C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Kirkhill]

I think that in the LAV OPV there is a lot of space in the turret taken up by the 25 and the coax and their feed mechanism which wouldn't be necessary if a sole .50 system went in there for self defence. The space is a minor matter however. My aim is to simplify the training for the FOO and leave her free to concentrate on the indirect fire fight while leaving the local defence fight and manoeuvring the vehicle to the driver and NCO crew commander.

I FOOed from a Leo 1 once on a Black Bear battle run. Even without the need - or for that matter any training at all - to fight the Leo it is very difficult to do the normal procedures involved in having the FOO, the tech and sig work as a team because you are separated by the hatches with only an IC to tie you together. In fact I had none of those. There was a German crew commanding and all I took along was a sig to sit in the hull and keep the sigs log. The double checks that you normally have to ensure rounds are safe are weakened. Even in the M113 it becomes tricky if the FOO is crew commanding to communicate with your det who are in the crew hatch - unless you're fully buttoned up which is a whole different problem. Crew commanding - especially when the range becomes a two-way one - takes a FOOs focus off your primary job. JTACing gets even more complex.



Yeah. I always wonder how they manage to do that. I know they have a great advantage in that field because the FSO stream is separate from the gun and CP streams. In other words their NCMs go directly from BCT (i.e. recruit) to AIT (i.e. advanced individual training) as fire support team members and officers to FSO positions immediately their Field Artillery Officer Basic course without going through the gun line first. It speeds up and simplifies training but narrows their focus and experience.

I can't recall the timing involved for the Canadian OPV training now. I just remember when I was told what the training was a few years back, I said "holly crap." It was not what you could expect to teach your average ResF lt with a job and just a few weeks off in the summer unless stretched over far too many years.

Again, this is a valid consideration for discussion on this thread.

We've really upped the requirements for FOO dets in the regiment from 4 or 6 to 9. You yourself know how hard it is for the regiment to not only force generate trained FOO dets but to career stream enough lts to qualify for FOO vacancies. It becomes an interesting question then when a C3 replacement is decided on as to what extent there needs to be an adjustment to the rest of the gun batteries structure. As it is, ARes regiments do not have the OP Battery structure that RegF ones do. In my model 30/70 regt, there is a full 100/0 gun battery (no FSCC or FOOs) and a 50/50 to 70/30 Tac bty which has a high ratio of RegF FSCCs and FOO dets and a high ResF STA component (I'm grouping radars and UAVs with FSCCs and FOOs in the Tac Bty and merging the separate OP and STA batteries)

I think any discussion as to replacing the gun, must be had within the framework of the organization and functioning of the total system.

Continuing to play the fool here:

Are Directed Energy Weapons Artillery?

Are photons particles or waves?

Where do lasers fit?

I am still having problems fitting 1916 stovepipes within a unified field theory where everything, to my eyes, seems to be related to everything else and the grey areas all overlap.

We can reach every part of the planet with a very large bomb.

I suggest we are equally able to reach any part of the planet with a single, small calibre, intelligent bullet without having to deploy a sniper.

We used to discuss the impact on history of a single sniper and Hitler or Stalin.

Israel just demonstrated an equivalent capability on HAMAS, without the need for a SEAL raid on a bedroom.

Our wars are all about Armies. Those armies are raised from civilian populations. But suppose you can't find the time or the space to mass an army. Suppose you can't find the weapons to train and equip them.

But suppose you don't need to raise an army when you can call up flash mobs in the enemy's towns, behind the enemy's borders any time you like.

I will continue to argue that the nature of the game is changing very rapidly. The reason I seem to find myself continually drawn back to this C3 thread is largely for all the reasons listed by @GR66 upthread.

The equipping of the artillery reserve, its establishment, weapons and roles, should be the basis for the nation's war fighting plans.

Not an afterthought dependent on which theater the government of the day is going to engage.

The C3 can trace its lineage back to the era of the Boer and Franco-Prussian wars.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The C3 can trace its lineage back to the era of the Boer and Franco-Prussian wars.

So can the majority of small arms and artillery systems in the current Ukraine conflict. As for what the Israelis did to Hamas in Tehran, it would be a much different story if they shared a land border, that fight would be at least 10% of the Israeli population dead, even if they are "winning". Israel spends a huge amount of money and effort on Humint and makes choices everyday that would have our politicians utterly squirming if they even had to do it once.

 

[quadrapiper]

The idea that the reserves should have a different weapon system than the regular army is already a poor one.

Though I could see a reasonable argument for determining which CA artillery functions have what sort of Reg/Reserve split: bleeding-edge stuff, high-time-commitment currency requirements, and high-demand low-inventory things probably belong in 100% full-time hands (whether those hands are ensconced within a full-time regiment, or are part of the 30% of a 30/70 battery, or whatever, is a different question).

There is little point bemoaning how good the PRes Arty had it with the C1 as it isn't a viable gun in this time period.

Seems like a good reference point if a towed gun is being looked at: "must be at least as durable and easy to maintain as the C1," however one expresses that in procurementese.

 

[markppcli]

The Reserves do not have the same:

Personal

Part of why we need structural change

Budget

Use more simulator training

Buildings

I call baloney, there’s a ton of ways that can be solved.

Maintenance support

This is the real issue

Access to artillery ranges

Really? Are you telling me Wainwright or Meaford are booked up year round ? I doubt that very much. That’s, frankly, a problem of lazy staff officers not planning, or it’s a problem that the OPs cells don’t have enough people to plan training. Probably solved by having less units to plan training for.

Vehicles

That’s sort of exactly what we are discussing no? They go hand in hand.

You need to make a lot of changes to the above to have the same guns as the Regs will have.

We sure do! See my post you quoted about structures, that both organizational and physical. That being said the problem with the reserves infrastructure is that we see the armouries as the one stop shop for everything. I think we can do better. There’s no reason that a reserve unit in Saskatoon can’t have its major equipment in Dundurn to be grabbed for exercises / weekends while drill nights focus on other skills and simulators. Maybe that means we have to repurpose some rooms and fix the classroom to bar room ratio in these places.

One great thing about the C1/C2 was that the gun required so little maintenance and most could be done by the gun crew on a evening parade.

Check tire pressure and lug nuts, correct as required

Check sight mount and alignment - Any fixes or adjustments had to be done by gun plumbers from the base support

Exercise recoil system - Done by gun crew with special plate and come along

Top up oil in recoil cylinder - Done by gun crew

Check gas in recoil system - Done by gun plumbers from the base support one to two times a year.

At most we had gun plumber come by 1-2 times a year to do checks and maintenance on the guns and they could do all 6 in a day, including driving to and from CFB Chilliwack. It was the gun crews job to keep up with the TLC of the gun and minor repairs. If your Tannoy failed, you took it off and swapped it with one held by our inhouse Sigs, who would try (generally successfully) to repair it.

We regularly towed those guns 450km each way to the gun camps behind our Deuces. There was just so little to break and they were very well built.

That’s all well and good, but if the Cold War went hot how useful were those guns? We aren’t in the business of making training easier - we are in the business of killing, at the end of the day that’s what needs to drive our choices.

 

[markppcli]

Though I could see a reasonable argument for determining which CA artillery functions have what sort of Reg/Reserve split: bleeding-edge stuff, high-time-commitment currency requirements, and high-demand low-inventory things probably belong in 100% full-time hands (whether those hands are ensconced within a full-time regiment, or are part of the 30% of a 30/70 battery, or whatever, is a different question).

If we don’t trust a reservist to be responsible for an operationally ready piece of kit, that’s what the adjective soup you used really means, then how do we expect them to use it in war time. This is the same kind of attitude that holds body armour and plates away from the reserves. It’s foolish and in my opinion dangerous.

Sorry that was probably more heated than you deserved my bad.

Seems like a good reference point if a towed gun is being looked at: "must be at least as durable and easy to maintain as the C1," however one expresses that in procurementese.

No because there’s reasons to have modern guns be a bit less “bullet proof” for example the M777s have digital fire control systems that makes laying the gun much much much faster and more accurate.