There were definitely some nuances missed in the article, and I would agree that the approach is unnecessarily confrontational. However, there is a very valid underlying truth in what she is saying which I and many others have raised in this thread before, and articulated in great detail.
I think where we differ here is that I don't see people who were conscripted or enrolled for the duration of hostilities as true reservists. These people were enrolled to complete a task, to put it most simply. This is not a slight on the reserves or a chest pumping for permanent force of the time. Its just they way it was.
First, I think you are incorrectly conflating the concept of a "Regular Force" as we understand it today with full time service of any kind, and you are further conflating the Regular Force of today with that of WW1 and WW2. The Army at the outbreak WW1 was the militia and its members were citizen soldiers, almost to a man. The relatively small pre-war professional army (or Regular force) was structured to meet the training and administrative needs of that part time component.
Agreed, that's just history. I am aware of those nuances but in the spirit of the article I spoke using the same level.
In the case of WW2, the militia was far more than just a recruiting base. The 40,000 man militia (and its citizen soldiers) provided the critical base and structure for force expansion, not the Regular Force. Militia leaders also had a key role in training that expanding force, though many of the senior leaders (LCol and above) were too old for active campaigning, so they were replaced by other (younger) citizen soldiers who signed on for the duration of hostilities, not for career-long service in a professional army.
Again hostilities only pers were not reserve or permanent force, they were hostilities only people.
Do we tie our success in WW1 or WW2 to the Reserve Force? Of course we don't. As you say, these were national efforts from a political, military and economic standpoint. However, I would offer that it was incorrect to minimize the role of the part time force and the citizen soldier in those achievements, and it would have been nice if that had made it into the national dialog.
No one is minimizing anything. I find it strange that the Army as a certain level of two way distrust between the Reg and Res force. I have experienced this a few times. We don't seem to share this sideways glance with our RCN reserve folks. Not sure about the RCAF.
Turning to the argument for institutional support for the PRes in the present day, the RegF may have been able to sustain the 4000 troop commitment in Afghanistan on its own in terms of overall troop numbers, but as organized throughout the conflict, it was unable to do so. You talk about guys chomping at the bit to go, and I am sure there was a lot of that on an individual level. However, the reality is that every unit which deployed to Afghanistan required massive cross-unit augmentation (including at least one full Rifle Coy equivalent for every Battle Group, Op Res, and numerous individuals), and this augmentation included a significant PRes component on the order of 20% of the force. The force as a whole was burning out by 2011, and it would have burned out a lot sooner if not for the PRes. No one (Christy included) is arguing that it was a PRes show, but the contribution was required as part of a team effort.
Perhaps you missed my post. You are right augmentation happened, it was forced. I had a very long chat with the NSE RSM about this in Cyprus. I had no idea, at that time, that billets were divided up between different commands, the majority obviously with the assembling brigade and the remainder spread to other commands and reserve organizations. I continually ran into antimosity during work up training from people in 2 CMBG who wanted to go but couldn't because augmentees had taken billets, in their minds they saw it that way. My point isn't to down play the excellent showing many reservists displayed in AFG. My point is that augmentation was forced
By their very nature, any part time force will require support from a full time component. If we were to look to our western allies, most Reserve forces have both a full-time reserve component and institutional support from the "professional force". Ultimately, if you are looking for a PRes track record, it is really only fair to assess the force against the tasks they have been assigned, and there are plenty of examples of the PRes meeting its obligations:
Op LENTUS (2014-Present)- Short notice individual and Pl sized augmentation.
Op LENTUS 2013 - 400+ reservists deployed at 24 hrs notice for a week-long local DOMOP using local resources almost exclusively.
B.C. Fires 2004 - 600+ Reservists deployed over a month long domestic operation, forming multiple battalion sized task forces.
Ice Storms 1998 - Hundreds of reservists deployed on short notice.
Op PALLADIUM - Composite PRes Rifle Coys for Rotos 11 and 12, and significant augmentation throughout.
Op HARMONY - Significant PRes augmentation. Anecdotally, I have read that some Rifle Coys had as much as 50% PRes augmentation.
Again you seem to think that I am talking down the Army reserve. In fact would like to see them more independent and responsible for their own tasks. Right now every one of those examples you provided were held together by a regular force foundation and core that ensured the success of those OPs. I would like to see the reveres be given an Op in its entirety and have them be successful with it, this should be the goal
I would offer that given current levels of resourcing (appx 6% of the defence budget including equipment, RSS PYs, infrastructure, etc.) and institutional prioritization, the Government is getting great value out of its PRes. However, it would be hard pressed to do more without significant reforms and some further investment. However, that shouldn't invalidate contributions made so far, or the potential for increased PRes involvement in a re-balanced force.
Again no one is invalidating. The fact is that the reg force has, can and will again have to deploy, domestically or internationally, on a moments notice. Until such time as the reserves can maintain that level readiness in useful numbers the lions share of funding should go to the regulars. IMHO.