Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[Eye In The Sky]

no one knows WTF is going on.

Not limited to the PRes world  ;D

 

[daftandbarmy]

Christie Blatchford: Canada couldn’t have taken Vimy without citizen soldiers

"Of the 40 regiments with Vimy colours or guidons, 37 are reserve units, what used to be called the militia."

http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/christie-blatchford-canada-couldnt-have-taken-vimy-without-citizen-soldiers

 

[Halifax Tar]

Christie Blatchford: Canada couldn’t have taken Vimy without citizen soldiers

"Of the 40 regiments with Vimy colours or guidons, 37 are reserve units, what used to be called the militia."

http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/christie-blatchford-canada-couldnt-have-taken-vimy-without-citizen-soldiers

While I can appreciate her steadfast support for the reserves and the CAF in general I think the argument as presented in the article is a bit of a stretch.  While the 37 regiments/units were part of the "mighty-mo" the soldiers who dispatched overseas were signed on for the duration of hostilities, were they not ?  I mean, WW1 wasn't fought 1 night a week and 1 weekend a month.

Her argument seems like a red herring to me in that the vast majority of those soldiers were not members of reserve units until the outbreak of hostilities.  Lets also not forget about the 47'000 conscripts who went over seas.

Again I appreciate her efforts, I think they are well meaning, and they may resonate more with people who lack the military exposure that we do.  I simply think that is a poor argument for upping the reserves as it was a wartime and wartime only, which repeated its self 20 years later.

 

[ArmyRick]

Have to disagree with you Halifax Tar,

She hit some very valid points in her article. Their is no reason for the reserves to be larger within the context of the current budget.

Interesting some of the tasks reserves have tackled, such as being the lead in each division's ARCG.

I will commit blasphemy here and say we need more reserves before we need additional regular units.

However current government in place, I suspect neither will be increased.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Have to disagree with you Halifax Tar,

She hit some very valid points in her article. Their is no reason for the reserves to be larger within the context of the current budget.

Interesting some of the tasks reserves have tackled, such as being the lead in each division's ARCG.

I will commit blasphemy here and say we need more reserves before we need additional regular units.

However current government in place, I suspect neither will be increased.

I am not sure what you are disagreeing with.  Trying to tie the successes of WW1 (or WW2) to the reserves is really an unsupportable position.  There are so many more factors that were at play (think total war concept). 

While the regiments were useful in acting as local recruiting centers they really were part of the regular forces for the duration of the conflict when deployed.  And the vast majority of the people who enrolled or conscripted had no prior attachment to the differing militia units they joined.  Again WW1 and 2 were not won on a reserve training schedule.

As for expanding the reserves, I would support your position if the Army Reserve could prove on a regular basis that they could assemble a useful amount of pers, in a reasonable amount of time and deploy for an extended period with out the support of Reg Forces admin and training assistance and support. 

Even her use of our recent experiences in AFG is incorrect.  The CAF could have conducted that mission, from start to end, using only Reg Force pers.  When orgs were being put together the billet numbers we assigned to many different orgs not just the assembling Brigade.  For instance on TF 1-10 MARLANT was given X numbers of billets to fill, ranging from Log, EOD to FP to GD.  So the hand was forced in that we were mandated to use the reserves for XX numbers of billets.  I also know we had line ups of people who wanted to deploy but were left behind because of the distribution of billet numbers.

Ensuring the distribution of that experience to all facets of the CAF is not a bad thing, but any one facet claiming that they were the reason the mission went ahead is patently false and misleading.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am not sure what you are disagreeing with.  Trying to try the successes of WW1 (or WW2) to the reserves is really an unsupportable position.  There are so many more factors that were at play (think total war concept). 

While the regiments were useful in acting as local recruiting centers they really were part of the regular forces for the duration of the conflict when deployed.  And the vast majority of the people who enrolled or conscripted had no prior attachment to the differing militia units they joined.  Again WW1 and 2 were not won on a reserve training schedule.

As for expanding the reserves, I would support your position if the Army Reserve could prove on a regular basis that they could assemble a useful amount of pers, in a reasonable amount of time and deploy for an extended period with out the support of Reg Forces admin and training assistance and support.

And that is the real value of the "Militia"  - the social club with a rifle company attached.  It provides a local point of attachment into the military system where people can see friendly, or at least recognizable faces, rather than heading off three thousand kilometers to join an amorphous blob run by the same people that take your taxes.

 

[Remius]

I am not sure what you are disagreeing with.  Trying to try the successes of WW1 (or WW2) to the reserves is really an unsupportable position.  There are so many more factors that were at play (think total war concept). 

While the regiments were useful in acting as local recruiting centers they really were part of the regular forces for the duration of the conflict when deployed.  And the vast majority of the people who enrolled or conscripted had no prior attachment to the differing militia units they joined.  Again WW1 and 2 were not won on a reserve training schedule.

As for expanding the reserves, I would support your position if the Army Reserve could prove on a regular basis that they could assemble a useful amount of pers, in a reasonable amount of time and deploy for an extended period with out the support of Reg Forces admin and training assistance and support. 

Even her use of our recent experiences in AFG is incorrect.  The CAF could have conducted that mission, from start to end, using only Reg Force pers.  When orgs were being put together the billet numbers we assigned to many different orgs not just the assembling Brigade.  For instance on TF 1-10 MARLANT was given X numbers of billets to fill, ranging from Log, EOD to FP to GD.  So the hand was forced in that we were mandated to use the reserves for XX numbers of billets.  I also know we had line ups of people who wanted to deploy but were left behind because of the distribution of billet numbers.

Ensuring the distribution of that experience to all facets of the CAF is not a bad thing, but any one facet claiming that they were the reason the mission went ahead is patently false and misleading.

I think her point is valid.  The fact is that most people that joined were not and did not become career soldiers like those in the Regular Force and never really considered themselves that way. Most thought it would all be over in a few months time.  Militia units were activated and grew as a result.  Many people were drawn to those local units in order to serve and fight in what they thought would be a short term thing.  Heck many units were created just so they could recruit locally.  If you took a reserve unit and activated it for 6 months is it part of the regular force in your eyes or is a reserve unit that stood up for a full time task?

Essentially it wasn't the regular force or the militia units themselves that fought and won the war but a citizen army that stood up for a time to do what needed to be done. 

 

[mariomike]

And that is the real value of the "Militia"  - the social club with a rifle company attached.  It provides a local point of attachment into the military system where people can see friendly, or at least recognizable faces, rather than heading off three thousand kilometers to join an amorphous blob run by the same people that take your taxes.

The British had their "Pals" battalions in early WW1.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwone/pals_01.shtml

"The pals battalions of World War I were specially constituted battalions of the British Army comprising men who had enlisted together in local recruiting drives, with the promise that they would be able to serve alongside their friends, neighbours and colleagues ("pals"), rather than being arbitrarily allocated to battalions."

"The practice of drawing recruits from a particular region or group meant that, when a "Pals battalion" suffered heavy casualties, the impact on individual towns, villages, neighborhoods, and communities back in Britain could be immediate and devastating. With the introduction of conscription in March 1916, further Pals battalions were not sought. Voluntary local recruitment outside the regular army structure, so characteristic of the atmosphere of 1914–15, was not repeated in World War II."

 

[Halifax Tar]

I think her point is valid.  The fact is that most people that joined were not and did not become career soldiers like those in the Regular Force and never really considered themselves that way. Most thought it would all be over in a few months time.  Militia units were activated and grew as a result.  Many people were drawn to those local units in order to serve and fight in what they thought would be a short term thing.  Heck many units were created just so they could recruit locally.  If you took a reserve unit and activated it for 6 months is it part of the regular force in your eyes or is a reserve unit that stood up for a full time task?

Essentially it wasn't the regular force or the militia units themselves that fought and won the war but a citizen army that stood up for a time to do what needed to be done.

Your highlighted portion is correct.  Just because they wore a certain cap badge doesn't mean a thing.  It was a way to keep people organized and in some form of order. 

Your underlined question, that has to do with its place in the order of battle does it not ?  Or perhaps Class A, B or C contracts ?  Would there be any use in activating a reserve unit as a whole ?  What actual numbers in strength could you get ?  Unless conscription was announced and people were funneled by force into the unit. 

 

[Eye In The Sky]

If you activated a reserve unit for 6 months, I think the real question is would the *Regiment* be a Coy or platoon, and where would they get all the kit they need?  :nod:

 

[Remius]

If you activated a reserve unit for 6 months, I think the real question is would the *Regiment* be a Coy or platoon, and where would they get all the kit they need?  :nod:

The larger ones would only be able to provide a platoon at most for any extended period depending on the task.  And likely, they would not get what they need in this day and age... [ [ [

But whether they deploy individual soldiers, sections platoons or whatever, they are always still reservists and not regular force members.   

 

[MilEME09]

Depends on the unit. Going back to my comments on the british territorials. I asked a few more questions to the member attached to us. They do have contracts unlike us, 5 years in length, states when they have to parade, that they can be called up for one six month period during that contract. Sounds like a better system to me.

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk

 

[dapaterson]

But whether they deploy individual soldiers, sections platoons or whatever, they are always still reservists and not regular force members.   

Which has caused no end of trouble, as our comp & ben are still done on Reg / Res lines.

Far better to stand up the Special Force (per the NDA), post people (Reg or Res) to the Special Force for the duration of their deployment (and beyond if necessary), and pass a single, simple QR&O stating something along the lines of,

"Unless explicitly provided for elsewhere, for the purposes of all orders, regulations, instructions and directives, members of the Special Force are deemed to be members of the Regular Force."

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Sounds like a better system to me.

OK.  Why?  What are the pro's and con's of their system over ours?  Would this help recruitment, retention or be negative to it if someone who intended to be a Cl A type only, with a full time civilian job, was told they would HAVE to parade on dates XYZ and they *might* have to deploy for 1/2 a year in that 5 year timeframe?  (Example of things to consider)

 

[Remius]

OK.  Why?  What are the pro's and con's of their system over ours?  Would this help recruitment, retention or be negative to it if someone who intended to be a Cl A type only, with a full time civilian job, was told they would HAVE to parade on dates XYZ and they *might* have to deploy for 1/2 a year in that 5 year timeframe?  (Example of things to consider)

It's about managing expectations.  Not sure how it would help retention though. All good points to consider.  Also they have a smaller territory thus many units are very near each other.  We have a geography issue that doesn't help...

I for one would like to see some rules about attendance tightened. 

 

[RCPalmer]

I am not sure what you are disagreeing with.  Trying to try the successes of WW1 (or WW2) to the reserves is really an unsupportable position.  There are so many more factors that were at play (think total war concept). 

While the regiments were useful in acting as local recruiting centers they really were part of the regular forces for the duration of the conflict when deployed.  And the vast majority of the people who enrolled or conscripted had no prior attachment to the differing militia units they joined.  Again WW1 and 2 were not won on a reserve training schedule.

As for expanding the reserves, I would support your position if the Army Reserve could prove on a regular basis that they could assemble a useful amount of pers, in a reasonable amount of time and deploy for an extended period with out the support of Reg Forces admin and training assistance and support. 

Even her use of our recent experiences in AFG is incorrect.  The CAF could have conducted that mission, from start to end, using only Reg Force pers.  When orgs were being put together the billet numbers we assigned to many different orgs not just the assembling Brigade.  For instance on TF 1-10 MARLANT was given X numbers of billets to fill, ranging from Log, EOD to FP to GD.  So the hand was forced in that we were mandated to use the reserves for XX numbers of billets.  I also know we had line ups of people who wanted to deploy but were left behind because of the distribution of billet numbers.

Ensuring the distribution of that experience to all facets of the CAF is not a bad thing, but any one facet claiming that they were the reason the mission went ahead is patently false and misleading.

There were definitely some nuances missed in the article, and I would agree that the approach is unnecessarily confrontational.  However, there is a very valid underlying truth in what she is saying which I and many others have raised in this thread before, and articulated in great detail.

First, I think you are incorrectly conflating the concept of a "Regular Force" as we understand it today with full time service of any kind, and you are further conflating the Regular Force of today with that of WW1 and WW2.  The Army at the outbreak WW1 was the militia and its members were citizen soldiers, almost to a man.  The relatively small pre-war professional army (or Regular force) was structured to meet the training and administrative needs of that part time component.

In the case of WW2, the militia was far more than just a recruiting base. The 40,000 man militia (and its citizen soldiers) provided the critical base and structure for force expansion, not the Regular Force.  Militia leaders also had a key role in training that expanding force, though many of the senior leaders (LCol and above) were too old for active campaigning, so they were replaced by other (younger) citizen soldiers who signed on for the duration of hostilities, not for career-long service in a professional army. 

Do we tie our success in WW1 or WW2 to the Reserve Force?  Of course we don't.  As you say, these were national efforts from a political, military and economic standpoint.  However, I would offer that it was incorrect to minimize the role of the part time force and the citizen soldier in those achievements, and it would have been nice if that had made it into the national dialog. 

Turning to the argument for institutional support for the PRes in the present day, the RegF may have been able to sustain the 4000 troop commitment in Afghanistan on its own in terms of overall troop numbers, but as organized throughout the conflict, it was unable to do so.  You talk about guys chomping at the bit to go, and I am sure there was a lot of that on an individual level.  However, the reality is that every unit which deployed to Afghanistan required massive cross-unit augmentation (including at least one full Rifle Coy equivalent for every Battle Group, Op Res, and numerous individuals), and this augmentation included a significant PRes component on the order of 20% of the force.  The force as a whole was burning out by 2011, and it would have burned out a lot sooner if not for the PRes.  No one (Christy included) is arguing that it was a PRes show, but the contribution was required as part of a team effort.

By their very nature, any part time force will require support from a full time component.  If we were to look to our western allies, most Reserve forces have both a full-time reserve component and institutional support from the "professional force".  Ultimately, if you are looking for a PRes track record, it is really only fair to assess the force against the tasks they have been assigned, and there are plenty of examples of the PRes meeting its obligations:

Op LENTUS (2014-Present)- Short notice individual and Pl sized augmentation. 
Op LENTUS 2013 - 400+ reservists deployed at 24 hrs notice for a week-long local DOMOP using local resources almost exclusively.
B.C. Fires 2004 - 600+ Reservists deployed over a month long domestic operation, forming multiple battalion sized task forces.
Ice Storms 1998 - Hundreds of reservists deployed on short notice. 
Op PALLADIUM - Composite PRes Rifle Coys for Rotos 11 and 12, and significant augmentation throughout.
Op HARMONY - Significant PRes augmentation.  Anecdotally, I have read that some Rifle Coys had as much as 50% PRes augmentation. 

I would offer that given current levels of resourcing (appx 6% of the defence budget including equipment, RSS PYs, infrastructure, etc.) and institutional prioritization, the Government is getting great value out of its PRes.  However, it would be hard pressed to do more without significant reforms and some further investment. However, that shouldn't invalidate contributions made so far, or the potential for increased PRes involvement in a re-balanced force.

 

[dapaterson]

WW2 saw the "citizen soldiers" serve longer than a current initial engagement in the Regular Force; undergo months to years to training prior to entering hostilities; and then undergo a gradual demobilization.

The "citizen soldier of WWII" is a potent myth, but its potency does not change its mythic nature.

 

[RCPalmer]

WW2 saw the "citizen soldiers" serve longer than a current initial engagement in the Regular Force; undergo months to years to training prior to entering hostilities; and then undergo a gradual demobilization.

The "citizen soldier of WWII" is a potent myth, but its potency does not change its mythic nature.

Some reservists (myself included) completed a year of high readiness training prior to deployment of Afg. 

We're not going to find an Oxford definition of a "citizen soldier".  We're all citizens.  However, I still think it useful to differentiate the professional force (those who will spend their working lives in the full time paid service of the crown) from those who live in both worlds, serving in a part time capacity and/or full time for a finite period of time when required by the nation.  Regardless of the length of service, the citizen soldiers of WW1 and WW2 still went home when the war was over.

I don't have the numbers in front of me, but I would also challenge you on the proportion of the RegF on a 3 year (or shorter) VIE. As I understand it, only combat arms privates would be on that kind of TOS.  Even assuming a high proportion of short term TOS, everyone who joins does so with the knowledge that they could complete their career in full time service if they chose.  To me, those are the employment terms of professional, not citizen soldiers. 

The Canadian "Militia Myth" was about an erroneous conception of the average Canadian as a woodsman inherently suited to soldiering without significant military training which is quite different from what you are talking about.

 

[daftandbarmy]

However, it would be hard pressed to do more without significant reforms and some further investment. However, that shouldn't invalidate contributions made so far, or the potential for increased PRes involvement in a re-balanced force.

Exactly.

For example: a properly managed and led reserve force should probably not run out money in the last quarter of the fiscal year, requiring Officers to order their soldiers (WTF Boss?) to not attend, and to cancel training that was planned meticulously in advance by a capable mixed reserve-regular force operations team, right?

 

[dapaterson]

Some reservists (myself included) completed a year of high readiness training prior to deployment of Afg. 

That the Reg F was doing the same suggests fundamental failings in readiness of the Reg F.  I'd suggest that if we maintain part of the military - Reg or Res - at a state of readiness that takes a year or more to prepare them for deployment, then we are failing badly.

A Res F cannot be the Reg F - nor should we expect them to be so on deployment.  Know the skills that are trained and maintained, and employ people appropriately.  If leadership can't handle that, get better leaders.

We're not going to find an Oxford definition of a "citizen soldier".  We're all citizens.  However, I still think it useful to differentiate the professional force (those who will spend their working lives in the full time paid service of the crown) from those who live in both worlds, serving in a part time capacity and/or full time for a finite period of time when required by the nation.  Regardless of the length of service, the citizen soldiers of WW1 and WW2 still went home when the war was over.

Agree.

I don't have the numbers in front of me, but I would also challenge you on the proportion of the RegF on a 3 year (or shorter) VIE. As I understand it, only combat arms privates would be on that kind of TOS.  Even assuming a high proportion of short term TOS, everyone who joins does so with the knowledge that they could complete their career in full time service if they chose.  To me, those are the employment terms of professional, not citizen soldiers. 

A solider mobilized in Sept 1939 would have served six years or more; most VIEs fall within that range. 

My point (made abruptly, I'll admit) was that the traditional myth of the "Canadian citizen dropped his lumberjack axe, picked up a rifle, and singlehandedly repelled the Hun and took back Europe" is false; equally false is the "Existing citizen soldiers immediately liberated Europe".  Canadian soldiers spent years in training and preparation before invading.

The Canadian "Militia Myth" was about an erroneous conception of the average Canadian as a woodsman inherently suited to soldiering without significant military training which is quite different from what you are talking about.

I think we are in pretty violent agreement here...