FJAG
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My guess is that we could. It's really just a matter of finding or making the right mounting brackets and selecting the right mounting points to attach it to. The L118 is very close in many of its components to the M119 so there is already a model there for mounting Linaps/DGMS.
ResF units currently do not have DGMS but do have the same command post Indirect Fire Control Computer System. The army has a funded Joint Fires Modernization project to digitally link "sensors" to "effectors." In short that means, especially in an adaptive-dispersed environment, that there be a digital chain from the sensors to the gun platform. The most obvious one would be from FOO through CP to Gun (There are some practical reasons why the CP - either a physical CP or a virtual CP - stays as an intermediary).
JFM will have very real effects on how the artillery processes operate and ResF training should, if not must, be in line with the RegF one in all aspects even if we are looking just at augmentation RegF units and providing just a "training" gun to the ResF.
A DGMS on a reserve gun is the starting point. Then there will have to be the JFM equipment with the FOO, and all the linkages in between the two.
I guess the term "easy swapping out" is flexible. Pretty much anything can be swapped out in the right circumstances. Back in 2006 some of the DGMS systems were initially installed in the field at Sperwan Ghar in between fire missions while the guns were in action. On one occasion one of the gunner SMEs who was there for the TAV doing the installation "took post" on an 81mm mortar for a mission.
I think more than anything else, the "easy swapping out" is dependent on the maintenance/manufacturing system having enough spare components available to do that. There are numerous other issues on "modern" guns that need specialized care and feeding. For example the M777 has many components made of Titanium. That requires specialized welding equipment and skills to deal with. It's not at the level of rocket science but some add on training for welders is needed as I understand it.
I just want to add a comment about the complexity of modern guns and the availability of reservists to be trained on it and reserve units to maintain it on Class A service. For me the proof is in the pudding with the USAR and ARNG. The M109A6 (and A7) both use a DFCS while command posts have computer systems and the radios are digital secure systems. US reservists routinely served 1 weekend per month and a two week session in the summer (39 days per year) and doing this maintained basic proficiency albeit there was always a train-up period before an operational deployment (like Canada but much shorter). their brigades were trained and maintained. Under Guard 4.0 the 39 days remains the standard albeit selected units/formations designated for deployments have a cycle that can add on collective training sessions (such as NTC rotations) that extends the annual training to 63 days in the final year so as to increase collective training and, as a result, readiness and to decrease the "train-up" predeployment training.
The question is never one of can this be done on Class A service. Of course it can. The whole aim of the reserve force is to build a larger more relevant army but to do so at the significantly reduced personnel costs that reservists offer. (Once initial training is completed, a reservist costs 1/6 of an active army soldier in pay and benefits - the annual cost of a reserve formation after things like ammunition, fuel, facilities etc is factored in is appx 1/3 of an active army one) The issue is always one of whether the will is there to build a reserve system that is capable of delivering. The US Army, like Canada, has factions which don't see eye to eye. The fact that the ARNG has a state guard role is a red herring because the USAR, which doesn't, delivers much of the same output quality (albeit focused in the combat support and combat service support roles)
Like the US, Canada has enough ResF positions in the ARE to approximately double the size of the RegF army. BUT. It has neither the structures nor the equipment to do that. Canada's mental processes - both within the GoC and senior military leadership - is focused on 1) equipping the deployed forces reasonably and structuring it sparingly; 2) equipping the rest of the RegF poorly (or barely adequately) and structuring it adequately for most capabilities and 3) equipping the ResF not at all and structuring it horribly.
There are answers there to fix the issue for anyone who wants to listen and learn.
