Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[daftandbarmy]

Crazytalk, Thuc!  Imagine someone (or group) starting out from first principles and defining exactly that "What should the Reserves be, what should it do and how do we want it to do it, and then resource if correctly?"

The Army is still trying to figure this out, between thoughts of somehow holding onto the notion of Mobilization, one of these days...and a model that may be closer to the RCAF's "we've committed the 'Reserve' to operate on a daily basis, since the Air Force conducts most of its ops across the force, not like the Army's MRS of peaks and valleys..."

I predict that nothing will change, and that the Army will fight to have it's status quo Reserve force do monetary battle with the other CAF Reserve elements and not much will change.

Regards
G2G

Mission:

1) Ceremonial Guard
2) Fill all the crummy outcan staff postings that the Reg F don't want, you know, like the ones in darkest Africa

 

[a_majoor]

Crazytalk, Thuc!  Imagine someone (or group) starting out from first principles and defining exactly that "What should the Reserves be, what should it do and how do we want it to do it, and then resource if correctly?"

The Army is still trying to figure this out, between thoughts of somehow holding onto the notion of Mobilization, one of these days...and a model that may be closer to the RCAF's "we've committed the 'Reserve' to operate on a daily basis, since the Air Force conducts most of its ops across the force, not like the Army's MRS of peaks and valleys..."

I predict that nothing will change, and that the Army will fight to have it's status quo Reserve force do monetary battle with the other CAF Reserve elements and not much will change.

Regards
G2G

Sad that this is gong to be the case, especially given the dramatic increase in military spending gives everyone the resources and opportunity to reset and reorganize.

 

[MilEME09]

Sad that this is gong to be the case, especially given the dramatic increase in military spending gives everyone the resources and opportunity to reset and reorganize.

I always find it amazing, the reserves is the one thing that actually needs to be changed, yet it is the one thing it seems no one wants to change

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I always find it amazing, the reserves is the one thing that actually needs to be changed, yet it is the one thing it seems no one wants to change

Including those in the Pres who like things the way they are. 

 

[FJAG]

I always find it amazing, the reserves is the one thing that actually needs to be changed, yet it is the one thing it seems no one wants to change

"Amazing" isn't the word that I'd use. "Scandalous", "Disappointing", and "Infuriating" are the ones that come to my mind.

I just spent the last half hour rereading my notes and the various Records of Decisions that I kept from my years (2001 to 2009) of sitting as a member of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council to remind myself of what the heck it was that we actually did there. In short we spent a lot of time on things like the reserve pension project, component transfers, injury/disability policies, the ill-fated Reserve Force Employment Project etc etc but when it came t hard-core role, capabilities and structure issues--not so much.

At the table I represented the smallest group of reservists, (just 63 of us) while the other commanders represented the remaining 24 to 25,000 so my voice didn't carry much water when it came to deciding what issues we would address.

I frequently felt that all that we were looking at was making life more profitable for the Class B and Class C soldier while ignoring the Class A types. There was very much an attitude at the higher level of leadership-both regular and reserve-that centered on "what are you doing for me today?" Quite properly the Class Bs and Cs were providing services that the regulars saw and needed every day so their focus was on them. Class As, on the other hand, merely represented a potential and nebulous service for the future and which, as far as day-to-day operations were concerned, were principally viewed as being merely a resource consumer.

On a number of occasions I broached the subject of advancing a legislative agenda (after all I was the lawyer) to make the ability of DND to facilitate the compulsory operational deployment of reservists more practical so that there would be a stronger incentive to properly organize, train and equip reserve units so that they would be available for immediate service. (In short the NDA already has those provisions and what was, and continues to be, needed are more regulations that allow the Minister to initiate the call up reservists (rather than requiring an Order in Council) and stronger job protection legislation.)

Those attempts were rejected within CResC Council for what I perceived the following reasons:

1. there was a perception that the civilian political leadership would not be prepared to enact such legislation/regulations;

2. there was a perception that senior CF leadership would not support or push for such legislation;

3. no one within the senior CF leadership was prepared to change anything which might cause an undesirable side effect on the status quo of the regular force structure and roles.

There was one thing I became to be embarrassed about and that was that, for the most part, senior Reg F leadership does not understand the current powers that they have under the NDA to essentially call up reservists (some, alternatively, understand the power but believe that it would be political or career suicide to advocate for it's use). The result is that Class As are viewed as having little value within the CF until such time as they volunteer for B or C service.

In large part we learned a false lesson in Afghanistan in that we could always get sufficient Class C volunteers to fill out the battle groups without any need for a compulsory call up. In addition there was always sufficient predeployment training time to get people up to scratch even for our risk-averse leaders. This makes us complacent and for the most part senior leadership will continue to happily run the risk that there will never be a need to rapidly call out a reserve force and therefore save themselves the budget costs for the training and equipment needed to create and maintain a truly effective reserve force.

In my view until DND as a whole gets over its aversion to compulsory call up of individuals or units of the reserve force we will never see any serious attempts being made to change the status quo except for minor--and basically inconsequential--fine tuning.

:cheers:

 

[MilEME09]

So basically despite your efforts the council was more concerned with concessions and the little things rather then the actual tough decisions that we expected of our senior leadership simply because they thought that nothing would ever actually come of it. You know if you never try you are going to fail 100% of the time.

 

[FJAG]

So basically despite your efforts the council was more concerned with concessions and the little things rather then the actual tough decisions that we expected of our senior leadership simply because they thought that nothing would ever actually come of it. You know if you never try you are going to fail 100% of the time.

I wouldn't so much say the "little things". Some of those matters were fairly significant but they never did touch on anything that could be called a review of the basic raison d'etre of the CF reserves in the modern era.

As far as the reason for not pushing for reform I think there is a very real lethargy in any bureaucracy that resists dramatic change unless it is on the coal face of disaster and has no other choice. We're not there yet.

I tend to view reserves the same way as insurance policies; you pay for years for something that gives you little in the way of a return so that when the need suddenly arises you're good to go. History is replete with examples of societies that fell because they didn't prepare for the unexpected. Personally, my two medical events in the US (this year and last) made me damn happy that I've been paying for good travel insurance. All the premiums I have paid up to now and will ever pay in the future have been more than reimbursed.

What bothers me more than anything else is that much of the cost of an efficient reserve force is already in existing budgets. What we're really talking about is serious organizational and structural changes (and that legislative stuff). There clearly would be additional capital costs to create an equipped force in being as well as the ongoing facilities and maintenance and training costs associated with a more deployment ready force. I know that there are others who would disagree with me but DND already has a fairly healthy budget which could be better utilized than it is. I do, however, also believe that we need to increase that budget if we want to be seen as serious contributors to NATO.

When you take a look at defence expenditures by countries https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures you learn two lessons:

1. The NATO block spends significantly more on defence then all our potential enemies combined; and

2. Many countries who spend around what Canada does (e.g. Israel, Turkey, Spain) get an awful lot more deployable force for the money that they spend than we do.

That makes me think that somewhere we've gone off the track as far as what we get for what we spend. A serious review of our organization, from the bottom to the top, is seriously needed. We simply can't count on that being initiated within the DND bureaucracy. Unless change comes from outside, it will never happen.

:cheers:

 

[Haggis]

I wouldn't so much say the "little things". Some of those matters were fairly significant but they never did touch on anything that could be called a review of the basic raison d'etre of the CF reserves in the modern era.

Each of the environments recruits, trains and employs their P Res differently.  An overarching decision on the raison d'etre for any single environment would not apply to the others.

What bothers me more than anything else is that much of the cost of an efficient reserve force is already in existing budgets. What we're really talking about is serious organizational and structural changes (and that legislative stuff).

Firstly, reforms cost money.  Reserve budgets are, at the best of times, discretionary funds liable to reallocation to higher priority line items.

Secondly, when reforms are pushed through in an ill-conceived, poorly executed manner simply to show that the senior leadership has done something to improve/change the Reserves, it rarely ends well.  The Reserve Force Pension is a prime example.

Thirdly, at the time you were on C Res & Cdts Council there were a huge number of Class B's in many HQs.  Some of them, I believe, served the sole purpose of improving their lots in life and employment prospects at the expense of the Class A Reservist.  Many times I saw draft policies and proposals that did absolutely nothing to improve the effectiveness of the Reserves writ large or increase the effectiveness of those on the Armoury floor/drill deck.

Many countries who spend around what Canada does (e.g. Israel, Turkey, Spain) get an awful lot more deployable force for the money that they spend than we do.

  Many of those same countries militaries are not as heavily regulated as Canada nor do they have to contend with the initiatives of social justice warriors within their civilian and political leadership ranks.  Also, none of those you mention have to contend with the very expensive and career limiting policy of official bilingualism and none areas as geographically challenged as Canada, (they could all fit in Ontario).

That makes me think that somewhere we've gone off the track as far as what we get for what we spend. A serious review of our organization, from the bottom to the top, is seriously needed. We simply can't count on that being initiated within the DND bureaucracy. Unless change comes from outside the CAF, it will never happen.

FTFY

 

[FJAG]

Each of the environments recruits, trains and employs their P Res differently.  An overarching decision on the raison d'etre for any single environment would not apply to the others.

We frequently dealt with issues that only dealt with one environment or branch. The problem, however, is a generic/universal one because each environment and/or branch has issues with how to fully maximize their reserve component. The solutions may very well differ to cater to their differences.

Firstly, reforms cost money.  Reserve budgets are, at the best of times, discretionary funds liable to reallocation to higher priority line items.

That in a nutshell is not the problem but a symptom of the problem which is perception. All budgets, regular and reserve, may need to give way to higher priority line items. The problem here is that reserve budgets are from the outset a low priority because reserves as a whole are not perceived to be full members of the defence team. As I said before, within the Reg F structure the question asked to determine worth of a unit or individual is "what have you done for me today?"  I know this will cause outrage amongst many of the regular components, but there are elements of the Reg F that do not need to be on full time service. As an example many of the gunners in the artillery (beyond those needed to keep expertise, a moderate career flow and to maintain equipment) are only needed on operations and could easily be filled by reservists. For every Reg F PY saved, 6 Res PYs (at 60 days per year) could be created.

Secondly, when reforms are pushed through in an ill-conceived, poorly executed manner simply to show that the senior leadership has done something to improve/change the Reserves, it rarely ends well.  The Reserve Force Pension is a prime example.

Why are you assuming that the reforms will be ill conceived or poorly executed? I do agree that the RSP was poorly done and argued so at CResCC. (In my view it followed the "what have you done for me today" mantra in that it only rewarded paid days served and therefore greatly favoured Class Bs and Cs. IMHO the potential to be called up should also be recognized in some way for Class As somewhat in the nature of the RFRG)

The fact of the matter is that there are a number of examples around the world which show ways that reservists are great force multiplier at a cheaper day to day cost. A proper study and implementation plan would make it successful. The problem is that no one at the top is remotely interested in doing the study for the reasons that I listed above.

Thirdly, at the time you were on C Res & Cdts Council there were a huge number of Class B's in many HQs.  Some of them, I believe, served the sole purpose of improving their lots in life and employment prospects at the expense of the Class A Reservist.  Many times I saw draft policies and proposals that did absolutely nothing to improve the effectiveness of the Reserves writ large or increase the effectiveness of those on the Armoury floor/drill deck.

I do agree with that statement completely. The whole thing was started by the fact that commanders who considered themselves Reg F understaffed could use their budgets to fill their full time positions or add to them. As a result we created a generation of Class Bs (and regretfully many of them for a long time were Class Cs until we tightened up the rules) who spent much of their time improving their own lots in life (the Reserve Pension was their greatest success). Unfortunately Class B's were in their commanders' presence day-to-day and therefore had much greater influence over them than their Class A counterparts. (I also have to admit that I also had great sympathy for many Class B reservists who did very good work for their directorates, in many cases [because they weren't posted around] formed the directorates corporate memory but were paid at 85% of their Reg F peers)

Many of those same countries militaries are not as heavily regulated as Canada nor do they have to contend with the initiatives of social justice warriors within their civilian and political leadership ranks.  Also, none of those you mention have to contend with the very expensive and career limiting policy of official bilingualism and none areas as geographically challenged as Canada, (they could all fit in Ontario).

Again you are not pointing at a problem but a symptom of the problem. We are long overdue for a pruning of regulations. The reason our headquarters are so bloated are because every time someone in NDHQ farts, another directorate is stood up to figure out how to solve the problem and then to administer the solution. There used to be a time when we dealt with "must knows, should knows and could knows" when determining how to spend our training time. Today everything is a "must know". Similarly our bureaucracy (both external and internal) has created regulations and offices of primary interest for just about everything that comes to their mind. Its time to reverse that trend which again requires a good study (preferably by an outside agency) and a good implementation plan.

Geography shouldn't be a challenge to us if we use it properly. I have seen small towns of ten thousand people scattered far and wide on the US Plains who each have a small armory with a fully equipped and manned National Guard or Reserve transportation or engineer company. Meanwhile Brandon/Portage La Prairie Manitoba, (two cities with a total of some 70,000 folks), within spitting distance of the best artillery range in Canada, a two-battery artillery regiment is hard pressed to put a troop in the field (which is a good thing because that's all the equipment it has anyway.) What we need is a new structure, a new rationale, and the proper enablers to ensure that such units and their soldiers can thrive.

Haggis. Please believe me that I know that there are difficulties but for every difficulty there is a solution. Any rationale, knowledgeable outside observer (and many inside ones) will tell you that for numerous reasons, we are not getting the military capability that our country is paying for. For decades now we have become a headquarters-bound force that's more concerned with administering itself (and when I'm really cynical; ensuring that every officer has a fulfilling career) than ensuring that we have a deployable field force commensurate with the number of people we have on the payroll. I guess maybe everyone is just too busy trying to figure out what to do with five guys and a flag.

:cheers:

 

[Haggis]

Haggis. Please believe me that I know that there are difficulties but for every difficulty there is a solution. Any rationale, knowledgeable outside observer (and many inside ones) will tell you that for numerous reasons, we are not getting the military capability that our country is paying for.

I know you know, FJAG.  We have sat around the same table at different times dealing with the same issues. 

This thread has 129 pages of people who also know we have a problem and about 1/3 to 1/2 of those pages propose one solution or another.  the biggest problem is that no matter what solution is proposed to "fix" the Army Reserve, even if it's the best one ever found, the institutional and political will to carry it forward - to flank the self-centred, careerists in the HQs, to slay special interest dragons in the lobby rooms, to silence those who would continue to turn the CAF into a social experiment- is not there.

 

[MilEME09]

Essentially this thread will continue to go in circles until people with power decide to change things. Atleast with the TAPV's they also gave us the kit to transport and maintain them in the field.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Don't worry, those will go the way the Bison (originally called the MILLAV...Militia Light Armd Veh) went...you'll be able to, maybe, possibly, borrow some of them from time to time after the Reg units claw them back when the next big C Army deployment happens...

;D

 

[MilEME09]

Don't worry, those will go the way the Bison (originally called the MILLAV...Militia Light Armd Veh) went...you'll be able to, maybe, possibly, borrow some of them from time to time after the Reg units claw them back when the next big C Army deployment happens...

;D

If I can lick it, the reg force won't want it any more right?

 

[MilEME09]

Any one else tracking a seemingly slow expansion of the PRes? seems some units have platoons popping up in smaller towns, example a few months back it was in the news the KOCR has a new B Squadron in Okotoks/high river

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Without a healthy Class A pool, you will not be able to recruit enough Class B & C when you desperately need them. If you want to healthy pool you need to be able to recruit and hold people. To do that you need an interesting and defined mission, that is unique to the military. You also need to properly fund training and provide equipment.
If you treat Class A as unimportant, people will receive the messages and leave, generally the good ones first, because they can find other ways to occupy themselves. Civil defense, SAR, forest fires, flood rescue and such are all great secondary tasks. At the end of the day, what makes the military different is the combat aspect, whether real life or training. 

 

[Underway]

This info from November's Frontline Magazine.  Heres the whole article about the Mighty Maroon.

http://defence.frontline.online/article/2017/5/8815-Mighty-Maroon-Machine-in-Atlantic-Canada

I pulled this out in particular.  Interesting.  Mortars are back, heavy weapons platoon is back, pioneers are back? What's going on?

New Roles for Reserves
BGen Macaulay comes to Atlantic Canada from Army Headquarters in Ottawa where he was the Director of Army Strategy, or as he describes it: “the Director of the Army of Tomorrow,” a position he concurrently held until November.

Certain organizational lessons were reinforced by last year’s Auditor General’s report, which underscored the unrealized potential of a strong, well-equipped reserve force. Historically, the Canadian Army Reserves have comprised some 18,000 personnel, but the new defence policy has mandated the Army reserves grow by 950 personnel within the next two years, and so, with these new positions will come new roles, capabilities and responsibilities.

“This is an exciting time as the team works to strengthen the Army Reserves. We are examining how we conduct business, are guaranteeing summer employment four summers in a row to new applicants, and enhancing the recruiting, retention and enrollment process” – all aimed at growing the base of part-time soldiers across the Army.

“In the past, we had to shave the ice cube,” BGen Macaulay noted, using a metaphor favoured by senior Canadian army personnel to explain the frustrations of budget paring, funding claw-backs and acquisition cancellations. “Now, the Army Commander has told us to build the ice cube. I have conveyed that to my unit commanding officers by telling them ‘You hire them, and I’ll pay them.’”

Building the army’s ice cube includes creating the Canadian Combat Support Brigade. And so, in October, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre transferred command authority for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB) to the 5th Canadian Division at a ceremony held at Fort Frontenac in Kingston. According to the Defence Department’s announcement, the brigade “institutionalizes key operational enabling capabilities such as Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Information Operations and Operational Support.”

Previously under the authority of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (Kingston) – the brigade now operates under the authority of the 5th Canadian Division, headquartered in Halifax.

The reserves of the four divisions across Canada will each provide four platoon-based capabilities, “the sweet 16” as they are called by BGen Macaulay:

Mortar – once cancelled as a capability of the infantry, is now being brought back as a weapons system for light infantry.
Direct fire platoon – will specialize in heavier weapons, such as the 50-calibre machine gun.
Pioneer platoons – for route preparation and route denial to the enemy.
Support – for light urban search and rescue.
​“These specialized mission tasks will not conflict with the primary functions of a unit such as Halifax’s Princess Louise Fusiliers, who will retain their primary roles, but these other capabilities will be added to their list of responsibilities – with additional soldiers and equipment provided to the units to accomplish these missions. This is in direct contrast to previous times when the reserve force would be assigned new responsibilities but frequently without the personnel, training and equipment to achieve them.

“With 5 Div assuming control of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB), Atlantic Canada’s maroon patch will be worn by the soldiers in this brigade across Canada,” Macaulay effused.

The core mandate of the CCSB is to oversee the training and operations of the Canadian Army’s key operational enabling functions:

Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance – collection and management of information on the operational environment.
Information Operations – information-related activities planned and conducted to have behavioural effects in support of a mission.
Operational Support – elements of support that facilitate all forms of military operations including engineering and artillery.
The Canadian Combat Support Brigade is the first Regular Force brigade to serve under the command authority of the 5th Canadian Division, which is the command element of the Canadian Army in four Atlantic Canada provinces.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

the new defence policy has mandated the Army reserves grow by 950 personnel within the next two years, and so, with these new positions will come new roles, capabilities

950...from coast to coast?  Maybe I am being too glass half empty but...from BC to Nfld, 950 is pretty thin butter on the bread.  Or is this to be selective and concentrated, with new units being stood up like the Hfx Rifles were a few years back?

As I get closer to CRA, anytime I see statements like "it's an exciting time to be in the YXZ..."...I hope the intent of the statement doesn't match the uniqueness of it - I've heard for too many people say that crap with zero change behind it.  2 decades and some change ago, my old Reserve unit could field 3 x 5 car recce troops, along with a suitable SHQ, Ech including some maintainers, a medic or 2, and go on Ex with 2 proper CPs from the local Sigs unit.  Last I heard, they didn't have the people or kit for 1 full 5 car troop anymore.

 

[Journeyman]

....the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre transferred command authority for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB) to the 5th Canadian Division...

So does CADTC lose its "Corps" patch? 

 

[MilEME09]

950...from coast to coast?  Maybe I am being too glass half empty but...from BC to Nfld, 950 is pretty thin butter on the bread.  Or is this to be selective and concentrated, with new units being stood up like the Hfx Rifles were a few years back?

As I get closer to CRA, anytime I see statements like "it's an exciting time to be in the YXZ..."...I hope the intent of the statement doesn't match the uniqueness of it - I've heard for too many people say that crap with zero change behind it.  2 decades and some change ago, my old Reserve unit could field 3 x 5 car recce troops, along with a suitable SHQ, Ech including some maintainers, a medic or 2, and go on Ex with 2 proper CPs from the local Sigs unit.  Last I heard, they didn't have the people or kit for 1 full 5 car troop anymore.

maybe thats their target recruitment goal? I know my own units recruitment goal would suck up a lot of that 950, so I think somethings out of context here.

 

[RADOPSIGOPACCISOP]

the new defence policy has mandated the Army reserves grow by 950 personnel within the next two years, and so, with these new positions will come new roles, capabilities

Excellent.

Now if they can just mandate the filling our other failed recruitment quotas we'll have a much better military.

Short of gangpressing people in, what exactly does "mandating" recruitment accomplish?