expeditionary land force.
To have any reasonable capacity to navigate freely in the Arctic, the ship has to be big to be able to drive through the ice with any reasonable amount of endurance. I would not think it necessary to deploy these ships to the Arctic any more than the navy has been up there recently, but if the fleet has at its core a significant projection capacity to do so, then it would enjoy a significant force in being factor as well as its actual force capacity.
Consider as well that any expeditionary naval force would require a substantial amount of basic tonnage just to even begin contemplating expeditionary operations, and that any such task force would have to have several dozen aircraft deployed with it. It would not be necessary to equip every ship with big phased arrays and big sonars, but these would have to be bought for some ships regardless of the size of the frigates that get built. At first glance, these big hulls might lead one to assume that the ships would be hideously expensive, but the actual hull itself is only one cost component of the whole package. The ten frigates would share a common hull with 3-4 auxilliaries (although the AOR's are probable too far along for this), and would form the backbone of the fleet. The navy acquired a sealift ship recently, one more might be useful, but apart from looking at the capacity for offloading without port facilities, these would be commercial grade vessels.
The other component of the fleet would be a force of corvettes, improved Kingston's with more range and better seakeeping on 25 knots top speed, assuming much of the light patrol duties given the cost of operating the SOE frigates. The Class 5 APV would be treated as just slower big hull corvettes to support the regular corvettes and submarines.
It is this fleet structure that drove the submarines down in size, but they could still be quite expensive even with a less demanding set of requirements.
I would not have a clue as to where the government is going in the long term, but I would not be surprised it is the naval strategy that is holding up the so-called 'Canada First' defence policy, since we are talking about many tens of billions of dollars even though it would be spent over the course of two or three decades. Big dollars, but any useful level of engagement is going to cost a lot of money, so why not a basic but complete capacity?
I agree entirely with the notion that any ships built should have an intrinsic Arctic capability at at least a minimum fundamental level. I have been shifting in my views towards a small submarine, because the core fleet unit would be huge by the common standard we go by today. I am sure it will raise some eyebrows, but the 10 SOE (Sovreignty-Ocean-Expeditionary) Frigates would displace around 15,000 tons light and 25,000 tons deep load on a double ended ice and sea bowed hull driven by 25kbhp direct drive and 20MW electrical drive propulsion (ie. 25 knots) and incorporate hangar space for up to eight medium sized aircraft as well as a proportionate amount of the equipment of an expeditionary land force.
To have any reasonable capacity to navigate freely in the Arctic, the ship has to be big to be able to drive through the ice with any reasonable amount of endurance. I would not think it necessary to deploy these ships to the Arctic any more than the navy has been up there recently, but if the fleet has at its core a significant projection capacity to do so, then it would enjoy a significant force in being factor as well as its actual force capacity.
Consider as well that any expeditionary naval force would require a substantial amount of basic tonnage just to even begin contemplating expeditionary operations, and that any such task force would have to have several dozen aircraft deployed with it. It would not be necessary to equip every ship with big phased arrays and big sonars, but these would have to be bought for some ships regardless of the size of the frigates that get built. At first glance, these big hulls might lead one to assume that the ships would be hideously expensive, but the actual hull itself is only one cost component of the whole package. The ten frigates would share a common hull with 3-4 auxilliaries (although the AOR's are probable too far along for this), and would form the backbone of the fleet. The navy acquired a sealift ship recently, one more might be useful, but apart from looking at the capacity for offloading without port facilities, these would be commercial grade vessels.
The other component of the fleet would be a force of corvettes, improved Kingston's with more range and better seakeeping on 25 knots top speed, assuming much of the light patrol duties given the cost of operating the SOE frigates. The Class 5 APV would be treated as just slower big hull corvettes to support the regular corvettes and submarines.
It is this fleet structure that drove the submarines down in size, but they could still be quite expensive even with a less demanding set of requirements.
I would not have a clue as to where the government is going in the long term, but I would not be surprised it is the naval strategy that is holding up the so-called 'Canada First' defence policy, since we are talking about many tens of billions of dollars even though it would be spent over the course of two or three decades. Big dollars, but any useful level of engagement is going to cost a lot of money, so why not a basic but complete capacity?
A
aesop081
Guest
T.S.Rea said:
You used the term "frigate". I'm sorry but right from the start, "frigate" was no longer suitable as a type of vessel for what you propose. The Current Halifax-class Frigates are big for that type of ship. What you propose would likely be the size of a Tarawa / Iwo Jima / Wasp - class warship.
'Frigate' (defined):
1. a fast naval vessel of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, generally having a lofty ship rig and heavily armed on one or two decks.
2. any of various types of modern naval vessels ranging in size from a destroyer escort to a cruiser, frequently armed with guided missiles and used for aircraft carrier escort duty, shore bombardment, and miscellaneous combat functions.
3.A warship, usually of 4,000 to 9,000 displacement tons, that is larger than a destroyer and smaller than a cruiser, used primarily for escort duty.
4.A high-speed, medium-sized sailing war vessel of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.
5.Archaic A fast, light vessel, such as a sailboat.
6.1585, from M.Fr. frégate, from It. fregata, like many ship names, of unknown origin. Originally a small, swift vessel, the word was applied to progressively larger types over the years, but since 1943 used mainly of escort ships.
7. a medium size square-rigged warship of the 18th and 19th centuries
8. a United States warship larger than a destroyer and smaller than a cruiser
9. a major naval sailing vessel, but less powerful than a ship of the line
The term does not really have a specific meaning, any more than 'destroyer' does given the 14,000t Zumwalt or the original 200-300t vessels. In terms of hull size, closer to a San Antonio LPD, but not as voluminous and more heavily built, nor having a well deck but having the capacity to offload equipment to shore, not with the accomodation of a LPD since the number of troops would be smaller and not kept aboard for more than a week and usually far less, having a 125m flight deck over top the hangar bays but not overhung nor intended to park aircraft and elevators replaced by two 25t cranes on a track along the edge of the flight deck.
The vessel may seem a radical departure from convention, but the same could be said of ironclads, dreadnoughts, or any other type of ship that has emerged through the evolution of technology over time.
1. a fast naval vessel of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, generally having a lofty ship rig and heavily armed on one or two decks.
2. any of various types of modern naval vessels ranging in size from a destroyer escort to a cruiser, frequently armed with guided missiles and used for aircraft carrier escort duty, shore bombardment, and miscellaneous combat functions.
3.A warship, usually of 4,000 to 9,000 displacement tons, that is larger than a destroyer and smaller than a cruiser, used primarily for escort duty.
4.A high-speed, medium-sized sailing war vessel of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.
5.Archaic A fast, light vessel, such as a sailboat.
6.1585, from M.Fr. frégate, from It. fregata, like many ship names, of unknown origin. Originally a small, swift vessel, the word was applied to progressively larger types over the years, but since 1943 used mainly of escort ships.
7. a medium size square-rigged warship of the 18th and 19th centuries
8. a United States warship larger than a destroyer and smaller than a cruiser
9. a major naval sailing vessel, but less powerful than a ship of the line
The term does not really have a specific meaning, any more than 'destroyer' does given the 14,000t Zumwalt or the original 200-300t vessels. In terms of hull size, closer to a San Antonio LPD, but not as voluminous and more heavily built, nor having a well deck but having the capacity to offload equipment to shore, not with the accomodation of a LPD since the number of troops would be smaller and not kept aboard for more than a week and usually far less, having a 125m flight deck over top the hangar bays but not overhung nor intended to park aircraft and elevators replaced by two 25t cranes on a track along the edge of the flight deck.
The vessel may seem a radical departure from convention, but the same could be said of ironclads, dreadnoughts, or any other type of ship that has emerged through the evolution of technology over time.
