Defence roles, organization, equipping and HQ (a split thread on everything)

[Kirkhill]

Absolutely... we need something.

However, what we need, how many, how we train, and how much we train are completely dependant on whether they are going to be expeditionary.

That's what I've been trying to say, we need a National discussion on what our expeditionary forces should look like.

Baz - you have identified the central question on these boards in one.

We no longer have a War Department (when we were under British jurisdiction).  We, like every other western nation, have adopted the passive, reactive terminology of Defence.

Expeditions beyond our borders are hard to square with the syllogism of Defence.  Many Canadians can not wrap their head around the concept of "Forward Defence".  For them "the best defence is a good offence" smacks of aggression.

Consequently, to justify "expeditions", we have to find people and things to defend.

The Air Force defends airspace, our own, our neighbour's and our approaches.  The inherent capabilities necessary for that are easily transferrable to expeditions - with a small portion of the home force being allocated forward.  That allocation allows some portion of the force to maintain skills in a contested, operational environment.  The Canadian public is generally tolerant of the force although they have sticker shock over the F35s, not fully understanding how the cost compares to the ongoing cost of supplying the F18 capability (or the CP-140 or any other critter).

The Navy, much like the Air Force has a clearly defined defensive role that can be easily relocated forward.  The difference between a force covering our EEZ and the Approaches, and an expeditionary force, is the presence of mother ships, AKA AORs.

In both cases machines do the work.  Manpower is minimized.  Casualties are few. Work is conducted out of sight of press and cell phones.

The Army is the problem.  Especially an infantry focused army.  Sending troops in harms way to close with and destroy is problematic.

The problem is deep-rooted. That is why all of our expeditionary armies have ultimately been volunteer efforts.  The Zombies are still with us.

My own personal sense is that the Army can only justify itself if it consciously adopts the role of, and commits to, preparing a Home Guard / Militia / Army of National Defence, stiffened by Permanent forces designed to be rapidly deployable internally.  Those  Permanent forces could also be rapidly deployable at sea with the RCN.  How heavy a force that might be would be entirely dependent on the number and size of appropriate hulls the RCN is willing and able to supply and how much gear the Army is willing and able to leave permanently afloat in those hulls.  Note I only said gear, not bodies.  The bodies are easy to get out to a ship, or to a port. The gear is hard.

A side benefit of gear afloat is that it is easy to donate that gear to allies/friends/folks in need in a timely fashion and not put Canadian lives at risk.

Thus my interest in aligning the Permanent Force Canadian Army with CJOC and CANSOFCOM while assigning CADTC to develop an Army of National Defence based upon a Militia.  There are lots of models, all over the world, National Guards and Reserves in the States, Home Guards in Denmark, Sweden and the Baltic countries - that make that system work.

It also drives my sense that somebody should be overseeing the purchase of ordnance so that, for example, the same missiles are used regardless of launch platform - for example the AIM 120 or the ESSM to be employed by GBAD, or the same C4 system used aboard ship being used on shore with a similar mix of weaponry to create a GBAD-LRPRS system that uses few bodies and that can be rapidly deployed at home, at sea, or on a foreign shore.

I know this is not strictly F35 related - but you presented too good an opening for discussion.  Even if we do make the moderators work for their non-existent wages and force a split.

 

[McG]

... somebody should be overseeing the purchase of ordnance so that, for example, the same missiles are used regardless of launch platform - for example the AIM 120 or the ESSM to be employed by GBAD, or the same C4 system used aboard ship being used on shore with a similar mix of weaponry to create a GBAD-LRPRS system that uses few bodies and that can be rapidly deployed at home, at sea, or on a foreign shore.

We have ADM(Mat) to do all ordnance purchases.  Its procurement mandate is given by the ECSs, and it has little (if any) power to force harmonization across the environmental requirements staffs.  This is not want you want.  You want a central office for all requirements development.  That would imply stealing the force development staffs from each of the environmental stovepipes and concentrating them within CFD.

 

[quadrapiper]

We have ADM(Mat) to do all ordnance purchases.  Its procurement mandate is given by the ECSs, and it has little (if any) power to force harmonization across the environmental requirements staffs.  This is not want you want.  You want a central office for all requirements development.  That would imply stealing the force development staffs from each of the environmental stovepipes and concentrating them within CFD.

I'd always assumed that, if there were elemental entities for function X, there would also be a purple entity of some sort, whether as clearinghouse, liaison, coordinator/commander, or whatever - if only for bureaucratic balance and empire-building.

 

[Infanteer]

Chief Force Development is, technically, that organization but I don't think it works that way.

 

[Edward Campbell]

:sorry: ... but what follows is an opinion wrapped up in a bit of a history lesson.

We, the Canadian Forces, only ever got close to being well organized once in our history. While I'm no fan of Paul Hellyer and I'm certainly not here to support him, he, and his team, got the organization right on 1 Oct 68:

    1. A unified (joint) Canadian Forces HQ in Ottawa;

    2. Several functional, unified (joint) commands ~

        Maritime Command which had naval fleets and organic air/aviation units, too;

        Mobile Command which had army brigade groups and a tactical air group with both rotary and fixed wing aircraft squadrons, including squadrons of CF-5 fighter/bombers;

        Air Defence Command ~ a single service command consisting of fighter/interceptor squadrons, radar chains and a spohisticated command and control structure;
 
        Air Transport Command ~ also a single service command;

        Materiel Command ~ a joint command providing third and forth line support to the CF;

        Training Command ~ a joint command providing training, including flying training to the CF. Almost all schools belonged to Training Command; and

        The Canadian Forces Communications System ~ a joint agency, patterened after the US Defence Communications Agency, providing strategic (fixed) communications support to the CF.

All of Mr Hellyer's changes, integration (the single service and single uniform and integrated personnel branches) and unification (CFHQ and the joint commands) was driven by economics. The 1950s had been a shock to the CF. Prime Minister St Laurent had made rebuilding and reorienting the CF one of his priorities: there were new ships (a new aircraft carrier (Bonaventure) and new destroyers (the St Laurent class and their follow-ons), new tanks and plans for a new, mechanized army, and the RCAF entered the jet age with the fabled F-86 and the CF-100 Canuck. But there were problems: the costs of modern military hardware were escalating (inflating) at a horrendous rate. The USA, in particular, had adopted an industrial strategy that had a very large, very profitable aerospace and defence sector. Canada could and did produce good, solid home -made equipment but in the marketplace the Americans would damned near give away airplanes, tanks and radios before they would see allies buy Canadian (or British) gear. The CF-105 brought things to a head: it was, simply, unaffordable for Canada, alone, and none, not one would ever have been sold outside Canada ~ the Americans promised that. Prime Minister Pearson was commited to finishing M St Laurent's grand plan, but it would have to be done with a shrinking defence budget which meant that major savings would have to be found in the superstructure; Mr Hellyer promised (and delivered) some of those savings and, in the process, gave the CF a good enough ~ not quite right, but good enough ~ organization.

It wasn't to last.

There were problems: given the shrinking budgets both the Navy (Maritime Command) and the Army (Mobile Command) failed to follow trough on unification. In each case the air component, which smart, young commanders all agreed was vital to victory in battle, was given short shrift when it wasn't ignored all together. It was a failure in leadership by senior, battle tested admirals and generals; it wasn't Minister Hellyer's fault, the blame rests with men like O'Brien, Porter, Timbrell and Boyle, in the Navy and Allard, Anderson, Turcot, Milroy and Waters in the Army. They were not bad officers, just terribly, terribly parochial, short sighted and narrow minded, much like most humans everywhere.

At the same time the Air Force felt a bit hard done by: Air Defence and Air Transport commands were perceived to be a bit junior and some air force generals were, honestly, dismayed at the second class status afforded to aviation in the navy and army. In 1975 we got Air Command, there were lots of excuses but it was, mainly, an exercise in self aggrandisement for a few very senior air force generals. The organization of the CF has gone, steadily, down hill since 1975, nothing done since then has done anything to make a significant improvement.

There was one addition to Mr Hellyer's structure that did make some sense: in 1972 Minister James Richardson (acting on a recommendation from Minister Donald Macdonald) integrated CFHQ and the Headquarters of the Department of National Defence (the Deputy Minister et al) into a single National Defence Headquarters, a Ministry of Defence structure such as all our allies have. This reorganization eventually spelled the end of Materiel Command as it was merged with the existing ADM(Mat) organization. It might have been better to have retained Materiel Command but to have given it (and Communications Command) a civilian "commander" (in effect that's what ADM(Mat) was when I served, back in the 1980s and '90s).

We, sailors, soldiers and airmen have known, since the 1940s that joint works. In 1968 we, the CF, were set on a joint path, but failures in leadership, careerism, jealousy and short sightedness put us back into single service stovepipes. It's time, in my opinion, to go "back to the future."

 

[Baz]

Well said.

I would also make it very much like '68, except:
- get rid of Material Command (ie ADM(Mat)) as we now have PWGSC; make the individual commands their own force generators
- merge air defence and air transport commands into one; but put Maritime Air and Tactical Air where they belong.  However, keep airworthiness and air order maintenance in the merged Air "Command"
- get rid of the Canadian Forces Communications Command (ie ADM(IM)) as we now have Shared Services Canada, but create a Joint Cyber Command, responsible for Defense Information Security and Deployed Comms

... and get rid of a bunch more Level 1s...

 

[McG]

We actually have the nucleus of a reformed Material Command in the CANOSCOM remnants found in CJOC.  I think I would merge Material Command and Air Transport Command into a single Support Command to do the whole national level S&T function.

 

[Kirkhill]

I can see the direction and understand it.

Splitting Air Assets effectively into Fixed Wing Trucks (IMO an aircraft that plans on launching Beyond Visual Range is more of a truck than a fighter) and Rotary Wing Trucks makes sense.

My problem is with the Maritime - Mobile Command split.  I don't see that working for ensuring that the RCN has the platforms to move the Army.  The RCN doesn't need the Army to conduct its vision of Expeditionary Ops, and frankly it doesn't seem particularly interested in Domestic Ops.  On the other hand the RCN (and the Air Force) are critical to the Army for any Ops. 

It can't get where it needs to be and hold in place without the other two Commands/Branches/Services/Thingamyjigs.

That is why I think that a CJOC for all things operational makes sense.  Force Generation should be the raison d'etre for the Institutional Elements, Recruiting, Training and Reserves/Militia.

MCG - The only problem I would have with that solution is that if you went that route I would expect Support Command to also be supplying Ships, Helicopters and Trucks. Essentially, everything "B".

 

[McG]

MCG - The only problem I would have with that solution is that if you went that route I would expect Support Command to also be supplying Ships, Helicopters and Trucks. Essentially, everything "B".

It would only go that far if one were deliberately trying to situate the estimate to some stupid extreme.

Your support command is your lifeline into theatre, you national level maintenance, and your depots.  All the tactical support remains under control of whoever uses it.

 

[Kirkhill]

Ok

I'll suck back on the Tactical B Trucks and the Helos.

How about the transport ships and the trucks to move to the docks?

 

[McG]

How about the transport ships and the trucks to move to the docks?

We have that already, along with the inland shipping to get things where they need to be.  It is overseen by CJOC now.  Mostly, it is contracted.

 

[McG]

Have a look at the CMSG and 4 CFMSU here:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-support/cfjosg.page

 

[Retired AF Guy]

[c]reate a Joint Cyber Command, responsible for Defense Information Security and Deployed Comms

Wouldn't some of that be overlapping with CSE?

 

[Kirkhill]

We have that already, along with the inland shipping to get things where they need to be.  It is overseen by CJOC now.  Mostly, it is contracted.

The thing I am stumbling over is that some/most of the Air Transport fleet is, like Tactical B Trucks and Helos, a Tactical Asset, or at least a Tactical Enabler.  Those aircraft (Hercs and C17s) are expected to operate at least some of the time from dirt strips and in the face of enemy fire.

What is the difference between a trucker on a dirt strip and a Herc driver on the same strip (or a Hook driver?).  They certainly are not in the same game as the civvy trucker in Canada or even a Polaris driver on some unnamed airfield in the Middle East getting a glass of orange juice between flights at the Hilton.

And with respect to shipping (boats on the water), if it is acceptable to charter boats instead of owning a vehicular transport, then why is it not acceptable to charter 767s and 777s to move troops to tarmac airfields for furtherance by the tactical transports.

In the same vein, if it is deemed appropriate to possess transport craft that are limited to tarmac fields well out of the AO, why is it not appropriate to possess ships for similar types of operations?

Finally, if Support/Transport is going to operate Air Transport, including Tactical Air Transport, why would they not be the responsible command for Amphibious Transport Ships?

That would leave the RCAF responsible for fighters and LRPs and the RCN responsible for the CSCs (even the AOPS might be considered as more of a Support asset than a Combat asset) and subs.

I am not trying to be obtuse here, although I am probably giving a fair impression, and I have some sympathy for a purple transport command, if only to bust some stovepipes.  But I keep bumping into the question of where to set the limits once you start down that trail.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Wouldn't some of that be overlapping with CSE?

CSEC are big boys; there's no need to worry about them; they are very able to ensure there is no overlap.

 

[McG]

Kirkhill,
I think one of the things you are stumbling on is an idea that commands are going to own all the toys in their sandbox.  You don't like the idea of a Maritime Command and Mobile Command because the Navy won't think about the Army's needs when selecting ships, and you don't know what to do with an aircraft that can fit both tactical and strategic roles.

With any possible CAF structure, there will be assets that must work together but do not permanently reside under a common commander.  How do you deal with this?  Put force development outside the commands; stick it all in CFD as an option.  This will ensure a whole force or joint perspective is taken when defining and prioritizing requirements.  And when it comes to employment, you attach assets from commanders who need them but do not normally have them.

The thing I am stumbling over is that some/most of the Air Transport fleet is, like Tactical B Trucks and Helos, a Tactical Asset, or at least a Tactical Enabler.  Those aircraft (Hercs and C17s) are expected to operate at least some of the time from dirt strips and in the face of enemy fire.

What is the difference between a trucker on a dirt strip and a Herc driver on the same strip (or a Hook driver?).  They certainly are not in the same game as the civvy trucker in Canada or even a Polaris driver on some unnamed airfield in the Middle East getting a glass of orange juice between flights at the Hilton.

What is the difference between the MLVW and the Herc?  The MLVW moves things within theatre.  The Herc most likely moves things into and out of theatre.  If a operation requires intra-theatre airlift, then attach assets to the theatre command to fill the role (either temporarily or indefinitely).

And with respect to shipping (boats on the water), if it is acceptable to charter boats instead of owning a vehicular transport, then why is it not acceptable to charter 767s and 777s to move troops to tarmac airfields for furtherance by the tactical transports.

It has been done .... Though I do not know that the aircraft were Boeing products or something else.  But this is a tangent.

In the same vein, if it is deemed appropriate to possess transport craft that are limited to tarmac fields well out of the AO, why is it not appropriate to possess ships for similar types of operations?

That is also a tangent.

Finally, if Support/Transport is going to operate Air Transport, including Tactical Air Transport, why would they not be the responsible command for Amphibious Transport Ships?

No.  Assault ships who deliver forces to theatre but then remain to support and/or participate in the operation would be assets to the theatre commander.  An AOR or JSS that sails with and supports the fleet in the day to day is an asset of the fleet commander.  If the CAF owned (as you hypothesize above) a cargo ship with a primary role to deliver goods between a Canadian port and an SPOD, then that could be a support command asset.

 

[GR66]

...

My own personal sense is that the Army can only justify itself if it consciously adopts the role of, and commits to, preparing a Home Guard / Militia / Army of National Defence, stiffened by Permanent forces designed to be rapidly deployable internally.  Those  Permanent forces could also be rapidly deployable at sea with the RCN.  How heavy a force that might be would be entirely dependent on the number and size of appropriate hulls the RCN is willing and able to supply and how much gear the Army is willing and able to leave permanently afloat in those hulls.  Note I only said gear, not bodies.  The bodies are easy to get out to a ship, or to a port. The gear is hard.

A side benefit of gear afloat is that it is easy to donate that gear to allies/friends/folks in need in a timely fashion and not put Canadian lives at risk.

...

Your parts about the Air Force and Navy make sense to me, but I'm not really sold on your vision of the army.  While a Home Guard/Militia focused military may have some political appeal (feeding off the "Militia Myth"), does it really make much military sense for Canada?  Unlike some other militia-focused armies, is there a realistic threat of invasion of our sovereign territory which would require a "Home Guard" designed to be rapidly deployable internally?  If instead of home defense we're viewing the Militia as a base for expansion of the small permanent force, do we have the equipment to be able to realistically expand our military into a larger force? 

Same with the concept of sea-basing of equipment...does it make military/economic sense for Canada to pre-position equipment at sea in expectation of possible deployment?  Has rapid maritime deployment been an urgent requirement for the CF in recent history?  Can the expense of amphibious capable ships sailing with war stocks waiting to be married to deploying troops be justified when our combat arms are lacking in basic military capabilities (GBAD, integral close air support, mortar platoons, pioneers, etc.)?

I agree that having a clear role defined for the army that can be clearly communicated to the public in order to gain the economic support of the electorate would be a good thing.  I'm just not convinced that the vision you've laid out makes sense to me personally.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Kirkhill,
I think one of the things you are stumbling on is an idea that commands are going to own all the toys in their sandbox.  You don't like the idea of a Maritime Command and Mobile Command because the Navy won't think about the Army's needs when selecting ships, and you don't know what to do with an aircraft that can fit both tactical and strategic roles.

Maybe to expand a bit on this in how we are organized; right now there are separate requirements sections for each element, which are manned by the operators, and then the actual material support is done (with some exceptions) at ADM(Mat), but with the SMEs vice the elements.  For example, all small boats in the CAF are slowly being passed to DGMEPM, FF turnout gear used by the RCN falls under DGAEPM, and some of the other common equipment falls under DGLEPM.  Other items like meters and normal test equipment falls under QETE.

Neither the requirements or support lines are responsible for the actual employment of the assets, which is managed by the operational HQs. 

That took me a while to wrap my head around it, but once I did the joint commands made a lot more sense.  They really don't need to care about the long term requirements for the future, how things work or how they are going to get fixed, only what capabilities they have at their disposal and how they can use them together.  As long as you have SMEs from different elements that understand how their part works involved, it can work pretty well.

One thing that helped side is that all the LCMMs and requirement people are now in the same building, so it has made working together a lot easier.  This is particularly important for support a ship, where you have systems on board from all the different elements, so doing platform level LCMM work got much easier, when you can walk up a few floors to talk to the person, and work together on requirements for common equipment. 

 

[Good2Golf]

Maybe to expand a bit on this in how we are organized; right now there are separate requirements sections for each element, which are manned by the operators, and then the actual material support is done (with some exceptions) at ADM(Mat), but with the SMEs vice the elements.  For example, all small boats in the CAF are slowly being passed to DGMEPM, FF turnout gear used by the RCN falls under DGAEPM, and some of the other common equipment falls under DGLEPM.  Other items like meters and normal test equipment falls under QETE.

Neither the requirements or support lines are responsible for the actual employment of the assets, which is managed by the operational HQs. 

That took me a while to wrap my head around it, but once I did the joint commands made a lot more sense.  They really don't need to care about the long term requirements for the future, how things work or how they are going to get fixed, only what capabilities they have at their disposal and how they can use them together.  As long as you have SMEs from different elements that understand how their part works involved, it can work pretty well.

One thing that helped side is that all the LCMMs and requirement people are now in the same building, so it has made working together a lot easier.  This is particularly important for support a ship, where you have systems on board from all the different elements, so doing platform level LCMM work got much easier, when you can walk up a few floors to talk to the person, and work together on requirements for common equipment.

Navy_Pete, good to hear that general consolidation of life-cycle managers and in-service support teams is working out.

Now the challenge will be to align/consolidate force development activities to reduce the stove-piping and increase the coherence of the overall Departmental/CAF capability acquisition effort.

:2c:

Regards
G2G

 

[Edward Campbell]

Some things are best done within a service specific structure: defining the right capabilities required in the next generation of warships, or rifles, or tanks or fighter planes, for example; others are best done in a joint environment: defining force structures and, broadly, the right mix of systems and ensuring that e.g. the air force can provide CAP for the navy and CAS for the army, when required. The trick is to find the right staff mix to:

    1. Define, broadly and at the joint/CF level, the capabilities required;

    2. Translate those capabilities required into specific proposals for combat and support systems;

    3. Allocate (financial and human) resources for the life cycle of each system;

    4. Procure the systems, balancing military operational requirements and national industrial requirements;

    5. Support those systems throughout their (extended) service lives; and

    6. Dispose of the systems.

If I knew how to do that I'd probably be rich and famous ...