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CH-148 Cyclone Progress

CBH99 said:
could we not purchase more airframes for the same cost as we're paying for the CH-148?

We can only put so many aircraft at sea on one deployement.
 
Dolphin_Hunter said:
How about an AF leadership who keeps getting screwed around by the government.  Leadership all across the CF are trying their best to upgrade their equipment, this has nothing to do with leadership not knowing what to do.   There is so much to do and a limited amount of resources the last thing the CF needs is a supplier demanding more money for a contract that has had so many problems getting off the ground, all of which due to government, not AF leadership.


I agree 1000% about the government and lack of $$.  But that's where leadership comes to play.  I do not want to sound negative, but we do have a problem within the AF, a serious problem.  we have "de-fanged" the AF, taken away much of its COMBAT capability.  The role of the airforce is AIR COMBAT, fire, brimstone and death from the sky.  We are the keepers of our nations airborne weapons systems, not the forest fire patrol, not the fisheries department!!  We have been doing everyone elses job for so long we have,at high levels, forgotten what our real focus is and should be, warfighting. 

Being in my position, I have been privy to many a meeting at high level, combat is never discussed, an when brought up quickly dismissed.  I have been in several operations where senior leadership has not been willing or able to make decisions, where, were it not for a few quick thinking capts & majs things would have fallen apart.  Recently the former CAS visited my wing before he retired.  He was given a tour of my unit, briefed on our capabilities and limitations.  He asked no questions until he came into our break room and asked 4 about the pool table!!  I heard similar stories from friends in other units he visited.  we have some serious problems that need fixing.  Aircarft like the Cyclone & Chinook will go a long way to fixing the issues, unless some twit puts them on crop dusting duties.
 
I feel for ya peaches.
The army was in those exact shoes for night on 40 years and only got back into the warfighting business after 9/11

Remember - the Government of the day was embarassed to bring up Medak to the Canadian public - at the risk of letting people know that we could still fight.

The ariforce as a service provider should be able to do more than offer .... transport.
 
CDN Aviator said:
You go try to fit a Chinook on a frigate. Once your done , come back here and let me know how you made out.  ::)

You're such a disbeliever, as long as you maintain a 80-90kt groundspeed on approach the Chinook will fit into the hanger, (as well as the stackflats)  ;D
 
Unfortunately when the Air Force and the Navy gets looked upon as a transportation asset of the Army by certain Generals then both services end up being defanged to the detriment of all.
 
It should not be a big surprise that the USN and CF Navy operate differently and have different requirements. The USN is currently fielding the MH-60R and MH-60S to replace the SH-60B, SH-60F, HH-60H, CH-46 and left-over UH-1s and UH-3s. The MH-60R is designed to handle all the USN's  warfare missions (ASW and ASuW); it has no additional capability. The aircraft is jammed with equipement and barely has room for 3 crew and 1 pax. It has a radar, ESM, dipping sonar, EO/IR, and sonobouy's. It will primarily embark on the FFGs, DDGs, CGs and to a limited extent CVs. The MH-60S is completely stripped out  and does not have any of the mission equipment of the MH-60R except for the EO/IR. It is actually a variant of the UH-60 and has a different cabin and tail wheel config and does not have a RAST. The MH-60S is designed primarily to conduct VERTREP and SAR but does have a prosposed limited ASuW capabilty albeit without a radar. It is also supposed to replace the MH-53 in the Mine Countermeasures Role, however, there are doubts that it has either the payload or endurance to conduct that mission. It will primarily embarke only on AORs and CVs.

The CH148 will have nearly an identical mission equipment fit to MH-60R with the exception of an additional crew member (TACCO) and the without the Hellfire capability. The big difference is with all the mission equipment the CH148 will still be able to handle an additional six passengers and SAR equipment, with the ability to remove some of the mission equipment in order carry additional pax and gear.

Purchasing either the MH-60R or MH-60S would not be satisfactory and purchasing a mixed fleet would require a shift in the way we operate, would likely increase O&M, and provide a loss of operational flexibility (the MH-60S could only embark on the AORs or JSS). Whoever said if it is good enough for the USN then it should be good enough for us does not understand the vast difference in how our two navies are organized or operate.

 
Ex-Dragoon said:
Unfortunately when the Air Force and the Navy gets looked upon as a transportation asset of the Army by certain Generals then both services end up being defanged to the detriment of all.

100% agreement from the peanut gallery

Though the Navy has been filling a security / picket role in the Persian gulf & indian ocean... at least that is a "combat/interdiction" role
 
Good2Golf said:
The most cost-effective and pan-AF supportable solution in the big picture for the AF would have been a fleet of EH-101 variants providing: SAR, Maritime and Heavy-lift Transport, each with reasonable and appropriate alterations to tweak them to the missions, absolutely doable.  Chinook for heavy list isn't a bad thing, and definitely gets the "right arc" of fire for lifting in extremis.  The H92, IMO, was born of a two-fold reason: 1) the Libs wanted anything other than an EH-101 so as to keep Chretien's "legacy"  ??? intact, and 2) the navigator mafia were quite vocal about not liking the NH-90 because they couldn't stand up in the thing (even though the NH-90 is arguably a very, nice MH machine by many accounts.)  Folding rotors and tail and new FBW should most surely have been portents of the troubles to come on H92/CH148.  There is so much legacy pressure on anything "helicopter" in Canada, I am astounded.  What is it with helicopters that successive governments feel compelled to screw the Departement over on?  ???

G2G


Agree with everything you say here except for the SAR role.  I do not believe the military should be doing domestic SAR, that is the Coast Guards job, but that's my opinion.  Giving the maritime helo folks the EH101, plus each brigade a sqn of them, and then have 1 Chinook & 1 Apache sqn at division level would make sense for our helo needs.
 
Ya that sounds about right. The guys at the bottom of the food chain know the right answer but the further up you go the more politics you run into.  :(

 
Baden  Guy said:
Ya that sounds about right. The guys at the bottom of the food chain know the right answer but the further up you go the more politics you run into.   :(

Could not agree more.  Politics screws everything up.  Takes the simple solution and complicates it for the sake of complicating it.  Like the name Baden guy, I was there as a kid '74-78.  Lived in Wintersdorf.
 
things overall could be worse, we could have ordered A400's instead of buying C17's and we would be waiting, waiting, waiting for our Strat Lift as well.


http://bp1.blogger.com/_rqH4fUbko2U/SB4XQ27OoXI/AAAAAAAAHGk/dkn9z-7PdbE/s1600-h/AIR+-+A400M+6776.jpg



 
Haletown said:
and we still don't know why the 92's are late and over budget . . . . 

The government side has gone public, we need to hear from Sikorski.

I completely agree!!!  They want more money citing a need for a more powerful engine, but don't think this realization of theirs just happened overnight.  It seems that the company has known about these problems (technical and financial) for a while now, but are slowing letting things out of the woodwork.  I don't blame the Canadian government for being upset with this situation.  There is no true deadline established, just a rough figure of 30 months and the aircraft is probably still not operational and definitely won't be by the Jan. 2009 deadline (as everyone knows).  I just want the whole story out of Sikorsky...how long and how much...and most importantly why!

I know I have said it before, but what even makes Sikorsky think that their H-92 (CH-148) proposal for the US CSAR-X competition is going to do any better.  It is the same freakin' aircraft.  I think that Sikorsky is stretching out these delays in their hope to win the US CSAR competition which will give them extra funding to upgrade the aircraft, thus they are letting any true reasons for the delay out and will not confirm a delivery date.  The delivery will be sooner if they win the US competition, much later if they don't.    But, if the USAF picks Sikorsky with all of their problems in Canada with the same platform, that is their fault.  Still going to be delays and problems with Sikorsky.
 
So, I constructed this timeline from news I have seen from Sikorsky, trying to encompass the story of the company's delays and see if their was any indication of where it started.  I find it interesting how from going through the history, you can see the Canadian government's initial support turn into frustration and low-confidence in the company and aircraft.

Let me know what you guys think.

05/08: More powerful engine needed for extra lift capacity because of the type of operations flown
05/01/08 – Canada refuses to pay extra $500M for helicopters according to Public Works Minister.  DM MacKay: “We obviously want to avoid-and I emphasize not at all cost-but we want to avoid a further delay.”
04/30/08 --  Defense Minister Peter MacKay: "We're not threatening anything until we have an opportunity to sit down and have a detailed discussion with Sikorsky about when these aircraft are going to be delivered."
04/08 -- Federal officials say that the Cyclones need a more powerful engine to meet Canada's requirements, no reason given.
04/08 – Canada Public Works:  "Once we have completed our review of the contractor's claimed reasons for delay, we will be in a position to determine Canada's next steps.  Canada is keeping all of its contractual and legal options open to minimize delay in procuring new maritime helicopters.” No delivery date in sight.
04/08 -- Federal officials are threatening to cancel a $5-billion contract with Sikorsky Inc. because the U.S.-based helicopter maker is asking for up to $500-million in extra funds
04/08 –Sikorsky Canada Inc. has a number of influential lobbyists working on their behalf, which include Patrick O’Donnell of CFN Consultants, Pierre Laguex and George MacDonald also of CFN, and Walter Robinson of Tactix Government Consulting Inc.
02/08 – Canada Public Works statement: “In Nov. 2007, the project marked the three-year milestone in the implementation phase… Government representatives are currently a detailed review of all aspects of the contractor’s schedule to determine how to minimize the impact of these delays and to ensure that they will not affect the key performance and airworthiness requirements of the Canadian Forces.  Other components of the project such as construction of the Training Center building in Shearwater, NS, and ship modification work on HMCS Montreal have progressed well and are on schedule.  The project is currently running within its authorized budget.”
02/25/08 – S-92 on cover of Aviation Week and Space Technology
01/08 – Canada Public Works statement: “We are addressing the implication of what a delay on the delivery of the maritime helicopters will have on the operational requirements of DND and PWGSC is considering all possible options with respect to Sikorsky’s default on the timely delivery of the Maritime Helicopters.”
01/08 - Sikorsky announces delivery of the CH-148 Cyclones could be delayed by 30 months. He says new engineering requirements -- likely a result of technology advances in certain aircraft components, which weren't foreseen in 2004 -- mean the original contract must now be reworked.  No specific technology advancement given…FBW?  Canada threatening to deeply penalize Sikorsky “thousands of dollars” for each day the choppers are late.  $36 million maximum penalty.
12/07- First H-92 helicopter to feature FBW has completed its first successful flight
07/07 – Still doing FBW ground testing – was to have had actual flight test in 02/07
01/07 -- Replacement helicopters for Canada's geriatric fleet of Sea Kings will be delivered at least 5 1/2 weeks late from Sikorsky International because of a strike at the company's factory in the United States.  However, the federal government says the delay is reasonable, and it is forgoing the late penalty provisions in the contract.  Delivery for Jan. 2009
07/06 – www.flightglobal.com – A test bed for the MH-92’s FBW technology flight control system will fly in 02/07, with delivery of the first of 28 Canadian aircraft (CH-148) scheduled for 11/08
06/05 – Sikorsky and NRC Aerospace win award for helicopter FBW flight control system for H-92
07/04 – Sikorsky H-92 selected as New Canadian Forces Maritime Helicopter—delivery for Nov. 2008
11/03 – FBW flight control for Sikorsky S-92 and H-92 helicopters to use BAE Systems CsLEOS Real-time Operating System
09/03 – BAE Systems developing FBW flight controls for Sikorsky S-92 and H-92 helicopters – under agreement BAE also becomes Sikorsky’s preferred supplier for future FBW systems
 
Ottawa has it dead right: not a dime more for Sikorsky

The Gazette [Montreal]

Monday, May 05, 2008

The tragicomic running saga of buying helicopters to replace the Canadian Forces' decrepit Sea Kings added another chapter last week. Sikorsky, a division of United Technologies Corp., is trying to shake down Canadian taxpayers for an extra quarter of a billion dollars - or maybe half a billion dollars. Why? The answer could be summed up in one word: "Oops."

The helicopter maker, which won the $5-billion order in 2004 for 28 Cyclone choppers, has decided, after careful consideration, that it will need those extra hundreds of millions to meet all the specifications and produce an aircraft that can perform all the jobs that Canadian Forces explained in great detail to all bidders a mere 17 years ago. The additional swag will pay for more powerful engines and for five-blade rotors instead of four-bladed ones.

Not on your life, replied Public Works Minister Michael Fortier. That might have been a shock to Sikorsky - defence procurement is usually pretty clubby - but it is an admirable stance, and we hope Fortier sticks to it.

His position is not just limpid, but appears unassailable legally: "When the government signs a deal with a supplier for a specific good at price X," Fortier said, "that's the price the government should pay for that good ... A price is not an approximation; it's not an estimate."

He then hinted unmistakably that unless Sikorsky fulfills its obligations at the agreed-upon price, Canada will look elsewhere for a supplier.

That should not be an empty threat. It has been 17 years since Ottawa decided to replace the Sea Kings, and the aged machines have been involved in 10 deaths. This fiasco over the choppers has truly been a bi-partisan effort. Both the Liberals and Conservatives have played with this deal over the years to gain political mileage. Fortier's pushback against Sikorsky is a refreshing change from business as usual.

Seventeen years is enough. Sikorsky should deliver the helicopters with the capabilities it promised when it won the deal. And at the price it promised.
 
If it were me, I'd be contacting Agusta Westland and giving them a shot at a sole-sourced contract for Merlin's.

They may be willing to fulfill the order at a much lower margin than normal, merely to sink their corporate opponent's primary competitive aircraft.


Matthew. 
 
Cdn Blackshirt said:
If it were me, I'd be contacting Agusta Westland and giving them a shot at a sole-sourced contract for Merlin's.

They may be willing to fulfill the order at a much lower margin than normal, merely to sink their corporate opponent's primary competitive aircraft.


Matthew. 

God wouldn't that be sweet.  ;D
 
There is still nothing definitive .  .  some second hand bits & pieces in the newspapers about engines & rotors, but nobody on the record yet.

RUMINT only so far.  Nothing from Sikorsky one way or the other.  Strange PR strategy  

Not saying Sikorsky (or any of the subcontractors providing mission equipment) hasn't screwed the pooch here  . .  but I have seen PMO's go off the rails and the play "newspaper negotiating" to cover their butts.

Somebody on the inside knows if the leaked story is the real story, but so far the lid is still on the can.  I am surprised one of the ace reporters who regularly expose DND issues hasn't jumped into the breach . .  

There doesn't appear to anything substantial doing Google searches, at least that I can find.
 
Haletown...I agree...very strange PR strange PR strategy from Sikorsky.  I am also surprised that no real stories have been uncovered, it seems that this story would be pursued by many Canadian journalists since this is their tax dollars and is affecting their troops.


CH-148 Platform Difficulties
The company has been experiencing FBW issues and they have also been having issues with regards to the platform:
Had to add 40” plug
Tail assembly redesign
New rotor hub
Five blade system
New transmission
New engine variant from GE--this is where they are asking for an additional $500 M

Sikorsky’s Tangled Web
Sikorsky has known the requirements since 2004 and to come out four years later and only twelve months before initial H-92 delivery and tell the Canadian Government there would be at least a 30 month delay in delivery with no reason officially publicly stated.  But then, only four months later, to tell the Canadian Government that it will cost $250 million to $500 million extra due to Sikorsky needing to swap out the engine in order to meet Canadian requirements.  Additionally, the company is not making any commitments on the delivery schedule, which can only lead to one of two conclusions.  One, is that Sikorsky is really bad at program management and has no idea of how to produce helicopters. Or two,  Sikorsky totally misjudged the difficulties of taking the S-92 and making it into the CH-148 (H-92). While Sikorsky did a masterful job of taking all of the S-92 goodness and then applying it to the H-92 by virtue of using the 92 designator, estimates are that there is only a 30% commonality between the two meaning that the H-92 is really a ground zero platform with very little pedigree to call on.

The fact that Sikorsky has only sold 28 of the H-92 rotorcraft and all to Canada makes one wonder if they will ever be able to make a profit off these one-off platforms unless of course they are able to win the US Air Force CSAR-X competition in which case they will making an additional 140 units.

The Big Picture

Leading to the big picture dilemma facing Sikorsky, they have a platform that needs $250 - $500 Million and who knows how many years to have something that will meet the Canadian Government requirements while trying desperately to keep their difficulties in Canada under wraps so as not to hurt their chances in winning the US Air Force CSAR-X program.  Risk is a major factor in any competition and right now Sikorsky looks like a tremendous risk.  Which could be a reason for why they have been so slow in disclosing program difficulties with the Canadian Government while hoping to get a CSAR-X decision before things get too hot.

 
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