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Defence roles, organization, equipping and HQ (a split thread on everything)

MedCorps said:
The Chief of Force Development (2-star) has created a number (10-12) mission-based scenario's that he envisions the CAF might become involved in in the next 10-30 years (horizon 3).  These scenario's have been endorsed by the CDS and I am told run by PCO (NSA) and PMO to ensure that these scenarios are acceptable and palatable to the Government in power. The scenarios range from a large domestic disaster to a large war joint fighting scenario and everything in-between.

These scenarios are then being war gamed (3-4 week sessions) by the Joint Capabilities Planning Team using current capabilities or capabilities that are to be fielded in horizon one. Capability gaps found in the CAF's ability to conduct mission success in the mission-based scenarios are then going to be further war gamed to set the conditions for identifying capability requirements amongst the three services. I am told about about 2/3rd of the scenarios are complete so far with notable gaps identified in some situations.
And, do the ECSs use these or invent their own scenarios for their own force development?

Unfortunately, sometimes ...
Good2Golf said:
Kirkhill said:
The hardest thing in any process is the first principle all of us were taught:

Selection and MAINTENANCE of the aim.
The nuance being selection by whom or what body? 

Each successive individual involved who has selected their own aim would tell you how they maintained their focus on that aim...  :nod:
... I suspect each level of command selects its own aim and would tell you how it maintains focus on that aim.
 
The CAF has Institutional ADHD. If it's shiny, we want it. If it's drab and boring, we do only what is minimally necessary.......Lets go for ice cream.....
 
MCG said:
And, do the ECSs use these or invent their own scenarios for their own force development?

That is a good question / observation. All of the ECSs (including RCN, CA, RCAF, CANSOFCOM, CFINTCOM, Cyber, Space, etc) have membership on the Joint Capability Planning Team. The scenarios are avaiable to the ECSs.  Do they taken them back and use them? Unsure.  I know of at least one who does outside of the CFD process. It is a fairly new concept with the first missions being approved in late 2013 and the remainer in 2014. 

I would also suspect (but do not know for sure) that it will be harder and harder to get by the most senior joint program boards if you are not on board with the CDS / GoC approved planning scenarios.

MC
 
There have been VCDS planning scenarios around for a number of years and the Army at least built its own unconnected FD planning references.  I have not seen anything to suggest harmonization, but I hope you are right.

Baz said:
- merge air defence and air transport commands into one; but put Maritime Air and Tactical Air where they belong.  However, keep airworthiness and air order maintenance in the merged Air "Command"
I meant to touch on this earlier but did not get back to it.
Could you not manage these functions directly under the national HQ as opposed to creating a command to manage a responsibility across other commands?  Could DGAEPM do both these, or is there more to airworthiness than the technical?
 
Going back to the earlier discussion with ERC and BAZ, I tinkered with the ideas and plugged it into a unified HQ structure that I previously drew-up.  It is a leaner looking organization.
 
I would make just one small change to your charts MCG.

I would have a dotted line from the CDS to the MND. It's not a reporting/responsibility relationship (or at least ought never to be). I would then put a straight reporting line up from the CDS to the GG-in-council (meaning the PM and all ministers, otherwise known as "HM's government"). It may sound like a technicality but it is not. The MND cannot give us marching orders, only the government can.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Mine would look a bit different ...
Like your proposal, I had previously drawn my HQ over joint regional commands (and a few other force options below) but switched it to the cloud to keep discussion on the HQ. 

I see you have three environmental chiefs of staff (Naval, General and Air) in your CFHQ with no command responsibility.  I envisioned force development (DOTMLPF) as the role in the structure that I drew, but you have placed your ECSs higher in the structure.  What do they do; is it more than I describe?

Why have you chosen the military side as opposed to the civilian side for Public Affairs?
 
And as reference for those who need it, here attached is how NDHQ is currently drawn.
 
MCG said:
Like your proposal, I had previously drawn my HQ over joint regional commands (and a few other force options below) but switched it to the cloud to keep discussion on the HQ. 

I see you have three environmental chiefs of staff (Naval, General and Air) in your CFHQ with no command responsibility.  I envisioned force development (DOTMLPF) as the role in the structure that I drew, but you have placed your ECSs higher in the structure.  What do they do; is it more than I describe?

Why have you chosen the military side as opposed to the civilian side for Public Affairs?


Sorry, MCG, I was away for a couple of days, not dodging your good questions ...

It seems to me that if you have a fully functional joint structure then there is no need, indeed no role for commanders of the RCN, CA and RCAF. But I still see a need for professional heads of service to deal with single service doctrine, training and requirements. I am conscious that we need a higher (in the pecking order) joint doctrine and requirements staff and I see there being a ACOS Plans on the Joint Staff (under the COS O&I (Ops & Int)) (Plans really means, mostly, joint doctrine and joint requirements) and I would expect that COS O&I, who is chief of the joint staff (ops supremacy and all that) would pass joint doctrine and requirements to the VCDS (the "general manager" of DND) who would, in his/her turn, direct the single service doctrine and requirements folks (through the service chiefs who report to him/her) to develop their single service doctrine and requirements in such a way as to take full account of the joint staff's direction. I appreciate this is a wee bit cumbersome but HQs can afford a bit of that. I'm looking for clarity in the chain of command, I'll accept a few "dotted lines" on the control (staff) side of the C2 superstructure.

As to public affairs. I'm afraid I'm  :deadhorse: again ...

I would like to see a triad in the public affairs/communications/public information business:

    The MND has a public relations staff which aims to tell Canadians what a great job the government of the day is doing at National Defence. This is, broadly, a partisan function with a high political content.

    The DM has a communications staff that tells Canadians, especially Canadian opinion makers about defence policy. There is a fair bit of advocacy here ... in essence government departments have to lobby the political centre
    (PCO, Finance and TB) to get the resources they need and they use opinion leaders, including in the media, to "sell" their programmes to PCO and cabinet. We might wish things were different but they aren't ~ at least they
    weren't in the 1990s, when I served, or in the early 2000s when I dealt, extensively with governments in my second career dealing with technical standards.

    The CDS needs, in my opinion, a public information staff that does not do advocacy. Rather it informs: it tells Canadians what the CF is doing, where and, to some degree how.

The three are not isolated, one from the other. Lets consider the "war" against IS**. In my model the MND's staff (maybe following the PMO) would announce, to much fanfare, that the CF is sending fighters to bomb IS**. The press release might even take a swipe at one or more opposition parties for being wishy-washy in dealing with terrorists. The DM's communications staff would have their own press briefing, explaining how they, based on information from the CF, PCO and Foreign Affairs, after receiving general guidance from the government, presented cabinet with a range of military (hard power) options, including costs and risks. Cabinet, in its wisdom, chose the bomber option. The DM's communications staff would explain that the mission's costs will come out of DND's hide for the first 90s days but, the official would say, DND will go to the policy centre (PCO, Finance and TB) seeking more resources if the mission lasts longer than 90 days. The CDS' public information office woulds, in turn, explain that the CF is deploying n CF-18s from 4nn squadron and n pilots and nnn support personnnel, mostly from n Wing in __base__, all under the command of Col Howsyourfather. The cycle is partisan spin, advocacy/policy explanation, and information ... repeat as necessary.
 
Based on that description, I think our two line diagrams are aesthetically but not fundamentally different.  Your COS O&I is my DCDS.  Your service chiefs and my environmental FD cheifs are again essentially the same.  I have split your COS A&L into a J1 and J4 function (probably for familiarity) but under the VCDS because I see these as part of that general management function at the national level; I see that fit being even more appropriate if one is considering the creation of a support command to execute the day-to-day delivery of the relate services.

 
In the US, the Senate Armed Services Committee is looking at Goldwater Nichols reforms that could eventually see the elimination of service component commands within the various combatant commands.  If it goes ahead, this experiment would be interesting to watch.  I suspect it would validate many proposals for the CAF that can be found on this site.

[The SASC proposal] also orders the Pentagon to “conduct a pilot program on an alternative organizational structure at one combatant command.” The secretary would pick a command of his or her choice and “replace the service component commands with joint task forces focused on operational military missions” in order to see how that would operate.
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2016/05/12/sasc-ndaa-swerves-hard-goldwater-nichols-reforms-mccain/84311626/
 
E.R. Campbell,
I think the discussions linked below would benefit from some of your perspective:
http://www.defenceconsultations.ca/canadian-approach-to-defence/forum_topics/do-you-have-any-comments-or-feedback-concerning-the-current-canadian-approach-to-defence1

and

http://www.defenceconsultations.ca/defence-capabilities-future-force/forum_topics/should-the-size-structure-and-composition-for-the-canadian-armed-forces-change-from-what-it-is-today1
 
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