Recently some Chinese political scientists have examined the rise of several modern countries, specifically: Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States. The scholars concluded that these nine nations shared a half dozen
attributes that led to and sustained their relative success:
• Political Stability
• Military Strength
• Economic and Technological Success
• National Cohesiveness
• Cultural Creativity
• Magnetism
The last two, cultural creativity and “magnetism” combine to create what Joseph Nye has described as “soft power.”
Clearly not all of the countries examined had all of those attributes in great abundance but a couple, and only a couple - Britain and America, were able to possess and maintain all six for protracted periods.
Interestingly, the Chinese scholars identified military strength as a double edged sword – coupling it with an aggressive policy spelled defeat for Spain, France, Germany and Japan. Building it at the expense of other attributes led to the defeat of Russia while failing to build enough led to the demise of Portugal and the Netherlands.
The lesson some Chinese are drawing or, more specifically, want their fellows to draw is that China must amass and sustain all six attributes.
In many respects the first, political stability, may be the one which is most worrisome to Chinese leaders. Traditionally China is ruled or governed by those possessing the “mandate of heaven” - 天命 or
Tiānmìng – which, unlike the European concept of the “divine right of kings” is highly conditional. The “mandate” is maintained only so long as the ruler/governor is wise and just – paralleling debates in ancient Greece about the nature of tyranny. While the Chinese “heaven” may, 2,500 years ago, have been a ‘place’ in the sky where gods lived it
morphed over the millennia into a compound of all this spiritual and the whole universe. As the supreme “god” and, more importantly, source of all power and justice it is
Tiān or 天 but it is also part of a “trinity” of three realms: heaven, earth and humanity.
(Parenthetically, the ruler of China is said to rule “all under heaven” or, for the Chinese, the whole of the
civilized world. For many Chinese, educated, thoughtful Chinese, this translates into a “feeling” that China is “rightfully destined” to rule all of Asia and to lead the world. This is, subliminally, taught in most schools. In several visits I never missed the (usually decorative) map of the world centred on China, in bright red. The red faded away to pink or to other colours as one got father and father from China but the message, to hundreds of millions of school children, is that China is at the centre of a “red” world.)
Be that as it may, Chinese rulers/governors still need a “mandate” which the current crop believe is demonstrated by a peaceful, happy populace – evidenced by a lack of the sorts of popular revolts that were common over the past 2,000 years or so. But the Chinese leadership is poor at
retail politics so it is unsure of its mandate – but afraid to adopt the sorts of democratic tools that make verifying the “mandate” so easy. Thus, even in the absence of open revolts, China is still not
politically stable.
There are some tentative steps in the right direction: local elections that appear to be free and fair. The Chinese leadership hopes,
I think, gradually to shift some decisions downwards from provincial and even national levels and, simultaneously, to allow – even encourage – free and open politics at local – village, town, district – level. It’s a gamble that may – or may not – pay off; it will be interesting to watch.
For now, China’s main weakness is in the
political stability domain – at any given moment the government’s ‘control’ over China is impressive but the government lacks the most effective tools for determining the people’s wants and needs and for determining how ‘best’ to meet them: elected politicians who, of necessity, are in close contact with their constituents.
An observer1 has suggested that China is trying to follow a path to global power that minimizes the requirement to build and maintain overwhelming military force à la the USA. Ramo suggest that China is emphasizing its economic and technological prowess and its well earned and carefully guarded reputation for non-intervention/respect for national sovereignty as the mainstays of a push for increased global influence. Another observer2 suggests that America is poorly positioned, strategically, to respond to an
asymmetrical Chinese “charm offensive” that aims to supplant American influence – especially throughout Asia.
The Chinese have a
cultural propensity towards the ‘long’ view – in contrast to the Euro-American preference ‘immediate’ results. This is part of a broader, more general, Asian
conservatism – the sort of thing that leads to long, long periods of “stable” government in Asia’s functioning democracies3 and that “permits” dictatorships (as in China) that “serve” the immediate, physical and security needs of the people. But it is also a product of China’s own cultural heritage. The risk, in analyzing China, is that one mistakes patience for inactivity or uncertainty.
The Chinese military/security superstructure is changing rapidly. The PLA has been “professionalized” and the defence budget continues to grow at an impressive rate. China is building a large, balanced, effective navy4 that
I am guessing will include, by
circa 2035 a half dozen or so modern carrier battle groups5 and at least three or four brigade sized amphibious task forces. I’m also guessing that the Chinese, 25 years from now, will have comparable and compatible land and air forces making them a major,
global power.
I think that a wholly asymmetrical approach based on an overwhelming preponderance of economic and “soft” power cannot work. I also
think the Chinese leadership share this view and that they will take steps to increase their “hard” (military) power – for use on the global stage – but not to anything like the levels currently held by the USA..
Thus, China is likely, over the next half century and beyond, to possess all six of the factors which some Chinese scholars have identified as critical for the development and maintenance of great power. Some of these factors – especially those related to “soft power” are likely be abundant and well exercised. China’s “hard power” is growing quickly but I share the
belief that China will not attempt to match the US bomber for bomber and so on – rather they will focus on a
global power projection capability centred on their own back yard: East Asia, the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. This should be sufficient to neutralize America in a strategic sense.
I think China will try to create a
Sinosphere (汉字文化圈 – the idea is well enough established in China to have its own title) embracing, at least, Taiwan (with a status similar to that enjoyed by Hong Kong) Burma, Vietnam, Korea and Japan. This implies loosening (not breaking) the ties Japan and Korea have with the USA and strengthening their social, cultural and economic ties with China.
(Singapore’s status as a “neutral” safe haven for business is likely to render it “safe” from too much Chinese influence. It also serves as a useful economic “safety valve” for all of Asia, including Hong Kong. If Singapore didn’t exist the Chinese would have to invent it.)
China’s weakest link will be political stability. The current regime, the
Hóng (紅 or Red)
Dynasty for want of a better name, wants to strengthen political stability by taking very tentative steps towards local democracy and counting on innate Chinese conservatism to bestow a continuing
mandate on those who govern honourably and virtuously but, above all effectively.
(
CougarDaddy or others will correct me if I’ve used
Hóng and 紅 incorrectly.)
My guess is that we, the American led West, will have difficulty countering a Chinese “charm offensive” based on a mix of sharing economic and technological achievements and adhering to strict non-interference in the internal affairs of other independent states – and demanding the same in return. The West has a long tradition – going back a few centuries – of taking rather than sharing (although many will argue, with considerable merit, that Britain gave much more – in social, legal and political philosophy – than it ever took in gold, goods and slaves) and of “interfering” wherever and whenever it wanted. There is nothing to choose between Christian missionaries, opium traders and George W Bush: all used overwhelming military force to impose their will on unwilling “victims.”
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1. Joshua Cooper Ramo in
The Beijing Consensus
2. Fareed Zakaria in The Post American World
3. E.g. The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan has been in power nearly continuously for over 50 years and the People’s Action Party in Singapore celebrates its 50th year in power in 2009.
4. See
US Congressional Research Service Report RL33153 dated 19 Nov 08
5. Three or four probably reserved for home waters and two or three regularly deployed to the Indian Ocean region – including the East coast of Africa – and the Western and South Pacific.