If you could find the earlier post concerning the engineering issues related to AOR/frigate hull design, I would appreciate it.
Their obviously would be major differences in the internal form of an auxilliary versus a combatant vessel, since the former would carry larger liquid and bulk loads and have a much greater range between light and deep load conditions, different metacentric heights and other balance and buoyancy figures as just a start of a long list of functional differences. It might have been more prudent to state a common machinery plant and a host of ship service equipment shared in common with both vessels, but their would be obvious differences between the two. The AOR program is probably too far along that it would matter regardless. Nonetheless, the latter would have a substantial fuel load in order to gain some independence from auxilliary support, and although it is not always appropriate to make direct comparisons with unrelated ships from different eras built with different sets of requirements, the reasoning follows something similar to the American Sangemon class CVE oiler conversions or any of a number of warships designed with very long range endurance. A margin of that fuel load would in fact be counterbalanced with floodable spaces so that the vessel trim and effective draught could be adjusted as the ship is underway, as well as providing a substantial damage control capacity with the ability to pump large quantities of liquid from one space to another. Deep load condition would in practice be the tonnage of a frigate departing for a global deployment and still thousands of miles away from the operational area.
The price of steel has been going up for the last few years, but it still does not constitute a large part of the end cost. Actually, a lot of the hull cost is driven by the degree to which the steel is processed into its end form for integration into the hull, but the form I had in made would be constructed with a lot of flat sections and two dimensional curvatures which would simply the manufacturing process and offer the potential of some stealthiness by virtue of its oblique faceted shape above the waterline. These construction techniques have been employed by some shipyards in Europe and elsewhere to successfully reduce production costs.
The term frigate has been used owing to the general similarity of the purpose of frigates of the sailing era as the lead projection force of the fleet more than to the modern one of an ocean escort and surface strike unit. I am not speaking of fast vessels with a high level of maneouverability, but ships with a lot of stamina that can get to distant sea areas quickly with the endurance to conduct operations once there. The interception of merchant and other types of vessels, one type of the operation the Halifax's have engaged in in recent years, would be conducted by corvettes (a limited number of which would be armed) under the protection and support of the frigates. A more closer comparison would be to the San Antonio class LPD with a number of shifts in capabilities that reflect a different set of intended priorities.
The price tag of one of these ships is about 700-1000 million, and although in terms of building such ships in Canada there would be a completely different set of cost factors, they would apply to any type of naval ship built in Canada. Characteristics they would share in common would be a 16 cell Mk41 VLS (with space left for more if required later), two RAM or similar CIWS systems, more hangar space but less effective flight deck parking area for a similar number of aircraft (stealth/ice and cold/top weight considerations), baseline 3D/volume and surface radars, ECM, SCM, and related electronics, similar magazine capacity, and similar level of propulsion machinery (might be necessary to economize more on electric drive, which is a contingency for laser/EM weapon refits in the distant future) and ship service capacity and at the same level as a common destroyer type. Differences would include no well deck, half as much troop lift capacity accomodated only periodically for short periods of time (some CA/AF bases would have superstructure mock-ups for proper training prior to adequate levels of exercises at sea prior to operational deployment when they arrive), much less vehicle and container stowage that would load/offload in direct paths abeam through various straightforward arrangements without need for complex elevator arrangements, a through path flight deck to aid in the launch and recovery of fixed wing aircraft and UAV's, significantly greater sonar capabilities, significantly greater radar capabilities in a proportion of the units, greater aircraft support even though they would embark only the aircraft needed for a particular deployment, heavier construction for greater damage tolerance and longer hull life. (Note: it is difficult to be brief in some descriptions here, since this is beginning to drag on).
Compared to a larger number of helicopter/guided missile ships of the form of recent history (I have seen some references to as many as 18, although not all with full armaments) with similar amounts of machinery and electronics and weaponry, I don't think the cost would be much different for either. The problem is, the SCSC does little to assert Arctic sovereignty, has little if any capacity for expeditionary operations beyond supplementing the escort service to other navies, and will cost the same ten to twenty billion dollars in the end.
This post is getting too long, you are probably right concerning manning requirements for the submarines (I was thinking more along the lines of 3 watches of four with two officers, a heavy reliance on automation, and a more limited patrol duration than common types). In the end, it might make more sense to abandon self sufficiency and opt for four to six Type 212 AIP's to start replacing the Victoria's a few years down the road from now. The aluminum powered boats originated some years ago when the defence budget was larger, their were lots of Soviet submarines prowling the Arctic and Atlantic, the specified displacement and crew was larger, and hydrogen fuel cells were no where close to as developed as they are now even if they still could benefit from further development, although I would still be inclined to test both internal and external aluminum fuel cells aboard the Chicoutimi as well as isotope power for life support and emergency communications systems and lithium ion batteries under real operating conditions if only to get hard test results prior to making a decision on Type 212's and possible design options for them. It would be rather arrogant to assume to have expert knowledge of every aspect of military science.
